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Abstract. 
This doctoral thesis seeks to answer the question what factors influence Trade 
Union representation? Using a case study design, the researcher uses documentary 
analysis and elite, semi-structured interviews, to evaluate the knowledge and 
experiences of union representatives, both nationally and workplace based, working 
in the MoD sector of Unite. 
This study of a relatively under-researched part of the public sector, demonstrates 
that for union representation to be effective: the union needs to be recognised for 
the purpose of collective bargaining; members need access to shop stewards and 
full time officials; clear structures need to be in place, demonstrating how the union 
should function; and the union needs to be able to protect and further the interests 
of its members. It is concluded that in the MoD sector of Unite this does not happen, 
meaning that representation is not effective. 
This research highlights a need for greater appreciation of the complexities of the 
super or conglomerate type unions that have emerged in response to union decline. 
It demonstrates, in particular, the need for the seminal work of Turner (1962) to be 
systematically updated and for further research to be carried out into the influence 
of factions on union government. 
The contemporary relevance of this research relates to the dramatic cuts to facility 
time that it analyses, alongside the government’s privatisation policies, providing 
empirical evidence of the difficulties that could be faced by British trade unions, if 
the Trade Union Reform Bill, going through parliament at the time of writing, is 
passed into law. The MoD Employee Relations review can be seen as a test bed for 
the Bill’s components on the restriction of trade union facility time in the public 
sector, and this thesis is, therefore, timely. 
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Chapter one: Introduction. 
Unite the Union was formed in 2007 from a merger of Amicus, the UK’s largest 
private sector union and the third largest, Transport and General Workers Union 
(TGWU). These unions had very different backgrounds, Amicus being able to trace 
its history back to the craft unions of the early eighteenth century, whilst the TGWU 
was rooted in the new unionism of the 1890s. This thesis will attempt to explore the 
complexities of a super or conglomerate union, such as Unite, in relation to 
structures, internal governance and representation. 
Responding to the decline faced by trade unions, which started in 1979 with the 
election of a Conservative government, and which has continued unabated to the 
current time, unions have adopted a number of strategies, designed as methods to 
try to end the decay in the their fortunes. ‘New’ strategies have been introduced, 
such as partnership, servicing and organising, linked with a merger market which 
has seen an immense number of transfers and amalgamations, culminating in the 
creation of Unite, as the UK’s largest trade union.   
Whilst research has been carried out into union structure, democracy and 
representation, the majority of the robust literature that has been written is now quite 
old, with the seminal work being that of Turner, (1962) and Cole (1939) in terms of 
structure, Turner (1962) and Hughes (1968) on internal governance and Batstone 
et al, (1979) on representation. Whilst some of this is still very valid, other parts are 
notably dated and predominantly based on the private sector rather than the public 
sector, where the majority of union members are now found, and which has been 
profoundly influence by the Whitely system of industrial relations. The contemporary 
research that exists has a tendency to be fragmented, focused narrowly upon the 
‘new’ strategies, pursued by unions, in reference to trying to halt their decline. While 
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much has been written about merger, organising, partnership and servicing 
(Waddington 2005, Undy 2008, Daniels 2009, Heery et al 2003), and there has been 
a nascent literature around the growth of new representative roles (such as union 
learning representatives and equality representatives) (Moore 2011, Daniels and 
McIlroy 2009), it can be argued that this literature does not address how these 
strategies or representative roles are linked to union governance or structure. 
Frequently there is a narrow focus upon what is being done and how this affects the 
union externally, rather than on how the strategies are integrated, or not, into the 
existing structures and governance of the union. 
It is the aim of this thesis to address some of these gaps and the fragmented nature 
of industrial relations research by conducting a case study of the MoD and 
Government Establishment sector (MoD sector) of Unite the Union. The MoD sector 
of Unite is one of the smaller sections within the union’s federal structure. However, 
it is also an interesting one, due to the fact that it has a mainly public sector 
membership, within a union organising primarily in the private sector. This brings 
with it some interesting research issues, as the size and low profile of the sector 
sometimes means that it is not resourced as well as its activists would like. It also 
means that industrial relations in the sector have been relatively stable, due to the 
Whitley system of industrial relations. In addition to this, the nature of the sector, the 
role of which is to support the British armed forces, has meant that stability has been 
required due to the recent deployments. 
This stability has come under increased pressure in recent years, notably after the 
gradual withdrawal of the armed forces from conflict areas such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and notably since the attempts by the Coalition government to pursue 
(further) privatisation in the sector as part of its austerity programme,  the 
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implementation of a review of employee relations which, under the aegis of saving 
public expenditure,  has massively reduced facility time and introduced restrictions 
on the unions. This latter government policy reflects some of those components of 
the Trade Union Reform Bill on public sector facilities time for lay union 
representatives, which is currently making its way through parliament, with the Civil 
Service being used as a test bed. 
The thesis, therefore, aims to try and bridge the research gap between traditional 
and theoretical literature on union structures and representation and the largely 
atheortical or mid-range theoretical research into contemporary trade unionism, 
using the complexities of industrial relations in the MoD Sector. This requires an 
inductive, exploratory approach to the subject, to try to provide insights from which 
a more robust theoretical approach to trade union structure, governance and 
representation can be developed.  
Therefore, the research focuses upon a principle research question that will be 
addressed using empirical data collected through the fieldwork outlined above, and 
related to four research sub-questions that were constructed out of the review of 
literature. These are: at what levels of the organisation and union structure does 
representation take place?; to what extent does this require effective interactions 
between different levels of representative?; to what extent has the UNITE merger 
effected representation within the case study research sites, in terms of national, 
regional, industry and workplace representation?; and what has been the impact of 
structural changes and the proposed/actual privatisation policies upon 
representation? By addressing these sub-questions, the principle research question 
can be answered: What factors influence effective trade union representation? 
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Thesis Structure. 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, six of which are designed to give a rich context 
to the research, explaining the key issues, highlighting the main literature and setting 
out how the research was designed and conducted.  
After his chapter (chapter one), which introduces the thesis, chapter two then 
examines the main developments in industrial relations since 1979 and how they 
have had a detrimental impact on trade union membership and influence. This 
chapter is split into two separate parts. Part one examines the decline in trade union 
power that has taken place post 1979, in terms of political voice, membership, 
density and collective bargaining, and looks at the strategies adopted by trade 
unions and the changes that have been made to structures in an attempt to arrest 
the decline that continues to this day. Beginning with a detailed discussion of union 
decline in the UK, and using Metcalf’s (1991) argument that there are five key factors 
that can help to explain why this happened, the chapter then turns to look at the 
responses that unions made to these factors, including renewal strategies, such as 
organising and servicing, merger strategies and the creation of a number of 
representational roles designed to make activism more appealing to people outside 
of the traditional profiles. The second part of the chapter then deals with the 
implications of this changing environment for research, examining the arguments 
that have been traditionally made about the links that exist between union 
structures, strategies, government and democracy. The chapter then links these 
issues back to arguments made in part one, in order to explain how these traditional 
arguments have been affected by the union’s attempts to arrest decline. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of the limitations that exist in reference to the 
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contemporary research, demonstrating the difficulties in linking these contemporary 
arguments with those of the traditional literature. 
Chapter three follows on by explaining the difficulties that are associated with trying 
to examine the structures and strategies of a contemporary trade union through a 
detailed analysis of the history and internal unions of Unite. As with chapter two this 
chapter is split into two halves. The first part explains how the merger of Unite came 
to be, plotting the histories of Amicus and the TGWU, through a considerable 
number of mergers to the forming of the new super union in 2007. It focuses 
particularly on the events that have caused structures to change so as to be able to 
understand the reasons for the union’s structure and governance. This is done whilst 
explaining the difficulties of applying theories on union structures to the complexities 
of the merged unions. Part two then analyses the key policies of Unite, identifying 
the tensions that exist between these policies and the realities of the activities 
undertaken at different levels and in different parts of the union. The chapter is 
important as it sets the scene for the remainder of the thesis. Before being able to 
conduct research on Unite, it is vital to understand how the union has come to be 
built in the way that it is. 
Chapter four analyses the MoD sector of Unite, in which the case study research 
takes place. Highlighting a number of the issues that can arise from researching the 
links that exist between representation, governance and democracy, this chapter 
will look at how Unite operates in the sector, looking at the dramatic changes that 
have taken place in terms of privatisation, reductions in facility time and 
restructuring. This will introduce the MoD sector of unite,  moving the thesis from 
the discussion of structure and governance, highlighted in chapters two and three, 
to a more focused discussion of representation. 
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Following on from chapter four, chapter five discusses the often complicated area 
of trade union representation. Central to the thesis, this chapter explains the key 
issues in relation to union representation that will be examined in this study, along 
with the issues raised by the previous chapters.  The literature will be examined to 
highlight the issues that exist in relation to different levels of representation. The key 
arguments and theories from the literature will be examined to demonstrate how 
representation, as a research subject, has become marginalised and fragmented in 
much the same way as research into structure and democracy. This will exhibit the 
key difficulties in addressing the central research themes of the thesis, in terms of 
the way that representation has been effected by contemporary issues, including 
internal factors such as the ways that unions have responded to decline and the 
impact of merger outlined in chapters two and three and external factors that have 
influenced representation, such as those that have taken place in the MoD, 
explained in chapter four. 
Chapter six highlights the methodological considerations taken which underpin the 
research. Split into three sections, the first part will explain the approach taken and 
the justification for these choices, including why an inductive, rather than deductive 
approach was taken. The second part of the chapter deals with the research design, 
explaining the rationale behind the choice of research methods, such as case study 
and elite semi-structured interviews. Finally, the third part of the chapter, explains 
how the research was conducted, outlining interview participants and dealing with 
issues encountered during the research, before finally explaining how validity and 
reliability will be established. 
Chapter seven sets out the main findings from this research, beginning by defining 
who the sample is, highlighting some of the key characteristics of the interviewees, 
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such as length of membership, and their perception of the representative role and 
duties. The chapter then splits into five sections. The first four of these deal with the 
research sub questions highlighted in the review of literature, before the final 
section, using the data from the other four questions, answers the principle research 
question, namely what factors influence effective trade union representation. 
Representation in the sector will be evaluated against four key conditions, covering 
recognition, access to representation, clarity of structures and the ability to protect 
and enhance the terms and conditions of members. An argument will then be 
strongly made that trade union representation in the MoD is not effective. 
Finally, chapter eight will bring the thesis to a close by explaining the key findings 
and the contribution to knowledge that has been made. This chapter will reflect on 
the limitations and generalisations that have been made, linking the research to the 
wider context and explaining how it can be used as a springboard to further 
research.  
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Chapter 2: Contemporary issues of trade union government, democracy and 
representation. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a foundation for the thesis by looking at what 
the key developments have been for trade unions since 1979. The chapter will 
evaluate these developments to examine how they have impacted on unions in 
terms of internal government, democracy and representation, highlighting the 
limitations of the traditional approaches to these issues and the lack of satisfactory 
contemporary research.  
In order to achieve this, the chapter will be split into two parts. Part one will examine 
the decline in trade union power and size, post 1979, in terms of political voice, 
membership, density and collective bargaining. It will then examine the strategies 
that have been adopted by the unions, as well as changes to structures, to try and 
arrest this decline. Part two will then discuss the implications of this changing 
environment for research, first examining the traditional arguments made around 
the links between structures, strategies, government and democracy before 
examining the implications for these traditional arguments on the changing 
strategies and structures outlined in part one. The chapter will come to a close with 
a discussion of the limitations of contemporary research, highlighting the lack of 
debate linking the new strategies to structure and structures to merger. 
Part one. 
Trade Union Decline. 
As stated by Willman et al (1993) “it would be hard to argue that the 1980s was a 
successful decade for British trade unions”.  Whilst the electoral success of the 
Conservative party in 1979 cannot be seen as the sole cause of the subsequent 
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decline in union density and membership, it was of enormous significance. With a 
majority of 43 Members of Parliament (MPs) and the support of 44% of those that 
voted, the victorious Conservatives believed that they had a mandate to push 
through parliament, over the following 16 years, a raft of changes to industrial 
relations legislation, with particular emphasis placed on curbing the power of the 
trade union movement (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:52). The response of the trade 
union movement to the onslaught that was to come differed from one trade union to 
another, with no united action taking place, as had been the case in 1970, following 
the publication of the Industrial Relations Act.  
The lack of a unified response by the unions and the continued success of the 
Conservatives in the 1983, 1987 and 1992 elections, with the ongoing support of 
42% of votes cast and large working majorities, forced change upon the unions both 
externally in terms of legislation and internally in terms of strategy. By 2000, trade 
union membership had fallen by 40%, from its peak in 1979 of 13.2 million (Undy 
2008), whilst union membership density, in terms of those employed, fell from 54% 
in 1979 to 29% in 2004. Waddington (2003:219) states that the period lasting from 
1980 to 1998 saw the longest period of continuous, year upon year, contraction in 
membership numbers since records began in 1892.  The gains that had been made 
between 1965 and 1979 were wiped out in half the time it had took to make them 
(2003:219). However, these are aggregate figures, which combine the density of 
unions operating in both the public and private sectors. When the public sector, 
which survived comparatively better with density still running at 59%, is removed 
from the figures, it can be seen that private sector trade unionism density, at just 
17%, was significantly damaged over the period. Also, it is worth noting that one of 
the peculiarities of the structure of British trade unionism, being that they have 
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tended to recruit in either the public or private sectors, meant that the decline in 
membership did more harm to some unions than it did to others (ibid :33).  
It is also worth noting at this point that not all trade unions suffered decline in this 
period. Thirty four trade unions made aggregate gains in their membership between 
1979 and 2003 and whilst much of this growth can be explained by mergers and 
amalgamations, eight of these unions grew without going through the 
aforementioned processes (ibid).  Whilst unions, such as the First Division 
Association (FDA), Equity and the British Air Line Pilots Association (BALPA) can 
be seen as niche unions, with those areas of the labour market in which they operate 
lacking competition from other unions, they still had to operate within the same 
unsupportive political atmosphere as those unions which experienced membership 
decline. This indicates that whist the political environment was of considerable 
importance it is not the only consideration to be made when explaining why 
aggregate union membership declined so sharply after 1979.  
Metcalf (1991:22) cited in Kessler and Bayliss (1998:162) states that there are five 
factors which came together in the 1980s to cause the decline of trade unions in the 
United Kingdom (UK). These are “the macro economic climate, the composition of 
the workforce, the policy of the state, the attitudes and conduct of employers and 
the stance taken by unions themselves” (ibid).  In reference to the first of Metcalf’s 
factors, the macro economic climate, the effect of unemployment and recession on 
the UK labour market had a huge effect on union membership. Between 1979 and 
1981 Britain experienced what at the time was seen as the worst recession since 
the end of the Second World War (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:39). Seeking to reduce 
an inflation rate of 10% the Conservative government, abandoned incomes policy 
in favour of a tight monetary policy (Waddington 2003:222). This shift in policy saw 
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the raising of interest rates and taxes, cuts in spending and attempts to control the 
money supply and reduce inflation. However, this had the effect of reducing 
aggregate demand and economic growth which in turn saw unemployment rise to 
3.2 million by 1984 (Undy, 2008:23-24). Whilst this total fell below two million 
between 1987 and 1990 there was a second recession between 1989 and 1992 
which saw the rate rise once more to a reported three million. Between 1983 and 
1988 the figure did not fall below 10% (Waddington, 2003:222). It is worth noting, at 
this point, that Lindsay (2003, cited in Undy, 2009:24) states, the way that this figure 
was worked out “changed some 30 times in ways that largely reduced the 
headcount” indicating that the real figure was higher than that reported. 
Whilst union membership indeed fell during these periods of labour market 
contraction it also fell significantly during times of expansion. There was no 
recession between 1993 and 2003 with employment rising to 27.9 million by 2002, 
three hundred thousand more than it had been in 1979. However, membership of 
trade unions fell year on year from 13 million to 7.8 million by 1998. Mason and Bain 
explain that high and rapidly rising unemployment, such as that experienced at the 
beginning of the 1980’s, is likely to have a big effect on union membership, however, 
when levels are low and more stable the consequences are negligible (1993:334). 
It is, therefore, important to look at what was actually happening during this period 
in terms of the composition of jobs and the workforce. Kessler and Bayliss state that 
“major declines in manufacturing and manual male employment and major 
increases in service sector, female part-time employment and in professional, 
managerial and highly skilled work – unquestionably contributed to the decline in 
union membership and density” (1998:162). Undy (2008:24-25), Nolan and Slater 
(2003:61) and Mason and Bain (1993:332) expand on this, explaining that the rise 
in unemployment that happened in the early 1980s disproportionately affected male 
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dominated industries with an emphasis on manufacturing, which whilst common to 
most advanced countries was particularly pronounced in Britain. As these industries 
were the most highly unionised sections of the private sector it is unsurprising that 
union membership was affected negatively. However, why did this not turn positive 
as employment returned to growth? The answer is that whilst employment growth 
returned the long-term trend in the manufacturing sector was one of contraction. 
Between 1981 and the early 1990s the sector experienced an average 3% reduction 
in employment year on year, with employment in skilled trades falling from 4.3 
million in 1981 to 3.7 million in 1999. Against this picture of decline in manufacturing 
and skilled trades is an expansion in areas such as management and technical 
professions as well as long established private sector occupations such as retail.  
Accompanying these structural adjustments were changes in gender composition 
and work patterns. Even at their peak and at a time that the labour market 
participation of woman was increasing, it is notable that trade unions had only limited 
success in attracting woman into membership. In 1978 38% of woman employed in 
the UK were in trade unions as opposed to 63% of men and by 1990 the percentage 
had fallen to 30%, (ibid). This is taken against a backdrop of declining numbers of 
men (just 36% by 1990) in membership and a significant rise in the number of 
woman in employment from 10 million in 1978 to 12.9 million in 2002. Whilst the 
economic activity of woman has increased the sectors which they are employed in 
are predominantly areas that the unions have found difficult to organise with the 
employment of woman in the service sector growing by 1.2 million between 1990 
and 2000. Whilst around a third of woman working in this sector are employed in 
health, education and public administration and are, therefore, likely to be in 
occupations where unions are present, of the two thirds that work outside of these 
areas many will not have easy access to union representation. Combined with the 
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changes to the workforce gender balance outlined above is the proliferation of non-
standard patterns of employment.  By 1998 part time workers were the majority in 
40% to 55% of workplaces within the retail, hospitality, education and health sectors. 
81% of these workers were woman doing work that was in the main low skilled. Cully 
et al (1999:86) reflects that “such woman employees may appear to be in need of 
union representation, but they remained generally unorganised”.   
The third of Metcalf’s factors is the policy of the state, in particular that of the 
successive Conservative governments and the anti-trade union legislation 
introduced throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Freeman and Pelletier, cited in 
Mason and Bain, 1993:338). Driven by the neoliberal belief that trade union power 
needed to be reduced in order to protect the individual and promote the role of the 
free market the newly elected government, led by Margaret Thatcher, acted almost 
immediately to start an attempt to curtail the unions (Dickens and Hall 2003:127). 
Curbs on the unions’ powers had been attempted in 1971 when the then 
Conservative government, led by Edward Heath, had imposed the Industrial 
Relations Act (IRA) (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:24). Based upon American law the 
act attempted “to control by legislation the status of collective agreements, the rights 
of individuals vis-à-vis trade unions, and the closed shop, picketing, industrial 
disputes in essential services and the registration of unions eligible for immunity 
from legal action”  (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:24). The IRA was bitterly opposed by 
the trade unions. The TUC advised all of its member unions to boycott and not 
cooperate with the Act’s major provisions and this, along with a failure of all but a 
small number of employers to make use of the legislation, led to the Act being 
repealed by the incoming Labour Government in 1974 (Dickens and Hall 2003:127). 
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Taking heed of the Heath government’s failure to introduce industrial relations 
legislation in one fell swoop, the Thatcher led administrations introduced change in 
a more piecemeal fashion. Beginning almost immediately with the 1980 
Employment Act, which introduced restrictions on picketing and the closed shop, 
along with reducing the burden of proof for employers to show that they have acted 
reasonably in unfair dismissal cases, no fewer than 10 pieces of legislation were 
introduced between 1980 and 1993 within the sphere of employee relations, the end 
result being a legislative framework far more restrictive than the one dreamt up by 
Geoffrey Howe in 1970-71 (Kessler and Bayliss 1998). Initially, the trade unions and 
the TUC reacted strongly, as they had in 1971. Complete opposition to 1980 
Employment Act was proclaimed by the TUC and public demonstrations were 
organised. Further opposition to the 1982 Employment Act was also organised. 
However, the support that the TUC had enjoyed for its protests against the 1971 
IRA was not there in the early 1980s. The economic recession that coincided with 
the 1979 Conservative party election victory had bought with it huge redundancies 
and job insecurity. Many union members agreed that the unions had become too 
powerful, that change was needed and indeed many union members had voted for 
the Conservatives (Kessler and Bayliss 1998). 
As mentioned previously, no fewer than ten separate pieces of legislation were 
introduced between 1980 and 1993, with the intention of reducing the power that 
unions were perceived to have over their members and industry. Prior to 1979, with 
the exception of the very brief period, highlighted above, between 1971 and 1974, 
unions were accepted as voluntary associations. This meant that they were left to 
run their own internal affairs, including elections and the calling and ending of 
industrial action, with little to no interference from outside of the organisation (Undy 
et al 1996:70). This as stated did change, briefly between 1971 and 1974 with the 
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Industrial Relations Act 1971, when there was an attempt by the government to 
impose a significant amount of state control over union affairs. 
Undy et al (1996:73-74) state that “conservative policy during the 1980s and 1990s 
can be best understood if we view it as related to two deep-seated strands of political 
ideology, both with a long history within the party: economic liberalism and 
authoritarian social-political policy”. Economic liberalism is based on the belief that 
the market will determine effective production and distribution whilst authoritarian 
social-political policy “draws on traditional Tory moral absolutism to outline what 
individuals should do” (ibid). In terms of trade unions these dual strands of ideology 
can be seen through the attempts made to restrict and regulate their activities. 
Waddington adds to this stating that “the three principle objectives of (the) 
Conservative Governments where the exclusion of unions from any role in national 
policy making; to change the character of internal union democracy by compelling 
unions to adopt representative forms of democracy at the expense of participatory 
forms; and to encourage management to assume greater control within the 
workplace” (2003:216). 
Keen not to repeat the failure of the Heath Government, as outlined above, in 
reference to the IRA 1971, the Conservative approach to the unions, after their 1979 
electoral victory, was initially a careful one, with a logical step by step approach 
taken in terms of the introduction of reforms. This changed after 1984 as it changed 
into a “haphazard insertion of neo-Hayekian anti-union ideology” (Undy et al 
1996:75), with Thatcher and her successor, John Major, becoming less carful, in the 
late 1890s and early 1990s, as union power was much diminished (ibid). 
Based upon the 1979 Conservative Party general election manifesto, the first salvo 
launched on the trade unions was the 1980 Employment Act. Guided through 
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parliament by Jim Prior, chosen by Thatcher over the more hard-line Geoffrey Howe, 
again indicating her caution at this time, the 1980 EA was still based on the 
conclusion that reform of trade unions should be voluntary. Undy et al state that 
“Conservatives at this point accepted that unions had an important role to play in 
economic growth, but felt that they should be less involved in formulating economic 
policy than they had been in the 1970s: unions should not be regarded as any 
different from other private voluntary organisations” (1996:77). Much of what was in 
the 1980 Act therefore was in line with these beliefs with unions having a choice 
whether to comply or not, with incentives if they did. This philosophy was 
demonstrated by the EA’s provisions in terms of balloting, with the encouragement 
of ballots for calling and ending industrial action and in elections backed with the 
offer of government  money to re-reimburse unions the cost of such. To qualify, 
ballots had to be secret and this was also backed by allowing ballots to take place 
on the employer’s premises, which was seen as a way to reduce the pressures that 
may be present at a mass meeting (ibid).  
In addition to these voluntary changes were legislative changes around picketing 
and the closed shop. In reference to picketing, this was made unlawful if not at the 
striking workers place of work, effectively outlawing secondary picketing in all but a 
minority of cases. In terms of the closed shop the EA 1980 firstly included provisions 
to strengthen the rights of trade union member against unions in relation to being 
unfairly excluded or expelled. Secondly the Act extended the grounds on which a 
worker could refuse to join a trade union, where there was a Union Membership 
Agreement (closed shop) in place, from religious grounds to also include the 
situation where a worker had a deep objection to joining a union on grounds of 
conscience or personal convictions (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:71-72). Any new 
UMA would require 80% of those eligible to vote, to vote in favour of it being set up. 
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Whilst the TUC did attempt to resist the provisions of the EA 1980, this opposition 
was muted in comparison with the 1971 campaign, the main success being a 
boycott by TUC affiliated unions in reference to balloting refunds. This failure of the 
1980 Act to encourage voluntary reform of union balloting led to a shift in 
Conservative attitudes, with the more hawkish Norman Tebbit taking over from Jim 
Prior, as the minister of state. Tebbit, who was closer, ideologically, to Thatcher, 
was bolder than Prior, in terms of legislation, stating that “further legislation to reform 
unions was politically desirable, industrially beneficial and practically possible…if 
union leaders did not introduce greater controls for union democracy, he would have 
to legislate on the subject” (Undy 1996:84). The 1982 Employment Act, therefore, 
included a number of further restrictions on the activities of unions. These included 
a continued attack on the closed shop with the law around UMAs being extended 
from the 1980 provisions (that a ballot must take place for one to be set up) to 
include those already in existence, stating that ballots would need to take place 
where one had not been carried out in the five years previous. In addition to this any 
term in a commercial contract which made union (or non-union) membership a 
condition was declared void as was any condition stating that a contract or tender 
list could only be awarded to a firm if union labour was used. Any industrial action, 
taken to pressure a company to only use union labour was also made unlawful. 
Another significant change, made by the 1982 EA was the abolition of some, and 
the narrowing of other, immunities in tort, abolishing some of the special immunities 
given to trade unions, to bring them in line with individuals and union officials, in a 
Hayek like manner (Undy et al 1996:84 Kessler and Bayliss 1998:73). The all-
important definition of what a trade dispute is, on which much of the immunities from 
tort enjoyed by trade unions, is based upon was also narrowed. The wording of this 
definition was changed to read as “a trade dispute means a dispute between 
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workers and their employer which relates wholly to…instead of a dispute between 
employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with” 
(Kessler and Bayliss 1998:73-74).  
After 1982 Conservative policy continued to make attempts to restrict the activities 
and influence of trade unions, although it stopped short of fully embracing Hayek. 
However the failure by unions to embrace the provisions made in the 1980 EA, in 
relation to balloting led to calls for these to be made mandatory (Undy et al 1996:84). 
Therefore, the 1984 Trade Union Act was set out with three main aims. Firstly, all 
union executive members needed to seek re-election every five years. Voting would 
need to be “secret, without interference, by the marking of a voting paper and where 
possible postal” (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:7. The postal rule could be passed over 
if a union could show that a workplace ballot complied with the first three provisions. 
In addition to this under the 1984 Act unions were expected to keep a register of 
their members’ names and addresses, for use in postal ballots. In line with the Act’s 
second aim, ballots were now required before industrial action could take place. The 
ballot would need to take place a minimum of four weeks prior to the strike, only 
those expected to take part in the strike should be included and the paper should 
ask a yes no question. The third aim of the Act was in reference to the political 
activities of unions. Many unions had political funds, from which a proportion went 
to the Labour Party, in way of subscriptions. The 1984 Act introduced the need for 
a secret ballot to take place every ten years, with members asked if they wished to 
continue with the fund. Any unions that had not balloted in the previous nine years 
were directed to carry one out as soon as was practical. This provision had the 
unattended effect that some unions were so alarmed by it, that they established 
funds for the first time (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:74-75). 
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The 1984 Act fulfilled many of the Conservative’s 1983 Manifesto promises, after 
which there was a lull in legislative change, in terms of trade unions. However, by 
1988, when the next major changes to legislation took place, the landscape had 
changed again. In particular, the TUC had ended its boycott of government ballot 
refunds. The boycott had long been a bone of contention for some union within the 
TUC. The AUEW(E) and EEPTU, in particular, had always been partially in favour 
of the refund scheme, mainly due to the fact that both these unions already made 
use of balloting, particularly postal, and saw the scheme as a way to recuperate 
money (Undy et al 1996:103).  
The Employment Act 1988 contained a number of provisions, many of which made 
attempts to tighten up on previous ones. In terms of strengthening the hand of 
individual members, rights were given to individual members to apply for a court 
order in a case where industrial action had been called or taken without a ballot. 
Unions could no longer discipline members who decided to not take part in strike 
action, even if a majority had voted in favour. Protections from actions in tort were 
removed where a union was striking to enforce a UMA. A number of amendments 
were made to previous Acts in reference to balloting. In addition to executive 
members with voting rights, non-voting members also needed to seek election as 
did Presidents and General Secretaries (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:77-78) The Act 
stated that all ballots, for such positions and to call industrial action, would need to 
be postal, rejecting the argument that workplace ballots gained higher turnouts, 
whilst stating that the participation came secondary in importance against the benefit 
that postal votes gave in terms of reducing electoral malpractice (Undy et al 
1998:107). 
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The Employment Act 1990 arrived in the wake of an upsurge of industrial unrest, 
which had taken place in the summer of 1989. The legislation that had been 
introduced to frustrate trade union activity in relation to industrial action had led to a 
surge in unofficial industrial action across rail, the Post Office and mining industry, 
to name just three. Throughout this summer the government made repeated 
statements that new laws would be introduced to curb such action and this was 
carried out in the EA 1990, which substantially extended the liabilities that unions 
had in terms of unofficial action. Trade unions were made liable for the organisation 
of unofficial industrial action by any of their officials, including shop stewards, 
committees or any group that had been set up with the purpose of calling and/or co-
ordinating industrial action. The Act included strict procedures for how a union was 
to repudiate such a strike and stated that any member still striking after repudiation 
would be stripped of any immunity, in terms of them breaching their contract. In 
addition to this, whilst EA 1988 had made the post entry closed shop unworkable, 
the EA 1990 completed the abolition of UMAs through the outlawing of any refusal 
to employ a worker on the grounds that they were not a union member or would not 
agree to join, prior to taking up a post. Finally, the Act completed the work started in 
1980 by virtually outlawing all forms of secondary action (Kessler and Bayliss 
1996:80). 
The EA 1990 was the final piece of major legislation, passed by the Tories, in 
reference to trade union power. The Trade union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act was passed in 1992, bring all of the fragmented legislation of 
the previous decade together and the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights 
Act was passed in 1993, giving more rights to individual members to take up 
grievances against their unions and tightened up further on ballots and elections. 
However, the major damage to union rights, activities and functions had already 
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been done. It was, therefore, with a large amount of hope that the union leaders 
greeted the electoral defeat of the Conservatives, by New Labour in 1997. Mason 
and Bain (1993:339) state that the changes in UK labour law outlined above can be 
shown to have reduced union density by 1-1.7% per year between 1980 and 1986. 
This, when aggregated, shows that almost the total decline in density (9.4%), that 
took place over this six year  period, may be attributed to the introduction of 
legislation. Without these changes there would only have been a fall of 1-2% (ibid).  
Elected in 1997 with a majority of 189 and the backing of 44% of those that voted, 
New Labour would go on to win subsequent elections in 2001 and 2005 (Undy 
2008), heralding in an era when “policy on industrial relations was no longer 
dominated by hostility to the trade unions (Kessler and Bayliss 1998:53). Differing 
from the previous Labour administrations, New Labour policy was committed to the 
continuation of a deregulated labour market, with the anti-trade union legislation 
retained and an attitude towards the trade unions of ‘fairness not favours’ (Undy 
2008:28 and Dickens and Hall 2003:151). The role of trade unions in society had 
also been reduced by the Tories (Waddington 2003:217). Under the more pluralist 
leanings of the 1960s and 1970s the promotion of tripartism had seen the unions 
gain seats on many public bodies and quangos. These institutional frameworks were 
systematically dismantled during the 1980s and early 1990s for reasons that “were 
ideologically as well as economically grounded” (Undy 2008:27). Whilst not 
reintroducing tripartism per se, the unions, under New Labour were invited to join a 
number of bipartite bodies, along with employers, such as the Low Pay Commission. 
The TUC and prominent trade union leaders had access to ministers and a public 
service forum was set up after the 2001 election where government ministers could 
brief relevant union officials on plans for reform prior to publication. Whilst often 
criticised for not reforming the anti-union legislation introduced by the Tories, twenty 
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six new and individual rights were listed by the TUC in 1999, as having been gained 
since the 1997 election (ibid). The key gains were those such as the right for 
employees to be accompanied at grievance and discipline hearings, protection for 
union members involved in disputes and a statutory recognition procedure, 
overseen by the CAC (Waddington 2003:230). In tandem with this the New Labour 
government also signed up to the European Union’s (EU) social chapter, ushering 
in European Community legislation on working time, European Works Councils and 
information and consultation, although the way that these Directives were 
transposed into UK law was often criticised by, amongst others, the TUC. However, 
whilst the environment was indeed more favourable to the trade unions this did not 
halt membership decline which, although slowed, continued throughout the New 
Labour period.  
Metcalf’s fourth factor was the behaviour of employers. Kessler and Bayliss 
(1998:117) highlight that there was no out and out assault on trade unions by 
employers in the 1980s. Whilst de-recognition did take place in a number of high 
profile cases, it was not implemented in the vast majority of cases, with employers 
instead attempting to reduce union influence through restricting the scope of 
collective bargaining or bypassing the unions via more direct forms of 
communication with their workforce. Where unions were already present managers 
did not see recognition as an issue. Kessler and Bayliss (ibid) discuss the attitude 
of one manager as being that as long as they could implement their policies without 
the union getting in the way then they did not see it as a problem. However, whilst 
recognition was not seen as an issue in the majority of cases where it already 
existed, the occurrences in greenfield sites, new businesses and those areas such 
as the service industries in the private sector where organisation had always been 
more difficult for unions, were much rarer (Kessler and Bayliss 1998, Undy 2008). 
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Where unions were recognised in these cases, management was able to take 
advantage of the absence of any legal right for unions to be recognised, to exclude 
or choose the union it wished to deal with often at the expense of collective 
bargaining.  
Between 1980 and 1988 the rise of Human Resource Management (HRM) in 
parallel with the resurgence of a more unitary approach to industrial relations led to 
a marked shift in the way that management communicated with their workforce, 
which impacted upon the status of unions and collective bargaining (Undy, 2008). 
The Conservative strategy to move away from collective values in favour of 
individualistic rights empowered employers to reassert their prerogative and to 
adopt methods by which they and their workforce communicated directly with each 
other via such things as cascade briefings and employee forums (Ackers et al, 
1996). Hand in hand with this came the introduction of non-union representatives as 
a supposedly independent alternative to trade unions. However, Undy (2008) points 
out that the propagation of such representatives would have been difficult without 
the active promotion of such policies by management, calling the independence of 
such representatives into question.  
The shift towards individual rights and away from joint regulation led to what Kessler 
and Bayliss (1998) identify as three key developments for collective bargaining. 
Firstly, in terms of coverage the percentage of employees covered by some form of 
collective bargaining fell between 1979 and 1990 from 71% to 54% and by 2011 
only 31% of workplaces had collective bargaining coverage.  When these 
percentages are disaggregated in terms of the private and public sectors we can 
see that bargaining in the public sector fell from 95% to 78%, caused mainly by the 
replacement of bargaining by pay review bodies for teaching and nurses, whilst in 
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the private sector it fell from 52% to 41% (ibid). The 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Study (WERS) showed that by 2001 57% of public sector workplaces 
were covered by collective bargaining whilst this was just 7% in the private sector 
(Wanrooy, 2011). It is worth noting that some academics, such as Burchill (2014:1-
2) and (1997:93) argue that the pay review bodies, mentioned above, are included 
in the definition of collective bargaining and, therefore, should be included in the 
WERS, but are not. 
Secondly, in terms of the level that bargaining takes place, there has been a 
continuing shift from industry wide to enterprise bargaining and then in a growing 
number of cases moves to decentralise this even further from corporate to divisional 
or plant level. As pointed out by Kessler and Bayliss, this is in no way universal with 
some companies, particularly some large multinationals, still opting for 
companywide bargaining and often, as stated by Marginson et al (1993) guidelines 
and limits are set at national or company level which plant bargainers then have to 
operate within.  
The third development for collective bargaining is that of scope. What is covered by 
collective bargaining, where it has remained, has changed considerably between 
1980 and 2011 as employers attempted to re-establish their authority over 
operational issues. The 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study (WERS), 
which was the first to be published post the financial crisis of 2008 asked managers 
whether they negotiated, consulted or Informed the union on seven key issues; pay, 
hours, pensions, holidays, training, grievance procedures and health and safety. In 
answer 51% said that they did not negotiate, consult or inform the union on any of 
those issues, 45% said that they did on some whilst only 4% said all. In 2004 these 
percentages had been 49%, 47% and 5% demonstrating a small but continuing 
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trend away from joint regulation. In the private sector the percentage of employers 
stating they discussed some had reduced from 39% to 36% and all from 5% to 1% 
whilst those discussing none had increased from 57% to 62%.  
The election of New Labour in 1997 did “cause at least some employers to reflect 
on their industrial relations policies and adjust them in the unions’ favour” Undy 
2008:31). Taking a less adversarial position, some employers taking heed of the 
change in the political landscape, turned more towards partnership with their trade 
unions, including organisations which had previously considered de-recognition. 
However, whilst the changes in government gave the unions some breathing space 
in which to recuperate, the above statistics show that whilst decline may have 
slowed it did not halt and was further exasperated by the financial crisis of 2008. 
The final factor discussed by Metcalf is the stance taken by unions themselves. The 
next section will discuss the strategies adopted by unions to attempt to put a rest on 
decline, however, before discussing that it important to discuss the state that unions 
were in post the 1979 election. Kessler and Bayliss argue that “unions needed to 
extend recognition and avoid de-recognition” (1998:163). Whilst de-recognition, as 
mentioned above, was relatively limited the changes outlined above in the attitudes 
of employers and lack of any legal rights, made securing recognition very difficult 
for unions during the 1980s. Again as mentioned above the political voice of the 
trade unions went from one of “national prominence and influence (in 1979)………to 
virtual exclusion in the corridors of power by 1990” (Undy 2008:32) over a very short 
period of time. As membership levels declined, the fact that many unions had not 
taken advantage of the growth years prior to 1979 to sure up their financial positions 
became exposed (Willman et al, 1990 and Undy, 2008) with a large number having 
to fall back on investments to fill the gap between the income generated by 
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subscriptions and expenditure. A survey conducted by the TUC in 1990 of 60 
affiliated trade unions including the two biggest, the AEU and the TGWU; found that 
expenditure exceeded income by five million pounds (Undy, 2008:37). This was 
shown to have been marginally reversed by 2005 but only after substantial job cuts 
had been made. Therefore, here the position of trade unions generally deteriorated 
between 1979 and 1997 in terms of their political voice, membership numbers and 
bargaining ability. Over this period a number of responses were devised to change 
this fall in the unions’ fortunes which will be discussed in the next section. 
Union responses to decline. 
In response to the problems of decline outlined above the unions adopted new 
strategies in terms of the way they dealt with employers, such as partnership and 
with members, such as organising and servicing. They also undertook changes to 
their structures such as those imposed by merger and the invention of a ‘plethora’ 
of representative roles. This section will now critically discuss these issues, first 
looking at strategy and then looking at structure to explain the varied, and often 
ineffectual, approaches taken by unions. 
The varied reaction to the change in the unions fortunes, ushered in by the election 
of the Tories in 1979 can be characterised as the tension between militancy and 
moderation (Kelly, 1996:77). The initial reaction of the unions to Thatcher’s election 
in 1979 was one of disbelief, coupled with the faith that the rise of the Conservatives 
would be short lived and that defeat, such as that as had befallen the Heath 
Government in the 1970s would soon follow (Ackers et al 1996:26). When by the 
midpoint of the decade this defeat had not happen, and quite the contrary the 
position of the Conservatives had been consolidated, some parts of the union 
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movement started to call for a reassessment of the situation under the heading of 
“new realism” (ibid). 
The defeat of the miners in 1985, following those of civil servants and steel workers, 
amongst others, in the early 1980s, led to some union leaders and academics, 
including leading voices in the TUC, calling for a change from the adversarial ways 
of the past, concluding that “union survival and recovery turned on the willingness 
of unions and their members to behave moderately and to offer concessions to the 
employer (Kelly, 1996:77). Ackers et al (1996) characterise unions at this time as 
being in one of three political strands. On the left, unions such TASS were following 
the traditional bargaining agenda whilst on the right the EETPU were signing single 
union, no strike deals, with employers. The centre ground contained unions such as 
the TGWU, attempting to win over employers with more modest concessions whilst 
trying to attract workers from the growing outlying areas of the workforce, such as 
part time workers, woman and ethnic minorities (1996: 26-27).  
As discussed in the previous section, whilst there was no notable campaign of de-
recognition by employers during the early 1980s, the instances of new recognition 
deals being agreed were few and far between. Where they were agreed the 
tendency was for them to be single union agreements, sometimes including no-
strike agreements, with the employers choosing the union they wished to deal with 
(Kessler and Bayliss, 1998). Under the heading of “business unionism”, unions 
entered into negotiations, particularly with new Japanese companies such as 
Toshiba and Nissan, in order to secure a recognition agreement. These 
negotiations, known as ‘Beauty Contests’, pitted unions against each other, giving 
an enormous amount of power to the employers who could choose the terms on 
which recognition was granted. Terms such as no strike agreements, binding 
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arbitration, total flexibility and single status, where often to be found in such 
agreements. However, as pointed out by Kessler and Bayliss “although such 
agreements were well publicised, there number was very limited – about 50 – and 
the number of employees covered was perhaps no more than 20,000” (1998:202). 
However, the idea of their being three clear strands, which unions fell into, is too 
simple. Whilst unions such as the AEU and EEPTU were indeed pursuing a 
cooperative approach with new employers, they were quite prepared to organise 
and support industrial action taken by members where the unions were already 
established. For example, whilst in 1984 the EEPTU signed a number of no strike 
deals on green field sites it was also organising strikes at ITV, Perkins Engines and 
Austin Rover (Undy, 2008:44). 
The new-realism mentioned above was, therefore, more of an acceptance by the 
unions that things needed to change in order for them to survive. The changes in 
the law introduced by the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997 were accepted 
and adhered to by the unions rather than being defied. The unions became more 
aware of the difficulties firms face in terms of the competitive environments in which 
they operate, particularly in terms of the development of globalisation and promoted 
a new partnership approach, supported by the TUC and post 1997, by the New 
Labour Government. Kelly describes five arguments, proffered by academics and 
some union leaders, in favour of moderation and partnership (1996:83-97). Firstly, 
it is claimed that the change in the balance towards employers meant that unions 
had to moderate their behaviours. In those workplaces where unions were 
recognised they had to moderate or offer concessions to employers else risk job 
losses, site closure or de-recognition, whilst in workplaces where there was no 
recognition it is argued that employers are less likely to award recognition if they 
believe the unions would bring militancy to their shop floor. Secondly it is argued 
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that, from the point of view of union members, strikes cost money rather than 
securing it, with the loss of wages incurred almost impossible to make up. Thirdly, 
the fragility of militant unionism is highlighted, with the argument being that whilst 
short term gains may be made the long term will see a collective counter offensive, 
either by the employers, the state or both. Fourth is the argument that through 
partnership and moderation unions are able to secure improvements to terms and 
conditions such as single status agreements whilst also opening up new areas of 
negotiation on issues of mutual interest such as training, productivity and health and 
safety. Finally, it is argued that those unions such as the EEPTU, whilst losing 
members after 1979, lost significantly fewer than those unions that took a more 
adversarial approach to industrial relations.  
Linked to the moderate approach to industrial relations was the servicing agenda 
adopted by some unions and promoted by the TUC in the early 1990s. Accepting 
the move away from collectivism in favour of individualism it was argued that union 
members should be treated more as customers or clients such as members of 
organisations that serviced individual needs like the Automobile Association 
(Waddington, and Whitson, 1997:517). The servicing model included two strands, 
the first being to offer individual benefits to union members whilst the second was 
the employment of full time officials to service members’ bargaining and 
representational needs (Waddington, 2003:238). The first strand, individual 
benefits, entailed the offering of a long list of benefits that were available to members 
and often their families. The offering of benefits to members was not new, the craft 
unions of the 1850s offering sick pay and accident benefits and many white collar 
unions offering an impressive list of benefits prior to 1979. However, to many of 
those unions entering into this market was something different, with benefits such 
as financial advice, legal advice, discounted car/house/pet insurance and holiday 
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clubs (ibid). These benefits came with the added incentive to many unions of the 
added financial income they could receive from the selling of such benefits as 
financial products (Undy, 2008:50) and were often taken up even where the second 
strand was not. 
The second strand, as mentioned above, included the employment of full time 
officials to service members’ representational and bargaining needs.  This strand 
was taken up to a lesser extent than the first. Employing large numbers of full time 
officials was expensive and the increased number of bargaining units caused by the 
breakdown of industry and national bargaining meant that many unions struggled to 
sustain a level of officer servicing, let alone increase it. However, some unions, 
particularly those white collar unions that organised professionals and managers, 
did embrace the full servicing model. Unions such as the IPMS, which later changed 
its name to Prospect and the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU), which 
was to become Unifi before merging with Amicus, traditionally used a servicing 
model, with members of those unions highlighting the importance to them of full time 
officer support. In a survey conducted in 1997 more than 80% of members in the 
IPMS “rated the involvement of full-time officers in collective negotiations as very 
important and they gave a similar response to full-time officers’ involvement in 
dealing with members’ individual contracts” (Undy, 2008:48). 
Waddington (2003:240) explains that the offering of extended member services had 
no effect on unions’ density in either the unions’ traditional job territories or the 
expanding areas of the economy where union organisation was more difficult. 
Waddington states that “a range of research results confirmed that packages of 
financial services were not attractive to either potential or existing members” 
(McIlroy, 2009:53). Waddington and Whitson (1997) highlight the results in a survey, 
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carried out by them, which pointed to only 3% of union members citing financial 
services as the reason for joining, whilst 72% cited support for problems at work and 
36% improvements in pay and conditions. However, as Undy (2008:51) states, any 
union that did not look to offer some of the benefits highlighted by the servicing 
agenda risked losing dissatisfied members to those unions that did.  
Reacting to the above findings there was a general shift by the TUC and some of its 
affiliates from servicing to organising. Differing from the servicing model and 
seemingly at odds with partnership, organising places the workplace at the centre 
of organising, integrating recruitment, retention and organising (Daniels, 2009:255) 
and encourages the role of union members in confronting the employer and in so 
doing, dealing with the grievances of the workers (Undy, 2008:241). Embracing the 
Organising Model the TUC was at the forefront of the initiative when it launched the 
Organising academy in 1998 with the mission to provide the trade unions with 
trained organisers (Waddington 2003:240). Acknowledging the financial constraints 
that unions were subject to and the increased demands that had been placed on 
fulltime officials by a decentralisation of bargaining (Kelly and Heery,1994), each 
trainee was given formal training by the academy’s tutors whilst gaining experience 
in the field working for an affiliate, sponsoring, trade union (Waddington, 2003:240). 
However, whilst the academy had successfully trained 161 organisers by 2003 only 
18 of the TUC’s 70 affiliated trade unions had sponsored a trainee, with only a small 
number being repeated supporters and several unions deciding not to employ the 
trainee that they sponsored. Non-involvement in the Organising Academy did not 
necessarily indicate non-engagement with the model with a number of unions 
running their own programmes independent of the TUC. The TGWU and the GMB 
both committed to the organising model allocating a significant amount of financial 
backing to the strategy (Undy, 2008:241). 
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Trainees are selected for the academy so that they share characteristics with the 
targeted groups of potential members, the foundation for this being that “like best 
recruits like”” (Waddington, 2003:241). The intention of the academy was that 
graduating trainees would be used to recruit new members in industries not yet 
organised by trade unions and where current full time officials did not have the 
resources to engage in such activities (Kelly and Heery, 1994). However, 
Waddington (2003:241) and Daniels (2009:267) point out that in many cases 
academy trained organisers have been used, primarily, to further recruitment in 
sectors that were already, at least partially, organised.  
For organising to be successful unions need to have active members, shop 
stewards and full time officials, at least at a local level and this is where the strategy 
hits some problems. Cully et al (1999:96) state that many unions have had difficulty 
recruiting and retaining workplace representatives and, as has already been 
discussed, full time officials have seen demands on their time increased in line with 
the decentralisation of collective bargaining. Added to this, Waddington and Kerr, 
(1999), cited in Waddington (2003:242-243) indicate that many union members 
were displeased with the contact they had with shop stewards and fulltime officials 
and felt that the information provided by their unions was inadequate. To attempt to 
combat the dissatisfaction that members felt towards their unions, telephone help-
lines were set up by many unions, to provide information and advice, highlighting 
the interchangeability that there is in union strategy between servicing and 
organising (Waddington 2003:240).  
In terms of the success of organising as a strategy the evidence is that it has worked 
better than the servicing model and has continued as a prominent strategy until the 
present. However it has not been a panacea for decline, most of the unions that 
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have moved towards the organising concept have not completely abandoned 
servicing and do not see the two as necessarily alternatives to each other (Undy, 
2008:52-53, Daniels, 2008:274). There are a number of unions that have not 
embraced organising, due to the costs seemingly outweighing the benefits to them 
(Daniels, 2009:267) and also because of reluctance from full time officers of the 
union to embrace the concept and see resources moved from servicing to 
organising and Ipso facto away from them (Heery et al, 2003:83). Also, as outlined 
by Daniels (2009:267), the rhetoric of those designing the strategies is not matched 
by what is actually happening on the ground. Whilst there have been wins for the 
unions’ organising teams, in new areas and traditionally weakly organised sectors, 
the majority of organising activity has taken place in sectors that the trade unions 
have been traditionally strong (Ibid). “in effect, trade unions in the UK are circling 
the wagons” (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998:19). However, unions are often 
pragmatic in that they will “adopt whatever self-help solutions to the problem of 
declining membership were on offer” (Undy, 2008:52-53), including mergers which 
will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Merger Strategies. 
Whilst unions looked to change their strategies, as discussed in the previous 
section, in order to attempt to arrest the continuous loss of union members after the 
1979 Conservative victory they also turned to their own structures, often through 
merger, as a way of consolidating and adding members. Between 1979 and 2004 
there were no fewer than 284 mergers, 225 of which were TUC affiliates. Before 
discussing this in greater detail it is important to understand the merger process and 
why unions may engage in it. 
 34 
 
Mergers are a way for unions to add large groups of members to their numbers, 
whilst at the same time reducing the amount of competition that there may be in a 
specific job territory (Waddington, 2005). Undy et al (1981) and Undy (2010) 
categorize mergers as aggressive, defensive and consolidatory. Defensive mergers 
take place where a union actively seeks a merger partner in order to stave off a 
decline in fortunes. Usually they take the form of a small union transferring into a 
larger organisation. Aggressive mergers usually have the character of a larger, 
open, union, seeking out smaller merger partners in order to gain a foothold in a 
new job territory or to increase its influence over its existing ones. Consolidatory 
mergers take the form of a union seeking out other unions within existing job 
territories, in order to consolidate its position and increase bargaining power (Undy 
et al 1981). 
 Waddington and Whitson add a further dimension to merger, discussing mergers 
that follow a political, rather than industrial, logic. Highlighting the success of TASS, 
a union that had itself broken away from the AEUW due to political differences with 
the right of centre AEU (1995:182-183). Having broken away, TASS became a 
beacon for other unions that were politically opposed to the AEU, allowing it to enter 
into mergers with four unions that organised manual workers, therefore, enabling 
TASS to break into new job territories (Waddington, 2005:283). This was similar for 
the right of centre EETPU, who targeted other right of centre unions, including those 
not affiliated to the TUC. This was further, stepped up, after the EETPU were 
expelled from the TUC in 1988 (Waddington and Whitson, 1995:182-183). 
Undy (2008) discusses mergers in terms of transfers and amalgamations, which 
differ in the way that they can affect the governance, structure and representational 
organisation of a union. Unions that are active in the merger market have adapted 
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their structures to include trade groups or industrial sectors (Waddington and 
Whitson, 1995). These structures allow incoming unions autonomy within the larger 
merged union.  In the case of transfers, which only require the members of the union 
transferring in to be consulted and balloted, Undy identifies four merger streams. 
The first is the geographical concentration merger “these typically entailed a regional 
or district union, recruiting in a specific industry and/or occupation, joining the 
national union organizing solely in the same territory” (2010:65). Undy states that 
17 such mergers took place between 1978 and 2004 leading to only five regional 
and district trade unions remaining in the TUC.  
The second stream is the white collar assimilation stream. These mergers involved 
a company specific union or staff association joining with a TUC affiliated trade 
union, organizing within the same job territory. Differing from the geographical 
concentration merger discussed above, which often involved smaller unions in 
financial trouble seeking a larger union to merge with, unions taking part in white 
collar assimilations were not looking just for financial salvation, but also for 
acceptance into the wider trade union movement and the TUC. Members of unions 
entering into these types of merger often profited from new and better union benefit 
packages and a better service due to being able to access the larger union’s officers 
(ibid:65). 
The third stream is the cognitive trade transfer, which entailed “industrial or national 
unions transferring to a general or conglomerate union with existing and significant 
presence in the smaller union’s territory” (ibid).  Finally Undy (2010) discusses what 
he terms a “fourth category of territorially miscellaneous transfers between unions 
in dissimilar territories” (ibid p.67). These transfers are often politically motivated, 
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with unions choosing to merge with other unions based on a similarity in their 
political positions.  
Amalgamations differ from transfers in that members of all unions involved have to 
be balloted and a majority vote in favour before the merger can take place. Undy 
(2010) puts amalgamations into two categories, dominant partner amalgamations 
and balanced partner amalgamations. Dominant partner amalgamations take place 
between a large (dominant) partner union and a smaller partner union and are thus 
usually handled in the same way as a transfer of engagements, as discussed above. 
Emphasis is placed by the dominant partner upon meeting the demands of the 
smaller union, rather than creating a whole new union. However, Undy highlights 
the case of Unifi, where the merger process was used by the officers of the dominant 
Bank, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU) to change the union’s internal 
governance and representational structures. Whilst minor partners in 
amalgamations may be a lot smaller than the major, or dominant, partners they wield 
a great amount of bargaining power as they have the ability to choose a merger with 
another union, where one exists, or can just walk away from merger all together 
(ibid). 
Undy (2010) states that balanced partner amalgamations differ as they have the 
ability to produce a new union with different structures and internal government to 
those of the merging unions. Kelly and Heery (1994:33-4) write that mergers can 
lead to “a more complex hierarchy, as separate organisations are bolted together”. 
In balanced partner amalgamations a rulebook for the new organisation will need to 
be produced, which will outline the structures of the merged union. Undy (2010) 
writes that this can be integral to the amalgamation, where the rules are presented 
to the members before the merger is agreed. Agreement on the new rules can be 
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difficult to reach. For this reason, Undy (2010) explains some unions will choose to 
put off these negotiations until after the merger has been agreed. Undy states that 
the financial position of the new union, post balanced partner amalgamation, is often 
not seen as important, with “a general acceptance that moves towards industrial or 
sectorial unionism would deliver some, largely unstated, bargaining advantages” 
(2010:189). 
It is noted by Waddington that merger has been central to the dramatic restructuring 
that has taken place in the UK trade union movement over the past two decades 
and had, in fact, been “the primary means of structural reform since the early 
nineteenth century” (2005:257).  However, contrary  to the aims of the TUC in 
seeking to promote merger as a way to simplify structure “mergers have added to 
its complexity in that they have crossed industrial, occupational and political lines of 
demarcation between unions” (ibid).  
As mentioned above there were 284 mergers between 1979 and 2004. The period 
was punctuated by a number of mega amalgamations between some of the TUC’s 
largest unions. 30 unions were responsible for almost all of the transfers between 
1979 and 2004. Three unions, Amicus, TGWU and GMB accounted for 76% of 
transfers during this period. Amicus, or the unions that came together to form it, was 
responsible for 86 transfers, 40 are attributed to the white collar unions that formed 
the MSF, 29 were completed by the AEEU, 12 by UNIFI and 5 by Amicus itself. The 
GMB completed 31 transfers and the TGWU 19. The TGWU and Amicus merged 
together in 2007 to form Unite (Undy 2008). The merger of Unite will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
If merger was meant to be a way for the decline in union membership to be arrested 
then it has failed. The unions that came together to form Amicus lost 1.1 million 
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members between 1979 and 2003 and the TGWU, over the same period lost 60%. 
Of those nine unions that managed to grow during this time only two, the FDA and 
NATFHE could point to merger as a major reason for this growth (Undy, 2008:33) 
and only the FDA can be seen to have only grown due to merger, with the other 
eight either not being engaged in any merger activity (NASUWT, BALPA, WGGB, 
Equity) or indicating growth even when numbers gained by merger are taken out 
(POA, AUT, EIS, NATFHE) (ibid:34).  
 
Representational types. 
The first decade of the 21st century saw a number of developments in terms of union 
representation, the one such change being the adoption of a number of new roles. 
Promoted by the TUC and to a lesser extent the New Labour government, Union 
Learning Reps (ULRs), Equality Reps (ERs) and Environmental/Green Reps (GRs) 
were developed as a part of the TUC’s New Unionism initiative.  Some have argued, 
such as Daniels and Mcllroy (2009), that these roles and the support from 
Government for them is an attempt to constrain the militancy and independence of 
trade unions. However, as Moore (2011:2) points out “there is evidence that these 
new roles have encouraged the emergence of new activists and that they can 
provide the basis for more diverse activism”. The advancement of these new 
representative roles can be linked to the attempts at union revitalisation outlined 
above (Wallis et al, 2005:284). 
Union Learning Reps were given statutory provision in 2002 as part of the 
Employment Relations Act. Whilst given no rights to negotiate they were allowed 
reasonable time off and promoted by the government as “an inexpensive source of 
expert advice for employers” (Mcllroy 2008:11). Wallis et al state that ULRs were 
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sold as providing increased learning opportunities to individuals, attracting new 
members for trade unions and offering increased productivity to employers 
(2005:284). Wallis et al (ibid) point to this as a success, with 6,500 ULRs trained at 
the time of the paper being written and 22,000 predicted to have been trained by 
2010. However, McIlroy (2008:302) states that Wallis et al may have been 
premature in their assessment, claiming that a third of those reps that were surveyed 
in the Wallis study were inactive, 45% found management to be supportive whilst 
45% found them indifferent. Two thirds of the ULRs had not been involved in any 
negotiations and where agreements were in place they were still bound by 
management prerogative, calling into question the claim by Stuart (2011:35) that 
“workplace learning agreements can be seen as one of the success stories of union 
learning activity”. Most disappointingly, for those trade unionist that evangelised 
around the positive effects of ULRs was that 51% of those representatives surveyed 
were already existing shop stewards and 47% health and safety representatives. 
McIlroy does not outline how many of these reps were in actual fact performing all 
three roles, however, only 16 of the 60 reps surveyed were new to any union position 
(2008:11). 
The role of Equality Representatives (ERs), like the ULR, emerged out of legislation. 
In the case of ERs this was the 2010 Equality Act, which bought together the 
previously separate equality bodies under one single Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC). Whilst it is true that ERs did exist in some cases prior to this, 
Moore argues that “the prospect of a new legal context and particularly the 
recognition of seven equality strands appear to have shaped the context for the ER 
role” (2011:97). Unlike ULRs, ERs did not receive any statutory rights to paid time 
off, facilities or training, although the EHRC did recommend that financial help be 
made available from the Union Modernisation Fund (UMF) for training and 
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development of networks of representatives. It was also recommended that unions 
and employers voluntarily renegotiate facility agreements to take account of the new 
roles. The refusal by the government to give statutory support to ERs was 
highlighted by Moore (2010) in a review carried out for Unison as a barrier to their 
long term potential. 
The final and most recent incarnation of the workplace representative is the 
environmental, or green, representative (GR).  Green representatives, as with ERs, 
do not have statutory support. Instead, ACAS recommends a voluntary code. GRs 
according to the TUC (TUC, 2015), are responsible for “promoting environmentally 
sustainable workplace initiatives and practices, carry out environmental risk 
assessments and audits, consult on environmental policies, practices and 
management systems” whilst receiving relevant training. The TUC reported that 
1,300 green representatives responded to a Labour Research Department survey 
in 2009 and also reported that it had trained close to 1,000 reps, although admitted 
that it did not have evidence of this in the form of any database. 
Wallis et al express “a mix of optimism and concern” (2005:298) in reference to the 
potential of these new representative types. However, McIlroy (2008:302) states that 
“if renewal is conceived as a movement wide goal and national strategy, it is difficult 
to see grounds for optimism”. McIlroy (2008) discusses the findings of Wallis et al 
2005, stating that the optimism comes from the evidence that ULRs (and it is 
assumed ERs and GRs) can aid union revitalisation within some workplaces. 
However, this is only where the unions are already strong and recognised, “no union 
recognition, no learning representative” (Davies and Freedland, 2007 cited in 
McIlroy 2008;299). Therefore, if the prerequisites for success, of these initiatives, 
are existing union strength and positive managerial attitudes, then union 
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revitalisation, in workplaces that do not have union recognition or where union 
organisation is weak, will be extremely limited.  
Where ULRs, ERs and GRs have been established, it is argued by some, such as 
Daniels and McIlroy (2009), that the roles are somewhat restricted in scope, due to 
functions of these not involving collective bargaining or joint regulation. It is also 
highlighted by Moore (20011:98) that the roles themselves can reinforce 
discrimination due to the attraction of these positions to female, black, disabled and 
LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) members. Whilst prima facie, the 
pull of these roles on members without the traditional characteristics of a union shop 
steward (white, straight and male) looks to be a positive thing, the danger is for roles 
such as the ER to become expected to be carried out by people with the 
characteristics described above, therefore enshrining the discrimination that the 
roles are designed to combat.  
Taking a look at the national picture, there has been a general reduction in the 
number of workplace representatives and an increase in the number of workplaces 
that do not have any union representatives, compounding the issues raised above 
in terms of unions needing to have relative strength in order for initiatives such as 
those surrounding ERs, ULRs and GRs to be a success. The 2004 WERS survey 
indicated that only 45% of members in recognised workplaces had a union 
representative, a fall from 55% in 1998. However the position appears to have 
stabilised, with no change shown by the 2011 survey. The 2011 survey indicated 
that 53% of representatives were men, 86% were over the age of 40, with the 
average age being 48, up from 45 in 2004. The 2011 survey also indicated that 98% 
of workplace representatives were white. If the initiatives outlined above were 
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designed to attract more woman, young people and ethnic minority members to 
become reps then the 2011 figures would indicate that it has not worked yet. 
The first part of this chapter has discussed the decline in union power that has taken 
place, in terms of political voice, membership, density and collective bargaining. This 
has been demonstrated through a discussion of how this decline has happened, 
including the key reasons for it and how unions have attempted to respond. Part two 
will now move on to explain the implications of the changing environment, outlined 
in part one, for research, firstly examining the traditional arguments that have been 
made around the links between union structures, strategies, government and 
democracy and then looking at the implications of the issues raised in part one for 
these traditional arguments.  
Part two. 
The growth of trade unions in Britain has been complex and haphazard, and this is 
reflected in their structure. Waddington states that “overlapping recruitment bases, 
a large number of unions that adhere to a variety of principles of organisation, and 
diversity in the origin of trade unions, contribute to this structural complexity” 
(2005:257).    
Hyman (1975:41) comments, that union structure can only be understood if looked 
at in its historical context. He states that structure is not a fixed phenomenon but in 
fact a process of evolvement over many years. The importance of history is further 
expressed by Lyddon and Smith (1996:1) who cite Phelps Brown, stating that 
bygone affairs were not transacted on another planet: the motives reactions and 
propensities displayed in them are the same as those in play around us now. By 
studying them we enlarge and sharpen our knowledge of them”. However, most 
contemporary industrial relations research has moved away from historical study, 
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creating a gap between it and the traditional research. For example, Lyddon 
(2003:105) cites Hughes (1967) saying that Turner’s work is essential reading for 
any “serious study of union structure and government” and it is pointed out by 
Lyddon that Turner’s work is often absent in most contemporary literature (ibid). 
Since 1979, it has been rare that historical articles have been published in UK 
industrial relations journals (Lyddon, and Smith, 1996:2). Where historical research 
has been carried out, the tendency is for this to have been histories of individual 
unions (Murray, 2008, Callow, 2011, Foley, 1992), with history and theory being 
compartmentalized (Lyddon, and Smith, 1996:7).  
Classifications. 
Traditionally trade unions have been sorted into three distinct classifications, with 
Waddington (2005:357) commenting that by the twentieth century no single form of 
union had become the predominant model. 
The first type is the craft union, which Hyman (1975:38) described as a union of 
skilled workers, which may straddle several different industries. Cole (1918:13) adds 
that this type of union, in purest form is made up of workers of a particular trade or 
who own a particular skill, with the goal of securing a set of common conditions. 
However Cole (1918:14) and Hoxie (1923:38) both point out that purity of this type 
is rare with craft unions often organising a number of kindred crafts rather than just 
one.  Therefore, Cole (1918:14) notes that craft unions can be either very narrow or 
very wide, in terms of their membership base. Those that do only organise one trade 
are described by Hyman (1975:38) as being small and limited in influence. Griffin 
(2005:363) notes that in those countries such as the United Kingdom that were early 
to embrace industrialisation, craft unionism was usually the first type to become 
established and dominant.  
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Craft unions are often inward looking, small and likely to employ officers that have 
been elected from within their membership (Clegg et al, 1961). They do not set as 
policy the need to change the economic system, instead only being concerned with 
the need to make it work better from the point of view of their particular trade (Cole, 
1939:536). Traditionally craft unions organised using the mutual insurance method 
to achieve their aims.  
The method of mutual insurance, first used by the Webbs (1894:152), uses a 
number of friendly benefits to obtain for trade unions the goals listed above, by 
attempting to control a trade through autonomous regulation. Turner (1962 p.204) 
states that where possible unions will always prefer the use of autonomous 
regulation to collective bargaining and prefer collective bargaining to legal 
enactment. Trade unions using this method provide benefits for their members such 
as strike pay, unemployment pay, sick pay and pensions. These benefits have the 
duel effect of providing for members when out of work and also of making sure that 
their members maintain discipline, under threat of losing these benefits if they go 
against decisions made by the collective. The Webbs state that before collective 
bargaining was allowed and legal enactment was obtainable the method of mutual 
insurance was the only way for workers to legally obtain their objectives (1894:152).  
Whilst the benefits provided by this method provide a safety net for union members 
who find found themselves out of work through unemployment or injury they also 
had a very important industrial function. Namely they allowed for members out of 
work to not be forced back to work on wages that were lower than the standard rate, 
thereby protecting it from erosion.  Whilst on first appearances the benefits provided 
by unions under the method of mutual insurance look to be similar to those benefits 
provided by friendly societies, there is a very major distinction. Trade union 
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members primarily pay their subscriptions in order to improve and maintain their pay 
and terms and conditions. Only if this is done do they expect to receive sick or 
unemployment benefit. Therefore, unlike friendly societies, trade unions do not 
guarantee these payments and there are in fact instances where unions involved in 
protracted disputes have seen their funds diminished to such an extent that they are 
unable to pay benefits.  
Coats and Topham (1988:43) note that the small size of craft unions meant using 
the legal enactment method was difficult, due to their lack of political influence. By 
limiting the number of apprentices in a trade, at any one time, craft unions were able 
to restrict the number of skilled workers available to employers, thus keeping wages 
high. Coates and Topham (ibid) go on to state that that the importance of craft 
unionism is not in their present state, which they point out has been in decline over 
a prolonged period, but in the imprint that the classification has left on modern trade 
unionism, such as the existence of sectional interests.  
The second traditional classification is that of the industrial  union. Cole (1918:15) 
states that promoters of industrial unionism attempt to recruit all workers in a 
particular industry into a single union, such as railway workers or construction 
workers, irrespective of their roles or level of skill. Coates and Topham (1988:43) 
add to this by explaining that benefits of industrial unionism are seen as their ability 
to eliminate inter-union rivalry and to bring all possible demarcation disputes within 
a single union. They are also able to command more bargaining power, due to their 
capacity to unite all workers in one bargaining organisation as opposed to a number 
of smaller, less powerful ones. 
However, it is noted by Cole (1918:13) and Coates and Topham (1988:44-45) that 
proponents of industrial unionism in the United Kingdom, came up against a number 
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of problems. Firstly, it is pointed out by Coates and Topham (1988:45) that the 
possibility of organising a union across a whole industry has often been blocked by 
the establishment of craft unions and general unions organised across industrial 
boundaries or in tightly knit sections of a particular industry. Cole (1918:13) notes 
that to form a union by industry not only means the amalgamation of various craft 
unions, all with their own sectional interests, but also the recruiting of a number of 
lesser or unskilled workers, who would most probably already be members of a 
number of general unions organised across a number of different industries. 
A second problem of industrial unionism, as described by Coates and Topham 
(1988:45-46), is the instability of employment in industrial sectors. They give an 
example of the National Union of Miners (NUM), which, when coal was the only fuel, 
was able to define itself by industrial means. However, with the introduction of gas, 
oil, electricity, and nuclear power as alternative sources of energy, the NUM saw its 
membership fall dramatically. Coates and Topham (ibid) add that fluctuations in 
employment, such as that in mining, call into question whether industrial unionism 
can form a long term prospect for organisation. 
The third traditional classification is that of the general union. Cole (1918:10) states 
that the late 1880s saw semi-skilled and unskilled workers attempting to organise in 
a major way for the first time. Finding the trade union movement almost completely 
dominated by unions made up of skilled workers, with vested interests and inbuilt 
prejudice against workers without the same level of skills, these workers set up their 
own organisations.  
The organisations that were set up became known as general unions, due to their 
acceptance of all workers into their membership, regardless of occupation or skill. 
Coates and Topham (1988:46) note that whilst general unions have almost no 
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restrictions in terms of who can join, their membership is weighted towards certain 
sections, due to their historical roots. An example given is the Transport and General 
Workers Union (TGWU now part of Unite), the biggest section of which was based 
around members of its predecessor union, the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General 
Workers Union (DWRGWU). 
Cole (1918:17) describes three situations in which general unions recruit members. 
Firstly they recruit members in industries where specialised unions have been set 
up to organise craft workers but from which lesser skilled workers are excluded. The 
second situation is where an industry has no specialised organised organisations to 
which workers are able to join and thirdly is where an industry does have specialist 
organisation but these have failed to organise nationally or to achieve their goal of 
industrial unionism. Cole (ibid) also points out evidence of some general union 
attempting to recruit members who are actually eligible to join strong craft based 
unions that have recognition in their industries. 
Coates and Topham (1988:47) state that unlike other forms of unionism, general 
unions have the ability to adapt to changes in the labour market and have an almost 
unlimited scope for growth. The large size of these unions allows them to offer a 
more generous package of membership benefits than smaller unions which has the 
dual effect of retaining members and deterring minority groups from looking to break 
away due to sectional issues. They also point out (ibid:48) that the biggest 
advantage of large membership is the influence it allows general unions to exercise 
inside the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). However, it is also 
pointed out (ibid:48-49) that great size can bring disadvantages as well as 
advantages, such as internal democracy being undermined by the remoteness of 
policy making and union bureaucracy, also the make-up of membership can make 
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it difficult to wield the full potential power of the union as the more skilled, higher 
paid members may be reluctant to take industrial action in support of the lower paid 
members. 
Whilst these classifications are seen as the main three traditional union types there 
are also other ways that unions can be categorised. The main additional type is 
occupational (or white collar) trade unions. Occupational unions seek to organise all 
workers within a specific job type or related group of occupations, such as teaching 
or nursing, and are less uniform in their structure than the apprenticeship based 
craft unions (Coates and Topham, 1988:50). Occupational unions face the same 
problems as industrial ones in that they often come up against craft and general 
unions that have recruited members in the area that they are attempting to organise. 
They also suffer from the same problems as craft unions, in reference to fluctuations 
within the labour market. Occupational trade unions are usually perceived to be 
white collar unions as they are concentrated primarily on the organisation of workers 
in non-manual occupations (Coates and Topham, 1988:50). This reflects the growth 
of the white collar workforce in the 1970s and 1980s, with many unions, of the 
previously described types, having created white collar sections in order to attract 
non-manual workers into membership. Flanders (1969:34-35) noted that although 
some manual unions had indeed set up non-manual sections most white collar 
workers were in occupational trade unions. Flanders further explains that white 
collar trade unionism was more rooted and successful within the public sector than 
the private sector, where it often lagged behind the manual, blue collar, unions. 
Whilst the classifications discussed above demonstrate the differences between 
union structures, based upon a union’s original make up or recruiting doctrine, 
Turner (1962:233) argued that this does not often reflect the reality of union 
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organisation, which is never as pure or as simple as the classifications above would 
suggest. These categories are too static and do not address the changing labour 
markets that the unions operate in. For instance, whilst some unions could have 
been described as craft, in reality many had taken into membership workers from 
outside of the original trade that the union was set up to organise (ibid:234). This 
was particularly the case, post 1980, where the decline in membership, discussed 
above, “impelled unions to seek membership anywhere, without regard to structural 
considerations” (Coates and Topham, 1988:55). Therefore, instead of using the 
traditional classifications discussed above, Turner classified trade unions as being 
either open or closed, in reference to their recruitment strategies.  
Open unions, Turner (1962:241) explains, are not able to impose any restrictions on 
entry and therefore are content to accept into membership any worker that is 
employed within the sphere that the union is attempting to organise. A consequence 
of the lack of control that open unions are able to exert over the areas of industry in 
which they organise is that they have to rely on collective bargaining and political 
action to advance their aims. Turner (ibid:242) states that this, in turn, makes open 
unions expansive in nature, owing to the need for high membership, both in terms 
of bargaining power but also for financial reasons, due to the low levels of 
membership fees that can be levied on a membership that is predominantly not 
highly skilled and low paid. 
Closed unions are described by Turner (ibid:242) as being smaller in size and more 
stable than the open type. They are restrictive in that they are able to control through 
apprenticeship and agreement with employers the supply of workers employed in 
the areas that they organise and also in respect to their limited interest in increasing 
by size. Turner (ibid) points out that rather than looking to increase their membership 
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base, the interests of closed unions are actually in the opposite: to place limits on 
the supply of labour to occupations that they control places the same limits on the 
union’s membership. Turner (ibid) makes the point that it can be said that trade 
unionism in Britain has taken the form of “open, expansionist unions…spread 
around islands of stable closed unionism”. 
Turner makes a number of further important points in terms of open and closed 
union classifications. In terms of open unions he states (1962:243) that in order for 
expansion to take place, unions within this classification will at some point find it 
necessary to increase the number of occupations in which they organise. This 
Turner explains can be achieved, either through recruiting members in occupations 
that are close or connected to those already organised or else by following existing 
members into new job territories. Turner also makes the key point that unions’ 
structures are not fixed permanently, stating that closed unions can become open 
and open unions can become closed, or can form closed sections within their 
membership (ibid). How this manifests itself will be discussed in more detail later. 
Internal Governance. 
As with structure, the internal governance of trade unions is complicated. The crucial 
argument made by Turner (1962:289) is that which linked the government of a trade 
union to the relationship between three key groups, the union’s full time officers, the 
proportion of members who take an active part in the union’s management and the 
proportion (usually the majority) of members who play no active part in the union’s 
management. From this position, Turner theorised that it was possible to identify 
three distinctly different types of union management which he called exclusive 
democracies, popular bossdoms and aristocracies.  
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Turner details these three types of management, firstly looking at exclusive 
democracies which, it is explained (1962:289), are characteristically closed in 
nature. Hughes (1968:10) states that Turner’s use of the word ‘exclusive’ places 
emphasis on the connection between a union’s democratic structures and levels of 
participation and the union’s occupational interests. Similarly to earlier descriptions 
of craft unions, Turner states (1962:289) that unions of this type are marked out as 
having high levels of participation by lay members and employing only a small 
number of full time officers. Importantly for the relationship between the union’s 
officials and rank and file members, full time officers in this category of union are 
elected from amongst the members and therefore are seen as one of them, with the 
same intricate knowledge of the trade. Hughes points out that these unions are likely 
to take a “conservative, protective and restrictive” (1968:11) approach to industrial 
policy, using their ability to limit the supply of labour available for employment within 
the occupations organised, to achieve their bargaining goals. 
The second typology described by Turner is that which he called the aristocracy. He 
explains (1962:289) that this type can be found either where a union that is closed 
in nature opens its recruitment to include workers from open occupations, such as 
ex-craft unions recruiting lesser skilled auxiliary workers, or where an open union 
develops within its membership a section that becomes dominant and  in some 
cases virtually closed. These unions are defined by the ability of a particular section, 
or aristocracy, to dominate the union’s affairs, through either being 
disproportionately represented on the union’s constitutional committees or by 
providing a high number of the union’s paid officials. Hughes (1968:11-12) points 
out that a dominant section can arise, not just out of exclusiveness, but also based 
on their industrial position in the workplace, such as face workers in the mining 
unions, or due to membership turnover being lower and more stable in one area 
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than other parts of the union. Turner (1962:290) explains that senior members of 
these dominant sections often behave as if having equal status with the union’s paid 
officers, many of which they have provided, and in some unions are able to act with 
a great deal of autonomy from the central officials. Other sections meanwhile will be 
passive in nature, possibly through design by formal restrictions. Hughes (1968:12) 
takes this further, pointing out that the danger of aristocracies is the development of 
classes of workers, based on inequality of participation. 
The third of Turner’s three classifications is the popular bossdom, which he 
describes (1962:290) as open, not just in regards to having no restrictions on 
membership, but also in respect to the fact that no group of members have managed 
to accomplish a dominant position within their structures. Participation by members 
in these unions is low, paving the way for full time officials to acquire a dominant 
position, with General Secretaries able to wield great power. Hughes (1968:13) adds 
that it is in these unions the impact of a powerful official is most felt on policy and 
direction, citing the role of Bryn Roberts, general secretary of the National Union of 
Public Employees (now part of Unison) who, between being elected in 1934 and 
retiring in 1962, guided the union to increase its membership from thirteen thousand 
to two hundred and twenty one thousand members. Turner also gives an example 
(1962:291) of the TGWU, which switched to a militant position under General 
Secretary Frank Cousins, after being particularly moderate as an organisation under 
the previous general secretary, Arthur Deakin. The TGWU will be discussed more 
in the following chapter. 
Turner (ibid) states that leaders of these unions accept low membership 
participation as natural and take the lack of any visible dissention as a sign of 
general approval. Turner adds that whilst some leaders may act as virtual dictators, 
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others have attempted to bring members more into the decision making processes 
of the union by putting emphasis on the democratic machinery of the union and 
looking for initiatives to boost the interests of members in becoming more active. 
Roberts, meanwhile, explains that strong centralised leadership, which may be seen 
as remote from the members, is a necessary consequence of unions of this size, 
due to these organisations being “far from homogeneous” (1957:12). Roberts also 
states that the centralised nature of some unions is based on the level at which they 
bargain, explaining that much negotiation, at the time of writing in 1957, had been 
removed from the place of work, often to a national level. This had meant that 
determination of basic conditions and wages had been moved a “considerable 
distance from the ordinary members” (ibid:13), necessitating the centralisation of 
leadership whilst at the same time reducing the necessity for active membership 
bases. 
The changes in union strategies and structures, discussed in part one above, which 
were designed to stem the loss of members and influence after the 1979 electoral 
success of the Conservatives, has a number of implications for the discussions of 
structure and governance. To begin with it is important to note that much of the 
legislation bought in by the Conservatives, in order to reduce the power and 
influence of trade unions was, dressed up as increasing the power of the individual 
members, who were perceived to be moderate and sensible, at the expense of the 
union leaders, who were seen as militant and autocratic (Kessler and Bayliss 
1998:176). To this end legislation was passed that saw all General Secretaries, 
Presidents, and national executive members being subject to elections a minimum 
of every five years. Whilst this was already the case in many unions, prior to the 
legislation being passed, the need for this to be done by secret ballot, as with 
industrial action ballots, was something new. However, whilst the legislation may 
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have had the intention of reducing the power of the union leaderships, there is 
evidence, as explained by Kessler and Bayliss (ibid) that the changes in law actually 
strengthened the position of some general secretaries and union hierarchies. For 
those unions that appointed their senior officers, elections allowed general 
secretaries to claim legitimacy, especially over the unions activists, who may be 
more militant and critical than the wider membership. This was also the case in 
reference to other areas in which secret ballots were introduced, such as pay claims, 
which allowed the union leaders to bypass the activists and go straight to the wider 
membership. Kessler and Bayliss (1998) again cite evidence from a Civil Service 
union general secretary who stated that the use of ballots amongst the membership 
had diminished the influence of conference, which were dominated by activists,  
Inland Revenue staff had, at a special delegate conference in 1990, voted to 
withdraw from a PRP scheme introduced two years earlier. In response the 
general secretary said that the union’s executive would press for 
improvements to the current scheme rather than seek its abolition. The 
executive, he added, took its mandate from the membership which had 
balloted in favour of a comprehensive settlement, including performance pay 
(1998:176).  
Another General Secretary is stated by Kessler and Bayliss (ibid:177) as believing 
that other changes, such as the legal requirement for unions to hold a central list of 
members had led to computerisation and greater financial efficiency, whilst moving 
power from the branches and districts to the centre. Most unions channelled income 
and expenditure through their central offices, meaning, along with the increase in 
the use of check-off, that the importance of branches diminished. This inclination for 
unions to become more centralised lends itself to Turner’s popular bossdom 
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classification of union democracy, implying that the government’s plan to “return the 
unions to the members”, whilst in some cases reducing the influence of activists, did 
not achieve its aims. 
In reference to the various renewal strategies outlined above (Servicing, Organising, 
partnership) some of the implications for democracy, governance and structure have 
already been discussed. Taking the strategies on their own will not give a true 
evaluation because, as mentioned above, unions only in a tiny number of cases 
choose one over another (Undy 2008:53). Most unions picked particular parts of 
different strategies, which they saw too their advantage. Therefore, whilst it would 
be easy to say that those unions choosing the servicing path could be characterised 
as becoming more centralised, with large administration and officer staffs, whilst 
organising unions were more decentralised with increases in staff aimed at 
recruiting and organising, this would not give a true or accurate picture (ibid). As 
discussed above, most unions embraced some parts of servicing and many 
describe themselves as organising unions (Unite, 2015, Unison, 2015, PCS, 2015). 
In the case of servicing, the part adopted most widely was not the expensive 
employment of large numbers of full time officials, but the cheaper and in some 
cases revenue generating, provision of financial services and other membership 
benefits (McIlroy, 2009:52). Unions that adopted only the membership benefits side 
of the servicing model did not see any great changes to their structures caused by 
this. Most of the benefits offered were bought in from and administered by outside 
organisations such as insurance and travel companies. However, those embracing 
the complete servicing model would need to make changes to their structures in 
order to integrate a large number of new full time officers.  
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How big an impact this would have been on internal structures would depend on the 
union in question. White collar trade unions, such as BIFU, were supporters of the 
servicing model but this was nothing new as these unions usually used a centralised 
servicing type model long before the strategy was popularised by organisations, 
including the TUC (Undy 2008:48). The biggest impact for unions adopting the 
officer led side of the servicing model would be on those that prior to its adoption 
did not have large numbers of officers, depending instead on networks of shop 
stewards. However, again this is not totally clear cut as unions such as the AEU, 
who adopted the servicing model, did not implement it across the whole union. In 
those areas that were already organised, strong shop stewards networks carried on 
as before, whilst the servicing model was used in workplaces where organisation 
was weaker or where recognition had only recently been obtained. For unions like 
the AEU and EEPTU the servicing model was closely linked to the partnership 
strategy.  
Turning to the organising model, this too is not universal in the way that it was 
implemented and therefore the effects that it had on structure and governance. 
Some unions such as the TGWU and PCS formed organising departments staffed 
by dedicated union organising officers, whilst other unions integrated organising 
responsibilities into the roles of existing officers (Daniels 2009:260). Where 
organising departments were formed some unions, as discussed above, chose to 
utilise the TUC’s organising academy to train its organisers, sponsoring candidates 
through the process before offering some employment after training was complete. 
Other unions such as the TGWU and now Unite opted to carry out their own 
organising training (Murray, 2008:203, Daniels, 2009:259). Unions that have 
organising departments differ in the level that these departments operate. Some 
such as the PCS have a national organising strategy with the intention that 
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organising filters down into every part of the union (PCS, 2015, Daniels 2009:261). 
The union has both national and regional organisers that are tasked with supporting 
the unions’ organising strategy at national, regional, sectorial, branch and workplace 
level (Daniels 2009:264). Other unions have different strategies. Unite, for example, 
working on plans first put into place by the TGWU, has its organising strategy tied 
to its one hundred percent campaign with regional organisers and organising teams 
working under a centralise organising framework. Unlike PCS, Unite does not place 
as much emphasis on organising being interwoven into everything. For example, 
branches, apart from workplace branches that are designated as being part of the 
one hundred percent campaign, do not have a stated organising role (Unite, 
2013:36).  
Mergers also have a number of implications for government, democracy, 
representational roles and relationships, some of which have again been discussed 
above. When unions come together, either as an amalgamation or transfer, there 
will be repercussions in terms of democracy, structures and representation for all of 
the parties. In the case of a transfer the effects on the union or unions transferring 
in are likely to be felt more than the effects on the union being transferred into. 
However, this is not always the case. In terms of structure, mergers may necessitate 
the creation of new sectors, in unions such as Unite, with a federal structure, or will 
inject numbers of members into already existing sectors or trade groups as was the 
case when the printing union, GPMU, joined Amicus, instantly swelling the numbers 
in Amicus’ existing printing and graphical section. Members in small unions that find 
that they have been subsumed into larger ones may feel that they have lost some 
representational voice. Structures need to be altered in order to integrate the officers 
of a transferring union or all of the officers of amalgamating unions or else staff 
reductions will need to be managed, and where job losses take place, it may appear 
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to the members as a takeover if the officers remaining in position are predominantly 
from one of the merging unions. 
As discussed above merger may lead to unions consolidating their positions in a 
particular job territory, often opening up membership to a wider range of occupations 
and skills, or may see a union move into a job territory where it was only lightly 
organised or not at all. In all of these cases unions will be moving towards a more 
open structure, which is more general in terms of its classification. Turner’s theory 
would, therefore, suggest that the governmental types of merging unions would be, 
or would be moving towards, the popular bossdom governmental style, although as 
suggested, mergers may also lead to aristocracies if one of the unions or a section 
within them, can take a dominant or influential position within the union’s 
governmental structures.  
A major issue in carrying out this research has been the limitations and 
fragmentation of the contemporary research in this area of Industrial relations, which 
has been highlighted by this chapter. There has been much written about renewal 
strategies and mergers, in terms of their importance for union attempts to reverse 
their fortunes, post 1979. However, whilst there has been some attempt, notably by 
Undy and Waddington, to discuss the effects of merger on trade union structure and 
representation, this is still rather limited, focusing mainly on the merger process and 
reasons for merger rather than the effect that the merger has on the people that 
work for, and those that are members of, the union. This is a similar story in terms 
of union renewal strategy debates, with much written around what these strategies 
are and how and why they are introduced. However, there is compartmentalisation 
in this research, with no real linking of all the issues together. The research is either 
into renewal strategies, merger or structure but there is no contemporary work 
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looking at how these affect each other, the standout work being that from prior to 
1979, notably Turner in 1962.  
Summary. 
This chapter has attempted to investigate and explain the key developments that 
have taken place with trade unions since 1979. Firstly it examined the decline that 
has taken place in terms of trade union power, including political voice, membership 
numbers, density and scope for collective bargaining, before explaining the key 
strategies and policies, used by the unions, to attempt to arrest the decline, such as 
servicing, organising and merger. This then led on to the second part of the chapter 
which looked at the implications of the changing environment, described in part one, 
on research examining the traditional arguments around structure, strategies, 
governance and democracy, through both traditional and contemporary literature. 
The chapter ended with a discussion of the difficulties of researching this area, due 
to weakness of the contemporary literature. 
One of the key issues discussed was the importance of the historical context, which 
is often omitted from the contemporary literature. The first part of Chapter three will 
now set the historical context for this thesis, by plotting the history of the key unions 
that came together to form UNITE. This will be followed by a discussion of UNITE, 
as a contemporary organisation, explaining its structures and governance. 
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Chapter 3: The complexities of trade union structures – the case of Unite. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain and highlight the issues associated with trying 
to examine the structures and strategies of a contemporary trade union by carrying 
out a detailed analysis of the history and internal workings of the UK’s largest union, 
Unite. As with the previous chapter, this will be split into two sections. Part one will 
explain how the merger of Unite came to be, plotting the history of Amicus from the 
early craft unions of the nineteenth century and the TGWU from the early general 
unions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the considerable 
number of mergers that led to the two unions that merged in 2007. This section will 
explain how these two unions (Amicus and TGWU) grew to be the unions that they 
were prior to 2007 and what the complexities of these two unions mean when trying 
to apply theories on union structure such as Turner’s. Part two will examine Unite. 
It will analyse the key policies of Unite and how these play out in reality looking at 
the tensions between organising and servicing, member led, managed activism, 
leverage and industrial action, and community organisation.  
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of history when trying to 
explain the workings of an organisation, such as UNITE, linking the union’s past to 
its present industrial, political and representational structures and policies. In doing 
this the complexities of researching a large trade union, such as UNITE, will be 
exposed, linked with the difficulties that have arisen from a lack of strong 
contemporary literature in this field. 
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Part one. 
This part of the chapter will be examining the creation of UNITE, beginning with a 
discussion of the unions that amalgamated/merged together, over more than one 
hundred years, to eventually form Amicus and then carrying out a similar discussion 
in relation to the Transport and General Workers Union. This will demonstrate and 
identify, following Turner (1962), the type, democratic structures, policies and 
practices that UNITE’s predecessor unions adopted. The section will conclude by 
looking at UNITE’s early history, explaining how the union came to be and some of 
the issues that have so far arisen, in terms of its structures. 
Unite was formed in 2007 from a merger between the Transport and General 
Workers Union (TGWU) and Amicus. This makes Unite a particularly interesting 
union to research due to the differing histories of the two merging unions. Amicus, 
was the result of a merger between the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical 
Union (AEEU) and the Management Science and Finance Union (MSF), which were 
themselves the outcome of several mergers, and can thus trace its history back to 
the closed engineering unions of the nineteenth century, which, using Turner’s 
terminology, could be seen as exclusive democracies. From these early closed 
unions the organisation has gone through a significant degree of structural change, 
resulting in the large open unionism of Amicus and the conglomerate that is Unite. 
The TGWU, meanwhile, began as a large open, general, union and has remained 
so throughout its history growing in size to become the UK’s largest union before 
declining in size throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Amicus - The Engineers. 
As stated above, Unite was formed by the merging of the Amicus and TGWU unions, 
with Amicus being the result of an initial merger, in 2002, of the AEEU and MSF 
unions. The AEEU, which itself had been formed in 1992 by the merger of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbers Union (EEPTU), could trace its routes back to 
the new model unions of the mid nineteenth century. 
The AEU’s history began in 1851 with the forming of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers from the amalgamation of the Journeymen Steam Engine makers and a 
number of its smaller rivals (Cole 1939:39). The aims of the organisation had been 
to unite all skilled engineers in one union, and whilst this was not fully realised, due 
to a number of craftsmen choosing to keep their own closed organisations, the ASE 
soon became Britain’s leading craft organisation (ibid: 40), with a membership total 
bigger, by 1852, than all other societies covering engineering trades put together 
(Jefferies 1945:32). The forming of the ASE was a new stage in British trade 
unionism, with features such as centralised control of funds and industrial action 
plus high contributions, marking it out as a new model of trade union, which became 
the basis for other organisations forming around the same time (Cole 1939:40, 
Jefferies 1945:32, Webb and Webb 1894:217). 
The reluctance of engineering employers to accept the legitimacy of the ASE led, in 
January 1852, to an attempt to smash the union, with a strike by ASE members in 
Oldham being met with a great lock out of engineering workers in Lancashire and 
London (Cole 1939:41-42, Jefferies 1945:38-39). The lockout ended in victory for 
the employers, with all workers made to sign a document, prior to returning to work, 
renouncing the union. However, the duress imposed on workers to sign the 
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document meant that it was regarded by ASE members as non-binding (Cole 
1939:41) and far from being smashed the ASE doubled its membership in the ten 
years following the dispute, whilst amassing an unheard of sum of £73,398 in funds 
(Webb and Webb 1894:226). 
Between 1883 and 1891, based on a period of prosperity and the success of the 
‘New Unions’, the ASE’s membership grew from 53,740 to 71,221 (Pelling 1992:94), 
maintaining its position as the lead union in the engineering industry. The Employers 
Federation of Engineering Associations (EFEA) was formed as a direct response to 
the growth in strength of the ASE (ibid: 102) and in 1897 there was a second great 
strike and lockout called over the Unions call for an eight hour day and the 
employers insistence to be “masters in their own workshops” (Webb and Webb 
1894:484-485). The lockout continued for six months and although the ASE 
received generous financial support from other unions, the expenditure needed to 
sustain the dispute was too high, leading to a humiliating climb-down for the unions, 
with the campaign for an eight hour day dropped and other rights ceded to the 
employers (Pelling 1992:103). 
The stigma of the defeat and the terms of settlement caused a great amount of 
upheaval in the ASE, with much debate about its structures and constitution. 
Between 1898 and 1914 the terms were discussed at every delegate meeting, with 
branches regularly calling for them to be abolished or renegotiated (Jefferies 
1945:151). In terms of the union’s structure, a large amount of importance was put 
on how the organisation was to interact with the large number of semi- and unskilled 
workers that were entering the industry. The question of how to deal with semi-
skilled workers was answered at the 1901 delegates meeting in Manchester where, 
by a slim majority, it was agreed to widen the societies’ entry criteria with the creation 
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of a machinist’s section (ibid 166). However, in the face of strong opposition from 
members this new section was largely inoperative, with only four thousand members 
recruited to it by 1904. The 1912 delegate meeting caused further internal conflict 
with the adoption of a section for unskilled workers (section F). This resolution was 
again met with opposition from the rank and file, even more fervently than the 
machinist section had been and in 1917 section F was completely abolished. 
Whilst shop stewards had existed prior to the First World War they had not been 
seen as important, with many engineering workshops having no stewards at all 
(Cole 1939:165). The conditions created by the war allowed for great advancements 
in the shop steward movement, particularly within the engineering industry. The 
Munitions of War Act, passed by parliament in 1915, prohibited unions from calling 
strike action, therefore, when grievances developed into strikes, during these 
periods, workers looked to leaders elected from within their workplaces (Cole 
1939:165). During the war, in some large engineering organisations, the shop 
stewards committees took over the job of negotiating with management on issues 
regarding conditions (Webb and Webb 1919:489) and after the war an agreement 
was achieved in 1919, between the unions and employers, on the official recognition 
of these stewards (Jefferies 1945:186). 
The ASE’s membership grew between the beginning and end of the war from 
170,000 to 300,000. However, many workers within the engineering industry still 
remained in associations outside of the ASE and attention was once more turned to 
uniting all skilled engineering workers in one union (Webb and Webb 1919:487). In 
1918 twenty two societies from across the engineering industry were invited to look 
at proposals, drawn up by the ASE, for amalgamation. Seventeen of those invited 
agreed to put the proposals to their members and with the ASE and nine others 
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receiving a vote in favour; the new Amalgamated Engineering Union came into 
being on the 1st of July 1920 (Jefferies 1945:192-193, and Pelling, 1992:157) with 
450,000 members.  
The new union’s constitution was almost identical to that of the ASE, with only slight 
changes. The delegate meeting was replaced by a national committee, consisting 
of two members from each of the union’s divisional committees, which would meet 
annually to receive a report from the executive and give guidance on future policy. 
A special meeting of the committee would take place every four years to debate 
proposed rule changes. Shop stewards were also recognised within the new 
constitution, with the right to have a direct involvement in the forming of policy, rather 
than their traditional role of recruitment and retention of members (Jefferies 
1945:192-193).  
The 1920s and 1930s were rocky years for the engineers, punctuated by two key 
issues, the General Strike in 1927 and great depression, which began in America, 
in 1929, but soon transmitted to almost every capitalist economy (Jefferies, 
1945:233-235). The build up to the general strike had been a long one. The British 
Communist Party’s official newspaper had run the headline “Thirty-four weeks to go” 
in august 1925 (Lane, 1974:18) referring to the  ending of the mining agreement, 
which it was anticipated would spark “the greatest struggle in the history of the 
British working class” (ibid). This headline came one month after the signing of the 
previous mining agreement on what became known as red Friday, after the Prime 
Minister, Stanley Baldwin, personally intervened in order to overt a boycott on the 
movement of coal, planned by the railwaymen and transport workers, in support of 
the miners (Pelling, 1992:162). Whilst the Unions are accused of being late in 
organising for the General Strike, the Government were not (Lane, 1974:18) and 
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when it came, it was seen by many commentating at the time, including the UK 
Communist Party, as being doomed to fail, as indeed it did (ibid:24-25). 
The experience of the general strike for the Engineers was a short one. The plan 
had been that key industries such as transport, print, iron and steel would begin their 
strike at midnight on the 3rd of May, with the engineering and shipyard workers acting 
as a second wave, coming out a week later on the 11th of May.   But, whilst these 
workers “received their marching orders with enthusiasm and a sense of relief” 
(Jefferies, 1945:233) the strike was called off the next day, after discussions, 
between the Government and the TUC general Council, led to the unions’ 
capitulation. 
Despite the failure of the General strike the 1920s had been a mixed decade for the 
engineers. The first half had seen the union lose members, whilst the second half 
had seen these fortunes reverse, with a rise in numbers, including some in two newly 
introduced sections, for less skilled engineering workers, although this did not 
immediately bare fruit, mainly due to the elitist attitudes of the union’s branches  
(Jefferies, 1945:235 and Pelling, 1992:194). However, this limited revival of fortunes 
was to come to an abrupt end with the great depression hitting the UK economy, 
after beginning in the US in 1929. As mass unemployment hit Britain, the burden of 
paying out unemployment benefits to members hit the engineers hard, severely 
weakening the union’s funds and prompted the engineering employers to launch an 
attack in 1931 that resulted in major changes, to the detriment of workers’ pay and 
conditions. (Jeffries, 1945:240).  In 1933, the engineers fortunes began to change 
again as the economy began to recover, with membership numbers again rising, 
including many new members in the lesser skilled section introduced in 1926. With 
the rise in numbers the union was again able to go on the offensive, managing to 
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return pay and most conditions, by the end of the 1930s, to the levels enjoyed prior 
to 1931. 
The conditions presented by the Second World War, such as the expansion of the 
engineering industry, saw the membership of the AEU grow to 900,000 by 1944. 
This huge increase in membership had been fuelled by the recruitment of many 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the formation of a youth section in 1940 and the 
historic admission of woman into the union, for the first time in its history in 1943, 
bringing it into direct competition with the TGWU and National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers (NUGMW), who till this point had been the main organisers of 
woman workers (Jefferies 1945:259). This rapid expansion in membership 
presented problems for democracy and organisation that were completely different 
to that of the smaller organisation that the AEU had been prior to the war. Seen as 
essential that as many members as possible were involved in the decision making 
and running of the union it was the role of the shop steward which was seen as 
holding the key. Targets were set to have an AEU shop steward in every section of 
every engineering establishment and the representational role was further 
developed to include the encouragement of members to attend their branch 
meetings and to demonstrate the value of membership through willingness to deal 
with the problems encountered by members, both at work and at home (ibid :261). 
The next significant merger to affect the AEU was its amalgamation with the 
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers (AUFW) in 1967 and a further merger with 
the Draftsmen and Allied Trades Association (DATA), who later became the 
Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS) and Constructional 
Engineering Union (CEU) in 1971, to form the Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers (AUEW) (Undy et al 1981:188). A continuation of the ASE’s goal of uniting 
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the engineering industry in one union, the AUEW was dominated, as prior mergers 
were, by the AEU which had a million more members than any of the other unions. 
The CEU was in fact smaller than some of the AEU districts. However the merger 
was important in that it bought a large number of white collar workers into the union 
through DATA, merger with whom had first been discussed in 1919 (Foley, 
1992:48), further opening the recruitment base of the union and continuing the 
evolvement of the union into a general union for the engineering industry (ibid).  
Taking a federated structure the four merging unions kept their own governmental 
structures, under the umbrella of the AUEW (Undy et al 1981:200), making the new 
union effectively an industrial engineering union with four separate trade groups. 
Whilst this was a major change for the AEU section, the only structural change of 
any consequence was the addition of a new top tier of decision making to the union’s 
vertical structure, in the form of an annual joint conference and joint National 
Executive Council, with the AEU’s general secretary serving as such for the whole 
of the AUEW’s existence (Undy et al 1981:101). However, a number of difficulties 
were to arise which stopped the merger from becoming a full assimilation of the four 
sections into one coherent unit. The relationship between TASS and the AEU had 
long been a difficult one. The two unions were often at odds politically, the final straw 
being the AEU’s courting of a merger with the right of centre Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbing union (EETPU) (Foley, 1992:60). With TASS 
against this merger the AEU national committee’s 1985 meeting voted to dissolve 
the federation, forcing TASS to go it alone (ibid). The remaining three sections of 
the AUEW subsequently merged fully, in a reformed AEU (Willman et al 1993 :155). 
The 1980s, as for most unions in the UK, were a challenge for the AEU. The 
reformed union, in 1985, had 975,000 members, but by 1989 this number had fallen 
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to 741,647. The aforementioned merger with the foundry and construction sections 
left the AEU with two loss making sectors (Willman et al 1993 :168) and the union’s 
structure, which had no provision for federation or sectionalism, made the union 
unattractive as a merger partner to smaller unions that would have wished to 
preserve some sort of identity (ibid). 
In 1989, amalgamation talks with the EETPU broke down over differences in the two 
unions’ democratic structures, political ethos and the career aspirations of leading 
officials (Undy 2008:148). However, merger with the financially secure EEPTU 
offered the AEU security, and also offered both unions the ability to move forwards 
in their goal of uniting the engineering industry under one banner (ibid). Therefore, 
merger talks began again in 1990 and were successfully concluded in 1992, with 
the union new Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU) formed on a 
rule book that did little more than bind the two unions together, largely unchanged 
structurally, with agreement that a new, more comprehensive, rule book be put into 
place within four years. 
The EEPTU, like the AEU was rooted in the craft traditions of the nineteenth century 
New Model trade unionism. In 1889, at the time of the great Dockers Strikes in which 
the TGWU can find its origins, the Electrical Trade Union (ETU) was formed at a 
delegate conference in Manchester. The new union, it was agreed, would be based 
on a set of rules modelled directly on those of the ASE, however, no decisions were 
taken on issues such as the location of the head office or the makeup of the 
executive committee or the identity of the unions officers, with those decisions 
deferred to a second conference the following year (Lloyd 1990 :1).  
Whilst the origins of the EEPTU, through the ETU, mirrored those of the AEU, the 
two unions which merged in 1992 were very different in structure and governance. 
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Unlike the AEU, which had always vehemently defended its democratic structures, 
including the legitimate rights of members to form moderate and broad left 
organisations within the union, the ETU was highly centralised and dominated by a 
national leadership that held a moderate right of centre ideology (Undy 2008 :148). 
Many unions have within them some form of political system, often based around 
factions. Edelstein and Warner (1975:188) describe these factions as a “somewhat 
organised special-purpose group within a larger organisation”. Usually these 
factions are described as being either right or left, however, rather than right-wing 
meaning conservative and Left-wing meaning Socialist/Labour, as it does in main 
stream politics, left and right within trade unions refers to the wings of the labour 
movement. Those described as left wing; therefore, usually include Communists, 
Maoists, Trotskyists, socialists and left wing members or supporters of the Labour 
party, whilst the right includes more conservative members of the Labour party and 
other individual’s committed to opposition to the policies of the left (Bray et 
al:2007:85-86, Edelstein and Warner 1975:191). 
Agreeing with the earlier work of Allen (1954) and Roberts (1956) that these factions 
have never been admitted into a trade union as a legitimate opposition, Edelstein 
and Warner state that whilst they exist, within trade unions, as organisations, they 
are “almost invariably only semi-organised, covertly organised or at least relatively 
restrained in organisational techniques” (1975:190).  
The right wing political ethos of the electricians had led to tensions in the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC), over the EETPUs aggressive commitment to single union 
no strike recognition deals, often at the expense of other unions (Callow, 2011:45). 
The policy led to the EEPTU being expelled from the TUC in 1888, after it refused 
to accept the decision of the TUC inter-union disputes committee, in reference to 
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two single union deals signed by the union, which undermined previous claims to 
recognition by the TGWU (Undy 2008 :42-43). This was in addition to the infamous 
involvement of the EETPU in the 1985 dispute at News International’s Wapping 
printing plant. During this dispute the EETPU was accused by SOGAT and the NGA 
(who would subsequently join the EEPTU, when merged into Amicus), of recruiting 
workers for News International, to carry out the work of striking workers in two of the 
company’s other branches (Lloyd, 1990:628).  
The EEPTU was to stay outside the TUC until the formation of the AEEU in 1992, 
by which time it had become apparent that the leaderships goal of forming an 
alliance of moderate leaning trade unions, in opposition to the TUC, had failed (Undy 
2008 :149). The union had failed to complete any merger of substance and the 
aborted merger talks with the AEU in 1989 had partly been caused by the EEPTU’s 
position outside of the TUC. This was compounded by a threat by the Confederation 
of Ship Building and Engineering Unions (CSEU) to expel any union which was not 
a TUC affiliate, which would have seen the job territory of the EEPTU threatened by 
poaching from competitor unions, within the industry (ibid). 
As mentioned above the AEEU was formed on a minimalist set of rules with 
agreement that a new set of rules be in place within four years. Left to the leading 
officials of the two unions, including the exclusively full time official staffed national 
executive committees, negotiations on the new rules ran into major problems over 
a series of issues. In order to solve this impasse a compromise was made, with the 
resulting rule book of the AEEU, accepted by ballot of the membership in 1996, 
being a middle ground between existing rules of the AEEU and EEPTU. Power was 
moved from the branches and district committee, as was the AEU model, to the 
shop stewards and industrial committees, in line with EEPTU traditions (Callow: 
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2011:50). The election of officers, long seen as non-negotiable by the AEU, was to 
remain, as was the staffing of the NEC by full time members. Also, whilst policy 
conference decisions where binding on the NEC, the executive was given the power 
to put any question of policy or rule amendment to a postal ballot of the membership. 
All in all the new rules of the union were seen to centralise decision making whilst 
reducing the influence of AEU branch activists (Undy, 2008:210). 
Whilst negotiations had been taking place over the union’s rules, another significant 
event was taking place in the political make-up of the new union. Both the AEU and 
EETPU were seen as being on the moderate side of the union movement. The AEU, 
as mentioned above, had an established factional system (Callow, 20011:50), with 
moderate and left wing groupings and at the time of merger it was the moderate 
group that held the majority of seats on the executive as well as the positions of 
general secretary and president. All evidence pointed to the AEU moderate group 
continuing this dominance in the AEEU, however, when the positions of general 
secretary and president both became unexpectedly vacant, the AEU moderate 
group collapsed amid squabbling over its choice of candidate for the position of 
president, allowing the left wing candidate, Davey Hall, to win (Undy, 2008:201). 
This was followed by the election of the EEPTU moderate, Ken Jackson, as general 
secretary (Callow, 2009:47). 
Almost immediately after the introduction of the 1996 rules, the newly elected 
general secretary sponsored a number of changes to the government of the union 
which prompted Davey Hall to resign as president. This resignation prompted further 
opportunistic changes to the union’s rules and governmental structure (Undy, 
2008:210). The post of president was removed and the executive was reconstituted 
as a lay body, whilst the election of full time officers was replaced by appointment, 
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something, which as mentioned above, had been a major sticking point in the 
drawing up of the union’s initial rules. The changes further centralised governance 
whilst reducing the influence of former AEEU officials (Callow, 2011:46). However, 
these changes, along with the raising of officer salaries in line with other unions 
made the AEEU more attractive as a merger prospect, given that the new structures 
mirrored those of potential merger targets. (Undy, 2008:210-11).  
The changes made to the AEEU structures and the continuation of moderate control 
were important in securing the 2002 amalgamation with the Manufacturing, Science 
and Finance union (MSF). Continuing the mission of the engineers, to organise all 
skilled workers within the engineering industry, the MSF was an attractive partner 
for the AEEU, albeit with some 50% of the MSF membership not involved in 
manufacturing (Undy 2008 :150). The MSF was itself the product of a merger, in 
1988, between the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
(ASTMS) and TASS (Pelling, 1992:295), who as discussed above had been a part 
of the AUEW, along with the AEU, but had parted company, in 1985, mainly due to 
political differences with the AEU and unhappiness at a possibly merger with the 
EETPU. After disaffiliation in 1985, as discussed in chapter two, TASS merged with 
a number of small unions, notably the gold and silver smiths, through what 
Waddington refers to as political, rather than industrial logic (2005:283). However, 
changes, particularly technological ones, that had replaced the old draftsman offices 
in which TASS had been best organised, had hamstrung the union (Callow, 
2011:145) causing it to seek out bigger merger partners. The Merger in 1988, 
between TASS and ASTMS, to form MSF, had originally been planned as a larger 
merger, driven by ASTMS General Secretary Clive Jenkins, which would bring 
together the four largest white collar unions, however, this failed when talks with the 
CAWU and BIFU, did not come to a positive outcome (Ibid:144).  
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Difficulties caused by restructuring after this merger and failure to successfully 
merge with the Institute of Professionals, Managers and Specialists (IPMS) in 1998 
had left the union in a financially precarious position. The union had been on a bad 
financial footing from the beginning, due to the spiralling debts and loss of 
membership, brought to the merger by TASS, and by 1992 the level of debt had 
reached £11 million.  Therefore, the MSF had more defensive priorities in securing 
a merger. The preferred merger target had been the IPMS, which was the union for 
professional engineers, due to its reserves. However, this merger failed after the 
proposal to enter merger talks fell by one vote at conference. Unifi was also 
considered, but ruled out as neither executive could see an advantage of joining two 
financially insecure organisations. This left only the AEEU as a practical choice, 
effectively returning TASS to the merger it had rejected seventeen years previous 
(Callow, 2011:152). 
However, the forming of Amicus, from the merger of MSF and AEEU in 2002 did not 
turn out the way that its moderate architects had perceived. Agreement had been 
put in place that the union would be vested with joint general secretaries presiding 
over their former sections, until retirement (Callow, 2009:22). However, members of 
the moderate group in the AEEU section of the union convinced Ken Jackson to 
extend his period of office beyond the age of 65, in order to ensure the continued 
control of the general secretary post, whilst restricting the influence of the MSF, 
under Roger Lyons. Therefore, the newly knighted Sir Ken Jackson stood for 
election in 2002, backed by the moderate AEEU united group. But, Jackson did not 
win the election, which was won by the Broad Left’s candidate, Derek Simpson, on 
the back of a wave of membership resentment against the moderates and when 
Roger Lyons was removed by the Certification officer in 2004, having failed to fight 
an election in the previous five years, Simpson found himself as the sole general 
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secretary of the union. Backed by the Broad Left, who had also made significant 
inroads into the Amicus National Executive, Simpson signalled a shift to the left by 
denouncing single union no strike agreements and sweetheart deals, whilst joining 
the group of general secretaries known as the awkward squad (Undy, 2008: 202) 
Under the leadership of Simpson Amicus acquired a number of further mergers, the 
two most significant being those with the banking union, Unify, and the Graphical 
Paper and Media Union (GPMU) (Callow, 2011:199). Both of these unions were 
themselves the result of mergers. In the case of Unify this had been a merger of two 
unions in some degree of financial difficulties, the Banking Insurance and Finance 
Union (BIFU) and the Barclays Bank based UNiFI, and one, the NatWest Staff 
Association, in a reasonable financial position. However, the financial position of the 
GPMU had ebbed and flowed and by 2001 a mixture of membership loss and 
financial problems caused by constitutional issues, such as the ability of some of its 
branches (known as the Taliban Branches) to retain more than 50% of member 
contributions, had caused the union to seek out merger partners (Undy, 2008:72-
73). 
The Unifi merger allowed Amicus to add one hundred and fifty thousand members 
to the fifty thousand already in its financial section and also stopped some of the 
smaller staff associations, which existed in banking and finance, from playing the 
two unions off against each other. In the case of the GPMU, Amicus only had a small 
number of technical and craft members working in paper and print; however, this 
small existence was bigger than the TGWU, the next largest union in the area. 
Merger with the GPMU, therefore, gave Amicus an entry, on a large scale, into a 
sector in which it had only limited organisation. For the GPMU, Amicus offered a 
specially created section with almost full autonomy for the first five years. Also, 
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importantly, the merger offered a way to reign in the `Taliban branches`, by ending 
the ability to hold monies outside of the control of the central union. (Undy, 2008:72-
73). The election of, left leaning, Simpson was important in the decision of the 
GPMU leadership to recommend Amicus as the favoured merger partner when 
members were asked to choose between that and the TGWU. It is inconceivable 
that this recommendation would have been so had the right-wing leaders of AEEU 
and MSF still been in the ascendancy.  
However, only three years later members of the former GPMU, would find 
themselves merging with the TGWU as part of Amicus, to form the huge, 
conglomerate union Unite. Before discussing Unite however, it is necessary to 
examine in detail the history and traditions of the TGWU. 
 
 
 
 
The TGWU. The General Union. 
The TGWU was formed in 1922 but to get a real understanding of the union’s origins 
it is necessary to go back further than this, to the beginnings of new unionism and 
the 1889 dockers strike. Prior to the late nineteenth century, trade unionism had 
been uniquely an issue for skilled and craft workers which, as discussed above in 
reference to the ASE and EEPTU, tended to be small, highly democratic and took 
the form of friendly societies (Murray, 2008 :14).  
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Those involved in unskilled labouring were seen by the leaders of established 
unions as un-organisable. However, this was to change. In 1889 living conditions in 
the east end of London were described as being amongst the worst in the whole of 
Britain. Herded together into slum housing, with little in the way of sanitation, those 
living in the east end suffered from a low life expectancy, poor diet, an absence of 
health care and it was against this backdrop that the conditions that led to the dock 
strike were able to grow (Murray, 2008 :15).  
The strike began with a local dispute on the South West India Dock, which was 
spread along the whole of the waterfront, under the leadership of Ben Tillett. Calling 
for an increase in pay from 5d to 6d (known as the Dockers’ Tanner) and a fairer 
distribution of bonus’, the strike swelled to include over 30,000 dock workers, with 
as many workers again coming from other trades with connections to the riverfront, 
such as carters. After five weeks the dispute was bought to an end, after mediation 
by the Catholic Church, with the strikers winning almost all of their demands (Coates 
and Topham, 1991).  
Trade unionism in the UK had been changed for ever by the dockers’ dispute. 
Unions catering for those workers seen as unorganisable by the craft elite were 
established across the nation for workers in the docks, gas works, agriculture and 
other areas with high concentrations of unskilled labour (Coates and Topham, 
1991:124). In 1890 there were two hundred thousand members in these unions, 
with membership of trade unions, as a whole, doubling in the UK. Whilst the ensuing 
years would see attacks launched on these organisations by the employers and 
state, new unionism was to survive to become the primary force in the UK labour 
movement. 
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1921 saw nineteen of these unions entering into amalgamation talks to form the 
union which would be the TGWU (Coates and Topham, 1991:773). These talks 
came in the wake of a great deal of industrial unrest in Britain. Thirty five million 
days were lost to strikes in 1919 rising to eighty five million in 1921 and the 
successful revolution by Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 looked likely to be the 
precursor to revolutions across Europe. The mood in Britain is highlighted well by 
the following quote attributed to Prime Minister Lloyd George. On the eve of a united 
strike by transport, rail and mine workers, leaders of these unions, known as the 
triple alliance, were told by Lloyd George: 
We are at your mercy…If you carry out your threat to strike, then you will 
defeat us. But if you do so…have you weighed the consequences…For, if a 
force arises in the state which is stronger than the state itself, then it must be 
ready to take on the functions of the state, or it must withdraw and accept the 
authority of the state. Gentlemen, are you ready? (Murray, 2008:31). 
In the event, the government conceded most of the demands of the unions involved 
and the leaders of said organisations, whom had no perspective for assuming state 
power, called off the action. The weaknesses of trade union organisation in Britain 
were exposed by the post war situation. The Transport Workers Federation (TWF), 
which included many of the unions which would make up the TGWU, attempted to 
progress the objectives of union members working in the sector.  However, the 
federal structure, which gave considerable autonomy to the affiliated organisations, 
meant that reacting to events quickly and effectively was often difficult (Coates and 
Topham, 1992:767). The answer, seen by many, was full amalgamation of all 
transport unions; however, in the end this was too ambitious. Nineteen mainly dock 
and road transport unions entered into the eventual merger discussions, whilst 
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others, notably the rail unions and seafarers’ unions, chose to continue with the 
status quo. Of the nineteen unions which balloted their members on the question of 
amalgamation, fourteen secured a successful outcome with those unsuccessful 
either voting against or not acquiring the required fifty percent turnouts, which 
legislation demanded. The TGWU came into being on the first of January 1922 
(Coates and Topham, 1991:810). 
As proposed by Turner (1962) the tendency of general unions is to conform to the 
categorization of popular bossdom, under the control of powerful general 
secretaries. The TGWU is a very good example of this and its history is best plotted 
via the tenures of these men (so far they all have been). Ernest (Ernie) Bevin joined 
the dockers union as a carter in Bristol and in 1911 started working as an official in 
the Bristol office. Rising through the union’s ranks, Bevin became highly influential 
in both the Dock union and the TWF and on the formation of the TGWU was elected 
as the first general secretary, securing ninety six thousand eight hundred and forty 
two votes, whilst his two opponents gathered just ten thousand between them 
(Coates and Topham, 1991:843).  
Bringing together fourteen unions, with three hundred and fifty thousand members 
was difficult enough. However, Bevin also had to deal with the ambitions of fourteen 
separate General Secretaries all of whom were used to running their own 
organisations. The task ahead would need all of Bevin’s vision, firmness and tact 
(Murray, 2008) and whilst the way that Bevin ruled over the TGWU has often been 
criticized it could also be argued that without it the new union would have faced 
breakaways and subsequent collapse (Allen 1957). 
Bevin believed the existence of a strong office of General Secretary to be essential 
in the battle against sectionalism, which he saw as a great threat to the union. 
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Combining a large element of regional decentralisation with national industrial trade 
groups, the structure of the TGWU was designed by Bevin himself. Initially the union 
had six national trade groups all led by a committee of lay representatives and a 
national officer. The union also consisted of eleven regions (subsequently reduced 
to eight) which were again led by a committee of lay members and a regional 
secretary (often one of the former union General Secretaries). The regions 
contained regional trade group committees, which elected members to both the 
national trade group committees and the regional committee. Top of this structure 
was the General Executive Council (GEC). Differing too many other unions at this 
time, the GEC was made up entirely by elected lay representatives, with full time 
officers barred from serving. Leading the GEC, with no vote but considerable sway, 
was the general secretary (Allen, 1957). 
TGWU members were prominent supporters of the miners during the 1926 General 
Strike. However, whilst the TUC had foreseen a dispute arising in the coal fields on 
the ending of government subsidies, no plans had been put into place for how to 
react. The result was that planning for the general strike was hurried and not 
thoroughly thought through and whilst Bevin who had recently been elected to the 
TUC General Council did his best to organise a successful strike, once it became 
apparent that it would take place, he soon came to the realisation that the dispute 
could not be won (Allen 1957:95-96).  Whilst not aligning himself completely with 
the capitulators on the general council, Bevin decided that he was not willing to lead 
more groups of workers out and was a member of the delegation that met Prime 
minister, Stanley Baldwin, to call off the strike, although it is noted that he was the 
only member of the group that tried to seek assurances (not forthcoming) that 
workers would not be persecuted (Murray 2008:52; Allen, 1957:96). 
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The aftermath of the General Strike saw union membership go into decline in the 
face of a legal assault by the Baldwin Government, on the right to strike and take 
part in political activities. With funds also diminishing in line with membership the 
TGWU had to cope with the cost of having spent three hundred thousand pounds 
on dispute benefit during the strike, resulting in the union being unable to support a 
major strike for some time. In tandem with the financial difficulties caused by the 
general strike, the dispute had also hardened the opinions of Bevin away from 
industrial action, towards negotiation and social partnership, illustrated by his 
prominent participation in the 1928 “Mond-Turner” talks, between the TUC General 
Council and business leaders. Murray quotes Bevin’s biographer, Allan Bullock, in 
saying that “the militant spirit that had characterised the unions in the years before 
1926 had burnt out” (2008:54). 
Throughout these troubled times the TGWU continued to add members through 
merger. By 1927 the fourteen unions which had formed the original amalgamation 
had been joined by thirteen more. Whilst the union continued to merge with unions 
in its traditional areas of the docks and transport it also sought to merge with unions 
organising more stable areas of employment. A merger of particular note is that with 
the Workers Union. Created in 1898 by Tom Mann, the Workers union organised 
across a plethora of industries and had grown rapidly in munitions and engineering 
during the war with membership peaking in 1920 at around half a million. However, 
by 1929 membership was down to just one hundred thousand members and the 
Workers Union was forced to merge with the much larger TGWU. The Workers 
Union merger was significant as it allowed the TGWU access to industrial sectors it 
had previously been peripheral too, such as engineering and agriculture (Murray 
2008:56).  
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1937 saw the TGWU’s membership pass the miners’ union to become the largest 
in the country with 654,510 members (Pelling, 1992:194, England, 2008:245). 
Building upon the legacy of the Workers Union, the Metal, Engineering and 
Chemical trade group grew in size to surpass even the dockers’ section as the union 
cemented its position in the engineering and car industries and with the AEU still 
refusing to admit woman workers into its ranks, these workers flocked to the TGWU, 
causing the union’s male dominated profile to change. However, whilst the union 
was undoubtedly changing from the organisation first perceived by its creators, in 
the early 1920s, Bevin’s authoritarian leadership continued with all unofficial, rank 
and file, movements banned after such an organisation amongst London bus 
drivers, had organised a strike to co-inside with the coronation of King George VI in 
1937. For Bevin, there was no place for any opposition within his organisation 
(Murray 2008). 
World War Two represents a significant period in the continued evolvement of the 
union. Firstly it saw the departure of Bevin as General Secretary, having taken up 
the invitation from the coalition government to become Minister for Labour. Officially 
Bevin did not relinquish the office of General Secretary until 1945, but for all intended 
purposes he had left the position in 1940 with Arthur Deakin appointed acting 
general secretary in 1940. Secondly, the war saw the union’s membership top one 
million members for the first time (Pelling, 1992:208). With this increase in 
membership came a number of new problems for the union’s leadership. Many of 
the TGWU’s more experienced officers had enlisted with the armed forces, leaving 
inexperienced officers in their place and the gap between the union’s leadership and 
its members seemed to be bigger than it ever had been (Murray, 2008:88). Into this 
gap stepped Shop Stewards, who became increasingly numerous and powerful 
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during the war, marking a shift downwards in power, which would be fought against 
by Deakin once the war was over. 
Formally elected in 1945, Deakin, although not of the same calibre as Bevin (Pelling, 
1992:214), was well set up for the job having been acting general secretary for the 
preceding five years and assistant general secretary for several years prior to that. 
Deakin had not, unlike Bevin, been shaped by an atmosphere of militancy and 
working class struggle prior to starting work as a union officer. However, he had 
studied Bevin’s methods and adhered to his doctrine and authoritarian nature. Allen 
States that “Deakin was authoritarian by nature. He was capable of making quick, 
firm decisions and he had the utmost faith in his own simple, straightforward 
opinions and ideas” (1957:257), whilst Jones described him as “an awkward 
intolerant man” (1986:132). Under the leadership of Deakin the TGWU officer core 
swelled in numbers from five hundred in 1943 to one thousand four hundred and 
thirty four in 1954. These officers were expected, by Deakin, to control union 
members and limit confrontation with employers and where this was not done, 
Deakin was known to go over the heads of his officers to directly order striking 
workers back to work (Murray 2008) Deakin was driven by an immense dislike of 
strikes and unofficial rank and file organisations and came to associate both with 
communism. This intense anti-communism, which had been a fixation for Deakin 
since his election (Goldstein 1953) led to a motion being passed at the 1949 
biannual delegate conference (BDC) banning communists from holding positions as 
union full time officials or lay officers (Pelling, 1992:218). Whilst the BDC had not 
intended this to be used retrospectively nine officers who refused to denounce their 
party membership were sacked and many lay activists from the GEC down to the 
shop floor were excluded from holding positions (Pelling, 1992:218).  
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Whilst the number of officers increased under Deakin, so the union’s membership 
also continued to grow during this period. Goldstein (1953:35-36) writes that in 1947 
the union’s membership had risen to one million, three hundred and seventeen 
thousand, which equated to the union being “responsible for the livelihoods of over 
16 per cent of all organised labour in the United Kingdom” (ibid). Whilst the union 
was officially opposed, as a voluntary organisation, to the closed shop, the union 
was in control of three hundred thousand positions of employment on the docks and 
in road transport. This demonstrates that whilst Deakin may often be criticised, for 
his handling of certain issues, as highlighted above, the union continued to thrive as 
an organisation, under his leadership.   
The end of the Deakin era heralded a radical change in direction, bought about by 
a number of unexpected events. Firstly Deakin died in 1955, as the election to 
replace him was taking place. Secondly, Deakin’s preferred successor, Harry 
Nicholas was found to be ineligible to take office due to a small break in contributions 
and thirdly, Jock Tiffin, Deakin’s elected successor died of cancer after six months 
in office (Pelling, 1992:231). These events paved the way for Frank Cousins who, 
despite his reputation for being on the left, had managed to secure the position as 
Tiffin’s assistant general secretary, and became the fourth elected general secretary 
of the TGWU (Smith, 2008:219). However the scale of his election victory over Tom 
Healey by five hundred and three thousand five hundred and sixty votes to seventy 
seven thousand nine hundred and sixteen, on what was a record turnout, indicates 
the hunger of the membership, for a new way of doing things (Jones 1986:143). 
The TGWU, under Cousins’ leadership, changed hugely in the 13 years that he held 
the office. Murray quotes Andy Homes, chair of the Irish region of the TGWU in 
saying that “Cousins dragged the union from the darkness into the daylight” (2008 
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137). It is proffered by Murray that “no leader changed the TGWU more than 
Cousins…(he) inherited the T&G in one condition and left it as something very 
different” (ibid:135). Smith (2008:219) adds to this, stating that on being elected as 
general secretary he “was confronted by an organization already in an explosive 
state” due to the way that it had become unresponsive to members. Under Cousins’ 
leadership, power in the union was disseminated downwards with extra authority 
given to the regions at the expense of the centre and the union’s national officers. 
Also, the wishes of members were raised above the opinions of officials, something 
that had been unthinkable under Deakin and to a major extent Bevin. Whilst 
criticised by some for not lifting the ban on communists holding office, immediately 
on taking power, the ban was lifted at Cousins behest, by the 1968 rules conference, 
although in reality the ban was being ignored by large parts of the union and was 
“causing considerable industrial complications” (Murray 2008: 135) in those areas 
still attempting to adhere to the restrictions. 
Under this new, more progressive, leadership style membership of the union grew 
at a significant rate, to reach one million three hundred thousand by 1960, resuming 
its merger activities, including all of the Gibraltarian trade unions amalgamating with 
the TGWU in 1963. The Cousins period formed the launch pad on which the TGWU, 
under the leadership of Jack Jones, would peak at over two million members by the 
end of the 1970s, making it “the largest trade union organisation in the capitalist 
world” (Murray, 2008: 140).  
Jones had begun his union trade union life as a docker in the port of Liverpool. 
Famously serving in the Spanish Civil War as a member of the International 
Brigades (Jones 1986), Jones was made a full time official of the TGWU on his 
return (Murray 2008: 141, Jones 1986:87). Working mainly in organising the car and 
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engineering sections in the Midlands region, Jones eventually became the regional 
secretary, from where he was able to strongly support the work of Cousins and his 
influence on the union’s internal governance was further advanced by the creation 
of a post within head office, where Jones was tasked with dealing with internal 
Government and administration problems. This role allowed him to build a network 
of supporters and influential contacts, which would be invaluable upon his rise to the 
position of General Secretary, succeeding Cousins in 1969 (Undy et al 1981: 98). 
Elected with over three hundred and thirty four thousand votes, whilst his nearest 
challenger got just twenty eight thousand, Jones was able to accelerate the work of 
Cousins. However, whilst the advancements made by Cousins cannot be 
understated, the union’s system of government had been generally untouched when 
Jones came to power.  
This was to change under Jones, who would use the new freedoms, implemented 
by Cousins, to accelerate change within the union (Undy et al 1981: 97). Drawing 
on his experiences of the Midlands region, known in the union as Region Five, shop 
stewards were central to his philosophy (Murray 2008: 141-142). As the regional 
secretary for Region Five, Jones had installed a style of governance that he would 
later install into the TGWU nationally. Dominated  by the engineering and car 
building industries, both of which had long traditions of shop floor  bargaining, Jones 
was able to build a strong support base by introducing changes that were popular 
amongst union activists, such as the decentralisation and democratisation of 
decision making (Undy et al 1981: 98, Jones 1986). The changes made by Jones in 
Region Five had indicated to him that there were two major benefits that could be 
gained in terms of membership growth and the union’s finances. Firstly, in terms of 
growth, Jones had noted the correlation between growth and consolidation of 
membership and strong well organised workplaces; and whilst Undy et al (1981:99) 
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indicate that there are difficulties in proving the connection between growth and 
good systems of local representation, they note that for Jones there was no doubt. 
In reference to the union’s finances, it had not gone unnoticed by Jones that 
increasing the number and competence of shop stewards, to deal with local matters, 
meant that the union could employ fewer expensive full time officials (ibid).  
Aided by the retirement of many of the officers remaining from the Bevan and Deakin 
eras, together with the increasing influence of the Broad Left (in turn facilitated by 
the removal of the ban on communists), Jones, through the measures outlined 
above, was able to market the union favourably as a potential merger partner (ibid), 
in an attempt to widen the union’s appeal. Shaking off the union’s image as an 
organisation for dockers, car workers and drivers, the TGWU, under Jones’ 
stewardship expanded rapidly into areas such as “public services, civil aviation and 
other white collar sections” (Murray 2008:159), whilst consolidating its position in its 
traditional job territories, through mergers with organisations such as the Scottish 
Commercial Motormen’s Union and the National Union of Vehicle Builders, the latter 
of which was particularly important as it brought craft workers, from the car building 
sector into the union, thereby, encroaching into areas previously dominated by the 
engineers’ union. 
Recognising the growing power of the shop steward movement, under Jones’ 
leadership the role of the lay representative, as mentioned above, was increased 
enthusiastically. Stewards were highly encouraged to be involved in bargaining at 
their workplace with the rule introduced that no agreement could be signed by an 
officer, without first being ratified by the shop floor (England, 1981:23, Smith, 
2008:222). Although England states “The popular bossdom phase of the 
TGWU…appears to be over”(ibid:27-28) this was plainly not the case. It is true that 
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Jones did not get everything his own way, the 1977 Conference being a prime 
example, when the leadership was defeated offer wage restraint (Murray, 
2008:165). However, this was very much the exception rather than the rule  and 
through the incorporation of the stewards into the unions machinery, aided by the 
high regard held of him by the rank and file (England 2008:247-248), Jones was 
able change the role of the steward from that of an independent representative who 
was only answerable to the members that had elected them, to something more 
comparable with a full time official. Yes they were still answerable to their members, 
but now they were also answerable to the union as a whole (England, 1981:17). 
Jones’ retirement as General Secretary in 1978 can be seen as another turning 
point, as the union, like all others, was to suffer gravely from the policies of the 
Conservative government, which would be elected the following year and stay in 
power for the next eighteen. Under the leadership of Moss Evans and then Ron 
Todd the union went into an era of decline as the realities of the Conservative 
economic policies and anti-union policies bit. The union’s governance and 
representative structures, throughout this period, remained unchanged from those 
put in place by Cousins and Jones. However, the huge decline in membership 
meant that some of the union’s officials and offices could not be sustained.  Ron 
Tod and the national executive eventually conceded that office closures and 
redundancies would have to take place in order for the union to reflect the changes 
in its circumstances (Murray 2008: 179). Merger activity continued in the 1980s, 
Murray (ibid) noting this to be “a bright spot for the union in the otherwise dismal 
decade”. Three mergers of particular importance were those with the stevedores 
union, completing the amalgamation of all waterway unions under a single banner; 
the merger with the Dyers and Bleachers Union, which, when added to the union’s 
existing textile members, provided the basis for a national trade group for textile 
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workers; and the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, which again 
added members to the TGWU’s existing, albeit, rather smaller membership in that 
sector. These mergers, consolidatory in style, added numbers to the TGWU at a 
time of great decline but were unable to do a great deal in terms of the union’s 
fortunes.  
The election of Bill Morris as Todd’s successor was seen as a landmark moment for 
British trade unionism as he was to be the first black General Secretary that the 
country had seen (Pelling, 1992:296). Born in Jamaica, Morris had come to Britain 
in the early 1950s and had been employed in Birmingham’s engineering industry, 
becoming the first black member of the TGWU to ever get elected onto its executive 
council (Murray, 2008: 186). His election was not uncontested, with a strong 
challenge coming from George Wright, backed by the Labour Party and anti-Todd, 
elements. However, backed by the powerful broad left electoral machine and having 
been number two to Todd, defeat for Morris was always unlikely and so it proved to 
be (ibid:187). Taking office, Morris had the unenviable task of dealing with the 
aftermath of the closures and redundancies carried out during the reign of his 
predecessor, modernising the union’s management structures and attempting to put 
in place some clear policies on how the union was to face up to the difficulties that 
it had before it. Morris made a number of changes to the union’s representational 
structures in reference to equality, which was where his record in office is most 
impressive. The number of guaranteed seats on the executive for black and woman 
members was increased to better represent the proportionate membership of the 
membership and committees were formed at all levels of the union to enhance the 
opportunities of members who may otherwise have struggled to find a voice (ibid: 
187-188). In 1996 Bill Morris became the first TGWU general secretary to have to 
submit himself to a second ballot of the membership, following the Conservative 
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government’s changes to legislation, which introduced five year maximum terms. 
This put Morris on a collision course with Tony Blair’s New Labour Government, who 
were attempting to secure understanding leaders in the larger unions, in order to 
allow him to drive through changes to the party. Blair backed Jack Dromey in the 
election, along with a group in the North West that had split away from the main 
broad left. The campaign was bitter but ended with Morris being re-elected, at the 
same time showing the limitation of Blair’s power over the unions (Murray, 
2008:190).  
Morris’ time as leader is noted for two key disputes, which reached national 
prominence. Firstly was a strike at British Airways (BA). Officially this was a dispute 
over pay and conditions being cut, however, the reality was that BA wished to break 
the union, using a break away organisation, Cabin Crew 89, to attempt to meet these 
aims. This dispute was a rare high-profile industrial victory for the union, which after 
three days of strikes, with huge financial consequences for the company, managed 
to reach agreement. The second dispute, and one that was far more troubling for 
the union, began with a small stevedore company at Liverpool docks making a 
number of members redundant. Had the dock labour scheme still been inforce these 
workers would have been re-employed by the Mersey Docs and Harbour Company 
(MDHC), but as it was not the MDHC refused to take them on. A picket line was 
mounted, which many of those employed by the MDHC refused to cross, leading to 
them also being dismissed, as this was deemed to be unofficial industrial action. 
This led to a bitter dispute between the union and the sacked dockers, with the union 
accused of misrepresenting its members. This culminated in some of the sacked 
dockers taking up legal action against their own union, highlighting the difficulties 
that unions in the UK face, due to the legislative framework that they have to work 
within. 
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The major factional grouping in the TGWU was the Broad Left faction which had 
backed both Morris and his Deputy Margaret Prosser. However, by the beginning  
of the twentieth century the left of the union was losing patience with a leadership 
that was seen as increasingly conservative (McIlroy, 2009:151-152). A split in the 
Broad Left followed, between the London Broad Left faction, who tended to lean 
toward the centre right and the faction, based primarily in the Northwest.  
Backed by the Northwest faction, Tony Woodley was elected firstly as deputy 
General Secretary, before being elected to succeed Bill Morris, and become the 
TGWU’s ninth and final General Secretary. Unusually for General Secretaries of the 
TGWU, Woodley was not chosen by Morris to be his successor, as had long been 
the tradition of the union. Woodley had been elected as Deputy General Secretary 
against the wishes of Morris, who was closely connected to the London faction, a 
move by TGWU members that reflected a general trend in the attitudes of union 
members in the UK, with a number of left leaning, more progressive, general 
secretaries, most prominently Derek Simpson, being elected around the country 
(Murray 2008: 201-202, McIlroy, 2009:152).  
Woodley had a great belief in the principle of organising, which he was confident 
could change the union’s fortunes in reference to the membership decline it had 
incurred. The union’s membership total stood at eight hundred thousand by 2003, a 
far cry from the two million the union boasted at the end of the 1970s. The organising 
strategy adopted by the TGWU, under the guidance of Woodley, was based 
substantially on Service Sector Trade Unions in the United States. These unions 
spent a considerable amount of their income on organising, which was a model 
mimicked by the TGWU with expenditures being reduced in order that more money 
was available to employ a large number of full time organisers, many of which were 
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“young, female and from ethnic minorities, or even all three” (Murray 2008: 203). 
This strategy saw over fifteen thousand members being recruited annually, on top 
of those members recruited in already organised workplaces and introduced strong 
shop floor union structures, with hundreds of new shop stewards being recruited. 
Woodley’s legacy however, was the merger of the TGWU with Amicus to form Unite 
and to this we must now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unite the Union. 
The election of Tony Woodley and more significantly Derek Simpson, as General 
Secretaries of their respective unions paved the way for the creation of Unite in 
2007. The TGWU was, in 2003, the third biggest union in the UK behind Amicus 
and Unison and the formation of Amicus as a general union had meant that the two 
unions, which had long been in competition in the car and engineering industries, 
were now coming into contact across a larger number of job territories than ever 
before. With the existence of the GMB as a further general union in manufacturing, 
the question of whether the UK could sustain three large general unions needed to 
be addressed. Against a backdrop of some doubt, especially on the side of the 
TGWU, who unlike Amicus, had assimilated many unions through merger, but never 
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merged with another union on an equal basis (Murray 2008: 210), it was agreed to 
hold merger talks between the three great general unions at a meeting on the 9th 
May 2005 between, Woodley, Simpson and the GMB’s general secretary, Kevin 
Curran (Callow 2011: 233). These initial talks, with a ballot planned for later in the 
year to determine whether the merger should go ahead, were interrupted 
unexpectedly in March of that year, when Curran was suspended by the GMB and 
subsequently resigned, over allegations of ballot irregularities in the 2003 general 
secretary election (ibid:235, Independent:2005). Whilst, prima facie, the 
replacement of Curran by Paul Kenny, as GMB general secretary, did not appear to 
jeopardise the ongoing merger talks, progress did slow down to an almost total 
stand still, with Kenny using the delays to “set the GMB’s own house in order” (ibid: 
236). When talks resumed in early 2006, the GMB was in a far different position 
than it had been prior to that inaugural May meeting. Edging into profit, the GMB, 
under the leadership of Kenny, began to identify that with the other two larger, 
general unions coming together, an opening existed for a rival, smaller general 
union, offering specialist services. Unhappy with the idea, embraced by the TGWU 
and Amicus, of leaving key areas of a new rule book unresolved until after a decision 
to merge, as had been the case in the creation of the AEEU and Amicus, the GMB 
leadership were adamant that the rules of the new union should be in place well in 
advance of any merger taking place. Against this backdrop, the GMB conference in 
2006 voted by an overwhelming 98% to break off negotiations in favour of “an 
alternative, independent model of development” (ibid: 237-238). 
The departure of the GMB from the frame did not detrimentally affect the ongoing 
talks between Amicus and TGWU, which in fact accelerated. The political outlooks 
of the two unions were broadly in line and the respective size of the two unions, at 
one million two hundred thousand (Amicus) and nine hundred thousand (TGWU) 
 94 
 
meant that the merger, on the face of it, was on an equal footing rather than a 
takeover of one onion by the other (Callow 2011: 238). Therefore, with over two 
million members and assets of two hundred million pounds the new union would 
have within its membership a third of all organised workers in the UK, giving it huge 
political and financial influence. In order to try and overcome some of the rather 
large problems envisioned in bringing two unions of this size together, merger was 
agreed to take place in a number of phases. On inception the new union would run 
for the first eighteen months with two sections representing Amicus and TGWU with 
joint general secretaries and a thirty member Joint Executive Council, fifteen from 
the Amicus National Executive Council and fifteen from the TGWU’s National 
Executive Committee. This joint committee would be tasked with drawing up a new 
rule book and would have overall say on new full time appointments and terms and 
conditions for full time staff (Callow 2011: 240). An eighty strong national Executive 
Committee (forty from each section) would then be elected to take control of the new 
union on the 1st of May 2008).  The twenty three Amicus sectors would merge with 
the fourteen industrial trade groups of the TGWU, over a period of four years, whilst 
the union would have a total of 10 regions. 
Amicus and TGWU members were balloted in early 2007, on the question of 
whether the merger should go ahead and voted overwhelmingly in favour with the 
result declared on the 8th March 2007. After this merger activities were sped up in 
terms of property sales, officer re-assignments and reduction of budgets. In May 
2007 the joint executive formally changed the name of the organisation to Unite the 
Union with the two unions formally to merge on the 1st of November 2008. However, 
this process was bought to an abrupt halt when a complaint to the certification officer 
forced an election to take place for General Secretary of the Amicus section of the 
union. 
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Inserted into the new rules of the union had been a clause which gave Simpson 
leave to remain in post a year longer than expected, until his sixty sixth birthday, in 
December 2010, whilst Woodley would retire a year early, on his sixty fourth birthday 
in December 2011. This arrangement was designed to transfer power from the two 
existing joint general secretaries to a single general sectary after an election which 
would take place in 2010, prior to Simpson’s departure (ibid: 326).  However, using 
the legislation bought in by the Thatcher Government and left in place by New 
Labour, a complaint was made to the certification officer that Simpson, by continuing 
in post until 2011, had gone past the time when a mandatory election must take 
place. After taking legal advice, Simpson and his senior team, pre-empted the 
certification officer’s decision, asking the Joint Executive to call an election for the 
Amicus section (Callow 2011: 330).  
The election attracted a larger field than expected with five candidates receiving the 
required number of nominations and four going forward to ballot, the result being 
declared on 7th March 2009. Simpson was re-elected with 60,048 votes. However, 
the most significant result of this election was that the expected resurgence of the 
right-wing did not happen with left-wing grassroots candidate Jerry Hicks coming 
second with 39,307 votes and the two right wing candidates only mustering 30,603 
and 28,283 votes each. This result, whilst showing a hugely increased majority for 
Simpson, demonstrated the union’s move to the left, as even if the field had not 
been split and all those voting for the right wing candidates had voted for a single 
one,  Simpson would still have commanded a large majority (Callow 2011: 337). 
Simpson accepted the result as a clear mandate to press ahead with the merger, 
however, the election had caused the process to slow to an almost complete halt. 
Campaigns had lost focus with many of the officers tasked with administering them 
engaged in electioneering for their preferred candidate and important decisions had 
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been deferred by the National Executive Council until the result of the election was 
known (ibid: 337). Callow (2011: 330) notes that:- 
Many of the problems that would dog the new union during its fledgling 
existence stemmed from the loss of these crucial months, when, instead 
of drawing more closely together, the T&G and Amicus were 
unexpectedly and unnecessarily kept apart, amid a prevailing 
atmosphere of uncertainty.  
The recession, which took hold in 2009, hit the new union hard with the 
November 2009 Joint General Secretaries’ Report to the Executive Committee 
stating that whilst 11,000 new members had been recruited that year over 
65,000 had been lost. This difficult economic situation led to large numbers of 
staff choosing to take voluntary redundancy and further reviews of the union’s 
property portfolio.  
As outlined above, having gone through what some would say was an 
unnecessary election in 2009 the union again was to hold an election for 
general secretary, in line with its rules, in 2010. The winner of this election 
would then take the post of general secretary elect in January 2011, becoming 
the General Secretary in January 2012 after the retirement of Woodley. In the 
event, the election was won by the candidate backed by Woodley, Len 
McCluskey, prompting Woodley to announce his early retirement  as General 
Secretary, to take place at the same time as Simpson, leaving the way open 
for McCluskey to take office in December 2011. McCluskey indicated during 
this election that he only planned to stand as a one term General Secretary. 
Therefore, it came as a shock to some when in December 2012 he asked the 
Executive Council to sanction an immediate election, citing not wishing for a 
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contest in 2015, which would clash with the general election and announced 
plans to stand for re-election.  
The election ran between January and April, with McCluskey and Hicks the 
only candidates. McCluskey won with 144,570 votes to 79,819 and was 
declared re-elected on the 14th April 2013. McCluskey, in his statement to the 
Executive Council, specified that he would not be standing for a further period, 
as he would be 67 at the end of that tenure.  
At this point in the thesis, prior to beginning a discussion of Unite, as an 
organisation, post-merger, it would be amiss of me not to briefly note that the 
bringing together of large, traditionally different trade unions, into one 
organisation had been played out previously to the Unite merger, with the 
creation of Unison in 1993, which at that time was to become the UK’s biggest 
union and largest representative organisation, in terms of public sector unions 
(Thornley 2000:137). 
Whilst culturally a very different union to Unite, in that it bought together three 
predominantly white collar union’s in NALGO, NUPE and COHSE as opposed 
to the industrially based unions, discussed above, that formed Unite, the 
formation of Unison is interesting in that, similarly to Unite it bought together 
workers, with quite different backgrounds (for example health workers and 
local government workers) in one organisation (Fryer 2000:25). 
Fryer explains, in terms that could be used now in relation to UNITE, that the 
formation of Unison was “a remarkable achievement” (2000:25). As with 
Amicus and the TGWU, the historical relationship between those unions 
coming together to form Unison had often been a difficult one, particularly in 
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relation to the rivalry between NUPE and COHSE, which in Fryer’s words “was 
legendry and long standing, including at senior officer level” (ibid:27). 
As with Unite there was acknowledgment of these tensions within Unison. 
Writing seven years after Unison’s creation, Rodney Bickerstaffe, who had 
been the union’s first general secretary and one of its architects, stated that in 
relation to these tensions “there are plenty of possibilities that the union might 
break up, even now” (2000:18). This demonstrates that, as with all general 
unions, such as Unison and Unite, strong leadership and clear policies and 
structures are necessary, in order that the union can function correctly. The 
failure of these structures, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, can have a 
severe effect on a union’s ability to represent its members effectively. 
 
Summary. 
This section has explained in detail the histories of the unions that came 
together in 2008 to form UNITE, focusing on issues of structure governance 
and representation. This is a very necessary section of the chapter as it 
explains to the reader the processes, successes and difficulties that have been 
gone through on the road to merger, from the early days of the small craftiest 
ASE and the plethora of unions around the dockyards and industrial towns that 
eventually formed the TGWU. This is very important as understanding the 
history of UNITE helps us to explicate some of the union’s peculiarities and 
explain why UNITE is structured the way that it is. The following section will 
discuss UNITE, as an organisation, explaining what UNITE is, how it is 
structured and the issues that have arisen in terms of its key policies and the 
way it is able to represent it’s members. 
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Part two. 
This section will discuss UNITE as an organisation, beginning by explaining 
what the union is in terms of its structures. This will entail a detailed 
investigation of the unions size and structures, including its industrial and 
branch organisation. This will lead to a discussion of democracy within the 
union, explaining how these structures are theoretically supposed to work, 
highlighting some of the issues that have arisen from contradictions in the 
union’s policy claims, such as that of being an organising union. This section 
will explain how the backgrounds and histories of the unions that have come 
together, over almost two hundred years, to make up Unite, have impacted on 
the union’s policies, democratic structures and ability to represent its 
members. It will also demonstrate the complexities of researching a union of 
this size, linking to the problems highlighted in the previous chapter, in 
reference to the weakness and compartmentalisation of contemporary 
literature in this field. 
According to its 2013 return to the certification officer, published in June 2014, 
Unite is a union of 1,405,071 members. Of these, 1,310,619 members are in 
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Great Britain, 43,242 are in Northern Ireland, 34,390 are in the Republic of 
Ireland and 16,790 are elsewhere abroad, including the Channel Islands. The 
union has a national executive council of sixty five lay members (Unite, 
2013:23). Thirty five of these are from the union’s twenty one industrial sectors, 
twenty six are from the ten regions and four are elected in the national 
constituencies reserved for Unite’s four equality streams, covering Woman 
members, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender members, Disabled 
members and Black Asian and Ethnic Minority members (Unite, 2013:18). In 
addition to this there are, at present, also two observer roles, for young and 
retired members, however, these do not have voting rights and are not 
enshrined in the union’s rule book. The number of representatives from each 
region and sector is determined by size. In the regions, when the membership 
figures are struck, those with less than 150,000 members, receive two 
representatives; those over 150,000 but less than 200,000 have three; and 
those over 200,000 have four. In reference to the sectors, those with less than 
50,000 members have one representative, with more than 50,000 but less than 
100,000 have two; and over 100,000 three. The executive is re-elected every 
three years and is the highest decision making body in the union after the 
national conference. 
As discussed above, Unite has a federal structure, with twenty one separate 
industrial sectors that operate at both a regional and national level. New 
sectors may be created and existing ones amalgamated by the executive, “on 
the basis of industrial logic and developing patterns of membership 
organisation” (Unite 2013:10). Each sector is led, in theory, by a national 
industrial sector committee (NISC) of lay members elected from the regional 
industrial sector committees (RISC) which are, in turn, elected from regional 
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industrial conferences held every two years. Each sector also has a biannual 
national industrial sector conference, where members are able to debate and 
adopt their own sectorial policies, as long as these are consistent with the 
union’s general rules or aims.  
The union has ten regions, each of which has a regional committee of lay 
representatives, elected from the RISCs and area activist committees. The 
regional committees are responsible for the management of the union at a 
regional level, in line with the decisions of the executive. Each region has a 
young activist forum which feeds into a national young members’ forum and 
there are regional and national committees and conferences in the four 
equality streams discussed above (Unite, 2013:13).  
Away from the industrial structures of the union, there is a national policy 
conference every two years and a national rules amendment conference every 
four years. The policy conference is attended by delegates from the industrial 
and regional structures of the union. Motions are allowed if they deal with the 
general policies of the union but are not allowed if they require a change in rule 
or if they are concerned exclusively with the industrial policy of one industrial 
sector (Unite, 2013:19-20). The rules conference, which takes place every four 
years is constituted the same way as the policy conference and has the 
purpose of amending the union’s rules. Motions are accepted from the union’s 
branches and regional structures and also the executive, which is able to 
submit motions and amendments, including at short notice if required. Rules 
may also be amended between conferences by the executive if there is a 
necessity to do so. Amendments by the Executive Committee may only 
happen if they are agreed to by more than 75% of the executives members, 
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and then only on the understanding that they cease to stand at the conclusion 
of the next rules conference, unless that conference has ratified the change 
(Unite, 2013:21-22). 
The General Secretary of Unite, who, at the time of writing is Len McCluskey, 
is elected by a ballot of the whole membership no less frequently that every 
five years. The General Secretary is responsible for the union’s general 
running and for implementing the decisions of the Executive Council. The 
General Secretary has the right to be present at any and all union meetings 
and committees and may delegate to other union members any such power 
that they possess and deem necessary. They are ultimately under the control 
of the national executive. 
A member led union? 
All Unite members are allocated to a branch, which wherever possible should 
be based on the workplace. However, there is provision for local/composite 
branches and also branches based on a local industrial sector or National 
industrial sector, such as the Ministry of Defence Fire and Rescue branch. The 
present policy on branches, introduced after a review in 2011, is that they 
should, wherever possible, be based on the workplace.  
The review, as part of Unite’s strategy of being a member led organisation, 
was introduced to give branches a greater role in the union, making them more 
relevant to the members whilst also bringing the union’s resources closer to 
the membership. Unite has made being a ‘member-led’ union one of its key 
values stating as its representational vision that it “values a modern approach 
to member representation and prides itself on being member led” (Unite, 
2015). However, if this is indeed the case then how does this fit with Turner’s 
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theories of union governance? Also, whilst this is written into the union’s aims 
and vision, the union does not mention being member led within its rule book. 
Rule 2.1.2 states that the object of the union is:- 
 to defend and improve its members’ wages and working conditions 
including the pursuit of equal pay for work of equal value. To help our 
members win in the workplace, using the union’s resources to assist 
in this process, and to support our members in struggle including 
through strike action (Unite 2013:2).   
Whilst this rule shows a commitment to supporting and helping its members, it 
also appears to point to a top down approach rather than bottom up. This is 
closer to Turner’s popular bossdom theory of governance and also 
demonstrates another tension within the union, that of organising versus 
servicing. Unite refers to itself as “a truly organising union”. Since 2011, this 
has been linked almost inseparably to the union’s 100% campaign. The 100% 
campaign, launched formally in 2011, is a strategy whereby Unite has 
focussed its organising efforts on building and developing its industrial power 
where it has existing bargaining agreements.  
Headed up by the national organising department, which co-ordinates the 
activities of the regional organisers, the 100% campaign is a key element of 
the union’s growth strategy. Since its launch the union has recruited 150,875 
new members in workplaces targeted by the campaign along with 11,615 new 
activists. However, Unite does not publish the figures of how many of these 
members stay in the union after the initial campaign moves on. Another 
criticism of the 100% campaign is that whilst it may have had some success 
this is only in those areas where the union already has a presence and does 
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nothing to gain membership in workplaces where the union has no presence 
or does but has no formal bargaining arrangements.  
This is where a contradiction occurs. Whilst the union puts large amounts of 
resources into organising, it often reverts to servicing for those areas where no 
bargaining arrangements exist. This is demonstrated within the guidelines for 
union branches, where a percentage of the funds allocated from the union are 
dependent on the branch having a lay officer to provide representation. Whilst 
this may fit within organising where the branch is connected to a workplace, it 
also very much fits within a servicing agenda when the branch is a local one 
covering multiple workplaces. Where the latter is the case there is a 
contradiction in the union’s policy.  
Within the geographical area covered by a local/composite branch there will 
often be workplaces that are organised and those that are not. In the case of 
those that are organised, it is likely there will be elected representatives, who 
will deal with at least first stage representative responsibilities, and will need 
limited contact with the local branch or full time officers. However, where 
workplaces have members but no organisation it is the responsibility of either 
the branch, where a representative officer has been nominated or a regional 
officer, where they have not, to carryout representational duties where they are 
required by members. At odds with the organising agenda those representing 
members through this servicing model have no responsibilities to organise the 
workplace that they go into or to refer them to the organising teams. Therefore, 
members in these workplaces are likely to remain unorganised and reliant on 
the union servicing them from outside the workplace. 
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Returning to Unite’s claims to be member led, this is at odds with another of 
the union’s key strategies, leverage. Leverage is the use of union resources to 
make all interested parties aware of the treatment that Unite members have 
received or are receiving at the hands of their employer. The parties could 
include shareholders, competitors, or customers of the employer or employing 
organisation, or the communities in which an employer is based or operates.  
The purpose of leverage is, by making the parties aware of an issue, to bring 
enough pressure to bear that an employer is forced to change a practice or 
else face the negative consequences of carrying them on in the public eye. 
Leverage, as with organising, within Unite is led not by members but is highly 
centralised and led by full time organisers.  
Action taken as part of leverage often includes Unite members taking part in 
lawful protests, organised by the union’s national or regional organising teams. 
Protests may be held outside workplaces, in communities or in some cases 
outside the residences of senior managers or shareholders, where the union 
feels they will be able to get the message across most clearly. Leverage, as 
stated by Unite, is not a call for unofficial industrial action as it comes within 
the sphere of lawful protest. Unite also makes it clear that leverage is not a 
replacement for the need for collective strength, stating that “the development 
of industrial power remains vital if workers are to have the ability to win long-
term. Leverage does not offer a solution that excludes the critical need to 
organise worker” (Unite 2015). 
Here, however, is another contradiction in the policies of Unite. The above 
statement makes it clear that Unite believes strongly in the continuation and 
necessity for strong workplace industrial unionism. This is strongly rooted in 
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the union’s industrial structures, and organising practices, including the use of 
leverage. However, again there is tension here, within the union, between the 
traditional ideas and commitments to industrial unionism and Unite’s 
community unionism initiative. Community membership of Unite is an initiative 
whereby people from outside of the workplace, such as students and the 
unemployed can join Unite for fifty pence a week. Membership is billed by the 
union as a way to introduce organisation and activism into the heart of the 
community, countering Conservative policies, such as privatisation in the NHS 
and cuts to welfare, and allowing people a channel through which to express 
their political voice. Unite community members have also been utilised by the 
organising department to be involved in protests as part of leverage 
campaigns.  
Whilst Unite may bill the objectives of community membership as those 
explained in the previous paragraph, it is also sold with a number of servicing 
style benefits. Indeed on a leaflet distributed by Unite titled “15 Reasons to 
Join Unite Community Membership”, all fifteen reasons given for joining were 
benefits which would be expected as part of a servicing model, such as legal 
benefits and financial services and products. There is no mention of political 
voice or community activism. This raises a question as to the reason why 
people would join such membership. Is it to be part of a movement or is it to 
access the benefits available to them. If it is the latter then it is unlikely that 
many of these members are going to wish to be involved with campaigning 
and also not certain that they will take their membership with them into 
employment. 
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This section has demonstrated a number of tensions and contradictions within 
a modern trade union, showing the considerable gap that has emerged 
between the traditional theories of structure and government and 
contemporary complexities of modern trade unionism. Where does Unite fit in 
terms of the traditional classifications? It is definitely an open and general 
union, to take two of the traditional descriptions; However, its goal of being a 
member led organisation is at odds with what should be expected from an 
organisation of this type, which as Turner and Hughes described, should be 
highly autocratic with low membership participation. With it being open and 
general it would be expected to fall within the popular bossdom style of union 
governance. Whilst that may indeed still turn out to be the case, the federal, 
industry sector based, structure of Unite is designed so that each sector has 
reasonable autonomy over its own affairs mitigating the effect of an all-
powerful general secretary. England (2008) and Smith (2008) state, in terms 
of the TGWU, that the Jack Jones era was the end of the popular bossdom 
form of government, due to the arrival of lay democracy. But is that correct? 
The regimes of Todd and Morris, point to a different narrative and in Unite, 
whilst the executive council has 65 members, the General Secretary has the 
executive powers between meetings and can declare an issue vital for policy, 
requiring a vote of 75% of executive members, to reverse the decision (McIlroy 
and Daniels, 2009:144). It could be that each of the sectors could have their 
own popular bossdom based around an officer or NISC leadership, or in fact 
an aristocracy may have emerged based on trade, politics or background (e.g. 
Amicus versus TGWU). What is clear is that a union as complex as Unite, 
which did not exist at the time that Turner and Hughes were theorising, will not 
easily fit into one of the traditional classifications.  
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There are other contradictions too, between the traditional industrial relations 
texts and the modern union. All the classifications of union in terms of the UK, 
discuss workers. The Webb’s famous definition of a trade union, as a 
“continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of improving the 
conditions of their working lives” (1902:1), Flanders defines unions as 
organisations that “defend and, if possible improve their members’ terms and 
conditions of employment” (1976:21). So where does Unite’s community 
membership fit in? These are members of the union but they are often not 
wage earners, due to being students, unemployed, retired etc. and are not in 
the union in order to improve the conditions of their working lives, they are 
members either for the benefits that they can receive, or to attempt, through 
collective action, to improve their non-working lives and the lives of those in 
their communities (Wills and Simms, 2004). 
Whilst Unite describes itself as an organising union, and indeed spends a 
considerable amount of money on organising, both nationally and regionally, 
there is still a considerable amount of servicing of members, particularly those 
outside the scope of the 100% campaign. If, as Daniels stated, servicing and 
partnership contaminate organising, with a one track focus on organising 
needed in order for success (2009:256), then can Unite truly call itself an 
organising union? Can a union the size of Unite take a one track approach, 
such as this? A national approach seems to be the answer, however, with finite 
resources does Unite have the ability to employ organising across all of its 
sectors? In addition to this how does leverage fit as a union strategy? The 
traditional discussion of what unions do is based around the Webbs’ 
discussions of mutual insurance, collective bargaining and legal enactment, 
where does leverage fit? The closest of the three would be collective 
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bargaining. However, this is described by Kelly and Heery (1994:165) as “an 
exchange of concessions” between workers and their employers which does 
not fit and whilst Flanders (1969) writes that collective bargaining has the effect 
of placing restrictions on an employer’s ability to run their business as they 
would wish, this still does not satisfactorily fit with the leverage method. 
Summary. 
This chapter has demonstrated that researching a modern union, such as 
Unite, is problematic due to the gap between the traditional theories and 
classifications and the reality of trade unions today. Whilst the traditional texts 
and theories, based on organisations that are simple in structure compared 
with a conglomerate such as Unite, do hold up to some extent there is much 
that they do not explain and the fragmented nature of research carried out 
since 1979 means that the gap that has emerged is considerable. The 
following chapter will look to move on from these issues, focusing on some of 
the issues surrounding representation in the Ministry of Defence and 
Government Establishments sector of Unite to explain some of the 
complexities of researching these issues and the way that they link to 
government and democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The complexities of trade union representation – the case of 
Unite in the Ministry of Defence. 
This chapter will look at industrial relations and union representation within the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Government Establishments sector, hereafter 
referred to as the MoD sector, of Unite. Highlighting some of the issues that arise 
when researching the links between representation and governance and 
democracy, this chapter will discuss the MoD sector in terms of its place within Unite 
and the wider civil service. It will look at how the sector operates, is structured and 
some of the dramatic changes that it faces in terms of privatisation, attacks on facility 
time and the effects of early retirement and voluntary redundancies. The aim of this 
chapter is to introduce, in some detail, the sector of Unite that will form the case 
study for this research and to move the thesis on from the issues of structure and 
governance, discussed in chapters two and three, to focus on issues of 
representation within the MoD sector. This will then link to the subsequent chapter, 
which will be a detailed discussion of union representation, more generally.  
What is the MoD Sector of Unite? 
The MoD sector is one of Unite’s twenty one industrial sectors. The largest part of 
the sector are employed by the Civil Service, including MoD agencies. However, 
there are also large numbers of members working in other Government controlled 
areas such as the prison service, research establishments and self-contained 
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entities such as the Royal Mint and the Met Office (Unite, 2015a).  There are also 
a number of members that are part of the MoD sector but who work in parts of the 
sector that have been privatised, such as, workers in the dockyards at Plymouth 
and Faslane, near Glasgow and very recently, the Defence Support Group (DSG) 
(ibid). As with other areas of the union, membership has been in steady decline 
since the 1980s. However, as opposed to some other industrial sectors, the decline 
in the MoD sector can be linked directly with government policy. Successive 
governments have imposed reviews on the sector that have led to rationalisation 
of sites and jobs and changes to the way that jobs are structured (Unite, 2015b). 
Membership figures for the sector are difficult to establish. However, in the 2014 
Executive Council Election results twelve thousand seven hundred and ninety six 
ballot papers were distributed to members of this section (Unite, 2014:10). Whilst it 
is accepted that this may not be a completely true reflection of the membership 
figures for this sector, with a high possibility that ballot papers will have been 
distributed to members that have left the sector but not reported a change of 
workplace, there is also just as high a probability that there will be some members 
working in the sector who have not declared so. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
research twelve thousand seven hundred and ninety six is accepted as the best 
estimate available. The MoD sector is a small part of the union’s public sector group 
which brings hundreds of thousands of members together from a number of different 
sectors including, Education, Health and Local Authorities, which are proportionately 
much larger. 
The MoD sector is a nationally dispersed group with establishments and members 
in all ten regions of the union, plus Gibraltar. The size of workplaces varies massively 
between very large workplaces employing hundreds, such as the larger Defence 
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Support Group and Land Systems sites at Bovington in Dorset and Donnington in 
Shropshire, and very small workplaces, employing just a handful of members, such 
as Sennybridge in Wales. The union branch structures, within this sector are 
complicated. The MoD Fire and Rescue service, members of which are 
predominantly from the former TGWU, have a national branch which covers all 
members in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but is based in the South 
West region. This is also the case for the MoD Guard Service, members of which 
are classed as non-industrial, meaning that they are deemed to be either clerical or 
managerial, as opposed to manual workers, who are referred to as industrial. The 
rational for these branches is that whilst there are considerable numbers of members 
in these occupational groups across the country, they are in small pockets (Unite, 
2013:36) and the specialist nature of these members’ jobs lends itself to a national 
branch structure. These branches have reserved seats on the National Industrial 
Sector Committee (NISC) but may also stand for election in the regions in which they 
work. This set up has the potential to cause some resentment amongst members 
outside of these occupations, who may question why the Fire and Rescue and 
Guards members appear to have two avenues to the NISC when they only have the 
one. Away from the two national branches there is a mix of branch structures across 
the MoD. 
The Unite branch review, outlined in the previous chapter, encouraged the setting 
up of branches based on the workplace or, if this is not possible, industrial sector. In 
the main the option of workplace branches has been taken up quite widely in the 
MoD sector, with a number workplaces opting to set up these branches. However, 
the second option of having MoD branches has also been taken up in some cases, 
for reasons that are not immediately clear. Further, other workplaces in this sector 
have opted to remain part of local composite branches, which is especially the case 
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in circumstances where the number of members is very small or the size of the 
workplace does not support a workplace or MoD branch.  Examples of this are DSG 
Bovington in Dorset, which opened a workplace branch, members having previously 
been dispersed across a large number of  geographical branches, based on their 
home address and DSG Donnington, which joined other MoD workers at the large 
Donnington MoD site to form an MoD sector branch. 
The MoD sector has one Unite national officer whom it currently shares with the 
union’s Education sector (Unite, 2015). Up until 2012 the role of national officer for 
the MoD sector was always a dedicated one. However, with the falling number of 
members in the sector caused by cuts and privatisations, this appears to have been 
deemed unsustainable, heralding the change. The sector primarily has been run on 
a servicing model, with the Whitley system of industrial relations (discussed below), 
contributing to a reliance on the sector’s national officer and lay national 
representatives. There is little evidence of organising having taken place in the 
sector, at least on a formal basis, with those workplaces that are well organised, 
being based more on traditions than on any sort of strategy. Reliance on this system 
has left union members exposed as national officer coverage and facility time for lay 
representatives has been reduced. The system of industrial relations used within the 
sector, which will be discussed in detail below, has meant that regional officers have 
been massively underutilised in this sector, due to bargaining taking place mainly at 
a national level.  
This section has outlined the MoD sector of Unite. It has explained what the sector 
is, what it covers and how it fits into the previously discussed industrial structures of 
Unite. The following section will now focus on the department’s industrial relations 
systems, with particular emphasis on Whitleyism. 
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Whitleyism in the Ministry of Defence. 
Whitleyism is associated with the Rt. Hon. John Henry Whitley MP, chair of the 
parliamentary committee set up in 1917, as a subcommittee of the reconstruction 
committee, to report on the relations of employers and employees (Seifert 
1992:207).  At the time of the committee being set up widespread industrial action 
was hampering the war effort (Parris, 1973:25). Two million working days were lost 
to strike action in 1915, rising to two and a half million the following year (ibid).  The 
Whitley Committee report recommended the adoption of formal negotiating 
machinery through the adoption of Joint Industrial Councils (JIC) in particular 
industries that had the purpose of making national, industry wide agreements 
(Seifert 1992:207). To support this, district committees would work beneath and be 
subordinate to the JIC and works committees would be set up, for consultative 
purposes in particular workplaces (Coates and Topham, 1988:177). Also proposed 
was a government backed voluntary Board of Arbitration, for settlement of disputes 
and recourse to a Court of Inquiry in the case of major intractable disputes (ibid). 
These structures, it was hoped, would regulate the relationships between employers 
and employees, bringing about industrial harmony and efficiency.  
 However, whilst the government of the day accepted the proposals and urged 
industry to do the same, it was less warm to the idea that the councils should be 
applied in the public sector. The government, via the Ministry of Labour, sent out a 
letter to trade unions and employer associations in October 1917 explaining the new 
scheme, whilst ensuring that it was understood that in no way was it proposed that 
the state would be interfering in the running of industry (Flanders, 1968:86). 
However, the letter was not sent to any of the unions or employer associations 
representing public sector workers.   
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In fact, it was not until July 1919 that the Civil Service National Whitley Council met 
for the first time, after much negotiation. The objects of the council were “to secure 
the greatest measure of co-operation between the state in its capacity as employer, 
and the general body of civil servants in matters affecting the civil service, with a 
view to increased efficiency in the public service combined with the well-being of 
those employed; to provide machinery for dealing with grievances, and generally to 
bring together the experience and different points of view of representatives of the 
administrative, clerical and manipulative civil service” (Parris, 1973:15). The rules of 
the council enshrined collective bargaining with the statement that all grievances 
must be taken as a collectively with no discussion of individual cases permissible.  
Whilst the Whitley reports recommended that the JIC should have executive powers 
to make agreements and decisions, this was not rolled out to the Civil Service. This 
was due to concerns that a Minister could be put into the position of being bound by 
a decision made by subordinates, of which they felt unable to defend (ibid). Staff 
leaders complained that this left the ultimate power in the hands of the Minister, as 
had been the case previously, with no ability to make an appeal to Parliament. One 
leader stated that “the scheme looked like Whitley, smelt like Whitley, almost tasted 
like Whitley, but it was not Whitley” (Parris, 1973:29). 
Whitley, in the industrial civil service, had been accepted a year previous to that 
discussed above, for non-industrial staff. Separate and different from the non-
industrial Whitley system, the industrial system was originally set up around five 
departmental industrial councils, one for the environment and the other four in the 
Army, Navy, Air Force and Procurement Department. Under these, the majority of 
establishments had local Whitley committees at workplace levels which dealt with 
matters concerning local working conditions and local application of national 
agreements (ibid:183).  
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Initially the scheme was a partial success, with seventy three councils set up 
between 1918 and 1921. This number shrank after the end of the First World War 
with just forty five still operating by 1938 as “many of these bodies failed to survive 
the period of industrial conflict which ended with General Strike” (Flanders, 1968:86). 
There was a revival, as Britain again went to war, with around one hundred and 
eleven councils in existence by the end of World War Two and around two hundred 
by 1965 (Coates and Topham, 1988:180; Flanders, 1968:86).  
The scheme particularly took hold in the public sector, “with elaborate structures of 
national bargaining committees going under the generic name of Whitley Councils” 
(Coates and Topham, 1988:180). Within a few years of that first Whitley Council 
being set up in the Civil Service in 1919, there were councils set up for manual 
workers in the local authorities,  teachers and railway workers and the Whitley model 
became the standard industrial relations machinery after the Second World War, for 
the National Health Service and nationalised industries. “Herein lay the origins of the 
centralised and rather bureaucratic collective bargaining machinery that is assumed 
to characterise public sector industrial relations and pay bargaining” (Winchester, 
1983:162). By 1969 the number of industrial staff in the Civil Service stood at two 
hundred and thirteen thousand four hundred, the vast majority of which were 
employed across the Ministry of Defence, with smaller numbers in other 
departments, such as the Royal Mint and Home Office. These workers were 
represented by twenty six different unions, which had involvement in the seventy 
departmental Whitley committees that existed. These covered every department and 
ministry, with one council in each, with the exception of the Post Office which had 
two (Parris, 1973:159). 
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Having discussed the makeup of Unite in the MoD and the key principles of Whitley 
as the system of industrial relations employed by the sector, the next section will turn 
to some of the tensions that have been bought to the fore by a union that has gone 
through and continues to go through tremendous amounts of change, brought about 
by a merger of two previously competing and often very different unions, with 
different traditions and histories. 
Internal Tensions in a New Union. 
Prior to the merger, whilst the TGWU was predominant in some areas, particularly 
MoD storage and distribution, Amicus was the biggest trade union operating in the 
MoD for industrial grades. Amicus held the vast majority of union positions in terms 
of Whitley and other committees with two national lay officers, one of which was the 
union side MoD Whitley secretary. The union’s national officer was lead negotiator 
on the MoD national Industrial pay committee and also all industrial pay committees 
across the MoD’s agencies and departments.  Amicus also held the position of Vice 
Chair on the MoD Departmental Industrial Whitley committee and all national Whitley 
committees. This demonstrates the dominance of Amicus, in terms of industrial trade 
union members in the MoD. As mentioned above, the TGWU had members in most 
areas of the sector, and in some cases was the dominant union. However, these 
cases were few and in most cases specialised, such as the MoD Fire and Rescue 
Service and MoD Guard Service, the latter of which are formally non industrial staff. 
The GMB and UCATT also had, and continue to have, members in the department. 
However, in the case of the GMB this tends to be in specific areas, such as DSG 
Ashchurch, where the union for historical reasons is strong. UCATT has seen its 
membership dwindle over recent years to the extent that discussions have taken 
place, at departmental level, on whether to derecognise the union. Whilst this has 
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not happened, as of yet, it demonstrates the weakness of UCATTs position in the 
MoD. Amicus took advantage of this, by taking UCATTs designated seats on most 
Whitley committees so as to increase its industrial power over the sector.  
The creation of Unite had a number of implications for the sector in terms of its 
running. The MoD section is at odds with the union nationally. Effectively, the TGWU 
leadership took control of Unite, after the retirements of Tony Woodley and Derek 
Simpson and the election of Len McCluskey. Former TGWU members and officers 
were located in many of the union’s key positions, with significant numbers of 
Amicus officials choosing to take voluntary redundancy as part of the union’s post-
merger rationalisation process. However, post-merger, the MoD sector of Unite 
continued to be dominated by the Amicus side of the merger. Whilst representatives 
from both sides were integrated into the union’s various committees, former Amicus 
representatives continued to hold key positions, including Chair and Vice Chair of 
the National Industrial Sector Committee as well as the majority of Regional 
Industrial Sector Chairs.  
The National Officer of the sector has always come from the Amicus side of the 
Union and, prior to the employee relations review outlined below, Amicus 
representatives were appointed to all three of the union’s National Lay 
Representative positions. National Lay representatives are full time positions within 
the MoD, filled by senior union representatives, who are appointed to these posts 
by their unions. Working between the national officers and the senior stewards, the 
aim of these posts was to oil the wheels of consultation, by having these 
representatives stationed at Whitehall.  
Unite is now seven years old, meaning that there are now a number of union 
representatives and many Unite members who do not identify as either ex-Amicus 
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or ex-TGWU, due to having joined after the union was created. On the face of it, this 
should mean a breaking down of some of the tribalism that is created by union 
mergers of this size. However, as in many cases workplaces had a traditional bias 
to one or other of the merged unions, it is likely that this will continue. 
In terms of size, Unite is a minority union within the MoD sector. In the prison service 
Unite is the third largest union behind the Prison Officers Association (POA) and 
Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS). Within the MoD Unite is the second 
largest union behind the significantly larger PCS. Prior to the removal of the 
separate industrial and non-industrial Whitley structures, in favour of a joint one, this 
was not an issue for Unite, which was by far the biggest union recognised by the 
department for industrial grades. With the GMB only having pockets of members 
and UCATT less than that, Unite was able to dominate the job territories in which it 
operates. However, with the introduction of a joint Whitley structure this changed. 
Unite now finds itself as a junior partner to the PCS. This will obviously have an 
effect on the way that Unite has to operate within the sector in order to achieve the 
best outcomes for its members.  
This section has researched and explained some of the issues that have been 
bought about by a merger of two unions, of differing origins and traditions, and the 
tensions that this has caused internally. The following section will examine some of 
the external tensions that have been placed on members and the union, by a job 
territory which has declined and continues to shrink, with change occurring due to 
rationalisation of jobs and sites. 
External Tensions. 
The job territory in which Unite operates has faced, and continues to face, dramatic 
changes. In recent years the sector has faced privatisation, attacks on union facility 
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time, the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1995), and high 
turnover of staff, through early retirement and voluntary redundancies. All of these 
challenges have had an effect of some type on the sector.  
Whilst this study is predominantly looking at public sector change, since the 
beginning of the 21st century, this cannot be done without looking at change that 
came before it, specifically in terms of the moves towards NPM, mentioned above, 
which Hood described as being “one of the most striking international trends in 
public administration” (1995:3). Whilst there are differing views on exactly what NPM 
actually entails, Hood (ibid) defines it well, as being an attempt to slow or reverse 
the growth of government, in terms of spending and staffing; increased privatisation 
and subcontracting; the development of more automated ways of producing and 
distributing public services; and the development of a more international agenda in 
regards to inter-governmental cooperation, policy and public management design. 
It is against this backdrop that we now turn to the developments in the MoD with 
which this study is primarily concerned. 
Large numbers of voluntary redundancies, known as voluntary early release (VER), 
began under the New Labour governments (1997 to 2010) and continued under the 
Conservative-led Coalition government, with no signs of change under the present 
Conservative administration. The Guardian (2011) reported that the 2010 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) had announced that twenty five thousand job 
cuts would be made in the MoD before 2015 and that this figure had been upped by 
a further seven thousand, meaning that the Department’s headcount has been 
reduced from seventy five thousand to forty thousand in nine years. Job losses of 
this magnitude, in a heavily unionised sector such as the MoD, have obviously had 
an effect on the unions. In fact, with the high density of union membership in the 
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civil service, this has meant that the union has seen a reduction in membership out 
of proportion to the number of people leaving. Also, this same period has seen a 
large amount of rationalisation, meaning that sites and workshops have been 
closed, privatised or outsourced such as the outsourcing of engineering and 
maintenance at the Faslane naval base in 2002 to Babcocks, the closure of 
Llangennech’s Defence Storage and Distribution Centre (DSDC) in 2008 and the 
DSG Aircraft Maintenance Facility at RAF St Athan. This was all followed with the 
sale of the majority of the DSG, to Babcocks, which was confirmed on the 17th 
December 2014 and completed on the 1st May 2015. Union responses to this have 
varied. In the case of DSG, a hard fought campaign was organised in an attempt to 
halt the privatisation. However, this was ultimately fruitless, although a small part of 
the operation has been retained within the public sector. 
Official figures show that, as of the 1st April 2015, the overall head count in the 
civilian MoD was fifty eight thousand one hundred and sixty, a fall of twenty seven 
thousand six hundred and ninety since 2010 (www.gov.co.uk, 2015:1). The rate of 
reduction continued to fall between January 2014 and January 2015 by an average 
of one percent per quarter. The foot print that the MoD has, covers most of the 
United Kingdom, with important naval facilities in the south of England and Scotland 
and the Army and Royal Air Force having sites across all four nations. At the time 
of the research DSG had eight sites, of varying size and this is mirrored across other 
agencies in the MoD such as Land Systems. 
The response of Amicus to this outsourcing was to move the members concerned 
into the appropriate sector for their industry, for example members at the Faslane 
naval facility were moved into the Aerospace and Ship Building Sector after the work 
that they did was contracted to Babcocks. However the recent trend, in Unite, has 
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been to retain these members in the MoD Sector in order to keep the sector as a 
viable entity. This strategy raises questions as to how these members can be 
properly represented when their terms and conditions are primarily negotiated 
outside of the sector’s sphere of influence. Babcocks, for example, as a private 
sector defence contractor, primarily comes under the brief of the Shipbuilding and 
Aerospace Sector Committee and the National officer of that sector, Ian Waddell. 
So taking the case of DSG, if it is to remain within the MoD Sector, will it be Ian 
Waddell leading negotiations on pay and conditions, as he does for the majority of 
Babcocks, or Mike McCarthy, as National officer for the MoD and Government 
Departments? It is questionable whether this strategy is in the best interests of the 
majority of sector’s members or the interests of those union officials and activists 
who rely on the MoD sector to keep them in positions of influence. 
This section has examined some of the external pressures that have been placed 
on Unite by a job territory, that has and continues to go through a great deal of 
change in terms of its size and make up. The following section will look at the new 
employee relations regime, now operating in the MoD. This will firstly identify the 
key changes that have taken place in reference to the department’s Whitley system, 
explaining how it has evolved from its original incarnation (see above) and how it 
continues to change, outlining the problems that these changes could and have 
caused Unite. After this there will be an in-depth look at the main themes of the 2012 
employee relations review, again highlighting and discussing the key issues and 
implications, of this, for Unite. 
 
 
New Employee Relations in the MoD. 
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Whilst the Whitley system within the MoD has changed significantly in recent years, 
the principles are still very much those set down in 1918 and 1919. Traditionally, 
Whitley Councils in the public sector, were divided into different councils based 
around skills and grades (Coates and Topham, 1988:180-181). The MoD had 
separate departmental Whitley committees for industrial and non-industrial staff, 
with clear lines of representation beneath these leading to committees at first 
national and then local levels, following the Whitley pattern. This was changed in 
2013, after a review of Employee Relations carried out by the department, when the 
dual industrial and non-industrial structures were replaced by a single, joint 
structure, which is discussed below. The constitution of the MoD’s Joint Whitley 
committee states that its aims are “to promote effective communication and the 
involvement of the representatives of the departmentally recognised trade unions, 
and to secure continuous improvement in efficiency coupled with the wellbeing of 
MoD civilians” (Annex A). The scope of the council covers “all matters affecting the 
conditions of service of all UK-based civil servants employed in the MoD, except 
those concerning pay, allowances and related conditions” (ibid).  
For the industrial unions, particularly Unite, the move to a single Whitley structure 
has marked a step change in how they operate within the MoD. The MoD Civil 
Service Unions (MCSU), which bought together the industrial unions with their non-
industrial counterparts, the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS), Prospect 
and the First Division Association (FDA), replaced the system previously in place 
where by each union had a lay representative, based in Whitehall, who enjoyed 
100% facility time. 
The role of the MCSU is “too promote, maintain and encourage an effective ER link 
to the department’s recognised TUs” (Annex B). However, in a major change to 
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previous arrangements, with the exception of the MCSU Chair, all other established 
posts, including secretary, are filled by the department, through its selection process 
(ibid), rather than by the 100% lay representatives, selected by the unions. This 
change, agreed to by the unions, effectively means that in terms of consultation, 
department employees, rather than union representatives are responsible for 
collating union responses. This raises questions as to the effectiveness of this 
system. What happens if two of the unions put forward arguments that are 
diametrically opposed? Formally, the Whitley secretary, as a lay union 
representative, would have attempted to get agreement from all the unions to a 
united response. However, under the new system this would mean the opposing 
arguments would be put forward as they are. This raises questions of independence 
and appears to be more resembling of a public consultation process than an 
industrial one. 
Each of Unite’s regions has a regional officer with responsibilities for the MoD sector. 
However, as noted above, the amount of contact between the regions and the sector 
differs from one to another and is, in the main, underutilised compared to other 
sectors. The use of the Whitley system and national pay negotiations across the 
sector means that the scope for local or regional bargaining is limited. The role of 
local representatives is primarily to implement and interpret national agreements at 
the workplace. Whilst still working well in some workplaces, it is questionable 
whether it is completely fit for purpose in industrial conditions that have changed 
significantly since the inception of the Whitley system almost one hundred years ago. 
The MoD, and indeed the Civil Service, is much more fragmented when compared 
to even thirty years ago. Some parts of the MoD, in particularly its Executive 
Agencies, have jurisdiction to bargain over issues such as conditions and pay, which 
would have been nationally bargained over in the past. In addition to this, the 
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introduction of Human Resource Management and private sector management 
practices has meant it is now more likely to see local agreements being made, which 
interpret national agreements, meaning that the importance of workplace bargaining 
has increased. This is happening at a time when facility time is being squeezed and 
the time the MoD Unite national officer has to dedicate to the MoD is falling, and 
means that more work will be placed on regional officials. However, as the Whitley 
system has ensured, for a long time, that these officials have been kept disengaged 
from bargaining in this sector, it is yet to be tested whether these officers have the 
knowledge or relevant experience to fill the gap in representation which exists. 
The Civil Service undertook a review of employee relations between 2012 and 2013. 
This was a far reaching review, covering changes to many terms and conditions, 
including holidays and trigger points for administrative action in reference to illness. 
The review also included a review of trade union facility time and facilities, of which 
consultation was launched on the 13th July 2012 (Annex C). The review of facilities 
had first been mooted in October 2011. As part of the Coalition Government’s 
austerity programme, it had been proposed that as the Civil Service was facing cuts, 
the unions could not be immune to this. The consultation paper launched in July 
2012 states that there are (at that time) at least 6,800 union representatives across 
the Civil Service though there is no breakdown of what types of representative these 
are. The total cost to the department of facilities and facility time provided to union 
representatives is estimated as thirty six million pounds a year with the government 
stating that “at a time when departmental budgets are under great pressure we need 
to ensure the current provisions for trade union facility time represent the best value 
for money” (Government 2012:4). It goes on to say that “providing value for money 
is critical for all areas of business and this includes spending on facility time. “We 
have to ensure that the time we pay for Civil Service trade union representatives to 
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spend on their trade union duties and activities is appropriate, accountable and that 
the value is identifiable within a reformed and modernised Civil Service” (ibid).  
Some, such as the Labour Party, TUC and Civil Service unions have framed these 
changes to trade union facilities as an ideological attack, with Labour spokeswoman 
Lucy Powell stating in March 2015 that they were a continuation of the coalition’s 
policy of disenfranchising workers in the public sector (BBC,2015). However, as can 
be seen from the above statements, the government has been very careful to paint 
the changes as part of its austerity measures. Francis Maude in March 2015 told 
Parliament that whilst supporting the principle of facilities, the time union 
representatives use needed to be “controlled and monitored, and it was 
unacceptable that tax payers were having to pay for their expenses and travel costs 
to attend trade union meetings and conference” (HC Deb 2015).  
The main proposals of the consultation paper were gathered under four headings: 
developing a common system for reporting and monitoring facility time; limiting the 
use of one hundred percent of representatives’ time being used on trade union 
duties and activities; making it the default position that time off for union activities 
be unpaid; and the reduction of overall facility time across the Civil Service. Of these 
four proposals all but the third, making union activities subject to unpaid leave, were 
implemented in full. In terms of point three, there was a small amendment in that it 
was agreed that paid time off could be appropriate, if it could be proved that eighty 
percent of a meeting’s agenda was in relation to issues that directly affected the 
particular civil service department in question. 
The first proposal, developing a common reporting and monitoring procedure was, 
in the main, a tidying up exercise from what already existed with the review stating 
that several departments already had procedures to monitor the use of facility time. 
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In order to bring these different practices together the review proposed a common 
reporting mechanism for departments, with representatives expected to keep a 
mandatory record of the time they spend on union duties and activities. With this in 
place, departments are expected to publish details of facility time and benchmarking 
the amount of time spent of specific duties was introduced in order to prove that the 
money spent of on a duty is “appropriate to the needs of the duty” (Government 
2012).  
The second proposal, to limit the use of one hundred percent facility time 
representatives, had far bigger repercussions for the unions than the first. At the 
time of the review, it was reported that there were two hundred and fifty union reps 
across the civil service who spent one hundred percent of their time on union duties 
and activities. In 2015, Francis Maude reported that this number had fallen to eight 
(HC Deb 2015). The review stated that “we believe for a trade union representative 
to function effectively and be able adequately to represent the views of employees, 
it is necessary for them to be actively involved in the work of their department or 
agency. Representatives currently in receipt of 100% facility time do not benefit from 
business skills that would be acquired from carrying out a Civil Service role” 
(Government 2012:7). The PCS, in their response to the consultation, stated that 
whilst they recognised that there were some problems associated with 
representatives having one hundred percent facility time over a prolonged period, 
these representatives also bring a number of advantages, such as the experiences 
that are gained through dealing with broad issues, the specialist knowledge acquired 
and the relationships that can be built up between these representatives and senior 
managers.  
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The removal of these representatives has an effect on the ability of unions, operating 
in the civil service, to represent their members effectively. In the case of Unite, it has 
been highlighted in this chapter and the one previous that the use of representatives 
on one hundred percent facility time was pivotal to the representational structures 
of Unite within the MoD sector. The servicing model, often used in the sector, with 
one hundred percent representatives, such as those based in Whitehall, being 
‘parachuted in’ to deal with local level issues, was of vital importance to the 
structures of the sector. How, therefore, has or will Unite react to these changes? 
Did it attempt to fight this proposal and how has it changed, if at all, in the wake of 
the changes being bought it? 
As discussed above, small changes were conceded in reference to the third of the 
four proposals. However the main focus of the proposal, that the default position be 
for only unpaid leave to be offered for the vast majority of union activities, as 
opposed to special paid leave, was bought in after the consultation. In fact, whilst 
some union officials claimed a minor victory on this, the original proposal stated that 
“we accept that there may (be) circumstances where paid time off for activities may 
be appropriate and wish to consult on a reasonable mechanism for deciding this” 
(Government 2012:8). It would, therefore, appear that it was always the intention of 
the department to negotiate around this and that the eighty percent department 
facing rule was no major gain. 
This change has the potential to be a major issue in terms of the running of the union 
and internal governance and democracy. The vast majority of the union’s 
democratic committees and conferences take place during the working week, 
including meetings of the RISCs, NISCs, regional council and National Executive 
and also all of the union’s main conferences (Industrial, Rules, Policy). It is unlikely 
 129 
 
that any of these, prima facia, would qualify as eighty percent department facing 
and, therefore, would not be eligible for paid leave. The fallout from this could be 
enormous as the options left open to union representatives wishing to attend such 
committees will be to take their own annual holiday or unpaid leave. As annual 
holiday is finite and the majority of representatives cannot afford to take much, if 
any, leave unpaid, this could have a dramatic effect: firstly on the ability for the union 
to attract representatives to attend conferences and committees outside of the 
workplace; and secondly on attendance, with some representatives not being able 
to attend all of the committee meetings in which they have been elected to take part. 
The fourth and final proposal is a reduction in overall facility time and ensuring 
appropriate use of facilities, across the civil service. This proposal builds upon the 
other three and is the most telling in its language. This proposal states that 
“alongside proposals 1-3 we intend to consider how we can reduce overall facility 
time through rigorous line management so that the balance can be struck between 
reasonable time off and business needs and ensuring best value for money” 
(Government 2012:9). This proposal is littered with aggressive language such as, 
facility time must be “reasonable…but not excessive…employers should deal with 
requests vigorously and representatives should demonstrate requests are 
reasonable and proportionate” (ibid). It talks about the need to “ensure that the use 
of facilities e.g. telephones, photocopying and use of office accommodation, is 
appropriate and represents value for money for the taxpayer…employers should 
operate rigorous management of facility time at line management level” (ibid). The 
aggressive language in this proposal points to a belief by the department that union 
facility time and facilities have been abused.  The department has made repeated 
mention of its support for trade union facility time and that these proposals are about 
modernising the civil service, to bring it in line with the private sector, rather than a 
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union bashing exercise. However, the repeated use of words such as reasonable, 
excessive, rigorous, realistic and proportionate demonstrates the belief of the 
government that the amount of time and money attributed to union facilities is a 
problem that must be dealt with. 
Whether the intentions of the proposals made and, in the main, implemented from 
this review were to merely tighten up the slack within the system or to seriously 
curtail the ability of the union to function, internally and externally to the department, 
the outcome is that one hundred and ninety two of those representatives who had 
been granted one hundred percent facility time saw the time they were allowed to 
dedicate to union functions and duties reduced to a maximum of fifty percent. Francis 
Maude stated in parliament that the changes implemented had reduced the costs of 
union facility time to the civil service, from thirty six million to ten million pounds a 
year (HC Deb 2012).  How the unions, particularly Unite, responded to this review 
and the effects that it has had on the way that Unite is able to represent and organise 
its members will be one of the primary themes of this thesis.  
A major concern for unions organising in this part of the public sector should be the 
possible loss of experienced representatives as a consequence of these changes. 
Whilst, on the face of it, these changes will, at the very least, diminish the amount of 
time that union representatives are able to dedicate to the union, there is the 
possibility that many of the one hundred and ninety two representatives, who prior 
to the review had enjoyed one hundred percent facility time, will not carry on in their 
roles as representatives or in some cases will leave the department altogether, 
through either voluntary redundancy or resignation. If this is indeed the case then 
does Unite have any contingency plans in place to deal with such a loss? Will 
existing representatives find ways to continue their work whilst accepting the tighter 
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restriction on their time? Will new representatives step forward to fill the places of 
those that have chosen to leave? How will the union need to change its structures, 
in terms of full time officer contact, for those members who find themselves 
unrepresented? These questions will be analysed in the course of this thesis. 
Summary. 
This chapter has set out the issues that make the MoD sector of Unite quite unique 
and, therefore, very interesting in terms of researching its representational structures 
and the way that the union has had to adapt to a dramatically changing situation in 
the workplace. Whilst many of its internal structures are comparable to other parts 
of the union, it is a very small part of the UK’s biggest union and is an Amicus-
dominated sector within a TGWU-dominated union. It is also a minority union within 
the Civil Service but with a presence that punches far above its weight. The 
centralised and often bureaucratic bargaining structures, formed through almost one 
hundred years of dedication to the Whitley System, have caused a high dependence 
on the full time officials and representatives with one hundred percent facility time. 
This system of industrial relations is coming under increased pressure from the huge 
changes that have taken place in the sector, in terms of rationalisation of posts and 
sites and especially in regards to union facility time. These changes will 
unquestionably have an effect on the relationships that exist between the different 
representational levels of the union. The following chapter will take the form of a 
review of the available literature in reference to representation, particularly in 
reference to the relationships that exist between regional and national full time 
officials, one hundred percent lay representatives, convenors and local stewards.  
Linked to chapters two and three and related to the issues and peculiarities of 
representation in the Ministry of Defence, this chapter will examine research which 
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has already been carried out in this area and identify the gaps in research that exist 
and to which this thesis aims to contribute. 
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Chapter Five. Theoretical considerations when researching trade union 
representation. 
This chapter will explore the often complicated area of trade union representation. 
Having discussed union structure, the history and democratic, representational 
structures of Unite, and the intricacies of the MoD sector of the union, that will make 
up the case study, this chapter is central to the overall thesis as it will seek to explain 
the key issues in relation to union representation that will be examined in this study, 
along with the issues raised by the previous chapters.  Examining the literature that 
exists in relation to this area of research, this chapter will look at the relationships 
that form between full time officials and the multiple layers of lay representatives 
who take an active role in representing the membership and within the internal 
government of their respective unions. The chapter will examine the relevancy of 
key arguments and theories within industrial relations literature to researching some 
of the contemporary issues of representation discussed in the preceding chapters. 
it will be argued that the issue of representation, like that of union structure has, to 
an extent, become fragmented and marginalised within industrial relations literature, 
highlighting the difficulties in addressing the central research themes in this thesis.  
Turner, as stated previously, placed representational relationships at the heart of 
union structure and democracy stating that “the actual government of a trade union 
really depends on the relationships between three groups: its full-time officials, that 
proportion of its lay members which takes an active part in the union’s management  
and the usually more passive majority of the rank-and-file” (1962:289). It is from this 
that Turner devised the typology of trade union government discussed in chapter 
three.  This chapter will begin by examining the roles of the union full time official 
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and workplace representative before moving to a discussion of how those carrying 
out these roles interact with each other.  
Before discussing in detail the roles of full time officials and shop stewards and the 
relationships that exist between them it is important to explain what is meant by rank 
and file. Taken in its purest form the phrase rank and file should cover all union 
members, the shop stewards being the rank and the members being the file. During 
the 1970’s , the term rank and file became inseparable from the movement of strong 
workplace organisation and shop stewards, which challenged employers and trade 
union leaders alike. However, the term has come to mean what Turner referred to 
as the, in the main, passive majority of members who hold no position of office within 
the union, with Darlington writing that “the term of rank and file provides only a broad 
characterisation of union membership (1994:32). The relationship between the 
members and shop stewards is defined by Darlington as being “characterised by a 
tension between democracy and bureaucracy” (1994:29).   
Heery, in 2006, declared that there were fewer than four thousand paid union 
officials dealing with the organisation, recruitment and representation of nearly 
seven million members. This indicates an increase from 1991, when Kelly and Heery 
stated that the number of officers was between two thousand nine hundred and 
three thousand. Heery states that the usual arrangement is for an officer to be 
responsible for the representation of between two and five thousand members, 
however the range is likely to be wider than that (2006:445).  The ratio of between 
two and five thousand members to one officer appears, from Clegg et al (1961:38) 
to be a historical one as their research showed that between 1921 and 1959 this 
ratio was broadly in line with what they discovered.  Kelly and Heery make links 
between the numbers of officers employed by a union and participation of members. 
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In those unions that have a below average member to officer ratio, Kelly and Heery 
found high levels of workplace organisation or a dependence on one hundred 
percent lay officials, whilst those unions with above average ratios were closely 
related to weakly or unorganised workplaces (1994:34). Kelly and Heery’s 
conclusions fit with those of Turner, who found that unions with high member 
participation and strong democratic structures (closed) are likely to have fewer 
officers than unions with low member participation (1962). This was also backed up 
by Clegg et al (1961:89) who state that unions with higher member to officer ratios 
place emphasis on their officers dealing with negotiation whilst those with low ratios 
of members to officers are likely to concentrate on office work, branch meetings, 
recruitment and helping members with individual problems. Turner (ibid: 287) cites 
the example of the TGWU and AEU (both now part of Unite) as evidence of this. 
The open TGWU with one and a quarter million members had between five and six 
hundred officers, whilst the closed AEU, with eight hundred thousand members, had 
just one hundred and twenty officers. 
In addition to this, McCarthy (1966:43) notes that there is a marked difference 
between the levels of interaction between shop stewards and full time officials in 
craft and general unions. McCarthy (ibid) states that shop stewards in general 
unions had more frequent contact and closer working relationships with full time 
officials than representatives in craft unions, writing that whilst this is to some extent 
due to the higher officer to member ratios, outlined above, it could also be attributed 
to the provisions made in these unions to deal with their considerable and varied 
membership. 
The number of officers reduced during the 1980s in line with the falling number of 
working people that were members of a trade union. However as the 2006 figures 
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from Heery show, the ratio of members to officers has stayed relatively stable. The 
variation in ratio, from one organisation to another may be explained by the 
aforementioned makeup of the UK’s union movement. Clegg (1976) also links this 
to the union’s bargaining strategy, stating that those unions that operate in job 
territories where bargaining is centralised, such as the public sector, will have the 
necessity for fewer officers than unions that predominantly cover job territories 
where bargaining is more dispersed. 
There are many ways to classify union officials. They can be classified as what they 
do or as what they believe. For example Heery (2006) develops four types of union 
officer based around the role, organisers, servicers, recruiters and seniors. The 
organising officer and the servicing officer are at opposite end of the spectrum. The 
organiser is mainly interested in the development of strong workplace organisation, 
through the recruitment of new members and activists and puts a large amount of 
work into encouraging and supporting workplace representative to take the lead on 
industrial issues. Meanwhile, the servicing officer is primarily concerned with the 
representation of members, either individually or collectively through negotiations 
and has little interest in organising members. The third is the recruiting officer, who 
is concerned with recruiting members, as is the organiser and individual 
representation, as is the servicer. Finally, the seniors are characterised as being in 
senior regional and national positions. These officers were reported by Heery to 
mainly be involved in higher level issues than the other three typologies, such as 
tribunals, recruitment policy and multi-employer bargaining. As is often the case, 
when trying to classify anything, officers may often not fit neatly into one of these 
boxes. For example, it is possible for an officer to encourage self-organisation in a 
workplace where the union is strong and already well established, whilst carrying 
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out a servicing role in a workplace where union representation is weak and 
unorganised.  
Kelly and Heery, in their 1994 study of union officials, attempt to classify union 
fulltime officials by way of their beliefs and ideologies. This time three typologies are 
proffered, the Managerialists, often from the political right of the union movement 
and highly bureaucratic, although still broadly pluralist; the Leaders, from the left of 
the trade union movement and viewing the relationship between employees and 
employers to be antagonistic; and the Regulationsists, not wedded to either ideology 
and adaptable in different ways to different situations. They also lend themselves to 
the union strategies discussed in chapter two, with the Manergerialist likely to be 
involved with servicing and the adoption of partnership whilst the Leader is more 
likely to be an organiser. However, as was also discussed in chapter two, unions 
and union officers will likely take a more mixed approach. 
The simplest way to classify trade union full time officials is to look at them from the 
point of job tittle. Almost all unions have national and regional officers and in addition 
there are a number of titles such as organising officer, district officer and branch 
officer that are often, but not always, present. The balance between the number of 
national officers and regional officers will often depend on bargaining arrangements 
that exist in a union’s main job territories. For example, many unions that 
predominantly organise in the public sector will focus more on national 
representation due to the higher level that bargaining takes place. In these unions, 
therefore, the branch is often seen as more important than it may be in a more 
general union (Kelly and Heery, 1994). However, even when trying to define union 
officials in this way there are issues. For example, where is the dividing line between 
fulltime officials and staff? In those unions that elect there officers, which will be 
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discussed, it is reasonably simple to split officers and staff as it can be said that 
those employees of the union that have gone through an election in order to take up 
their posts are officers whilst those that have been appointed are staff (Clegg et al 
.,1961:19).  
This is more complicated in unions where officers and staff are all appointed rather 
than elected. In this case the definition proffered by Clegg et al (ibid) is that staff, in 
the main, deal with internal union affairs whilst officers primarily deal with negotiating 
with management. However, they point out that this is still not perfect and differs 
from one union to another. For example, in some unions, research officers and 
education officers, who deal principally with issues external to the union, are classed 
as staff whilst in other unions, senior administrators are classed as officers when 
the vast majority of their duties are linked to internal union issues. 
The way that union officials are selected differs from one union to the next, the 
primary debate being between election and appointment. The way that unions 
recruit their officers will have an effect on the structures and governance of a union. 
Those that elect their officers will have fewer officers in senior positions than those 
that appoint and are more likely to be responsive to the wishes of the members and 
less accountable to superiors (Kelly and Heery, 1994).  Recruitment of officers may 
be open or closed, as unions can be. Unions that recruit openly, particularly white 
collar unions, advertise and seek to appoint officers from outside of the union. 
Unions that do this are more likely to recruit officers that are woman, young and/or 
have a higher educational background than unions that operate closed recruitment 
meaning that officers are appointed or elected from the union’s existing 
membership, within the bounds of employment law. Leaders within unions tend to 
be creatures of tradition and therefore will operate the same selection procedures 
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as they always have (ibid). However, this can change, particularly when two unions 
with differing traditions merge. This was the case, as indicated in chapter 3, when 
the AEEU was formed between the engineers, who had a long tradition of elections, 
and the electricians who had previously moved to a system of appointment. The 
result being that the AEEU adopted the electricians’ system of appointment. This 
was again the case when Unite was formed. Amicus had, two years prior to merger, 
voted at conference to reintroduce the election of officers; however, this reverted to 
appointment as part of the merger with TGWU, who had always used appointment 
for recruiting officers. In those unions that appointed their officers, some only did 
this when, in addition to passing an interview candidates had the prerequisite 
number of years in membership. In addition to this some unions make selections for 
appointed officials, from a list of members that have passed a pre-selection panel 
(Clegg et al 1961:51). 
The relationship that full time officials have with their lay activists is, as Turner 
discussed, a crucial but often complicated one. Webb and Webb (1894: 489) state 
that the origin of the shop steward is as a minor official of the union, elected by the 
‘men’ in a particular workshop, with the job of making sure that all members had 
paid their contributions. The role of the shop steward has evolved a great deal since 
this definition. Goodman and Whittingham define the shop steward as a 
‘representative appointed from the members of the unions employed in the 
establishment to act on their behalf’ (1969:1). They elaborate on this by stating that 
stewards are a representative of union members in a workplace and are 
acknowledged as such by both their trade union and management but are not a 
branch official or paid officer of the union (ibid). Clegg et al state that “a shop steward 
is a local union representative who has definite responsibility for the first stage of 
local negotiations, but is neither a full time officer nor a branch secretary with 
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recognised negotiating rights in that capacity (1961:180), whilst McCarthy stated 
that “the term shop steward is used to refer to trade union lay representatives at the 
place of work” (1966:4). McCarthy goes on to explain that these stewards are 
elected by their fellow members but do not tend to face opposition once they have 
been elected (ibid:57). These are not catch all definitions. There is a lack of a 
standard terminology for workplace representatives meaning that the role may be 
identified by different names. In some industries the duties discussed above are 
carried out by someone who does not come under the definition, such as the print 
workers father of the chapel, and imperial fathers (or mothers) (Clegg et al 1961:24). 
In many white collar unions the role is classified under the bland label of “union 
representative”. However, for all intended purposes, in this study, workplace 
representatives will be referred to as shop stewards.  
The role of shop   stewards was defined by Goodman and Whittingham as “actions 
performed by a person to justify their occupation of a position which is usually 
imprecisely defined” (1969:5). Again this highlights the formlessness of the 
stewards’ role which may differ from workplace to workplace and from union to 
union. They are regarded by unions mainly as administrators. They are voluntary 
assistants who are the union’s main recruiters and are tasked with maintaining that 
membership, once recruited. In terms of the branch and full time officers, the shop 
steward is the ear on the shop floor. They can and are expected to feedback 
information in regards to shop practices and any proposed changes to practice, in 
reverse they are also the conduit through which information is disseminated from 
the national union to the rank and file. Stewards are tasked with ensuring that rules 
are followed, both by members and employers and that collective agreements are 
observed, reporting any infringements (ibid:6).  
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Clegg et al (1961) outline in their survey the key duties of the shop steward, finding 
that whilst these duties were wide ranging there were a number that were common. 
The most time consuming activities were carrying out negotiations with 
management and holding discussions with members. Many shop stewards stated 
that they did this exclusively with no other duties mentioned. Most stewards reported 
that they spent more time with managers than foremen and it was also shown that 
shop stewards spent as much time talking to foremen and managers as they did 
discussing issues with constituents. In the case of convenors, more time was spent 
with managers than it was with constituents. The average time spent on union 
business, per constituent, was found to be 3.9 minutes a week of working time and 
6.6 minutes when the stewards own time was taken into account (Clegg et al 
1961:138). 
From a servicing perspective, stewards are involved when a member has an 
accident, gathering evidence and giving advice, also shop stewards inform 
members of other benefits that the union provides. From the point of view of 
management, shop stewards can be seen again as a conduit for the passing of 
information between the business and the members and visa versa (Goodman and 
Whittingham 1979:5-6). Lane, writing in 1974 writes that the range of activities 
stewards were prepared to perform was extraordinary with, in larger plants, a 
steward being prepared to give advice on almost anything. External to the 
workplace, stewards gave advice on such things as “tax problems, marital problems, 
problems with the kids, problems with the school, trouble with HP (hire purchase), 
the mortgage (and) social security (Lane 1974:201). Internal to the workplace 
stewards continue their role as, in the words of Lane, a social worker (ibid); helping 
members to fill in forms, calculate their wages and negotiating for an hour or two off 
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work to accommodate a trip to the dentist or doctors. Whilst these issues, on their 
own, may seem trivial, Lane points out that they are important to the individual (ibid). 
Batstone et al (1979) carried out a study of shop stewards in a UK manufacturing 
firm and found that there were, as with full time officials, a number of different types 
of shop steward. Four distinct classifications of shop steward are identified based 
on their pursuit of union principles and the way that the role is seen in reference to 
being a delegate or representative (ibid:35). The first type, the leader, takes a 
representative role, is totally committed to the union’s principles and generally able 
to achieve them. Secondly, the nascent leader also takes a representative role and 
is usually sponsored by a leader. Like the leader this type of steward is committed 
to union principles however, without the support of other representatives, is often 
unable to achieve their goals. The Third type is the cowboy. This steward, like the 
two previous, takes a representative role but differs in that they are not dedicated to 
union principles, instead being more interested in making short term gains for the 
department that they represent. The final type identified is the populist. This type 
neither dedicates themselves to union principles nor takes a representative role. 
Instead the populist sees themselves as a delegate and therefore the activities and 
goals of these stewards are determined by the members that have elected them. 
Fosh (1981:72-79) builds on some of the ideas espoused by Batstone et al dividing 
shop stewards into two distinct groups which she terms actives and inactives. The 
active group fits very well with the leader typology highlighted above. They believe 
strongly in trade unionism, seeing it as a social movement rather than a movement 
for individual gain and seeing the union as an organisation for the promotion of 
political and social goals, as well as economic ones. Sometimes the beliefs held had 
always been with the representatives whilst others needed something to trigger 
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them. Fosh explains that the beliefs of the older actives were often based on 
experiences of adversary in childhood, strong family ties to trade unionism and 
experience, as adults, of industrial disputes. Meanwhile, the younger actives were 
less likely to have had the same experiences as the older ones but were surrounded 
by friends and family, who were pro-union.  
Batstone et al (1977:36) concentrate their observations on the roles of leader and 
populist stewards, as they state that these two types are the most numerous, 
forming 38% and 45% respectively of those studied. They noted that these two types 
of steward were distinguishable by very marked differences in their behaviours and 
commitments to union principles and the representational role. They found that 
populist stewards placed greater emphasis on short term improvement in wages 
and conditions, whilst leader stewards saw the longer term goals of defending the 
rights of workers and the pursuit of socialism as primary objectives (ibid:37). It is 
indicated that these differences in commitment to union principles are driven by the 
differing perceptions that individual stewards have of their roles. In terms of role it 
was found that 88% of leader stewards strongly agreed that the role, whilst being a 
representative, sometimes required telling members things that they did not want to 
hear whilst only 35% of populists strongly agreed and 12% either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed (ibid:39). At the same time, populists saw members as the main 
influence on the decisions that they made, whilst leaders were noted as placing far 
more emphasis on the influence of other stewards and collective bodies of stewards, 
such as the Joint Shop Stewards Committee (JSSC). These differences were noted 
as being in line with the arguments made around the distinction between 
representatives and delegates.  
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Darlington (1994) is critical of Batstone et al (1977). He states that they overstate 
the differences between leader stewards and populists, with stewards, in practice, 
displaying elements of both positions. Darlington (1994:21) therefore declares that 
it is not possible to characterise stewards in the way that Batstone et al do, as their 
roles and behaviours change depending on circumstances. He states that those 
representatives, who would fall under the classification of leader due to their 
dedication to union principles, whilst indeed exercising a certain amount of 
autonomy, still have to be seen to react to the needs of the members that have 
elected them, or else face the ignominy of a challenge to their position. On the issue 
of trade union principles Darlington (1994:23) also disagrees with Batstone et al 
(1977). Darlington (1994:23) states that the argument made by Batstone et al (1977) 
that sectional interests and union principles are not compatible is incorrect, writing 
that whilst some issues may appear to be sectional in appearance they can have a 
direct effect on workers in other areas of a plant. Therefore, to attempt to restrain 
sectional interests or to stop it spreading can be self-defeating, as it may weaken 
union organisation more generally. It is often a matter of judgment for stewards 
whether to support such an occurrence.  
Batstone et al (1977) also discuss the differences in the ways that shop stewards 
interact with managers and members. In terms of managers, Batstone et al 
(1977:166-167) state a number of differences between leader stewards and 
populists. They found that leader stewards were more likely to have dealings with 
managers above the foreman level whilst populists had more interaction with 
foremen and charge hands. In fact, they found that the most senior of leader 
stewards, the convenors, had almost no contact with managers of foreman level or 
below, as they felt to do so was beneath them. They describe (ibid: 168-169) how 
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the relationships that develop between stewards and managers are nurtured in 
order to form strong bargaining relationships.  
These strong bargaining relationships are said by Batstone et al (1977:169) to 
develop further than the normal formal relationships that exist normally in the day to 
day running of an organisation. These relationships allow for the exchange of 
information, including that which is confidential through off the record discussions. 
It is pointed out that whilst these relationships are formed and maintained for the 
purpose of achieving goals, their closeness can mean that the maintenance of these 
relationships and protection of the parties to them can take on an importance of its 
own. It is further noted (ibid: 171) that these relationships are based on a broad 
equilibrium of power and influence between the two parties involved. Without this, it 
is stated, there would be no incentive for either party to develop the relationship as 
confidences and support could not be reciprocated. 
However, again Darlington (1994) disagrees with Batstone et al stating that their 
evaluation of power is incorrect. The power of shop stewards, it is argued by 
Darlington (1994:180), is curtailed by the capitalist system. Therefore, as it is the 
employer that has overall control of what they wish to bargain over and what facilities 
will be afforded to union representatives, it is not strong bargaining relationships or 
the abilities of stewards that give the latter power in the industrial relations setting, 
but the collective backing of the union membership. Darlington continues to write 
that, whilst the adoption of strong bargaining relationships can achieve limited 
success for some groups of workers, the policy, in the long term has serious 
limitations in delivering gains to members (ibid: 269). Also when this type of give 
and take bargaining is used over a long period of time members may be lulled into 
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a false sense of security, meaning that they are ill prepared when more militant 
forms of action are needed (ibid).  
When asked why they had become shop stewards, Batstone et al (1977) noted a 
significant difference in responses, between shop stewards representing shop floor 
workers and stewards representing staff. For the staff representatives, the key 
reason given was that they felt there was a need for the union’s members to have a 
mouthpiece. However, for the shop floor stewards the main reason for becoming a 
rep was the achievement of certain collective goals. This ties into the notion that 
blue collar shop stewards were more attached to union principles than their white 
collar counterparts, with the study finding that almost a quarter of the staff stewards 
surveyed were not aware of any union principles at all. Also, shop floor stewards 
place particular emphasis on the protection of members and the improvement of 
terms and conditions, whilst staff representatives placed more importance on 
voicing the feelings of members and ensuring a harmonious relationship with 
management (ibid). 
As with full time officials there are different levels of shop steward. Above shop 
stewards in the union hierarchy are senior shop stewards, convenors and works 
convenor. Senior shop stewards often form what Batstone et al labelled the quasi 
elite (1979:45). This group of stewards are “experienced stewards who are in close 
contact with the convenors and upon whom the convenors rely” (ibid). This 
experience is seen not just in the time that they have been representatives, but in 
terms of the level at which they have bargained and the success that has come from 
this. These stewards have more contact with the convenors than other stewards, 
and are distinguishable from other stewards because  the contacts that they have 
with convenors is not attributable to just one particular issue. They are placed on a 
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more equal basis to the convenors by other stewards and the convenors 
themselves. (ibid:36-47). Quasi elite members assume a leadership role which 
makes them, to an extent, independent from their members and, whilst primarily 
being interested in the aspirations of their own members, they also have a greater 
understanding of, and involvement in, plant wide issues.  
Above the quasi elite, in terms of structure at least, are the convenors. Usually senior 
shop stewards, convenors are elected by their shop stewards committees and 
usually take the role as secretary. Works convenors are elected by all reps, 
irrespective of union, at the inter-union Joint Shop Steward Committee (JSSC) 
(Goodman and Whittingham 1969:3, Clegg et al 1961:24). Convenors have almost 
always been elected as shop stewards prior to being elected as convenor. Once 
becoming a convenor, they may continue in their role as a constituency shop 
steward, whilst some may give this up in order to concentrate on the higher position 
(ibid). 
While the role of convenor may vary, there are a number of things that are common. 
They are seen by management as having significant influence over the plant’s other 
representatives and, for this reason, can be highly influential in the progression of 
disputes.  Convenors have a great deal of knowledge in reference to wider issues 
and are able to advise stewards on factory wide practices and policy. They may join 
shop stewards at certain stages of negotiation and will become involved at the very 
start of procedures, if it is deemed that an issue requires urgent attention (Goodman 
and Whittingham 1969:3). 
The relationships between the differing levels of steward are at times fractious. It is 
felt by convenors and experienced stewards, such as the quasi elite, that shop 
stewards should be able to deal with the vast majority of issues themselves. It was 
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therefore a major criticism from the senior representatives that some shop stewards 
do not try to deal with issues themselves, instead “using them as whipping boys” 
(Batstone 1979:32) due to not knowing how to or not having the confidence to 
bargain hard enough. Part of this criticism is that some shop stewards are not 
assertive enough to explain to their members when they are not right about 
something. “A steward cannot support his section when they are wrong” (ibid). In 
order to give the convenor strength it is believed that “a steward should deal with 
problems himself…he shouldn’t just moan” (ibid). 
The study carried out by Batstone et al (1979) found that the relationship between 
the wider union and the shop stewards and members was a tenuous one. Some 
shop stewards had been on courses that had been run by the union and stewards 
often placed emphasis on the wider union in terms of it being an embodiment of 
principles and self-identity. However, other than this there was very little involvement 
with the wider union. Stewards with leadership qualities were more likely than 
populists to be involved. From the perspective of the rank and file members, the 
shop steward is often the only contact that they will have with the union. Often the 
members will think of their shop steward or shop stewards committee as the union 
and will refer to them as such.  
The relationship between the stewards and rank and file is, therefore, an important 
one. The strength of shop stewards stems from their leadership being accepted by 
the constituency of members that they represent and their ability to carry the 
members with them. For them to be able to lead then they must respond to the 
changing needs of the members. Unless the implicit and explicit requirements of 
members are fulfilled by the shop stewards then this leadership may be challenged, 
with the risk that they may be replaced (Goodman and Whittingham 1969:15). Lane 
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describes the shop steward as the ‘man’ with two masters “he has the employer, 
who can use all sorts of undetectable victimisation that doesn’t necessarily mean 
dismissal, and he has to satisfy the members” (1974:195). Lane goes on to say that 
stewards have no direct power over their members as they have no way of 
sanctioning or coercing members to do what they wish. The authority given to them, 
by the members, is linked to their performance as a steward and as a member of 
the work group (ibid:198). However, “authority was not a fixed lump of social capital 
in the sense that once accumulated it was thereafter indestructible. Like physical 
capital it had to be continually replenished, if it was to remain valuable” (Lane 
1974:1999). 
Shop stewards are usually paid the average wage of those which they represent 
and whom they work alongside for most of their day at work. As they are subject to 
election usually annually or biannually, when their fellow workmates have the 
chance to cast their judgment on their performance over the period of office, by 
either re-electing them or voting them out (Darlington 1994:31-32). However, 
Darlington also states that in some workplaces, steward organisation may become 
so centralised and hierarchical that the relationship between shop stewards and the 
rank and file can become blurred. In some cases this can lead to full time convenors 
having more in common with full time officials than they do with the members that 
they claim to represent (ibid). This, Darlington explains, comes from a tendency in 
the 1970s for a layer of shop stewards, usually convenors, to become estranged 
from the members due to their full time status and provision of facilities by 
management and involvement in plant wide bargaining.  
Darlington (1994: 29) states that the relationship between full time officials and shop 
stewards is “characterised by a tension between independence and dependence”. 
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Stewards have independence in terms of having the ability to handle a variety of 
grievances and negotiations with a large amount of autonomy. Stewards can act as 
a counterbalance to the often cautious nature of officials and can apply pressure to 
full time officers when in negotiations with management. However, Darlington points 
out that the reverse of this is that being the link between the rank and file members 
and the wider union makes stewards dependent on full time officials for services 
such as information, assistance in collective bargaining, help with legal backing, and 
securing support in strikes. Darlington states “without which they (shop stewards) 
couldn’t function” (Darlington 1994:31) 
The concept of a shop steward as an representative, who works alongside and 
receives the same wages as the members who regularly elect them means that they  
are a directly accountable, strongly democratic expression of the concerns and 
desires of their members. However, as with union full time officials, shop stewards 
also come under pressure from bureaucratisation. Given facilities to carry out their 
duties, such as offices and time off, stewards, particularly those in senior positions, 
can become separated from the shop floor, as they are encouraged to think in terms 
of the needs of the business and the wider interests of the union (Darlington, 1994) 
The relationship between shop stewards and full time officials is described by Heery 
and Kelly as one that involves the two most contrasting positions in the trade union 
movement. Both sets of individuals wish to expand their involvement at the expense 
of the other. Officials wish to preserve and negotiate national agreements whilst 
shop stewards want to replace these with locally bargained ones (1990:76). 
However, Batstone et al (1979:202) argue that convenors and full time officials have 
a shared interest. Many full time officers, particularly those in manual unions were 
formerly convenors and understand the need for strong leadership and 
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organisational unity. This is added to by Darlington who states that full time officials 
often have a great deal of authority over steward organisation “transmitting 
leadership policies downward to the shop-floor” (1994:31). 
Full time officials do not want to be involved with what they regard to be trivial issues 
at the shop floor level (Batstone et al 1979:187).  Even if these sort of issues are 
problems for shop stewards they should not necessitate the involvement of full time 
officials. In terms of shop stewards, the main interests of full time officials are that 
leadership is not being misused, that members are not being soft on management, 
whilst maintaining the support of their members. Full time officials are also 
concerned that stewards, especially convenors maintain close contact with the 
larger union.  Stewards’ networks are a rich source of information for full time 
officials. They can relay what the aspirations of their members are to full time officers 
prior to negotiations then, in turn, keep members informed of the progress of those 
negotiations (Heery and Kelly 1990:75).  
However, Batstone et al (1979:204) point out that whilst the building of good 
relationships between shop stewards and full time officials can be very helpful in the 
pursuit of shared goals, both parties have the ability to do great damage to each 
other if this co-operation breaks down for any reason and the relationship becomes 
one of conflict. If this does become the case then it maybe that a full time official will 
take, or attempt to take, away the credentials of a convenor or shop steward. 
However, this could exacerbate a situation, particularly where the representative in 
question remains popular and well supported by the members and other stewards. 
In turn, where a full time official is elected they are susceptible to particular damage 
at times of re-election. In some cases this may come from the direct challenge of a 
convenor standing against the incumbent officer. However, it may be that the 
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challenge comes from a convenor, or opinion forming shop steward, publicly 
backing a rival candidate and using their influence to sway members of a plant to 
vote that way. This is particularly true of convenors in large workplaces, where the 
number of votes which may be influenced is large.  In other cases, it can be that 
convenors write letters of complaint to the superiors of full time officials. In terms of 
internal union politics, it may also be the case that complaints can cause particular 
harm where an officer is known to be a member of a faction other than that of the 
dominant group.   
Factionalism, and membership of political groupings, as has been discussed 
previously, needs to be noted in any discussion of union representation. However, 
it should also be noted that the political sociology of union representation means 
that, as stated by Wright Mills and Schneider, whilst the majority of people are 
politically passive in nature, that does not mean that they cannot enter into “zones 
of political awareness” (1948:15) when, or if, an issue arises that they feel strongly 
about. Lipset et al (1962) and Wright Mills and Schneider (1948) discuss how the 
political persuasions of individuals manifest internally in trade unions to create 
tensions over union policy, structure and direction. These tensions can be played 
out through factionalism, in terms of internal groupings around issues such as 
conference motions and elections and can also be seen external to the trade union 
structures, with outside organisations, such as the political parties of the far left, 
organising to try and influence the internal workings of the union. As has been noted 
in earlier chapters this has been dealt with differently from one onion to another, 
with some such as the AEEU, if not embracing then at least accepting such politics, 
whilst others, such as the TGWU attempting to stop them by banning unofficial 
groupings and banning members of the far left (and right) from holding lay or full 
time office. The changing nature of the working class also needs to be noted within 
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this discussion, as highlighted by Goldthorpe et al (1975). Noting the breaking up of 
some traditional industries (something that, as discussed in chapter two, 
accelerated in the 1980s) and the increase in white collar work at the expense of 
blue collar, Goldthorpe et al (1975:14) discuss the” embourgeoisement of the 
working class”, linking this to the rise in working people voting Conservative in the 
1960s. This embourgeoisement is important in relation to trade union 
representation, in terms of the influence that it can have as a moderating influence 
on unions, through less militant representative and activist bases and a feeling 
amongst the membership of increased affluence. 
As will be noted from the first part of this chapter there is a significant lack of 
contemporary research into this area of trade unionism. Whilst there are notable 
exceptions, such as, amongst others, Kelly and Heery, Darlington and some of the 
work of Fosh, the issue of lay union representation has not been significantly 
researched since the seminal work of Batstone et al, in 1979. Whilst research has 
been carried out into trade union renewal strategies modernisation and to a certain 
extent, merger, the issues surrounding the relationships between the different levels 
of union representation, shop stewards, convenors, full time officials and others, is 
under researched. Even Darlington’s research, where he attempts to revisit 
Batstone et al. with a critical eye, is over twenty years old, and whilst Moore (2011) 
has researched and discussed the emergence of new representational roles, such 
as equality and learning representatives, she did not really discuss how these roles 
relate to others within the unions, focusing instead on the people that accept the 
roles and the motives behind them. 
This research gap has meant that, in terms of this research, many of the 
complexities outlined in the proceeding chapters are not picked up in the existing 
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research. Much of the literature was written at a time when unions were going 
through a period of quite p henomenal growth and in a position of considerable 
industrial and political power. Pluralism was the overriding ideology rather than the 
current dominance of the neo-liberal linked unitarist perspective and the legal 
framework surrounding trade unions and industrial relations was more in line with 
the traditional voluntarist approach. Whilst there were large general unions, such as 
the TGWU and GMWU, there were also many trade unions catering to specific 
trades or industries, for example the AEU, EEPTU and NGA, all of which, along with 
the TGWU, are now part of Unite.  
A second issue in terms of the this research and the research gap outlined above is 
that, in terms of the MoD and Civil Service, there is relatively little research that has 
been carried out into representation in this area, and none, that the researcher was 
able to locate, into representation by industrial trade unions. What research there is 
in this area focuses predominantly on other areas of the public sector, such as the 
National Health Service (NHS) and Local Government, which have considerably 
different industrial relations machinery to the Civil Service and Ministry of Defence. 
Therefore, in terms of this research, whilst the existing literature has provided a 
number of avenues that need to be explored and has been used to inform the 
research and help to address the research question of what factors influence 
effective trade union representation, there has quite clearly not been enough 
contemporary theoretical or empirical research conducted to build even a mid-range 
theory.  
Before moving on to outline the way this research has been designed to begin to 
address this research gap, it is important to first define what is meant by effective 
trade union representation. To begin with, we can use the three perspectives of 
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industrial relations to explain some of the different perceptions of what is meant 
effective in terms of union representation. The unitary perspective, whilst hostile to 
the concept of trade unionism, does, however, have to accept that it is something 
that needs to be dealt with, where is cannot be discouraged or eradicated.  
Therefore, from this frame of reference, effective trade union representation means 
that unions should not take an adversarial role towards the management (Fox, 
1966:10, Burchill 2014:7). Management’s prerogative, the right to manage, should 
not be challenged in any way, with the union existing as an extension to the Human 
Resources department. Where grievances arise, effective union representation will 
act swiftly to nullify the discontent by explaining that it is in the best interests of the 
company and, therefore, the union’s members for the grievance to be put aside (Fox 
1966:12, Williams and Adam-Smith 2006:9). In reference to full time officials, this 
perspective sees there role as one of managing discontent, from the point of view 
of the organisation. If and when an issue arises that cannot be dealt with by the 
management and cannot or will not be dealt with by the union’s workplace 
representatives, the role of the full time official is to quell the dissatisfaction, by 
applying pressure on the shop stewards or sometimes bypassing them altogether 
by directly addressing the members. This perspective is linked to a weak version of 
the partnership approach, discussed in chapter two, with unions giving up the strike 
weapon and accepting a servicing role adding value to business, in return for 
recognition (Burchill 2014:7). 
The second perspective that can be used to analyse what is meant by effective 
union representation is pluralism. The belief of those that adopt this frame of 
reference is that unions and conflict have a legitimate role to play in industrial 
relations. Representation, from this perspective, revolves around effective joint 
regulation, notably collective bargaining. Whilst conflict is seen as having a 
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legitimate place in industrial relations and can have a positive effect, this must not 
be allowed to become destructive (Fox, 1966:7, Williams and Adam-Smith 2006:9). 
Therefore, effective union representation means the channelling of this discontent 
into procedure. Industrial action, whilst part of collective bargaining is seen as a 
failure of both sides to come to agreement and, therefore, would not be seen as 
effective industrial relations (Burchill 2014:8). 
The Marxist frame of reference sees capitalism as an “inevitable and fundamental 
source of conflict” (Burchill 2014:9 Hyman, 1975:20). This perspective sees society 
as being divided into two clear classes, those who own the means of production and 
those who do not. Those who own the means of production are, from this frame of 
reference, mainly concerned with the maximising of their profits, seeing labour as 
just another resource to be exploited. The Marxist perspective differs to the pluralist 
perspective, which also accepts that conflict is inevitable, in that it does not believe 
that this conflict can be institutionalised within procedures. Any agreement reached 
to end an agreement is merely a temporary truce “used in the pursuit of absolute 
control” (ibid). Therefore, trade unions are a form of protection against the 
uninhibited advance of capitalism which emerged when workers realised that joining 
together was the only way that they could increase their power in order to defend 
themselves against their employers. From this frame of reference, therefore, 
effective trade union representation can be seen as the success that a union has in 
defending its members from the worst effects of capitalism. However, this frame of 
reference also states that leader of unions can often be incorporated into the 
management of capitalism and therefore, their ability to effectively represent their 
members is tempered by this (Hyman, 1975:27). 
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Effective union representation in terms of this study will, therefore, be defined in the 
following way. For trade union representation to be effective the union must be 
recognised by the employer for collective bargaining over wide number of issues, 
including pay and conditions. Trade union members must have access to local, 
workplace representatives and/or full time union officials and there should be clear 
structures which indicate to members, representatives and full time officials how the 
union should function. While these provide the framework for effective 
representation, the key issue of effectiveness is the extent to which unions can 
protect and further the interests of their members through joint regulation and other 
methods, notably job control and legal enactment (Webb and Webb, 1902).  
This chapter has demonstrated the lack of continuous and coherent research into 
union representation, with a few notable exceptions, since the 1980s. Whilst some 
limited research has been carried out into representation, as has been highlighted 
in this chapter, the majority of research in this area has focussed on what unions do 
and not on the people that do it. Therefore, as with union structure, research around 
representation has become fragmented and marginalised.   Linked to the 
complexities of union organisation and representation identified of the MoD case 
study and the varieties of competing trade unions strategies developed since 1980, 
these research gaps have exposed some important avenues which will be explored 
in the second half of the thesis. However, the lack of contemporary research in 
reference to representation, democracy and structure and the complexities of union 
responses to decline and of the nature of the MoD case study, mean that a deductive 
theoretical framework will not be used or developed for this project. Such theoretical 
developments can only happen once in-depth qualitative case study research has 
taken place and will, therefore, not be possible until after this particular research 
project has been completed. Therefore, adopting an inductive, exploratory approach 
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to research, this study will attempt to address a number of research sub-questions 
that have been raised in the first half of the thesis.  
The following sub questions that arise from the review of the literature and the 
background to Unite and the MoD cover the key issues of interaction between the 
representational levels, merger, and the external environment (economic and 
political) raised in the above research question. At what levels of the organisational 
and union structure does representation take place and to what extent does this 
require effective interactions between different levels of union representatives? To 
what extent has the Unite merger effected representation within the case study 
research sites, in terms of national, regional, industry and workplace 
representation? What has been the impact of restructuring and the privatisation 
policies upon representation? What has been the effect of Whitley and the recent 
Employee Relations Review on structure and representation? 
The first question stems from Turner’s evaluation of union democracy and the 
Batstone et al discussion of shop steward networks and the way that these interact 
with each other and with representatives at other levels of the union.  The research 
will examine, using evidence taken from interviews, the relationships and 
interactions that take place between full time officials, national lay representatives, 
convenors, shop stewards and the wider rank and file. This will highlight how, and 
where, these interactions take place and explain the differences, if they exist, 
between this contemporary research and that which has been examined in the first 
part of the thesis. 
The second and third questions will look at the merger process. This will examine 
the merger to see what effects it has had on Unite’s structures and ability to 
represent its members (within the MoD). Issues such as the size of Unite and the 
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way it is run, or perceived to be run, will be examined to see how this has affected 
democracy within the union and the way that members are able to identify with it. 
The fourth question will look, in depth, at the effects that external changes, such as 
the austerity and ideological driven review of employee relations. How has this 
review effected the way that Unite is structured within the MoD Sector? How has 
representation been affected and what are the major hurdles for the union in the 
future? 
 
Summary. 
This first part of this chapter built upon the previous chapters to examine and explain 
the roles of, and relationships between, the differing levels of trade union 
representation. This involved an in-depth discussion of the full time official, and their 
lay counterparts, the shop stewards. This review of the literature exposed gaps in 
research, with nothing significant written since the 1970s, identifying a central theme 
which will be explored in the second half of this thesis. The second part of this 
chapter has brought together the issues that have been raised in the project’s first 
five chapters, to explain the research topic and questions which will be explored in 
the second half of the thesis. Chapter six will now outline the methodology used, 
firstly clarifying the reasons for the approach taken before going on to explain the 
design of the research and giving an overview of and reflection on the project. 
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Chapter Six: Methodological Considerations. 
This chapter will outline the methodological considerations underpinning this 
research. Firstly, the chapter will explain the approach and the justification for the 
decision taken to adopt an inductive approach rather than a deductive one, and why 
a theoretical framework is not being  used or developed for the project. The second 
part of the chapter will deal with the design of the research, explaining the rationale 
behind the case study selection, and the reasons for the selection of documentary 
evidence and elite interviewing as the primary methods used in the research. This 
section will also discuss the experience of the researcher, as a former lay 
representative in the MoD sector. The third part will describe how the research was 
conducted, outlining who was interviewed and the problems encountered in 
conducting the research, as well as considering issues reflecting the researcher role 
as a former activist and a consideration of reliability and validity. 
The two main methodological strategies used by researchers are the inductive and 
deductive approaches. The two approaches differ in the way that they interact with 
theory. The inductive approach builds, or generates theory whilst deduction tests 
theory that already exists (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:10). Generally, but not 
exclusively, inductive researchers use predominantly qualitative methods to 
immerse themselves in the facts of a specific case. From this, researchers are able 
to suggest rules and theories that are in turn used to “drew inferences about 
behaviour generally” (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:9). Whilst research using this 
approach does not test a predetermined theory, as deduction does, it nevertheless 
has a clearly defined purpose with a number of research questions and aims 
(Saunders et al, 2007:57). The inductive approach can, therefore, not be used 
without the researcher having an in-depth understanding of the subject area being 
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researched (ibid). Through this approach institutions are looked at holistically, “that 
is in their context (both socio-economic and historical) and in detail…to understand 
institutions often requires an examination over time…at the least their history (thus, 
the term “historicism”) needs to be examined” (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:9).  
Distinctly different to the inductive approach, the deductive approach to research, 
rather than working from the field up as the inductive method does, works from the 
theory down (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:10). From this approach a theoretical or 
conceptual framework is developed and then tested (Saunders et al, 2007:57).  
Robson (cited in Saunders et al.,2007:117) lays out five stages that deductive 
researchers will progress through. Firstly deducing a hypothesis from the theory; 
secondly expressing how this hypothesis is to be tested; thirdly testing the 
hypothesis; fourthly examining the outcomes of the research to see if the theory has 
been confirmed by the findings or needs modification; and finally, making 
modifications to the theory, if this has been found necessary.  Deduction also differs 
from induction in that it those who subscribe to it generally use quantitative methods, 
rather than qualitative (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:10). Deductive research is 
criticised by those that use the inductive approach for being too rigid in its design, 
not allowing for “alternative explanations of what is going on. In that sense, there is 
an air of finality about the choice of theory and definition of the hypothesis” 
(Saunders et al, 2007:119).  
In terms of this research it has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that, 
whilst it may be desirable for a theoretical framework to be in place prior to starting 
case study research (Yin, 2014:37), this has not been possible, as the literature that 
exists does not sufficiently address the issues to be examined in the research 
question for even a mid-range theory to be proffered with any confidence that it 
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would stand up to scrutiny. This means that no hypothesis can be put forward to be 
tested, rendering the deductive approach impractical in this case. Therefore, the 
approach taken by the researcher has been the inductive which has of late been the 
more popular choice for researchers in the field of industrial relations. In line with 
the discussion of the two approaches above, a large amount of understanding in 
reference to the historical and socio-economic background of the research area has 
been demonstrated in the five chapters preceding this one, and from this, a number 
of avenues for research have been identified through a main research question and 
a number of sub-questions.  
The issues highlighted in chapter two, in terms of the key developments in trade 
unionism that have taken place since 1979 and the response of unions to these 
developments and chapter four, in reference to the complexities of the MoD, have 
led the researcher to the conclusion that in order to fully understand these complex 
issues and make theorisation possible, then an in-depth analysis must be 
undertaken using qualitative case study research.  
Whilst this choice of research approach is a departure from the frequent use of 
deductive methodologies in industrial relations research, with a growing reliance on 
survey based research such as WERS, it is still in fitting with the long tradition of 
research in the field, of being problem centred in its orientation (Kochan, 1998:32). 
The holistic approach offered by induction is also in keeping with the traditions of 
the field. Industrial relations researchers have long taken this approach, using  
multiple disciplines to analyse a problem, in order to be able to place a contemporary 
problem or theoretical insight in its proper historical perspective” (ibid:35). 
This first section has outlined why the researcher chose an inductive approach when 
carrying out the research, explaining the differences between induction and 
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deduction and why this particular study has used the inductive approach, rather than 
the more widely used (in industrial relations research) deductive approach. The 
second part of this chapter will now discuss the research design. Firstly it will explain 
why a case study was selected, highlighting the experience of the researcher, as a 
former lay union representative. Having done this and explained how, and why, sites 
were selected to be part of the case study, the methods used will be explained, with 
a discussion about why some methods were used as opposed to others, how 
participants were selected and what documents were available and how these were 
selected. 
Why Case Study? 
Kitay and Callus write that the “case can be made that the case study is the most 
favoured research design used by industrial relations researchers” (1998:101), 
stating that use of case study research can be traced back as far the studies written 
about by the Webbs in 1902. The ongoing popularity of the case study reflects that 
it is very well suited to understanding complex social phenomena and the 
multidisciplinary character of industrial relations research.  Kitay and Callus 
(1998:102) wrote that there is no agreed upon definition of a case study. For some 
time, the case study was seen as just the exploratory stage of other research 
methods and it, therefore, is often not considered to written about, as a formal 
method at all in some of the earlier textbooks (Yin, 2014:15). The multidisciplinary 
format of case studies also makes them hard to define. Some writers have stated 
that case studies are “typified by the use of qualitative methods” (Kitay and Callus, 
1998:102), such as interviews, however, they can also include the use of 
quantitative methods, with these in some cases being the primary means of 
collecting data (ibid). Case studies, differ to experiments, as they place the 
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phenomena being studied in their wider context, rather than taking them out of 
context to study in isolation and differ from historical studies, as the usually attempt 
to explain a contemporary issue, although often a sound understanding of the 
historical context surrounding the phenomena under investigation is required. Kitay 
and Callus, therefore, define the case study as “a research strategy or design that 
is used to study one or more phenomena and to understand or explain the 
phenomena by placing them in their wider context” (1998:103).  
Yin’s definition is more complicated. It is split into two parts as he states it needs to 
be explained using a “twofold definition” (2014:16). Part one discusses the scope of 
a case study, stating that “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be 
clearly evident” (ibid). This part of Yin’s definition therefore separates the case study 
method from the historical and experimental frameworks, as outlined above and also 
differentiates it from surveys as whilst a survey may be able to deal with context and 
the phenomena under study, it is unlikely that it will be able to investigate the context 
(ibid). The second part of the definition deals with the issue of the phenomenon 
being studied and the context it is found in, not always being sharply distinguishable, 
in real life situations (ibid:17, Kitay and Callus, 1998:104), making it the complete 
opposite of the experimental strategy (Saunders, 2007:139). This part states that “a 
case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with date needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (ibid: 139). This does not mean 
that it is not important to identify the particular case being investigated. On the 
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contrary, identifying what, specifically, is to be considered is vital when conducting 
a case study (ibid:24).  
The case study is a research design, or strategy, rather than a method in itself. In 
order to understand a situation fully a large amount of information is required to be 
collected. In order for this to happen, whilst it is not necessary for case studies to 
include numerous techniques, it is highly likely for more than one to be employed 
(Kitay and Callus, 1998:103). The common misconception, as mentioned above, is 
that case studies are a research method, rather than a strategy. In fact, they should 
be seen as a strategy that involves the use of a number of methods, in order to 
understand complex social situations (ibid: 104). Therefore, it is likely to find the use 
of one or more of the following; semi and unstructured interviews, archival work, 
structured questionnaires and observation (ibid).  
Choosing whether to use a case study will hinge on the type of research question 
being asked, as well as the “important practical considerations of time access and 
resources” (Kitay and Callus, 1998:104). What questions, such as “what can be 
learned?” lend themselves to an exploratory strategy and therefore any of the main 
research methods (experiment, survey, archival analysis, history and case study) 
can be used. “What” questions, which are actually asking “how many” or “how much” 
are better suited to a survey or archival analysis as are “who” and “where” questions. 
“How” and “why” questions are explanatory in nature and will therefore lend 
themselves to case study, history or experiment (Yin, 2014:10). In terms of case 
studies this is because they are “particularly well suited to researching motives, 
power relations or processes that involve understanding complex social 
interactions” (Kitay and Callus, 1998:104). They are very good for examining how 
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particular things happen and exploring the casual relationships that operate 
between social actors (ibid).  
In addition to the type of research question, it is also important to consider whether 
a holistic approach to the research is required, as this is where the case study really 
excels as a strategy (Kitay and Callus, 1998:104). When beginning case study 
research it is vital to define what the boundaries of the research are (ibid:105). Yin 
(cited in Saunders et al., 2007:239) states that there are “four case study strategies 
based upon two discrete dimensions”. These are single case vs. multiple case and 
holistic case vs. embedded case.  
Yin (2014: 52) states that there are five situations when the single case design can 
be used. Firstly is a when a particular case fits exactly and is, therefore, critical in 
the proving or disproving of a theory or theoretical framework. Secondly the single 
case approach may be selected if dealing with a case which is extreme or unusual. 
The third reason for using a single case is the common case, where the objective is 
to capture and study the circumstances around an everyday situation. The fourth 
reason for the single case is the revelatory case, where access has been granted 
to a situation that has previously been inaccessible to researchers and finally the 
fifth rational is the longitudinal case where a single case is studied on two or more 
separate occasions, mapping how a research situation changes over time. The 
single case approach may also be used as a pilot scheme, before a multiple case 
study is started (ibid, Saunders et al, 2007:140).  
In addition, these single cases may be looked at as holistic or embedded, depending 
on unit of analysis (ibid). Both these approaches have strengths and weaknesses 
when using a single case rationale. The holistic case is used when the researcher 
is only concerned with an organisation as a whole. No subunits have been identified 
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or the theory being used to underpin the research is in itself of a holistic nature. 
Issues with this approach arise from the potential for researchers to not dig deep 
enough into a case, so that “a typical problem with the holistic design is that the 
entire case study may be conducted at an unduly abstract level, lacking sufficiently 
clear measures or data” (Yin, 2014:55). A second issue with the holistic approach 
highlighted by Yin is that nature of the case study may shift whilst the study is being 
carried out, meaning that the initial questions are no longer relevant and the 
research deign has to be changed. The embedded approach helps to mitigate this 
problem by introducing a set of subunits. However, the embedded approach also 
has drawbacks as research using this approach can focus too much on the subunits, 
rather than the organisation as a whole. 
Yin states that whilst some fields consider single and multiple case studies to be 
separate methodologies, he believes the two methods to be “variants within the 
same methodological framework and no broad distinction is made between the so-
called classic (that is, single) case study and multiple case studies” (1998:56). The 
evidence that is often collected from multiple cases is seen as being more 
compelling and, therefore, robust than that from single case studies. However, 
conducting multiple case studies can be expensive and is time consuming, meaning 
it might be beyond the means of a single researcher. Saunders et al (2007:140) 
state that using a multiple case approach is favourable to using a single one and 
“were you to choose to use a single case study, you will need to have a strong 
justification for this choice. Again multiple case studies can be looked at as holistic 
or embedded, with a multiple number of holistic cases or embedded cases, within a 
study. “The difference between these two variants depends upon the type of 
phenomenon being studied and your research questions” (Yin, 2014:62). 
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As discussed in chapter three, the overarching research question that is to be 
answered in this study is ‘what factors influence effective trade union 
representation?’ This is a “what” question, as are the four sub-questions that have 
been devised to aid the answering of the main question: at what levels of the 
organisation and union structure does representation take place?;  to what extent 
does this require effective interactions between different levels of representative?; 
to what extent has the Unite merger effected representation within the case study 
research sites, in terms of national, regional, industry and workplace 
representation?; and what has been the impact of structural changes and the 
proposed/actual privatisation policies upon representation?  
As stated above there are two types of what question. The questions being asked 
in this study are the first type of what questions, in that they are exploratory, looking 
to find out what can be learned from this investigation, rather than the second type, 
asking how many or how much. As it is an exploratory question it is important to 
explain why case study approach was chosen.  
As discussed previously there are five research appoaches, highlighted by Yin 
(2014:9), experimental, surveys, archival analysis, historical and case study. The 
experimental method requires the researcher to be able to “manipulate behaviour 
directly, precisely and systematically (Yin, 2014:12), in order to test a hypothesis 
(Bruins, 1998:85). It has been successfully used in industrial relations research “to 
investigate questions at the level of individuals or small groups, such as job 
satisfaction, turnover, job performance, group decision making, coalition forming 
and especially bargaining” (Bruins, 1998:85)  The nature of this study meant that 
this type of manipulation was not possible. There was, as explained above, no 
theoretical framework or hypothesis to test as the study was inductive and access 
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to undertake such research would not have been granted. Therefore, the 
experimental method was not a viable option.  
The survey approach was also not applicable to this study. Surveys are used widely 
in industrial relations research, with their use increasing in recent years (Whitfield, 
1998:65). However, in reference to this study, because the research is being 
conducted inductively and is not testing a hypothesis it was not believed by the 
researcher that surveys, on their own, could produce the richness of data needed. 
This was also the case with archival analysis. 
The historical approach is used extensively when “dealing with the dead past” (Yin, 
2014:34). This approach is better than any other when researching events that 
cannot be examined directly and when those that witnessed the events are not “alive 
to report, even retrospectively, what occurred” (ibid). Those using the historical 
method, therefore, rely on primary and secondary documents and artefacts as 
sources of evidence on which to build their research (Ibid). Some of the methods 
used by the historical approach, such as primary and secondary sources, will be 
employed by this study. However, the subject being examined is very much a 
contemporary one and, therefore, lends itself to the case study. 
Like the historical method, case studies also use primary and secondary sources to 
build a picture. However, where they differ considerably is that case studies are also 
able to include within them two sources of evidence unavailable to historians. These 
are “direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the persons 
involved in the events” (Yin, 2014:12). Whilst there is a large amount of overlap 
between case study and historical research, the case study is uniquely placed in its 
ability to take advantage of a “full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, 
interviews and observations – beyond what might be available to a conventional 
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historical study” (ibid). For these reasons the choice of the case study research 
strategy for this research is completely justified. 
As discussed above, when designing a case study, consideration must be given to 
whether a single or multiple case approach should be taken and should the study 
be holistic or embedded. In the case of this research a single case approach was 
chosen on an embedded basis. As discussed above there are five situations in 
which the single case is appropriate to be used. The case study, as discussed in 
chapter three, is that of Unite’s MoD sector. The best fit for this case study, in relation 
to Yin’s five rationales for the single case design, is the common case. As discussed 
briefly above, the objective of this is to investigate and capture the “circumstances 
and conditions of an everyday situation” (Yin, 2014:52) in order that lessons can be 
learnt around the social processes that are contained in the case.  
The embedded nature of this case refers to a number of embedded units of analysis, 
contained within the case study. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.0 The embedded single case model (Yin, 2014:50). 
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Figure 1.0 demonstrates the model that the case study will take. The context is Unite 
the union, discussed in chapter three, the case is the MoD sector, discussed in 
chapter four and the embedded cases are workplaces within the MoD sector, which 
will now be discussed.  
The case study. 
The MoD Sector of Unite is a complex mix of public sector workplaces which differ 
in terms of size, geographical location, and union density. Therefore it follows that, 
in order to carry out a study of this section of the union which is both valid and 
reliable, it is necessary to conduct research at a number of these different locations. 
The researcher had very good knowledge of the MoD sector having worked in it for 
fifteen years. In 1996, having left school at the age of sixteen, the researcher began 
an apprenticeship at the Army Base Repair Agency (ABRO) in Donnington, 
Shropshire, joining the AEEU in his second week of employment. Graduating in 
September 1999, as a qualified electrician and having been given a permanent 
contract, the researcher was elected by the AEEU members in his section on the 
eleventh of July 2000 to act as their Shop Steward and Safety Representative. In 
2002 he was elected as a reserve delegate to the Biannual, National Industrial 
Conference in Blackpool, which he was able to attend after becoming a full delegate 
when one of the other delegates became ill.  
In 2003, the rule stating that the role of Branch Secretary had to be held by a full 
time official of the union was removed after the rules of the new Amicus union had 
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been agreed. In January of the following year the researcher was elected Branch 
Secretary of branch 0909, Telford, a position he still holds, although the name was 
changed to Telford WM/6130 in the Unite branch reorganisation (see chapter three). 
When first elected, the researcher was the youngest branch secretary in the union, 
at the age of twenty three and in July of that year, having been elected once again 
to attend industrial conference, he was elected to be a member of the National 
Industrial Sector Committee (NISC), membership of which he was re-elected to, 
successively, until leaving the sector in 2011.  
On the 8th November 2005 it was announced that ABRO Donnington, along with 
ABRO Warminster and Colchester, was to close due to a large re-structuring of the 
organisation. The union at Donnington began a campaign immediately to fight the 
closure, of which the researcher was an intrinsic part, being effectively granted 
100% facility time, although unofficially, by a general manager who was supportive 
of the campaign. In December 2006, the Donnington site was given a reprieve when 
it was announced that the site would stay open “in the medium term” (Shropshire 
Star, 2006). Whilst officially this was due to increased demands placed on the armed 
forces by commitments in Afghanistan, the unions at Donnington claimed that it was 
the “unremitting pressure” (Telford Journal, 2006) from workers, the unions and local 
MPs that had caused the U-turn. However, this was never admitted by the 
government or proven.  
In the aftermath of Donnington’s reprieve from closure the researcher was officially 
granted 100% facility time, in part to participate in a number of working groups set 
up in order to change perceptions of Donnington, including industrial relations 
issues. In 2008, following a merger between ABRO and the Defence Aviation Repair 
Agency (DARA) to form the Defence Support Group (DSG), the researcher was 
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elected as full time Deputy Convenor of the Donnington site which post, as with the 
NISC, he remained until leaving DSG in 2011. 
The experience and knowledge that the researcher gained in his fifteen years of 
employment by the MoD and eleven years as a union shop steward, as well as his 
ongoing role as a Unite Branch Secretary, gave him a significant advantage going 
into this research, in terms of knowledge of the sector and key sites and 
understanding the key gatekeepers in relation to securing access.  
A number of MoD sites were selected, to give the research a good geographical 
spread, covering the North, South and Midlands in England, Scotland and Wales, 
though extending this to Northern Ireland was not financially viable. As DSG has an 
extensive footprint which covers all of these areas, many of their sites were used as 
part of this study. However, other parts of the MoD, such as Defence Land Services 
and the Defence Fire and Rescue Service were also included. In all, eight DSG Sites 
were marked out as potential embedded units, as was the Fire and Rescue Branch 
and the largest of the Defence Land Services facilities.  
DSG Bovington in Dorset is the second largest of the group’s sites. Its primary 
business is the overhaul of what are known as A-vehicles. A-vehicles is the name 
given by the MoD to Armoured Fighting Vehicles, such as the Challenger 2 main 
battle tank, Warrior Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) and the group of vehicles 
that come under the acronym CVRT (Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance Tracked). 
Bovington also deals with the repair of what is known as B-vehicles, which refers to 
non-armoured vehicles, such as Land Rovers and lorries. The site is spread across 
two locations. The main is the Bovington Camp, shared with the British Army’s 
Armour Centre, which is the “Army’s centre of excellence for training in the core 
skills of armoured warfare” (Army, 2015). DSG Bovington also manages DSG’s 
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Warminster and Colchester workshops and also managed the group’s Afghanistan 
workshop, prior to the army’s pull out of Camp Bastion in 2013. Unite is the only 
union organising industrial workers at the Bovington site. Bovington is also home to 
the Joint Union Focal, who is a Unite representative, with 100% facility time and 
national responsibilities. Whilst the focal is a Unite member the role is a joint one, 
covering all of the recognised unions.  
DSG Donnington in Telford is the largest of the group’s sites. Its primary business, 
like Bovington, is A-vehicle repair and overhaul. However Donnington also houses 
the groups “Small Arms” Weapons facility, which overhauls the vast majority of the 
Army, Navy and Royal Air Force’s guns, including the standard issue machine gun 
and the Raadan  gun, which is fitted to many of the military’s armoured vehicles. 
Also at the Donnington site is a facility which deals with electronics and optronics 
and a small B-vehicle workshop. Whilst the A-vehicles and heavy engineering 
workshops are managed by the Donnington site, the B-vehicle workshop is 
managed by DSG Catterick and the electronics, optronics and small arms business 
(EOSA) comes under the line management of DSG Sealand. At the time of this 
research, it had recently been announced that the electronics, optronics and small 
arms businesses were to be taken out of scope, in reference to the sale of DSG, 
and would remain part of the MoD. Unite is the primary union at Donnington, 
representing industrial grades. However there is also a small contingent of GMB 
members.   
DSG shares the Donnington Site with Defence Land Systems (DLS). DSG Land 
Systems’ primary business is logistical support for the Armed forces, including the 
storing and distribution of kit to all areas of the military. The Donnington site is the 
organisation’s second largest (Bicester is the largest). In recent years DLS has gone 
 175 
 
through considerable restructuring, with large numbers of agency staff employed to 
fill posts formally held by permanent staff. The union at DLS Donnington has 
traditionally enjoyed a great deal of support from its management, demonstrated by 
the large number of representatives (four) that were in receipt of 100% facility time, 
prior to the study beginning. 
DSG Stafford is a small site, with just four Union Representatives, three Unite and 
one GMB. The Stafford site, like the EOSA at Donnington, is managed by DSG 
Sealand, and has been taken out of the scope of sale. DSG Stafford, unlike the 
other parts of the group, did not come from either ABRO or DARA, instead it was a 
part of the group that is now Defence Land Systems, having originally been run by 
the Royal Air Force. The primary business of the Stafford site is still the Air Force., 
however, the work carried out is not dissimilar to that done at other sites, 
predominantly being engineering type work, repairing and maintaining kit for the 
RAF. 
DSG Sealand, in Flintshire, Wales, is the only remaining former DARA site in DSG. 
Sealand, as discussed above has managerial responsibilities for DSG Stafford and 
the EOSA area of DSG Donnington. Sealand’s primary business is Electronic 
components for the Air Force, reflecting its DARA heritage. However, through 
restructuring, work formally done at Donnington and Stafford is now done at the 
Sealand site. Unite shares industrial membership at Sealand with the engineering 
technician and managerial union, Prospect. The Unite membership at Sealand, is 
unique amongst the DSG membership in that it can mainly trace its heritage back 
to the MSF union, as opposed to the AEEU and to a smaller extent TGWU.  
DSG Catterick is DSG’s most northerly English site. Unite is the only union 
representing industrial members at Catterick and has three shop stewards. Primarily 
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a B-vehicles site, Catterick has line management responsibilities for the B-vehicles 
business at Donnington and also DSG’s Kinnegar site in Northern Island. Catterick 
also has line management responsibilities for DSG’s Stirling Site in Scotland which 
also primarily deals with B-vehicles. 
Initially, it was planned that this research would be carried out using a mixed 
methods approach inside the case study, which would include the use of a survey 
of union members, along with elite interviewing and analysis of documentary 
evidence. As discussed, quantitative methods, such as questionnaires and the 
analysis of large workplaces surveys have been used increasingly by Industrial 
relations researchers in recent years (Whitfield, 1998:65), as it is perceived that the 
use of such methods may add rigour to the research. Surveys are linked to the 
deductive approach to research (Saunders et al.:138), due to their ability to 
statistically test hypothesis and theories (Whitfield, 1998:65). However, when 
designing the fieldwork stage of the research, it was decided by the researcher, in 
conjunction with his supervisory team, that the proposed survey was not appropriate 
with an inductive methodology, and this was subsequently dropped from the study 
in favour of heightened reliance on elite interviewing as the primary vehicle for data 
collection.  
The research was intended to be carried out over four phases, with each one 
designed to investigate a different part of the complex relationship between shop 
stewards, convenors, lay representatives with national responsibilities and full time 
officials. Phase one comprised of an analysis of a number of documentary sources 
generated by Unite, the MoD and Civil service, and other relevant journals and 
media sources, such as those found on the internet. This analysis was to be carried 
out prior to the interview phase of the research, forming a strong foundation on which 
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the interview schedule could be built. During phase two, interviews were to be 
carried out with a number of union representatives, nationwide, at convenor level. 
As these representatives are often perceived to be the lynch pin between the union’s 
national and local structures, these interviews would be used to identify key issues 
that could then be further examined in phases three and four. The convenor level 
representatives would also be gate keepers to accessing the shop stewards in 
phase four, and, therefore were of vital importance to the success, or not, of the 
research project. The focus of phase three of the research was to be interviews with 
a small number of representatives with national responsibilities, including the DSG 
joint national focal point, a retired full time lay officer, national branch secretary and 
the MoD sector delegate to Unite’s Executive Council. In addition to this, one 
regional full time officer with responsibilities for the MoD sector was also selected 
for interview. Phase four would then focus upon interviews with shop stewards and 
safety representatives at five Ministry of Defence civilian sites, DSG Bovington, DSG 
Donnington, LS Donnington, DSG Stafford and DSG Catterick.  
It was expected that the use of elite interviewing techniques, backed up by deep 
and careful analysis of documentary evidence, within the encompassing single 
case, embedded case study design, would be able to provide in-depth and 
meaningful data, with which to answer the key research question and the sub 
questions outlined above. The following section will now explain the rationale behind 
the choosing of interviews and the type of interviews used, followed by a discussion 
about the analysis of documentary evidence. 
The Methods. 
Interviews. 
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Defined by Saunders et al (2007: 310) as a “purposeful discussion between two or 
more people”, the interview is a tool used by researchers as a way of collecting data 
which is both valid and reliable. Whipp (1998:54) states that “the interview is the 
primary means of accessing the experiences and subjective views of actors. 
Detailed, vivid and inclusive accounts of events and processes may be generated. 
The flexibility of the interview enables the researcher to open up new dimensions of 
a problem, or to discover clues that connect its different elements”. Bell adds to this 
(2010:161) stating that “one major advantage of the interview is its adaptability”. In 
the hands of a skilled practitioner the interview is an immensely powerful research 
tool. The flexible nature of interviews mean that the interviewer can probe 
responses, follow up on the ideas and answers supplied and examine what the 
motives or feelings of a participant are or were, when discussing a particular 
experience. Most interviews are conducted “face to face” with the interviewee, 
although interviewing over the phone, through Skype email or instant messenger 
are also methods, sometimes employed, particularly when lack of time or resources 
is an issue (Saunders et al, 2007:342). When conducted face to face, interviews 
allow the researcher to note the way that a question is answered “the tone of voice, 
facial expression, hesitation and so on” (Bell, 2010:161).  The interview, therefore, 
has a number of advantages over questionnaires. With surveys there is no ability to 
probe and follow up on answers in the way that interviews can and the information 
gained from the non-verbal cues, highlighted here, would not be picked up in a 
written response (ibid). 
Interviewers use different formats of interview, depending on the context in which 
they are working. Different types of interview will deliver different results to the 
researcher and, therefore, the choice of which format to use is a pivotal decision in 
any research (Saunders et al, 2007:313). Before making a choice of which interview 
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type or types to use, the researcher needs to decide the purpose of the interview, 
what they wish to find out and what type of data they wish to collect. 
Saunders et al, (2007:312) demonstrate that there are a number of differing 
typologies which, whilst overlapping in some key areas, give us an “overall 
understanding of the nature of research interviews” (ibid). The most commonly used 
types are the structured, semi structured and unstructured versions (Saunders et al, 
2007:312, Bell, 2010:162-165, Whipp, 1998:54). However, Saunders et al 
(2007:312) cite Healy (1991) as using the typology of standardised and non-
standardised interviews and Robson (2002) as using a typology of respondent and 
informant interviews. This section will explain the different interview types, using the 
most used typology of structured, semi-structured and unstructured interview, but 
will introduce the other typologies as, and when, they overlap.  
Structured interviews cause the interviewer to ask questions in a very fixed form and 
sequence (Whipp, 1998:54).  Interviewers administering structured interviews use a 
predetermined list of identical questions, from which they do not deviate. Each 
question is asked in turn, with the response recorded on a standardised schedule, 
usually containing a number of pre-coded answers, which can be circled as the 
interview progresses (Bell, 2010:163). This reduces the need for the researcher to 
be writing the respondent’s answers down in full, throughout the interview, meaning 
that more attention can be made to the respondents’ non-verbal cues. The 
standardised nature of structured interviews is the reason that they are sometimes 
referred to as standardised interviews (Saunders et al, 2007:312). Standardised, or 
structured, interviews are linked more to quantitative than to qualitative research as 
the way that they are conducted and the results are analysed, are closely linked to 
the survey method. Structured interviews also lend themselves to the respondent 
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interview typology, referring to way that these interviews are administered, with the 
interviewer directing the interview and the interviewee responding to the questions 
asked.  
However, this is where the typologies overlap, as the description given of the 
respondent interview could also refer to semi structured interviews. Semi structured 
interviews, along with the unstructured type to be discussed next, come under the 
non-standardised label (Saunders et al, 2007:312). Different to the structured 
interviews, researchers administering these types of interviews have a large amount 
of freedom, over how they choose to do so. Rather than having a strict schedule of 
questions, from which they are unable to deviate, researchers using this method 
have a list of themes and questions that need to be covered. However, the order in 
which these questions are asked can and will vary from one interview to the next 
and in some cases, questions will be omitted. In addition to this, one of the great 
strengths of this type of interviewing is that researchers are able to introduce new 
and extra questions, so that answers can be probed further. This means that 
interviewers can explore more deeply the experiences of respondents, using these 
extra, exploratory, questions to expand upon the answers that are given (Saunders 
et al, 2007:312). However, the researcher remains firmly in control of the interview. 
Unstructured interviews are at the other end of the spectrum from the structured 
type. These come under the typology of informant interviews as they are guided by 
the interviewee. Unstructured interviews are very informal, with no list of questions, 
although the researcher will have a clear idea of what issues they wish to explore 
(Saunders et al, 2007:312). The objective of these interviews is “to provide the 
greatest opportunity for the views and values of the respondents to become known” 
(Whipp, 1998:54). To do this the interviewee “is given the opportunity to talk freely 
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about events, behaviour, and beliefs in relation to the topic area” (Saunders et al, 
2007:312). However, an interview is more than just an interesting conversation (Bell, 
2010:164) and whilst a conversation around a topic may be interesting, it is 
important that the discussion remains relevant (Whipp, 1998:54).   
The exploratory nature of this study lent itself to the semi-structured interview 
typology. Saunders et al (2007:315) state that “where it is necessary for you to 
understand the reasons for the decisions that your research participants have taken, 
or to understand the reasons for their attitudes and opinions, it will be necessary for 
you to conduct a qualitative interview”.  In this study the attitudes and opinions of 
participants is of vital importance, in terms of their perceptions of what factors 
influence effective trade union representation. This information could not be gained 
from using the structured approach. The inductive approach, taken by the 
researcher, requires a large amount of information to be collected in order for a 
theory, or ideas leading to a theory to be built up, (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998:10). 
Therefore, the ability to further probe and explore the answers provided by 
interviewees, that the semi-structured interview could provide over the structured 
type, was of great importance. The unstructured approach is not appropriate in this 
case. Whilst this approach can be rich in data collection, the completely non-
standardised nature of the method is better suited to preliminary interviews (Bell, 
2010:164), where a research question is being constructed. In the case of this study 
a research question and a number of sub-questions have already been formulated 
prior to field work beginning. Therefore, for this reason and the reasons above, in 
relation to structured interviews, the semi-structured method is the one that will be 
used during this study. 
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The study, as discussed above, was designed to have four phases, with the second, 
third and fourth comprising a number of semi-structured interviews. Before any 
research could be conducted access to research subjects must be granted 
(Burgess, 1984:45). The central figure in this stage of research is the gatekeeper, 
or the gatekeepers. These are individuals who have the power to be able to grant 
access to people or withhold it and are usually the people or person in charge 
(Burgess, 1984:48).  In the case of this study the gate keepers were the senior 
representatives within the MoD sector. As discussed above, the researcher has a 
history of working in this sector, both as an electrician and a union representative. 
The researcher, therefore, has a large number of contacts within the sector and the 
wider union. Saunders et al (2007:168-169) state that “most management and 
organisational researchers suggest that you are more likely to gain access where 
you are able to use existing contacts” while Buchanan et al (1988:56)  reveal that 
“we have been most successful where we have a friend, relative or student  working 
in the organisation”. Burgess (1984:46) adds to this explaining that successful 
researchers are often able to use the knowledge that they have of a particular setting 
to negotiate access, highlighting some examples where researchers already had 
contacts in a setting, through connections or from having worked in the proposed 
research area. 
The gatekeepers, in relation two phase two, the convenors, were two individuals 
known to the researcher, the MoD sector Unite Executive Committee member and 
the convenor of DSG Donnington who, until recently, had also been the group’s 
national focal. Through these individuals contact was enabled with all of those whom 
would be targeted to take part in phase two. These would be all Unite 
representatives at convenor level in DSG, the convenor of DLS Donnington, and the 
Secretary of the Defence Fire and Rescue, national branch. The two original gate 
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keepers also gave the researcher access to participants in phase three, the 
Executive member himself, the regional officer with MoD responsibilities, the DSG 
National Focal and the retired national lay officer. The Union’s National Officer for 
the MoD sector was also approached. For phase four, which entailed the 
interviewing of shop stewards below convenor level, the participants from phase two 
became gatekeepers themselves, as they were the individuals that had the power 
to grant access to the shop stewards on their particular sites. The phases were set 
out so that the research cast a broad net, which would catch representatives, at all 
levels, across a large geographical spread.  
Documentary Analysis. 
Prior to the interview, phase one of the research entailed a large amount of 
documentary analysis in order to set the context for the research. Set out in two 
streams, the first would examine documents in reference to the MoD and civil 
service, and the second stream looked to those Unite and its predecessor unions. 
This analysis would set the scene for the interview stages by examining the 
contemporary and historical context of the research. 
The term document is a general one which refers to “an impression left on a physical 
object by a human being” (Bell, 2010:125). Most commonly this is something in 
written form, such as a manuscript or report, but documentary evidence can also be 
such media as a photo, film, or CD-ROM/DVD, to name just a small selection of 
possibilities. Documents can come as primary and secondary sources and can be 
deliberate or inadvertent. Primary documents are those such as manuscripts or 
printed materials such as diaries, letters, and minutes of committee meetings 
(Patmore 1998:219), which often come about during the period that research is 
taking place. Secondary sources are interpretations of events based upon primary 
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evidence, such as company annual reports, union journals, staff magazines, 
legislative papers and newspapers (ibid). This study uses both primary evidence 
such as Shop Steward Committee Minutes, and secondary sources such as 
newspaper reports and union journals. Deliberate sources mean those that were 
written specifically to be of use to scholars at a later time. This could pertain to 
documents such as diaries or autobiographies, or primarily in the case of this study, 
journal papers. Inadvertent sources are those that are used by researchers for a 
purpose other than that which they were intended such as government reports (Bell, 
2010:131).  
When analysing documentary evidence it is important to ask a number of questions. 
Bell divides these into what she describes as “external and internal criticism” 
(2010:134-136). Bell states that a number of questions need to be asked in order to 
attain whether the document under analysis is genuine and authentic. In terms of 
external criticism the researcher must be able to identify whether the author was 
actually at the place that the source came from, at the time it was supposed to be 
written. Are there other sources that can verify that the author actually wrote the 
source, is it typical of other sources written by the author and does it share its 
structure with similar documents? In addition to this, Patmore states that when 
examining a historical document researchers should scrutinise the document to see 
why it has survived (1998:220). Is it that the document paints the organisation being 
researched in a particularly good light? Have documents showing a negative picture 
been destroyed? Are the documents real or fake? Answering this question allows 
the researcher to show that a document is genuine, in that it is what it is claimed 
that it is. Through internal criticism the researcher seeks to discover what type of 
document it is and whether the author has a particular agenda (Bell, 2010:135). 
Again, this is done by using a number of questions; what type of document is it?; 
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what is the documents purpose?; when and how was it produced?; and is it typical 
of its type? In addition, a number of questions should be asked in terms of the 
motives of the author: who are they and what is known about them?; what are their 
political views and aims?; how long after the event was the document produced?; 
and is the author known to exaggerate or tell untruths? (Bell, 2010:136) This is 
particularly the case in terms of newspapers (Patmore, 1998:220). 
As mentioned above, documentary analysis was carried out in two streams. Firstly, 
in terms of the MoD and Civil Service, a number of documents were looked at 
regarding the department’s employee relations policy, industrial relations 
procedures, and recent review of employee relations and trade union facility time. A 
number of the department’s extant Whitely constitutional agreements were also 
looked at. These documents were accessed through both public sources such as 
the internet and human sources within the department that were known to the 
researcher. All documents were accessed legitimately and, in terms of government 
documents, were all unclassified at the time that they were accessed.  
The second stream looked at documents in relation to Unite and its MoD Sector, 
acquired through the union’s website, other media and human sources, such as 
convenors and officers, known to the researcher from within the union. Again, all 
these documents were accessed legitimately. Important issues were highlighted by 
the analysis, which lent them themselves to further investigation. These included 
the effect political and cultural divisions, a legacy of the merger between Amicus 
and the TGWU, were having on the union’s ability to make policy decisions that 
benefitted all of its members. Other points of interest raised by the analysis were 
that the union’s MoD sector appeared to have been under a sustained attack from 
both the current Tory led coalition government and the previous New Labour and 
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Conservative governments. Both of these administrations had presided over a 
number of policies that had seen large numbers of site closures, job cuts, 
privatisations, semi-privatisations and cuts in terms and conditions which had 
weakened the union’s membership base. The analysis demonstrated that this 
onslaught had not abated, with a wide range of changes to terms and conditions 
taking place under the auspices of the department’s employee relations review and 
a number of privatisations planned, such as the sale of the Defence Support Group 
to Babcocks International.  
This section has examined and explained the rationale for choices taken in terms of 
the design of this research. Having explained in part one that an inductive rather 
than deductive approach had been taken, against the recent trends in industrial 
relations research, this section explored why a case study approach was chosen, 
explaining what is meant by case study research and why the researcher believed 
this was the correct strategy to take. This section then looked at the research 
methods which had been used within the case study strategy, explaining why semi-
structured elite interviews had been chosen over other interview typologies. Finally, 
documentary analysis was discussed, explaining the issues related to the method 
and the strategy that was taken by the researcher when finding documents and 
choosing which ones to use. 
The following section will give an overview of how the research was actually carried 
out, explaining who was interviewed and how the interview process worked, 
reflecting on how closely this mirrored the design of the research, outlined above. 
This section will highlight issues that were encountered when carrying out the 
research and will reflect on the way that the researcher’s role as a former Unite shop 
steward may have affected the research. Finally, to bring this section and chapter 
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to a close, there will be a discussion in relation to the reliability and validity of the 
research. 
Research Ethics. 
The key ethical issue for any researcher is to do no harm. Saunders et al (2007: 
181) highlight that “the way you obtain consent, preserve confidentiality, collect your 
data from participants and the way in which you use, analyse and report your data 
all have the capacity to cause harm to participants”. The use of interviews, as in the 
case of this study, can be seen as intrusive and stressful for participant and it is, 
therefore, vital that all possible ethical issues are considered prior to the research 
taking place, with protection for participants built in to the research design. 
Saunders at al (ibid) explain that there are a number of common ethical issues that 
can arise during a research project and should therefore be considered. These are  
privacy of possible and actual participants; voluntary nature of participation 
and the right to withdraw partially or completely from the process; consent 
and possible deception of participants; maintenance of the confidentiality of 
data provided by individuals or identifiable participants and their autonomy; 
reactions of the participants to the way in which you seek to collect data, 
including embarrassment, stress, discomfort pain and harm; behaviour and 
objectivity of you as a researcher. 
In order to nullify these ethical issues a number of forms were designed by the 
researcher, with approval from the university’s ethics committee. The use of these 
forms, to seek consent and in the case of the information sheet and invitation letter, 
to explain to participants the reasons for the research and the way that it would be 
carried out, will be explained in the following sections. 
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Research Overview. 
Administering the interviews. 
Following the first documentary analysis stage interviews were conducted with 28 
union representatives (Annex D) with responsibilities in the MoD sector of Unite, 
over the next three phases. During the second phase interviews were carried out 
with eight union representatives at convenor level. The third phase then entailed the 
interviewing of a small number of representatives with national responsibilities (n=4) 
and one regional full time officer. These four national representatives were the 
Executive Council member for the MoD, the DSG National Union focal point,  and 
the retired Lay national official. Phase four consisted of interviews with fifteen shop 
stewards and safety representatives in five Ministry of Defence civilian sites, DSG 
Bovington, DSG Donnington, LS Donnington, DSG Stafford and DSG Catterick. 
Prior to interviews taking place, perspective participants were contacted by the 
researcher by email. This initial contact included two documents, an invitation letter 
and an information sheet (Annex E). The invitation letter introduced the researcher 
to the potential participant, briefly outlined the project and explained that they were 
being contacted, as a union activist, to ask if they were willing to take part in the 
research. Finally, the letter directed the respondent to the attached information 
sheet.  The information sheet explained to the individual concerned the aims of the 
research and that they had been chosen to be a participant because of their role as 
a union activist or officer. It stated that it was believed that their experiences would 
enable the researcher to gain an important insight into the internal workings of Unite. 
The information sheet then went on to explain that they did not have to take part in 
the study but what they would have to do if they did. Finally, participants were 
informed, through the information sheet what the risks of taking part were, explaining 
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that they would be offered anonymity, in terms of their identities, who would have 
access to the data collected and who they could contact in case of a problem. 
Interview location is important as getting this wrong can have an adverse influence 
on the information gathered from the interview. It is important that the location is 
convenient for participants and that they feel safe and relaxed (Saunders et al: 321). 
During the data collecting stage of this study most interviews took place in union 
offices, at the participants workplace. Advantages to this were that these locations 
were comfortable for participants, being places that were well known to them and 
which felt safe due to their nature of being the union’s “home” in the workplace. 
These rooms were also convenient to participants, being at their place of work, so 
caused minimal disruption and allowed them to attend the interview, using union 
facility time. The exceptions to this were the interviews that took place with 
representatives at DSG Catterick and also with a regional union officer and a retired 
lay national official. In the case of DSG Catterick, the union’s office had been 
previously removed during a review of facilities and interviews took place in the 
office of the Convenor, who was also a Team Leader. This was slightly problematic, 
as the session was twice interrupted by people entering the office. However, this 
was perceived to be a better option than the alternative, which was for interviews to 
have taken place in a conference room next to the Human Resource (HR) 
department, which could have caused participants to be more guarded in their 
contributions. The other two exceptions, as mentioned above, were an interview 
with a retired national lay officer, which took place in his home at his request, and 
an interview with a regional official, which took place in the home of the researcher. 
In both these cases, as in the case of DSG Catterick, it was not felt that the interview 
locations in anyway compromised the data. 
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Before interviews took place the researcher ensured that interviewees had read 
through the information sheet and that they had chance to ask any questions they 
may have, prior to starting. Participants were then invited to fill in two copies of a 
pre-interview consent form (Annex E), one for themselves and one for the 
researcher. This form asked respondents to confirm that they had read and 
understood the information sheet, that they understood that they did not have to 
take part and that they agreed to take part in the study. It then asked interviewees 
to choose whether they wished for the data collected, during the interview, to be 
anonymised and were happy for the interview to be recorded.  
Interviews were conducted using a predetermined schedule of questions (annex E). 
These questions were used as a guide by the researcher, with a number of sub-
questions developed to expand on the answers received. Designed to be relatively 
easy to answer, the early questions focussed on issues around how long 
participants had been a union member and activist, what positions they held in the 
union, as well as how and why they had become a representative or officer. These 
questions allowed the participant and the researcher to settle into the interview and 
for rapport to be built between the two, before the interview moved onto more 
complex questions. After these initial questions the schedule moved onto ask a 
number of questions that defined how the participant saw their role, duties and 
responsibilities, in terms of their union position. These questions allowed the 
researcher to investigate what it was that the participant did for the union and how 
they carried out these roles. The interviewer was also able to explore whether or not 
participants saw a leadership role in what they did, considering Batstone et al (1979) 
categories of shop steward, in terms of representatives and delegates. The next 
phase of questioning covered the interactions that the participants had with full time 
officials, lay representatives and rank and file union members. These questions 
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allowed the researcher to examine the relationships between full time officers, 
representatives and members in order to compare and contrast this to Turner’s 
(1962) arguments of union democracy and were then further developed with 
questions about influence and the level of activity of members represented by the 
participant. These questions also gave an insight into how representation was 
administered and how participants saw their place within the union in respect of its 
structures. Finally, the researcher asked a number of questions in reference to the 
effect that internal changes, such as merger, and external changes in civil service 
industrial relations had on the way the union was structured. In addition, the semi 
structured nature of the interviews allowed for a large number of supplementary 
questions to be asked, dependent on the responses to the scheduled questions. 
Some of these supplementary questions became staple in that they were asked in 
a large proportion of interviews. These questions covered a number of constant 
themes, including the implications of the Government’s review of facility time on 
representation and the repercussions of the union’s size on identity and democracy. 
These additional questions allowed the researcher to add some very important detail 
to the data collected, which would have been missed had a more structured 
approach been taken. 
After the interview participants were asked to fill in two copies of a post-interview 
consent form (Annex E). This form again asked them to confirm whether they wished 
the data to be anonymised, allowing for interviewees to change their response from 
that proffered in the pre-interview consent form and asked permission for comments 
made during the interview to be quoted in subsequent publications. The interviewer 
then carried out a post interview debrief with the respondent, asking them if they 
were happy with the way that the interview had gone. Interviewees were asked if 
they would be happy for a follow up interview to take place, if deemed necessary by 
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the researcher and informed, once again, of how the researcher could be contacted 
after the interview if the participant wished to do so.  
Issues experienced. 
The issues that were experienced during the research phase of this project were all 
related to access. As outlined above, the researcher had deep roots in the sector 
being examined, meaning that issues of access had not been foreseen prior to 
beginning work in the field, due to the relationships that already existed between the 
researcher and some of the research participants. 
The first phase of interviewing (the convenor level) went smoothly. Interviews were 
set up, as identified above, through an initial contact email, after which a mutually 
agreed date, time and location was set up for the interview to take place. All 
interviews in this phase were set up easily and carried out quickly, either at the 
convenors’ own sites or after a meeting of the Unite DSG combine committee, in the 
case of the convenors of DSG Stirling, and DSG Warminster.  
The next phase of interviewing was trickier. Whilst interviews were set up relatively 
easily, with the sector’s Executive Committee member, the DSG union focal point, 
the secretary of the national MoD fire and rescue branch and the retired full time lay 
officer, other planned interviews were more problematic. In the case of the interview 
planned with a regional officer with responsibilities for the MoD sector, it took more 
than two months to set up the interview due to diary commitments of the officer and 
went ahead in the home of the researcher. Other planned interviews with the 
secretary of the national MoD guard’s branch, the chair of the MoD NISC and the 
sector’s national officer did not happen. In the case of the secretary of the guard’s 
branch and the chair of the NISC, both of these prospective respondents initially 
responded positively to the researcher’s advances. However, the guard’s secretary 
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failed to respond to follow up attempts to set a date and time for the interview and 
in the case of the NISC chair, whilst always positive to the idea of taking part in the 
study, it was ultimately not possible, due to the respondent’s unavailability. Attempts 
to interview the sectors national officer also failed. Again discussions about this were 
initially very positive. A number of emails were exchanged, with the Officer stating 
that he would be happy to take part in the study. However, despite several attempts 
to make this happen, the workload of the officer, which had increased just prior to 
the fieldwork taking place, would not allow it and after several months of attempts 
to arrange the interview the officer stated that unfortunately he would not be able to 
take part. Whilst disappointing, the absence of the data that may have been 
collected from these interviews did not, in the opinion of the researcher, damage the 
research, due to the richness of the data collected from the respondents that did 
take part, particularly those with national responsibilities, who were able to give a 
wide ranging overview from a national perspective. 
Issues with access were also experienced in the final phase of interviewing. The 
fieldwork stage of this research took in the region of fourteen months to complete 
and in this time the situation surrounding trade union facility time in the civil service 
shifted significantly. Had the study been designed to be holistic, then this shift in 
context could have been a significant problem. However the embedded nature of 
the case study meant that any issues that may have been caused by the changes 
to the way facility time was managed could be mitigated. 
The changes to facility time, discussed under the employee relation review in 
chapter four, were in place at the beginning of the study. However, by the time the 
final phase of interviewing was launched the restrictions that were in place were 
being policed far more rigorously by management. Therefore, whilst at the beginning 
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of the study the convenors still had significant time and freedom to meet the 
researcher; this was different when the final phase was launched, in relation to shop 
stewards. Whilst this, in most cases, just built a delay into the research, as finding 
time to meet the researcher was more difficult, in some cases, such as that of DSG 
Sealand, interviews with stewards were not possible as the respondent claimed they 
could not justify taking the time to meet the researcher. Again, whilst this was 
disappointing, it was not felt by the researcher that this damaged the research as, 
in anticipation of issues such as this, five other sites had also been approached to 
take part in this phase of the interviewing.  
Reflection on the role of the researcher as a former Unite workplace 
representative. 
 As discussed above, the researcher has a history in the sector, having worked in it 
as an electrician and union representative, for a total of fifteen years. This raises 
issues of potential bias, due to the relationships between the researcher and the 
topic and participants in the research. Bell (2010:169) states that as interviewers 
are human beings and not machines the way that they act during an interview can 
affect the way that interviewees react to questioning.  
Saunders et al (2007:318-319) highlight a number of problems in relation to bias, 
which could have been an issue in this study. Two types of bias are identified here, 
interviewer bias and interviewee-response bias. Interviewer bias is that discussed 
above by Bell (2010). The interviewer’s tone of voice, comments they may make or 
non-verbal behaviour will influence the respondents in the way that they answer 
questions. This is particularly a problem where non standardised interviews are 
used as in this project. Interviewers may try to impose their own views or frame of 
reference on an interview and can sometimes express bias in the way that they 
 195 
 
interpret responses (Saunders et al, 2007:318). The interviewer was highly vigilant 
of these issues during the research. Issues related to interviewer bias could have 
arisen due to the researcher’s knowledge of the sector and some of the issues being 
discussed. The researcher was very careful to stay neutral, acting, as far as 
possible, as if he had no personal knowledge of the issues being examined.  
The second type of bias, discussed by Saunders et al (2007:318), is interviewee 
bias, also known as response bias. This is where bias is influenced by the 
interviewee’s perceptions of the interviewer, or where respondents answers are 
tempered by concerns they may have about discussing certain themes. This was 
the bigger concern for the researcher. Being known to many of the respondents, 
through either personal relationships or reputation, the researcher was very aware 
that this could influence the answers given to questions.  One such problem was 
with respondents presuming that the researcher knew certain things through his own 
experience of the sector and, therefore, not explaining things in the necessary detail. 
The researcher dealt with this by using supplementary and probing questions to 
expand on the answers given, demonstrating the importance of having chosen the 
semi-structured interview typology. This form of bias could also have been an issue 
in terms of the respondents wanting to please the interviewer by answering the 
questions in the way that they felt the researcher wished them too. This, however, 
was where the interviewer’s experiences of the sector really helped him, as where 
it was believed by the researcher that this may be happening, he was able to ask 
further questions to clarify what was being said, whilst at the same time being aware 
of possible interviewer bias or perceptions of such. 
Having discussed issues of bias the final part of this chapter will look at the validity 
and reliability of the research. 
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Validity and Reliability. 
Kitay and Callus (1998:111) state that “one of the advantages of case studies is that 
the amount of information that is collected and the ability to probe beneath the 
surface enhances the validity of the information that is obtained”. Bell 
(2010:119:120) explains that validity “tells us whether an item or instrument 
measures or describes what it is supposed to measure or describe”. Validity refers 
to the extent that the researcher is able to gain access to the knowledge and 
experiences of the people that are participating in their research. This research 
therefore, with its embedded case study design and semi-structured interviews, as 
designed so as maximise the validity of the project, again justifying these choices. 
Reliability is defined by Bell (2010:119) as the extent to which a test or procedure 
produces similar results under constant conditions on all conditions”. For this reason 
case study research is often seen as less reliable than other methods, because of 
the difficulties or replicating the findings (Kitay and Callus, 1998:111). However, 
findings taken from the use of non-standardised methods, such as case studies, are 
not necessarily supposed to be repeated as they are a snapshot of a particular issue 
at the time that data was collected (Saunders et al, 2007:319). However, whilst 
replication may not be necessary there are still tasks that can be carried out to 
ensure that the data collected can be trusted. Therefore, Kitay and Callus 
(1998:111) state that there should be common protocols used during research. The 
same themes should be explored at each site, with the same main questions and 
issues covered. This was a key design of this research project. 
Summary. 
This chapter has set out in detail the methodological considerations that have been 
taken when designing and carrying out this research. The chapter began by 
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explaining the reasons behind the decision to take an inductive rather than 
deductive approach. Explaining that the lack of a hypothesis or theory to test, as is 
the norm in industrial relations research, meant that the research would need to be 
carried out from the field up, rather than the theory down. Having explained the 
justification for using an inductive approach, the chapter then examined how the 
research would be carried out by outlining the research design. This began with a 
discussion of what is meant by case study research and then outlined how this 
design would work, explaining the key methods that would be used and justification 
for these methods over others. Also included in this section was an examination of 
the researcher’s background, looking at his experiences of working in the sector as 
an employee of the MoD and as a Unite workplace representative. Having explained 
the research design and how it would be conducted, the final part explained and 
reflected upon what the researcher was, and was not, able to achieve. This entailed 
an in-depth look at how the interviews were administered, explaining who was 
interviewed and how closely this matched the design. There was a reflection on the 
problems that were encountered, particularly in terms of access and on issues that 
arose from the researcher’s role as a former activist. Finally there was a discussion 
about validity and reliability. 
Having set out how the research was planned and carried out the following chapter 
will set out the findings of the research, demonstrating how the data collected was 
used to answer the over-arching research question via a number of themes, set 
around the fore mentioned sub-questions. 
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Chapter Seven: The Findings.  
This chapter will now set out the main findings from this research. It will begin by 
defining the sample, outlining some of the key characteristics of the respondents, 
including the length of time that they have been union members and how they 
perceive their role and duties. It will then be set out in four parts, each one using the 
interview data to address the four research sub-questions established in chapter 5. 
The final section will then address the principle research question, namely “what 
factors influence effective trade union representation?” 
The Sample. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there were twenty-eight respondents, 
interviewed as part of this study. This included eight lay representatives at convenor 
level, four lay representatives with national responsibilities, one regional full time 
official and fifteen shop stewards, below the level of convenor. In order to answer 
the above question the respondents at each of these levels of representation will be 
discussed, in turn, followed by a discussion examining the relationships and 
interactions that take place between these representational levels. 
The Convenors. 
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With the exception of one of the convenors (Con8), who had been a Unite member 
for eleven years, the other seven had all been members of Unite, or one of its 
predecessor unions, for at least twenty years, with two of them, having thirty years 
of continuous membership (Con1 and 3). Also of interest, is the proportion of time 
while members that the convenors had spent as union representatives. Three of the 
convenors (Con 3,4 and 6) had all spent more than four fifths of their time as 
members holding representative positions  in the union, with two others (Con 8 and 
2), holding posts for around two thirds and three-quarters of their time in 
membership respectively.  
The reasons that the convenors gave for initially joining the union were mixed. For 
one (Con 3) it was a political move, having been “politicised by the (1984) miners’ 
strike”, whilst for another convenor, who had a registered disability, it was individual 
protection that they were seeking. One of the convenors had joined as an 
apprentice, when working in the private sector “it wasn’t a closed shop but it was 
certainly a stronger union then. In those days the shop steward would approach you 
soon after you started and ask you to join. I don’t remember anyone not joining” (con 
1). In this case the respondent was happy to join, seeing it as a rite of passage. 
Convenor 5 at another one of the sites also reported being approached, soon after 
starting their job. However, their experience was not so positive: “a rep came to the 
training school and told us we would join. I resented this at the time. But you felt that 
if you didn’t join you wouldn’t get a job”. Faced with joining the EEPTU or not having 
a job, the respondent did not feel that they had any choice and although they did 
not have any more to do with the steward that recruited them, they did not form a 
loyal bond with their union, leaving, when the opportunity arose, to join the MSF. 
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When asked what the reasons for becoming a union representative were, two of the 
eight convenors stated that it had been due to feeling that there was a lack of 
information, indicating individualistic reasons for taking office. The other six 
convenors all indicated more collective reasons, such as politics or wishing to 
advance the interests of the members. For example, one (Con3) replied to the 
question, what was your reason for becoming a union representative by stating “I’m 
a socialist. I am a member of the Socialist Workers Party and you try to, you know, 
advance things…lead your members” whilst the convenor of another site replied to 
the same question saying “there was a lack of information coming out of my union 
team…there was a load of shit going on with several reps having left. I’d been 
moaning about not enough information coming out of the union and as they had lost 
a number of reps they asked if I fancied doing it. There were three of us making a 
noise and we all became reps” (con8).  
In relation to the Batstone et al.’s (1977) shop steward typologies, four of the eight 
expressed that they felt there was a leadership role related to the post of convenor, 
one stating “I see it that we are elected to give a lead and we should do that” (con 
3). Two did not express an opinion on these issues, whilst two felt that it was more 
of a communication role, with one stating “communicating rather than being a role 
model for people to follow…if someone comes to me (with a problem) I can point 
them in the right direction” (Con 8). Another convenor (Con 7) answered the 
question by saying that, in his view, members should be able to make up their own 
minds, as long as they had all of the information at their disposal “no charging up 
the hill and expecting them to follow”.  
From these three, quite simple questions we can begin to see a pattern emerging. 
Convenors, in the main, have a considerable amount of years in membership and 
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tend to have spent a large proportion of those years in some sort of representative 
role, which is in line with the Batstone et al (1977) argument that convenors, more 
often than not, are senior stewards. In addition to this, most of those interviewed 
highlighted collective issues as the reasons for becoming representatives. These 
trends appear to be broadly in line with the traditional literature, particularly Batstone 
et al (1977). However, their reflection on the role of the convenor as being one of 
leadership was not so well backed up by this study. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter in terms of shop stewards, this may reflect rather that the representatives 
do have a leadership role, even if this is exercised sometimes reluctantly, but feel 
uncomfortable acknowledging it. This was the case with Convenor (Con 5) who, 
whilst accepting there was a leadership role, stated that “although other reps are 
active and capable and could do the job, it’s recognised that I know more than them. 
It’s something I am not always comfortable with, but it is the way that it is”. 
In terms of another of the Batstone et al.’s (1977) assumptions, that of the majority 
of convenors being wedded to union principles, which was backed up by Fosh 
(1981), this was also not strongly supported in these findings. Whilst there was some 
evidence of this in a minority of cases, the majority of those who offered evidence 
in relation to this did not have strong union backgrounds, in terms of family or 
politics, nor did they appear to have displayed much interest in activism prior to 
being elected as a shop steward. Four of those interviewed stated that they took 
part in no wider union committees, with their activities confined primarily to their 
workplace. The other four respondents were all members of their respective RISC 
and one was also a member of the MoD NISC. However, outside of the MoD sectors 
structures there was very little evidence of involvement with the union, with branch 
involvement mainly being where the branch was based on their workplace. The 
attitudes of the majority were summed up by convenor 4 who stated that “I have 
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other interests in my life that have greater priority when I am not at work”. This 
demonstrates a potential gap between the literature and the reality of modern shop 
stewards. 
The convenors perceived their role in different ways. However, a theme that 
emerged was the role of a conduit, through which information could be passed 
between the union and members, management and members and vice versa, as 
discussed by Goodman and Whittingham (1971). One convenor summarised his 
role, stating:  
I am the guy who is the interface between the management and members. I 
attend meetings on behalf of the union and are an all-rounder rep rather than 
being specifically for one thing. I am perceived to know more than other reps 
and members sometimes come to me rather than the rep closest to them 
(Con 5).  
Another convenor (Con 2) said “I see my role as reporting into the focal. We have a 
meeting every 8 weeks so I get input from the members to put into that and then I 
disseminate the info back to the members”, whilst another replied saying: 
As convenor I am the figure head for Unite the union in my place of work. I 
am the focal point for people on the shop floor to come to if they have 
problems with management. I’m also the funnel for management to pass info 
to the shop floor. I work for both ends (Con 8).  
Only one of the convenors was in receipt of 100% facility time, which was linked to 
their role, away from the site, as part of a team putting together an in-house bid, to 
try to stop full privatisation of the organisation.  
Interestingly, many of the respondents talked about part of their role being to tell 
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members things that they may not wish to hear. This included respondents such as 
the one (Con 5) who, whilst stating, that they felt their role was a communication 
one rather than leadership, replied “oh yes…I don’t avoid it. I try to give them enough 
reasons why what they want won’t work, or stall them whilst I get the information 
and then show them a hard copy, stating why it won’t work.” This, as discussed 
above, points to an understating or under acknowledgement of their roles as 
leaders.  
Finally, in this section, the convenors were questioned about their main duties and 
responsibilities. Here there were some differences in the descriptions given. Some 
saw their role in terms of the work that they did directly representing members, such 
as accompanying them to grievance and disciplinary meetings or making 
representations to management on their behalf. As one put it “I am the point of 
contact on the shop floor in reference to attacks on terms and conditions…I am 
responsible for stopping the guys from being shafted” (Con 7). Others saw their role 
as more strategic, in terms of the interactions they had with the management. For 
instance, one of the respondents (Con 8) discussed being part of the management 
team, explaining membership of this gave him access to the senior management, 
when he needed it. This demonstrates both the Batstone et al (1977) analysis of 
convenors forming relationship with managers and also the Clegg et al (1961) 
analysis of shop stewards sharing their time between management and members. 
However, the relationships with management would appear to be more based on 
accommodation than bargaining strength. 
Representatives with National Responsibilities. 
In terms of years in membership, like the convenors, the national representatives all 
had considerable numbers of years of continuous membership. In fact, two of them, 
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the present and previous national MoD lay focal, with membership of thirty-eight and 
thirty-nine years continuous service resepctively, were in the top four longest serving 
members in the study. The other two respondents with national responsibilities, the 
DSG national union focal (26 years) and the MoD Fire and Rescue national branch 
secretary (27 years), had been in membership for a similar length as the convenors. 
The proportion of time which they had been a representative was again, like the 
convenors, very high.  Both the Fire and Rescue branch secretary and the former 
national lay representative had spent about four-fifths of their time as members in 
representative roles and the current national lay representative had spent about 
three fifths of his time in such roles.  However, the DSG national focal had only spent 
about two fifths of his time in membership, as a representative.  
Therefore, like the convenors, these representatives, in line with the assumptions of 
Batstone et al (1977) were all senior representatives who had considerable amounts 
of experience of representing trade union members. All four of the national 
respondents gave quite similar reasons for joining the union. The national focal for 
DSG remarked that all were encouraged to join the union by the MoD when starting 
a new job and that, having been a union member prior to working for the MoD, it 
became more apparent why the unions were needed as he got more interested in 
its workings. The other three also mentioned that they had been encouraged to join 
the union when they had start working for the MoD. However, they also all 
mentioned outside influences for their decision to join. The current national lay 
representative cited a family friend, who was the Donnington convenor, as a major 
influence and the former national lay representative stating that his father had 
advised him to sign up. The national branch secretary for MoD Fire and Rescue 
stated that he had always had a strong belief that people should be represented at 
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work, saying “that was one of the main reasons at first, the representation side of it, 
in case anything should arise at work”.  
When asked why they had become shop stewards all of them cited collective 
reasons, contrasting with some of the more individualist reasons provided by the 
convenors, making these respondents closer to the “actives” typology of Fosh 
(1981). The former national lay representative stated that he had been taught at an 
early age to stand up for himself and had done a considerable amount of public 
speaking prior to joining the MoD, which transcended itself into the workplace. 
Having stood in whilst his shop steward was off sick, he was asked by his fellow 
workers to take the role permanently, winning the subsequent election by 129 votes 
to 1. The current lay national representative cited the influence of the Donnington 
convenor at the time stating that he was inspired by their “willingness to help people 
and stand up for people and fight”.  
As with the convenors, there was some reluctance from the respondents to accept 
that they had a leadership role. All four continued to be elected as shop stewards, 
in their original workplaces, despite having national roles. However, the reason for 
this differed, with the DSG national focal seeing it as insurance in case their national 
role was phased out and the national branch secretary for MoD Fire and Rescue 
seeing it mainly as an administration issue. The current and former national lay 
representatives saw being elected as a shop steward as being vital in order to keep 
them in touch with the members. The current national lay representative said “like 
the PM you need to get back to your constituency. It keeps you grounded. You can 
get carried away with dealing with Whitehall. It’s interesting to keep in touch.” This 
was backed up by the former national lay rep who noted:  
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I had to be (elected). Not just because it is process but it became very 
important, as respect has to be earned in all walks of life and that includes 
trade unions… the election process was essential and I always had it in my 
diary and was always re-elected at all levels. Because it is part of the values 
of trade unions. To not be elected is cheating. You can’t expect people to 
follow you blindly. 
The roles of these representatives with national responsibilities differed quite 
significantly. The roles of the DSG national focal and Fire and Rescue national 
branch secretary were seen by the incumbents as mainly administrative, with the 
former stating “I am mainly a post box, particularly for the other unions, I also 
organise meetings for the full-time officials and the convenors.” The national lay 
representative role is seen by the present post holder as a very strategic one. “Most 
work goes into the monthly strategy meeting and the role has become one of a 
strategic level role centred around policy. I complement the National Officer”. The 
former holder of the role also saw it as a strategic one and used personal 
relationships with senior civil servants to influence change:  
I was always interested in partnership. I would try to exploit things as the 
department changed. For instance, when they got rid of HR. You had to get 
to know the people who would now be dealing with the grievances. By getting 
to know these people you are able to gain access to other important people 
so that you could change things. So I embraced the idea of partnership and 
used to work with people. And I was never told not to do it that way. People 
liked the results.  
Whilst the roles of these national representatives may differ, the main duties had 
striking similarities, particularly in relation to administration. The duties of the DSG 
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national focal were described as being mainly administrative. He explained that his 
main duties were in relation to consultation documents from both the MoD and DSG. 
When sent a consultation document it was his job to “post out to convenors, collect 
their feedback and respond”. The secretary of the national MoD Fire and Rescue 
Branch also reported spending significant amounts of his time on administration 
“one important part of it, I always think, is ensuring that your branch is running 
smoothly, and for the branch to run smoothly correspondence from Unite the union, 
which we usually get from central office or our regional office in Bristol, needs to be 
put out. That is my job”.  
In a similar vein the former national lay representative described his duties mainly 
as being in reference to consultation, stating that his job was “to make sure the ITU 
and its members saw all the information and had the opportunity to respond. I was 
a conduit, which was what the National Officer wanted, although I felt I could have 
done a lot more”. The present post holder stated that he felt he “wore a number of 
hats” as, despite having the national role, he still felt they had a duty to the 
Donnington site from which he was elected as a shop steward. In terms of their 
national role he felt that this was something that was still evolving, since the changes 
that had taken place after the employee relations review (discussed below). 
One full time employee of the union was interviewed as part of this study who, 
despite having regional rather than national responsibilities, provided some similar 
explanations. He explained that he had been a member of the union since the early 
1980s having joined the EEPTU when he started an apprenticeship as an 
electrician. He was encouraged to join the EEPTU rather than the AEU, due to the 
electrical bias of their apprenticeship. However, there was no agreement between 
the unions on this and other electrical apprentices had joined the AEU instead of the 
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EEPTU. Having been a shop steward and convenor he had been a full time officer 
for eleven years.  
They had become a shop steward, having come back to their original workplace, 
when the steward in his section had left in order to pursue a career elsewhere. He 
had a reputation for being able to stand up to the management and stated that he 
“always had a tendency to react to people who are bullying or treating people badly”. 
So when the senior steward came onto the section to ask for someone to stand 
“everyone turned and looked at me so I said, in a very squeaky voice that I would 
give it ago”. He had, therefore, been active prior to being a steward, demonstrating 
a connection to union principles, other than being a member in their workplace and 
later a shop steward. “I was involved in protest movements and always on the fringe 
of being non-conformist. I dabbled briefly with the Socialist Workers Party”. 
However, his involvement outside of the workplace was curtailed by the 
development of a young family. 
In 2002, having risen through the union in the workplace to the position of convenor, 
he felt that they had outgrown the role having increased his education, including 
gaining a master’s degree in industrial relations and needed to try something else. 
“As luck would have it the organisation was calling for people to take voluntary early 
release (VER). I applied for it and was accepted”. He initially applied for a role with 
the union as a researcher, based in London, but “the region stated that they wanted 
me and offered me a role. Was told I had ability but also I had been chosen for my 
politics as I was seen as a moderate”. Therefore, he started working for the union 
as a regional officer, with an industrial brief. 
The duties of a regional officer, known as regional organisers in the TGWU, (which 
should not be confused with organisers in Unite, whom are linked to the union’s 
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centralised organising strategy) are varied. Working out of a regional office, the 
officer stated that he had a portfolio of companies that were his to organise and 
“take care of”. In addition to this he also had responsibilities for whole sectors, 
across the region in which he worked, including the MoD Sector. He also explained 
that regional officers were also given a number of postcodes that they were 
responsible for, to deal with postcode referrals. Post code referrals, he explained 
worked as thus. If a member, who worked in an unorganised workplace had a 
problem they could ring the regional office for assistance. The person handling the 
call would then ask for the postcode of the member’s workplace and then assign the 
call to whichever officer had been assigned that post code.  
The post code referral system is interesting as it very clearly fits into the servicing 
rather than organising model (reference), exposing the contradictions that often 
happen in unions, such as Unite, which claim to be at the forefront of organising. 
This will be explored later in this chapter.   
Shop Stewards. 
As discussed previously, fifteen shop stewards were interviewed as part of 
embedded studies, within the larger case study. Shop stewards at DSG Bovington, 
DSG Donnington, LS Donnington, DSG Stafford and DSG Catterick were invited to 
take part, chosen due to the geographical spread that these sites gave the study.  
The statistics around the length of time in membership were far more varied than 
for the convenors and national representatives. Whilst two of the shop stewards (B2 
and B3) had the longest periods of continuous union membership, at forty years 
each, this group of respondents also included the two (C2 and D4) with the shortest 
memberships (3 and 6 years). In fact, ten of these participants had lengths of service 
below the average for respondents in the study of 26 years. A similar pattern 
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emerges when looking at the length of service as a representative, as a proportion 
of their overall membership, as whilst one (LS1) of the shop stewards was amongst 
the highest in the study at almost nine-tenths, all but one (C2) of the rest (with two 
thirds) had spent less than half their time in membership as a representative, with 
eight of the fifteen having less than two fifths. This might indicate that these shop 
stewards are less wedded to union principles than their convenors and national 
colleagues. It may also be that they could not achieve a steward position as there 
was an incumbent representative already in position. However, the evidence, in 
relation to most being elected unopposed and difficulties recruiting new shop 
stewards, would appear to make the former more likely. 
Of the four shop stewards that were interviewed at the DSG Bovington site, three of 
them identified their wish to stand up for people as the reason for becoming a shop 
steward. This is highlighted by this quote from one of the representatives (B2), who 
was in his fortieth year of union membership, having joined at eighteen, when he 
started working for the gas board:  
It’s something you do as you know it’s the right thing to do. It’s social justice 
I think. I like dealing with other people, it makes life a bit more interesting. I 
don’t know if I am a socialist but if you are then helping other people is 
something you do. It’s like being a social worker. It’s more of a calling than a 
job.  
These stewards all displayed some elements that could place them in what was 
outlined by Batstone et al. (1977) as the leader typology of shop steward. They 
demonstrated that they had strong connections to union principles, one stated “Yes 
I was active when I worked in Liverpool. I attended a lot of courses and was on 
strike. I was also in the boilermakers when on the rigs and rig yards so been a 
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member all my life. I know what it’s all about” (B1) whilst another responded to 
questioning about being active stating “I did stand back from it a bit ago but I missed 
it. It’s difficult to step away from” (B2).  However, the fourth steward interviewed at 
Bovington was quite different. He had not become a shop steward due to “a calling” 
as the other three had seen it. Instead he stated, “I believed that if you want to find 
things out then you have to get amongst it. I am forward and believe that the shop 
floor needs to know things. It was a truth finding mission to find out who was doing 
what. Who was shafting who etc.” (B4). He did not have a particular association with 
union principles, having only been a member of Unite for fourteen years and a 
representative for five. He informed the researcher that he had not been in a union 
prior to working for DSG, as he had been in the army until 2000 and after this had 
gone from job to job in small workplaces, where there were no unions. 
He did acknowledge that the role necessitated some degree of leadership. However, 
in contrast to the other three shop stewards, he displayed the characteristics of a 
populist, taking more of a delegate role. An example of this came from how he 
defined his role:  
Enlighten the masses. It’s to get the message out on what is going on, what 
the options and potential outcomes are, lay that out in front of the members 
and see which way they want this table (the JSSC) to act. What route to take 
on an issue?  
This demonstrates the differences that can exist within a group of shop stewards. In 
terms of duties, all of the representatives interviewed at Bovington discussed them 
in relation to the direct contact they had with members, one (B2) stating that “we are 
here to be a point of contact… you get people coming to you very upset and it is 
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your job to calm them down” and another (B1) replied that their duties were to 
“represent my members and treat people fairly”.  
As a contrast to DSG Bovington, DSG Donnington was also used as an imbedded 
research site within the case study, in order to be able to compare two relatively 
large shop steward organisations. At Donnington, five shop stewards and one safety 
representative were interviewed. When asked why they became representatives, 
the most common answer was that they wished to make a difference. For the newer 
representatives, those elected within five years of the research taking place, the 
main cause was changes that had taken place at the site, particularly in terms of 
management. For example, the safety representative (D3) stated that “I wanted to 
make a difference. I didn’t agree with some of the things that were going on in the 
area I worked [in] so decided to try and change things” and one of the newer shop 
stewards (had been a representative for five years) said:  
I became a shop steward after shaking [manager’s name] hand. He said we 
were going on a journey and I didn’t believe it. I could see through him. I 
became a shop steward a few months later….. I could see through [manager 
name]. The journey wasn’t going to be a nice one for us. He told us there 
were some great people here but didn’t know us, so that was false. But really 
he wanted to change the work effort and take back much more control to the 
point that I felt was unbalanced. We were fighting back against a bully. I didn’t 
want to see people bullied and intimidated (D2).  
For those that had been representatives longer than five years at the time of the 
study, the motivation was more in line with what had been uncovered at Bovington, 
with interviewees wishing to make sure that the membership was represented 
appropriately “I wanted to make a difference to the members in the work place and 
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try to help in the wider MoD. Try to resolve any issue with management, bullying 
and harassment etc. and try and help with health and safety as well” (D6). Only one 
of the stewards differed in their motivation stating that, in fact, they did not want to 
be a representative: “No one else would do it. I don’t want to be a shop steward. It’s 
a shit job. I tell everyone that but no one else will do it” (D5). 
Five of the six representatives interviewed at Donnington agreed that the role 
included an amount of leadership. One of the stewards explained how they had 
changed from something that resembled a populist into a leader steward:  
I see my role now as a bit of a leader. I have evolved into that. In 2008/9 I 
was more of an information distributer but now I take the role as a leader and 
impart my thoughts on things... I see myself as a leader, able to get the 
message across in a clearer way. A slanted way sometimes but I feel it is 
important to show the way (D2).  
This was added to by newest steward (D4) to be interviewed in this study, who had 
been a steward for two years and a member for six, who stated that:  
there has to be leadership, because if you didn’t they [the members] would 
drift towards the arguments that nothing could be done. If there is no 
leadership then people drift. You have to put the arguments across and that 
draws people to you. You have to give a lead definitely. I was finding when I 
was in building C22, I wasn’t a rep but I would be involved in discussions and 
put my point across. Slowly you would see people listen and then use the 
arguments that I had used to another group of workers and it felt good to 
have influenced people.  
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Shop steward (D5) who had been negative when discussing his reasons for being, 
and in his case not wanting to be, a shop steward, was the only representative 
interviewed at Donnington not to agree that the role of the steward was one of 
leadership. “No, I’m not there to tell them what to do, as I tell the other reps. I give 
them the information and they do what they want with it”. However, this statement 
is at odds with what he said later in the interview when questioned about their 
relationship with the members: “I have a good following. If I say this is what we are 
going to do, then they do it”. There was still reluctance by the respondent, however, 
to accept this as an example of leadership, despite it being so. When pointed out by 
the researcher the interviewee responded saying “they vote to do things, I don’t tell 
them, I put things to them and then they decide what to do and I tell the JSSC of the 
decision. I don’t lead them I give them the facts and they make their own choices”. 
The DSG Donnington stewards interviewed demonstrated differing commitment to 
union principles. Some, such as D5 discussed above, confined their interest 
primarily to the workplace, stating that:  
some are activists who really care passionately about it don’t they? Like 
(named two other stewards). I admire them for it, fair play. If they get 
enjoyment from going to rallies and lobbying people and chatting to people 
about things, then that’s great for them. Personally I can’t think of anything 
worse. I spend all week talking to these fuckers here and that is enough for 
me.  
Others demonstrated political reasons for becoming involved:  
I wasn’t really political until 2010. My family were always Labour. You went 
to my uncle’s house and the word Tory was always followed by the word 
bastard! That’s how it was. He always supported Labour, even when it was 
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Gordon Brown, because he came from a time when it was more obvious that 
they (the Conservatives) were the enemy. So I wasn’t political but then 
started to get more involved when they got in. I attended a march in 
Birmingham at the Tory Conference and from there that was it. And I got 
more involved (D4). 
As with the stewards at Bovington, the representatives that were interviewed at DSG 
Donnington saw their duties and responsibilities mainly in relation to the interactions 
they had with the members, in contrast to the convenors who had put more 
emphasis on the interactions they had with the management. A good example of 
this is demonstrated by the following quote from one of the respondents at 
Donnington (D4):  
I am a face. The face of the union. Many members don’t know about the EC. 
They don’t know what a NISC is or a conference, some don’t know who the 
General Secretary is. But for them they see the union as here.  So you 
become the face of the union. My role is to educate, agitate and organise. So 
when stuff comes out you have to put an argument across as the counter 
arguments are always that nothing can be done, so you have to show things 
can be done.  
Another of the stewards (D2) said their role and duties were to:  
get the message out. Lots going on as we move towards sale. Lots of attacks 
on us which makes me want to fight back more. Make sure people get the 
correct information, not necessarily what is being said in the media. In the 
recent pay deal I made the point that the company was making a massive 
profit rather than the line that cuts are necessary as people were being told.  
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In contrast to the larger sites at DSG Donnington and DSG Bovington, the DSG sites 
at Stafford and Catterick are much smaller. In contrast to the large shop stewards’ 
committees at the bigger sites, the smaller sites have far fewer stewards: Stafford 
having three and Catterick having four, inclusive of their convenors. The stewards 
at these sites were towards the lower end of the scale in terms of experience, with 
all three of the stewards interviewed (one at Stafford and two at Catterick) having 
been shop stewards in the MoD for just two, three and five years respectively. In 
terms of the proportion of time in membership that these representatives had been 
stewards, they are also low, in the cases of the Stafford representative (S1) and one 
of the respondents from Catterick (C1). The other Catterick steward (C2) had been 
a shop steward for two thirds of the time that he had been a member of Unite. 
However, this only equated to two years out of a total membership of three.  
Their reasons for becoming shop stewards are very similar in that they all state that 
they were asked to stand for election by others. The representative from Stafford 
and the less experienced steward from Catterick (C1) both had experience of trade 
unionism prior to working for the MoD. The Stafford representative had previously 
been a mineworker, and member of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and 
steward C1 from Catterick had been a member of the TGWU. However, this had 
caused him problems, leading him to leave when he moved to another company to 
finish his apprenticeship. “As an apprentice I was at a bus company which was 
closed shop in those days. I refused to change to the EEPTU and so lost my job. I 
had come from another company and was in the T&G which was fine as an 
apprentice but when I came out of my time I was told to change or leave and so left”.  
Whilst the representative at Stafford had been active when working at the pit, the 
three had not been active in Unite before being elected as representatives, but they 
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all expressed that they had supported the aims of the union. One of the Catterick 
representatives (C2), for example, stated “if the union asked us to do something I 
would do it” and the other saying “I supported the union. I would do whatever it 
asked” (C1). All three of the respondents expressed a desire to be more involved 
with the union, outside of the workplace. In the case of the Catterick stewards, they 
both stated that they wished to do more, one stated “I would like to do more but 
there is not much locally” (C1) whilst the other said “Yes [they would get more 
involved], if relevant and worthwhile” (C2). This would appear to demonstrate some 
commitment to union principles and therefore, it may be expected, as has been 
shown by other respondents, in line with Batstone et al (1977), that these 
representatives would exhibit leadership. However, this was not the case in terms 
of the respondents from Catterick. C1 stated “I wouldn’t say leadership I would say 
guidance. You want them to make their own decisions but guide them in the right 
direction”, whilst C2 said: “No. I represent them. Their wishes because they elected 
them to represent them not lead them. It is more of a delegate role”. Interestingly, 
their convenor was also rather reticent in relation to the question of leadership:  
Probably is. But I am not really a very strong leader and have said to the 
chaps here that if they want to be convenor I am happy to move aside, as 
with my team leader job I don’t have the time to do what I would like. I think 
there is that role but it is hard to inspire people now. I say things how I see it 
and at the end of the day I am not the union the collective is and I will do what 
I can, but it is up to them to come behind me (Con2).  
The respondent at Stafford, in response to the leadership question, did agree that it 
was part of the role. “Yes. You have to explain to the members what is going on and 
dispel the rumours. The majority don’t want hassle they just want to know the good 
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parts not the bad. But I just tell them”. Interestingly, this is in line with the views of 
his convenor, who also believed that leadership was an important part of being a 
shop steward. This seems to show a trend, at least at smaller sites, towards the 
views of the convenors having significant influence over their stewards, which does 
not appear to be so prevalent at the larger sites 
The role and duties of the shop steward are defined by all three respondents from 
Stafford and Catterick as supporting the convenor whilst looking after the interests 
of the members. The more experienced of the two Catterick representatives defined 
the role as “mainly to deal with personal issues and health and safety and workplace 
issues” and the duties as “passing on info to members. Informing them of their rights, 
and representing them if they want. I could say education I suppose” (C2). The less 
experienced steward (C1) described his role as “I support [the convenor’s name]. I 
do a lot of the letter writing as I have a good grasp of how to put things down” and 
the duties as “to look after the members and make sure they are not being abused”. 
When asked if they were involved in the more formal functions, such as negotiations 
with management and representing members at formal hearings the more 
inexperienced of the two Catterick respondents (C1) replied “I would do it but the 
convenor is better so I tend to do the informal things”, which was echoed by the 
interviewee from Stafford, who said “(I) Leave that to [Convenor’s name] really. I am 
more involved at the informal stage. Sometimes [Convenors name] comes to me for 
advice”. The Stafford respondent, who was also a team leader, saw the role and 
duties of the steward as “mainly support the Convenor, if he needs anything. We 
discuss the main issues and as a team leader I can sometimes see both sides of 
the argument”.  
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Finally, for this part, two representatives from Land Systems (LS) Donnington were 
interviewed. Differing to the DSG Sites, where the membership is predominantly 
skilled, the workforce at LS Donnington is chiefly semi-skilled or unskilled, based 
mainly around storage and distribution of kit to the armed forces, rather than 
engineering and repair, as is the case with DSG. Both of these representatives had 
been members of the union for twenty-six years, having both joined in 1988. 
However, there was a large difference in the proportion of their membership in 
representative positions, with the more experienced respondent (LS1) having been 
a shop steward for twenty-three of those twenty six years (almost nine tenths) whilst 
the other (LS2) had been a shop steward for only four years (less than one fifth).  
The more experienced representative (LS1) was elected after the steward in his 
area had retired. An oddity in LS, he is from the technical side due to working in the 
Inspection Department. He had been the only shop steward from the EETPU and 
therefore had automatically been elected to sit on the Whitley. The less experienced 
representative (LS2) stated that he had become a shop steward as “we had no rep 
in the building so were getting no info back”, but had not been active in the twenty 
years previous, other than attending meetings. Both these respondents agreed that 
leadership was part of the role, with the experienced steward (LS1) saying “Yes, 
because people look to you for responsibility. Everyone looks at me as a confident 
person but I am not really but the union has really helped me with that. If I know I 
am right, then you can’t tell me anything. If I am not sure then I keep quiet”. This 
was echoed by the less experienced steward (LS2) who said “I think … yes as you 
feel you are responsible for giving them correct information and squashing anything 
that isn’t right. You do feel responsibility as it could be someone’s job if you get it 
wrong”. 
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In terms of their role and duties both, as has been the case with a large number of 
the stewards interviewed, explained this in terms of their perceived responsibilities 
to the members. The experienced representative (LS1) stated “hoping to keep 
people informed and keep a future for Donnington. I try to do the best I 
can…information dispersal really”. This was again, mirrored by the less experienced 
representative (LS2) “Any queries that they [the members] have they come to me. I 
do the Health and Safety audits and sit on the meetings. If I get any info, then I 
distribute it and I keep the union board up to date”. These representatives, like those 
at Stafford and Catterick, saw their role as largely informal. While both had been 
involved in disciplinary hearings, this had only been at the informal, first stage point 
in the process. This was explained by the less experienced representative. Whilst 
he expressed an interest in being involved at the next stage he also stated that he 
would be concerned about “letting the member down” adding that in terms of 
anything formal, they would usually “tend to pass up”. This tendency of shop 
stewards to rely on convenors, in terms of the formal stages of procedures, will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
This section has demonstrated that whilst some of principles stated by the traditional 
literature are still valid, there is also some significant blurring of the lines between 
the arguments around role and function. Whilst the arguments developed by 
Batstone et al. (1977) and Fosh (1981) about representative types and adherence 
to union principles still fit in some circumstances, as do some of the pre-stated 
explanations of what stewards do, they do not appear to fit in with the analysis of 
the majority of representatives, with significant differences in respect to the variant 
levels of representation. 
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In reference to representational types, whilst it still appears that the majority of 
representatives fall into the leader or populist descriptions, there is some blurring of 
the lines, reflecting in part what Darlington (1994) has argued, with some 
representatives displaying behaviours from both typologies. The convenors that 
were interviewed as part of this study mainly fell into the leader typology in that they 
took a position of leadership towards the stewards and members in their workplace. 
However, some were reluctant to accept this position, displaying leadership whilst 
claiming that were reluctant to do so. 
Whilst the national representatives displayed a belief in collective goals, this was 
less prevalent in terms of the convenors and weaker still amongst the shop 
stewards, many of whom saw their role more as a mouth piece, again displaying 
some differences between the contemporary state of affairs and the writings of 
Batstone et al. (1977), Fosh (1981) and Clegg et al (1961). 
The role of the representative was shown to be significantly different to the one 
described by these authors. Shop stewards had very little interaction with 
management, above the level traditionally filled by a foreman, whilst the national 
representatives had very little interaction with the members, demonstrating that the 
Clegg et al (1961) claims that the role was split neatly between the two is not the 
case in this study. In reference to convenors, the amount of interaction differed from 
case to case, with some outlining a role close to that described by Clegg et al (1961) 
whilst others did not. This size of the site appeared to have a bearing on this, with 
convenors at the larger sites having less day to day contact with the members than 
their counterparts at the smaller sites. 
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Overall, this demonstrates that there are gaps between the conditions outlined by 
the literature and the contemporary workplace. This will investigated further in the 
following sections of the chapter. 
The level of representation and the extent of interaction between union 
representatives 
As set out by Turner (1962), democracy in trade unions depends on the 
relationships between a union’s officers, activists and the predominantly silent rank 
and file. This section will now examine these relationships, in the context of this 
study. Following the pattern above, this section will first examine the relationships 
that the Convenors have with Full Time Officials (FTOs), other representatives and 
the general membership, followed by similar examinations, in terms of the 
interviewees with national responsibilities and the shop stewards. 
Convenors.  
The convenors, as outlined above, are often seen as the lynch pin between the 
stewards and members below and the full time officers and union hierarchy above, 
or vice versa, depending on your perspective. Therefore, it is the convenors, more 
than any of the other respondents, that have the most interactions with all of the 
levels outlined by Turner.. 
Starting by looking at the interactions between the convenors and FTOs, there is 
disparity between the different sites, with some convenors having relatively little 
involvement with any FTOs, whilst others have a considerable amount. There are 
also differences between the levels at which the interaction takes place, with some 
convenors reporting more involvement with officers at national level and others 
stating that it is with regional officers that they are most likely to have contact.  
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A number of the convenors that were interviewed indicated that they, as far was 
possible, liked to be self-sufficient. For example, when asked what interaction they 
had with regional officers, one (Con8) of them stated:  
Very little. My regional officer, I don’t know the last time I seen him. Contact 
him when I have too. See those that run the committees quarterly. As we 
don’t have many problems I don’t need them often.  
This was echoed by another (Con1) who stated that “the region would be involved 
with any strike action and stuff. Mostly we are self-sustained especially due to 
branch”.  
Convenor 3 at one of the larger sites went further in explaining why he did not 
engage with the regional office too often “Well the regional officials. To be honest I 
try to keep them out of it. Because I don’t have a great deal of confidence in them. I 
see them at the RISCs, but don’t really need them”.  
However, whilst some the convenors above expressed limited contact with their 
regional officials, others stated that they had regular contact. One of the smaller site 
convenors (Con6) said:  
Quite a lot. Our regional officer comes into to see me at least every season. 
We text each other a lot and I email him a lot of info… So I interact with him 
a lot and I do a lot of that giving him a lot of information. I have known him a 
long time, 18 years, because he used to work for the MoD as well and I knew 
him before he was a full time official for the union. So I class him as a friend, 
and it’s nice to have. He gives me a lot of good answers and gets me answers 
that I could never get myself, so he’s a good sounding board.  
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Another of the larger site convenors added some context to this, stating that he had 
some interaction with their regional officer, but explaining that this interaction was 
not as regular as maybe it could be:  
Well obviously we have regular contact with our regional officer, through the 
RISC. To be fair to him, he has a busy job, with the postcodes and the 
industry that he has to cover. But I suppose, he’s enjoyed MoD taking care 
of itself because we have been so lay member led. But, you know, he is 
available. If you need him to come in or need advice, then he is there and 
available. We don’t tend to use him, we didn’t used to use him as much as 
we could of, ’cause we were well organised in ourselves (Con4). 
The way industrial relations operate in the MoD, through the centralised Whitley 
System, means that it might be expected that interactions at the regional level would 
be lower than in other sectors, where more negotiations take place at regional and 
plant level. As stated by one respondent “because it’s the MoD and as you well know 
it’s a strange phenomenon, we have to work with the national officer a lot” (Con7). 
However, here again there are differences between the sites with convenor 6 
stating, for instance, in relation to the interactions he had with the national officer:  
Lots. Daily basis. Especially at the moment while we are going through this 
here sale process. It’s in my interests and certainly in my best interests 
because of the people I have to look after that he has every bit and piece of 
information. Quite often he will phone me to ask for more info so he’s on top 
of it”.  
Another convenor (Con4) also spoke of the relationship he had with the national 
officer: “we enjoy a good relationship with our national officers, have done for ever 
really, back to when it was [officer’s name] for the T&G and [officer’s name] from 
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Amicus. Since then, with [officer’s name and [officers name] and then [present 
National Officer] they’re all willing to help and useful and knowledgeable” 
Some of the other convenors outlined a less interactive relationship. Convenor 2 
from one of the smaller sites, for example, expressed some frustration saying:  
We haven’t seen a National Officer here since (Former National officer) came 
quite a few years ago. I have mentioned it to our present National Officer but 
I just don’t think he has the time. But it is a shame as even if it was just a half 
hour meeting it would do a lot for the members, it invigorates people. 
Familiarity breeds contempt. If I say something it doesn’t have the same 
impact of someone from outside.  
Convenor 8, from one of the medium sized sites also stated, that he only had very 
limited access to the National Officer, explaining that most interaction took place at 
meetings away from his site, whilst the majority of the information he received, of a 
national nature, came via the national union focal. 
The role of the full time officials is explained well by Convenor 8 who stated that:  
I see it as if my Regional Officer can’t deal with something then I go to the 
National Officer and if it is MoD specific then the National Officer may have a 
better understanding as my regional officer is spread across all industries and 
might not have info I need. 
This again demonstrates some of peculiarities of the MoD industrial relations 
system, as in most industries the regional officer, with responsibilities for that sector, 
would have sufficient knowledge to answer most questions raised by the 
representatives that they cover. In the MoD Sector this is not seen as the case. As 
convenor 4 explained: “obviously the National Officer is at the heart of all the policy 
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stuff, the compensation stuff, the overarching outsourcing piece and that, [name] as 
the National officer along with the national Lay representative, they’re at the heart 
of that really.” He expanded on this, outlining the duties that may have been 
appropriate for the Regional Officer, such as attending grievance and disciplinary 
hearings, were carried out by the local representatives.  
Therefore, the picture being formed here, in terms of the MoD sector, is one where 
the regional function of the union, in terms of the representative role is not, or at 
least until now has not been of great importance. This, however, may change as the 
facility time elements of the Employee Relations Review, which will be explored later 
in the chapter, begin to take hold. In addition, to this, most interactions, between 
FTOs and convenors take place via committee meetings of some type, rather than 
through visits to the convenors’ sites. This means that, particularly in the case of the 
smaller sites, such as Warminster and Catterick, visits by national officer are rare.   
The interactions that convenors have with other lay representatives can be split into 
two groups, the first group being the stewards at their own sites, who have elected 
them to be the convenor, and the second group being lay representatives from other 
workplaces, including other convenors. In terms of the representatives at their own 
workplaces, interactions were relatively high at all of the sites. However, there was 
a tendency for them to be higher at the smaller sites, where there was a smaller 
number of shop stewards. For example, at one of the sites, where there were only 
a small number of representatives, the convenor (Con5) stated “We see each other 
every day. If I have been to a meeting I pass this on. The national focal sends me 
info, which I filter a bit sometimes, as some of it isn’t relevant. I try to be sensible. 
Email works well but can’t beat face to face”. It was the same at two of the other 
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small sites. None of these sites had formal shop stewards’ committees, instead as 
one Convenor (Con2) said:  
I only have 2 reps and I see them every day. We have a handful of GMB 
members on sight but no rep. There is a PCS rep. I speak to my reps a lot 
but not others. There is no structured Shop Stewards Committee as we don’t 
have the people. We used to, but it doesn’t work with only three of you so I 
email info and talk to them at least once a day to keep each other up to date.  
The larger sites, where there are larger numbers of representatives, had more 
formal structures, with day to day contact between the convenors and 
representatives, but not with all of them as with the smaller sites. Monthly shop 
stewards’ meetings were the primary means of interaction; supplemented by ad hoc 
meetings when needed, such as after pay talks.  
The primary concern of the convenors at the bigger sites, however, was with the 
interactions that they had with lay representatives at other workplaces or those with 
national responsibilities. This was mainly due to their stewards’ committees being 
organised in such a way that the representatives underneath them were able to 
carry out some of the duties, such as representing members, where this would be 
left to the convenor at the smaller sites. Interaction between the convenors and 
representatives at other sites was regular, either via phone or email or meetings. 
One convenor (Con8) explained “(The) Convenors are in touch all the time. Most 
days I am emailing the focal. Occasionally on the phone. We meet when we can but 
[have] physical contact every 2 months. Email and phone daily or weekly”.  
Convenor (Con3) at one of the larger sites explained, in detail the representative 
structures:  
 228 
 
within DSG things, I think, have improved immensely over the years, because 
of the combines… we elect a small delegation to do pay and one for Whitleys 
and what have you and on the back of that…. we have a monthly combine 
meeting where we all get together and, in theory at least, the person who 
went to the pay meeting will say that we said this, this and this and we vote 
and make a decision on where we go forward. That is working a lot better 
and does mean that we can try and do that leadership role across DSG… 
wider than DSG we have a thing called the Regional Industrial Sector 
Committee which brings lay reps together and I found that of very low value. 
I go there, I give a report on what is going on here, I hear a report from the 
guy in prisons and a report from the guy from MoD Fire and Rescue, but it is 
nothing I didn’t know or anything that affects us, so feel it’s a waste of a trip, 
waste of a day. And then there is a national industrial sector committee, which 
is where you meet a wider layer of lay reps and I think that is where there has 
been an appalling lack of leadership in the union. I find it a tragedy to be 
honest, because we had structures in place through the Whitley that weren’t 
perfect. I know they were from a different age and more pluralist, you know 
a Donovan idea of Industrial relations, but they were there, structures that 
our Brothers and Sisters and colleagues in the private sector could only 
dream of. We’d got them and we gave them away and part of it is we didn’t 
know what we had got. 
The NISC came in for criticism from a number of the convenors. In addition to the 
comments above, another convenor (Con7) who was a member of the MoD NISC 
stated:  
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As a shop steward committee it was decided that the RISC should get up and 
running and subsequently NISC membership was wanted so that we had a voice 
nationally. I was so disappointed. It is a toothless tiger. The national committee 
should be moving the union forward not just the sector but union as a whole. It’s 
a bun fight. They fight amongst themselves. An example is the committee putting 
a motion back to the combine calling for support to stop privatisation because it 
hadn’t come through a RISC. It is all show and no go.  
When asked why he thought this was he replied:  
They are too set in their ways for too long. They enjoy the trappings but it is self-
preservation and they have forgotten the fact that they were put there to exercise 
leadership. The bickering is shameful and things have been missed as people 
have not done their job. You need people to be on the ball and sparking. 
Interested in reading things and making sure things are done properly. Need 
people to be more proactive but they have been too comfy for too long and don’t 
know how to react to things. 
Whilst more positive in relation to the future of the NISC, the convenor (Con4) of 
one of the larger sites was also critical saying “I think the recent elections to the 
NISC were timely, because I think the NISC, as was, was a bit prehistoric and that 
people were on there who weren’t very interested, or weren’t very active, I don’t 
think it was very effective.” Highlighting some of the issues with the way that the 
NISC was set up, he said:  
I think that it was stale. I think there was people on there that were elected 
from RISCs because there was nobody else to go, and that might sound 
awful. We had some people on the NISC from MoD who might only have had 
3 or 4 members, who didn’t bring much to the table in my view. I always had 
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this impression that, I used to go to a few especially around the pensions and 
compensation, you know, attacks, where the NISC was opened up to the 
wider audience. I used to think that people, some of the NISC members used 
to go and speak for the sake of speaking and that they were bullshitting really, 
you know a lot of what they were saying was just hot air and they couldn’t 
deliver a lot of what they were saying. So I did think the NISC was quite 
ineffective and I didn’t see what NISC played in the wider sector really.  
But, the positivity that he had felt, due to the previous elections, was tempered by a 
number of those elected leaving the MoD after losing their posts in the Employee 
Relations Review.  
Interactions between the convenors and members, like the interactions outlined 
above, differ from one site to another. As mentioned above, only one of the 
convenors had 100% facility time, which for the convenor of one of the largest sites, 
who had seen their facility time reduced from 100% to 50%, was a relatively recent 
thing. Therefore, all of the convenors except one spent some time working alongside 
the members. The extent to which this was the case though, differed from one 
situation to another. The convenor of a small site, for example, who officially had 
25% facility time, said “I work on the shop floor. I have about 80 members and 70 
see me every day. So I would say I have a very good daily interaction with them. If 
they want me they can pull me to one side. I am there for them” (Con8). The 
narrative of convenor 6 was similar:  
I’m lucky. I have 50% facility time. Half of my day I am the union man and 
nothing else, half of the day I am supposed to stand at my bench… the 
members that we have know that I’m on the bench and they come and have 
the crack with me, like they do with all their other mates. Some days it’s have 
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you heard this joke that’s going around  did you see the footie on the telly last 
night, or what’s the management saying about this? So my interaction is very 
good because not only am I their representative that I am by their grace, and 
I do thank them for trusting me, always will. But they’re my friends as well. 
That’s more important perhaps. 
Alternatively, convenor 3 from one of the larger sites who had recently had his facility 
time reduced from 100% to 50%, argued that, given the size of the site and its 
multiple buildings, he was inhibited from having daily contact with as many members 
as the convenors at the smaller sites. In another example of this, convenor (Con5) 
stated that: “till two months ago I was on the shop floor so would be accessible all 
of the time. Stop me and buy one sort of thing. I am now in a different building and 
have less time on the shop floor. This hasn’t been as problematic as first thought. 
The plan is to hold a surgery and always have my lunch in the break room. I am 
trying to maintain a presence”. 
One convenor (Con4) had retained his 100% facility time post the Employee 
Relations Review, albeit due to being part of an in-house bid team. However, whilst 
he may have retained 100% time off, the interactions with members had actually 
reduced quite significant, due to him being off site for two to three days a week. He 
explained how things had changed, since the results of the ERR had come into 
force:  
before the 1st July we had very good relations, face to face relationships with 
the members. You know if I’m being frank, back when I joined the union and 
the department, if the convenor had been coming round the buildings 
something was wrong. Either they wanted to take the flexi off you, or there 
was something big going on and everything else would be conveyed through 
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the shop stewards’ setup… But, as I say, over the years, the shop stewards 
have become less and less dedicated and if we can talk frankly, which I’m 
sure we can in this interview, now when we hold a shop stewards’ meeting, 
you could say a lot of them stewards come over and treat it as privileged 
information. They get to hear it from the horse’s mouth, but then don’t really 
go back and tell the rank and file members, which is what they should be 
doing… We got to the position that on a six weekly basis, myself and another 
full timer were putting together a programme to go around and hit all the 
buildings over a two day period, to update the members on what was going 
on. Really doing the shop stewards job you could argue…Now I’m down in 
Bath that has suffered a little bit… I have now pretty much gone to trying a 
different tactic, of every month doing a written update brief of what’s going on 
and getting that distributed through the shop stewards’ network cause quite 
obviously they are happy to hand out a bit of paper, rather than stand up and 
talk about it. 
As demonstrated by this section, the convenors are at the centre of the 
representational structures of Unite. They interact regularly with the stewards 
beneath them in the structure and with representatives, from other workplaces, 
through combine committees, within the structure of their organisations, or thorough 
union committees, such as the RISC and NISC. They also interact regularly with 
members in their workplaces and with full time officials, being the main conduit 
through which information from the national union and the union’s officials is passed. 
Size does appear to matter; with convenors at smaller workplaces having more 
access to the membership as a whole and the other workplace representatives, on 
a regular basis, but less interactions, directly, with full time officials. The next section 
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will examine how representatives, with national responsibilities, interact with the 
other representational functions of the union. 
Lay Representatives with National Responsibilities. 
Operating in the area above the site convenors but below the union’s FTOs, the 
roles of those representatives with national responsibilities differ quite significantly 
from the convenors.  
In terms of the relationship with the union’s FTOs, this group reported more 
interaction than any of the others interviewed for this study. The DSG National Focal 
stated that he had regular meetings with Unite’s National Officer for the MoD and 
also with the National Officers of the other recognised unions, such was the joint 
nature of his role. He explained that some of the work that he did allowed the 
National officer to deal with other things. The former National Lay Representative 
presented a similar narrative, explaining that:  
I used to spend an awful lot of my time doing case work that officers should 
do. Lots of regional officers and others didn’t like me but they used me. This 
made attending some of the national union only meetings at Esher and 
places impossible…. as I would be dealing with case work from officers. I’d 
be having to go all over the country and had love hate relationships with many 
officers. A lot of them didn’t really want me there but were also glad that I was 
[there].  
The National Branch Secretary for MoD Fire and Rescue also spoke of the 
relationship that he had with the union’s FTOs, explaining that he had a large 
amount of interaction with the national officer and also the regional officers, due to 
it being a national branch:  
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if we have any issues and have to contact MoD main building then we go 
through the national officer, but because our branch membership is based in 
Bournemouth if we have an issue with DEFRMO [Defence, Fire, Risk, 
Management Organisation]. For instance, if DEFRMO want to bring out a CD 
[consultation document] on manning levels at such a such a station, it would 
go to our lead official, who is [name] in Bournemouth and then [name] sends 
it to myself and I send it out to our executive committee and the station 
concerned and then obviously it comes up the chain that way. 
In relation to other lay representatives, the national representatives reported 
different amounts of interaction. The former national lay representative 
demonstrated a number of levels of interaction saying: 
I attended meetings at the sites and would go to any site that I was invited 
too. I attended one Whitley a year at all RAF bases, and would get Whitleys 
going where we didn’t have them. Plus by phone regularly and by email 
where possible. I encouraged people by getting them together. This was 
easier with some National Officers than others. 
The DSG national focal, however, outlined their interactions in terms email 
communications and the combine committees discussed by the DSG Convenors. 
The national Branch Secretary for MoD Fire and Rescue explained that he had a 
range of interactions with stewards from different organisations and at different 
levels of the union. Geographically he was based at the Donnington site, which he 
saw as an advantage:  
I think fundamentally we are very fortunate in the location that we are, being 
at Donnington as a branch secretary. Because, I firmly believe that the two 
strongest parts of the MoD and Government departments are based here. 
 235 
 
What I am trying to say is that LCS and DSG to me are fundamentally front 
runners in the way that our MoD and Government departments sector is run. 
I think they are a very big influence. I think that you work with these guys, 
learn off these guys and working together does go a very long way. 
As with the convenors, the NISC came in for some criticism from this group of 
respondents. Only the National Branch Secretary, who was relatively new to the 
NISC, was positive towards it saying:  
I think the role of the NISC is quite important within our organisation, 
fundamentally within the MoD and Government departments it is the 
strongest committee... So from policies, issues, I think fundamentally that is 
the most important committee within the Government departments sector. 
How it’s working at the moment? I think that it’s working quite well… as things 
have gone on and the communications network has been set up, over the 
last two or three years things have gone from strength to strength. When the 
NISC is working well, as it is now, sending down information to the RISCS, 
to go out to the sector, it is absolutely imperative that it is, and it is the most 
professional working element of our profession.  
This, however, was not in line with the views of the other representatives with 
national responsibilities, who had more negative things to say in terms of the 
contribution of the NISC, in terms of representation. The DSG National Focal did not 
feel that the NISC was functioning well, stating: 
The NISC should be the body that organises the sector. Should be the key 
players and right people for the job, but it is not always the case. Things need 
to be driven but aren’t. The NISC Chair, EC member and national officer 
should be driving things but are not… VER [voluntary early retirement] is rife 
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and many NISC members are going. What will be left? Rumours are already 
circling of who the next chair will be and he is not the right person as has a 
very narrow view of one part of the sector.  
The National Lay Representative was also relatively scathing of the NISC and in 
particularly of the quality of the members, hinting at a dilution by the TGWU: 
To be frank the quality of the people on it is an issue. On the Amicus NISC 
the only non-craft person was me and the quality was high. The merger 
meant that people dropped off and those on it are sometimes parochial and 
non-effective. There are not enough quality reps on it.  
Going into more detail of the NISCs limitations the former National Lay 
Representative argued:  
The NISC had all the senior reps who spent a day or 2 debating, listening to 
reports which I could have done via email. I didn’t see why I needed to be 
there when I could be doing something useful as there were no outcomes. 
We couldn’t even sort out an industrial action ballot…the committee meetings 
were full of people trying to fight the good fight but it was like a salvation army 
meeting without a band, there certainly wasn’t a conductor. I think there was 
a golden opportunity and a few years ago, when we had people with the skills 
and beliefs, they were worthwhile but now I think things need to be done 
different[ly]. I saw an email a few days ago from a few reps and their main 
issue was that they couldn’t have a pudding as well as a starter and I think 
that sums it up.  
These comments, along with those of the convenors, appear to show that the NISC, 
an important body in terms of the union’s representational structures, is not working. 
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The extent to which this has been caused by internal issues, such as the Unite 
merger, or by external issues, such as the Employee Relations Review, is 
addressed below. 
The levels of interaction with the union’s members differed for these national lay 
representatives, depending on their role. The National Branch Secretary, for 
example, responded to being asked what interactions he had with the rank and file 
members, saying:  
A lot. Fundamental part for myself is because I am still a shop steward, which 
is the most important thing for me. I still enjoy doing the shop steward’s work. 
I do enjoy the branch secretary work, but the shop steward work to myself is 
the biggest, erm, satisfaction I think I get out of it… If not for your members 
wouldn’t be elected, and if not elected you can’t be branch secretary, you 
can’t carry on with any other commitments whatsoever. So that is a massive, 
fundamental part of being a shop steward, working with your members.  
This representative, whilst having national responsibilities, varied from the others in 
this respondent group, in that they had 50% facility time not 100%. Therefore, he 
actually had more in common with the convenors, in many ways. However, whilst 
he represented twenty members at the Donnington Site, he was responsible for a 
branch membership of six hundred and seventy four.  
The DSG National Focal, who before being elected to the role had been the Unite 
Convenor of DSG Bovington, reported having very little to do with the rank and file 
at that site since taking the position: 
At Bovington I am still out on the shop floor often but it is difficult as now a 
corporate asset. I’m still a safety rep, involved more with rank and file at other 
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sites backing up the convenors. It’s difficult at Bovy as I don’t want to 
undermine the position of Bovy reps. Therefore, I tend to stay away.  
This highlighted the tendency, described by Darlington (1994), for interactions with 
members to become less the further the representative gets from the shop floor. 
This was seen with some of the convenors and then again with the national 
representatives. Whilst all of them were elected, in some capacity, at their original 
workplaces, they all, with the exception of the National Branch Secretary, who had 
more in common with the convenors, had only very basic contact with the members 
they had been elected to represent. The National Lay Representative stated:  
Maybe not so much. Structures are that the convenor at Donnington is 
between me and the members. So I don’t get bothered about the small things. 
But have to do enough to get elected. This is the same challenge for a lot of 
people with a national role. Luckily the members are loyal and not 
troublesome. So don’t have too much in the way of interaction.  
This statement almost points to the members and the need to be re-elected as a 
hindrance to him. When asked if re-election had ever been a problem he replied 
“Not as yet but it’s always on your mind. It’s difficult for the members to see you very 
often. I make a point of going to the section whenever possible for a bit of banter”. 
The former National Lay Representative stated that he would sit down with the 
stewards and members, on a site, prior to meeting with management, in order to 
see what the issues were but, other than this, interactions with members were a 
minimum. 
Shop Stewards. 
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Of the shop stewards interviewed, almost all reported having very little, if anything, 
to do with full time officials, with some indicating that this was something that had 
changed over time. This was summed up well by shop steward (D5) at DSG 
Donnington who said, when asked if they had any interactions with FTOs:  
I have met them when doing other things but not through the union. And as 
for [the present National Officer], I have never met him. Which is bad as I saw 
lots of (a former National officer) and he was supposed to the fucking anti-
Christ of union officials. 
 Asked if the lack of interaction was a new thing, or something that had always been 
a problem he said:  
I don’t know. When [former National Officer’s name] was national officer I 
saw him a lot and did speak to him. I was told he was a moron and he did a 
good job of showing himself to be a moron but at least he came in to be told 
he was a moron. This one I have never seen and I don’t think I saw the 
previous one either. Maybe once.  
A shop steward at DSG Catterick (C2) responded “Only indirectly. The Regional 
Officer didn’t even know DSG was up for sale. No interaction with National Officer. 
I don’t even think I know his name”, whilst a representative at LS Donnington stated 
“I have rung the Regional Officer a couple of times when they were trying to privatise 
us, but never a National Officer, I wouldn’t know how to get hold of one” (LS2). 
For some of the stewards interviewed, the lack of interaction with the national officer 
was a negative, whilst others did not see it as an issue. For example, a shop steward 
in Catterick (C1) asked if seeing more of officials would be helpful, said: “it would be 
nice for us and the lads to see them as it would give confidence rather than the 
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normal faces. Members question why they are paying their £13 a month”, whilst a 
shop steward at DSG Donnington (D4) said: 
I know the Regional Officer and have seen the National Officer once or twice 
but don’t really have dealings with them. I don’t feel I need to…I understand 
that if they are a Regional Officer then they organise the region, but in terms 
of me if they were not there I don’t think it would bother me. I don’t think 
anything they do affects me here.   
Another observation was that many of the shop stewards felt it was the job of the 
convenor to deal with FTOs. For example, Catterick Steward (C2) said “I don’t think 
we need interaction. We have the members, us, then (Con2’s name) so don’t need 
it”. 
Interactions with other representatives can, as with the convenors, be split into two 
groups: other representatives in their workplace and those from other workplaces. 
In the case of the convenors, this had been quite equally spread, with face to face 
interactions with representatives in their workplace but also daily interactions with 
representatives at other sites, either face to face or via email or telephone. The 
interactions that the shop stewards have with other lay representatives are mainly 
the first group, with very little interaction with stewards from outside of their 
workplaces. On the smaller sites, as highlighted by their convenors, interactions 
between all of the stewards can happen on a daily basis. Shop steward S1 from 
Stafford said “We speak to each other generally as [we] see each other every day. 
Only see other reps if they are down for a visit”. A Catterick representative (C2) 
indicated that he would like more interaction and saw the merit in it, stating: “The 
only ones I really know are the ones here and the ex-ones. I don’t know any from 
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other sites. I think it would be useful to meet them because if you can separate 
people you can batter them individually but if we all stand together that is harder”.  
Stewards at the larger sites saw less of each other, increasing the importance of the 
convenors on these sites. As shop steward D5 at DSG Donnington said “Mainly in 
the meetings. I don’t really see them and see even less of them now as we are all 
locked in our little worlds. I ring the convenor if I need to know something”. Here, as 
at other larger sites, in addition to the convenors were a number of senior stewards, 
who could also be called up on for advice, when needed. As shop steward D6 at 
DSG Donnington stated, in relation to the  interactions they had with other 
representatives; “Locally I have a lot. Especially with (Senior Representative one, 
senior representative two and the convenor) … (Senior representative one) is very 
knowledgeable as are the other two. They are very active” This lends itself to the 
Batstone et al (1977) quasi-elite typology of steward. 
The shop stewards had more regular interactions with the members than any of the 
other groups interviewed. The shop stewards worked alongside their members and 
had often done so for many years. As such members were also friends. All those 
interviewed reported holding regular meetings with their members, in order to keep 
them informed of issues affecting them and others. However, as they were friends 
with the members as well as their representatives, the relationships were far less 
formal than those between some of the other levels of representation. For example, 
a DSG Donnington Shop steward (D5) noted “when there is a meeting I talk about 
it with them and when there isn’t I talk about football”. Some stewards favoured 
informing members about issues on a one to one basis or in small groups, as 
indicated by this representative from DSG Bovington (B3): “Members come up to 
me when they want to know something”. Other representatives, such as D4 from 
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DSG Donnington favoured getting them all together regularly, seeing it a vitally 
important to be seen as one of them: 
I hold a shop floor meeting after a meeting and put the minutes of all meetings 
on the board. Throughout the day too. You get respect from being alongside 
them. The members see that the union is not a guy in a suite in a car; it’s a 
guy in overalls working alongside them. I don’t do email or leaflets.  
This was also reflected in the approach by steward LS2 from LS Donnington, who 
said: “If I get something off the convenor I get them together for 10 to15 minutes. I 
don’t like getting them on their own as things get twisted”. 
This section has demonstrated that the role of the shop steward is vital in terms of 
workplace representation. However, interaction between this level and the union’s 
full time officials is almost non-existent, as is the interaction between the shop 
stewards and representatives at other sites. In terms of the interaction between 
them and FTOs, it was felt by a number of the stewards that this situation had 
deteriorated over time, with the situation previously being that FTOs, particularly 
National Officers, had spent more time meeting with representatives at the sites.  
In addressing the question relating to levels at which representation takes place 
within the organisation and union structure as well as the extent to which this 
requires effective interactions between different levels of representatives, four 
important issues will be examined following the findings set out above. Where does 
representation take place? Who is involved? How do interactions work? Are these 
interactions necessary for representation to be effective? 
Representation takes place at a number of different levels as set out above, but is 
mainly confined to national level, in terms of policy, pay, and conditions and plant 
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level, in terms of representing the members in areas such as disciplinary and 
grievance hearings. Whilst there is some involvement of the union’s regional 
structures, this tends to be confined to attendance of the RISCs and, in some cases, 
the provision of advice. However, there is very little evidence of Regional Officers 
being used to actually represent the members.  
Those involved in representation at the workplace level are the shop stewards and 
convenors. Size is an important factor here. Stewards at the larger sites are more 
likely to be involved with the representation of members at hearings than those at 
smaller sites, where it was seen as part of the convenor’s role. Many of these 
stewards stipulated, in line with Batstone et al (1977) that they saw their role as 
being at the informal stage of the disciplinary process and that case work would be 
passed by them to the convenor if the process entered the formal stages. However, 
in contrast to Batstone et al’.s (1977) findings, the convenors did not express any 
negative feelings towards this, instead accepting it as part of their role and, in some 
cases, expressing that they would not want the stewards to take on more 
challenging roles, putting them more in line with Goodman and Whittingham’s 
(1969) findings. 
A number of the shop stewards and convenors agreed that they took a leadership 
or representational role, in reference to the way they dealt with their members, 
accepting the need to sometimes tell members things they did not wish to hear. 
These respondents took a representative role at the stewards’ committees, taking 
decisions that they were then happy to defend to their members. On the other hand, 
there were also a number of shop stewards and convenors that took a more 
delegate style role, although this was relatively rare with the convenors. These 
respondents stated that they were in post to deliver the wishes of their members, 
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and would always seek their views before making a decision and would push 
forward the wishes of their members, even if they did not personally agree with them 
or feel that they were deliverable. This appeared to be broadly in line with Batstone 
et al’s (1977) study, in that the most prevalent types of representative were the 
populists and leaders, However, this differed considerably from site to site and also 
demonstrated elements of what Darlington (1994) stated was blurring between the 
typologies, with representative displaying elements from different ones.  
Due to the Whitley industrial relations system, the majority of negotiations covering 
policy, pay and conditions take place at a national departmental or agency level as 
set out in chapter five outlined by Coates and Topham (1988) and Parris (1973). For 
this reason, the role of the Union’s National Officer is obviously a very important 
one. However, the MoD sector also boasts a number of lay representatives with 
national responsibilities. This included the National Branch secretaries, a National 
Union Focal in DSG, and a National Lay representative, based at the Civil Service 
head offices, in Whitehall. These representatives, particularly the national focal and 
those based at Whitehall, aid the National Officer, attending meetings in their place 
and covering much of the administration, such as distribution of, and collation of 
responses too, consultation documents. 
The National Officer was criticised by a number of respondents for not spending 
enough time working in the sector, with some stating that this had changed over 
time, with previous National Officers being more diligent. However, it is also pointed 
out by some respondents that the national officer has had their area of responsibility 
widened to include education, meaning that the time they have to devote to the MoD 
has been reduced. The evidence collected demonstrates that the argument of Kelly 
and Heery (1990), that the relationship between shop stewards and full time officials 
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is a contracting one, with both trying to expand their involvement at the expense of 
the other, is not valid in this case study. If anything the stewards would welcome 
more involvement by full time officials, however, the centralisation of Whitley, 
traditional independence of many of the research sites and the workloads of officers, 
has worked against this. 
Interactions vary between the different levels of representation. The convenors have 
the most interactions. Being the lynch pin between the national union and the rank 
and file, the convenors interact regularly with the union’s members and the other lay 
representatives, be it in their own workplaces or outside, and also have regular 
dealings with the union’s officers and national representatives. The convenors are, 
therefore, vitally important to the representational structures of the union. Their 
interactions with the members mean that they have a very good understanding of 
the issues that are important to them. This can be fed into union’s representational 
channels, such as the combine committees and can, therefore, be used to inform 
the actions of the representatives that sit on the main negotiation committees, such 
as the National Whitley Committee and Pay Committees (outlined in chapter 4).  
As outlined above and in chapter 2, Turner (1962) theorised that type of government 
adopted by a union depended on the relationship between the three groups: namely 
the full time officials; lay activists; and members. Analysis of these relationships, it 
was argued by Turner, would allow the governance of the unions to be devised as 
an exclusive democracy, aristocracy or popular bossdom. These themes will be 
returned to later in the chapter. However, it is important to begin looking at this here.  
Unite, from the evidence provided from this fieldwork, is not an exclusive 
democracy. Participation amongst the members of the union in the MoD sector is 
low, as is, to a major extent, participation outside of the workplace for most shop 
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stewards. However, it does not purely fit the aristocracy or popular bossdom 
typologies either and there is also some ambiguity due to the union’s federal 
structures. The union nationally will be discussed later in the chapter, in relation the 
amount of influence that respondents believed they had within it and their 
perceptions of the union’s leadership. However, the federal structure of Unite means 
that it is possible to see both traits of aristocracy and popular bossdoms within the 
sector. In reference to it being an aristocracy, there is some evidence of this in terms 
of a definite Amicus ‘bias’ in the sector. The Executive Council member and NISC 
chair are both formerly Amicus activists, as are the majority of NISC members, 
convenors and senior representatives interviewed as part of this study. In relation 
to the popular bossdom typology, the low participation and open structure of the 
union and, thus, membership base in the sector, would appear to lend themselves 
to this formed of union government. However, the influence of FTOs working in the 
sector is not apparent. This may be offset by the tier of national lay representatives, 
who have influence over the sector due to their positon in relation to national 
bargaining and the influence they have, due to their access to the union’s national 
officials. These topics will be returned too, 
The key interactions for the shop stewards are with each other, at a workplace level 
and with their convenors. They have very little interactions with stewards at other 
sites and virtually no interactions with the National Officer. Interactions on the 
smaller sites tend to be more ad hoc, with daily meetings taking place between 
representatives on the shop floor. However, at the larger sites, interactions between 
the stewards are more structured, with monthly shop stewards’ meetings being the 
main way for them to come together, fitting closer to the Batstone et al’s (1977) 
model of the sophisticated steward network, where shop stewards rely on their 
convenor or senior stewards. The shop stewards speak regularly with the members, 
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working alongside them and sharing their experiences. Often, as stated by Batstone 
et al (1977) and Lane (1974) they are the only contact the members have with the 
wider union. This makes them a vital part of the representational structure as the 
information they process can be fed into the structures, in order to inform the 
negotiators. Without this important insight the representatives on the national 
committees would not be able to advance the aspirations of the members as well as 
they can with the stewards input. 
The key interactions for the representatives with national responsibilities were with 
the convenors and the union’s full time officials. They had very little to do with the 
shop stewards and representatives below convenor level and less still to do with the 
members, interaction with whom was mainly focussed around the necessity to be 
re-elected. Therefore, for these representatives, the link to the aspirations of the 
union’s rank and file came almost exclusively via the convenors. These national 
representatives did have more interactions, than the other two groups investigated, 
with the union’s FTOs. They represented the National Officer in meetings that he 
could not attend and were the National Officer’s link to the convenors, shop 
stewards and members. Without the National lay representatives to aid him the 
National Officer would need to radically change the way that he worked, if he were 
to be able to support the members in the same way that they are able to do under 
the present system.  
This analysis fits with Darlington’s (1994) argument that some shop stewards can 
become estranged from the members in their workplaces and become quasi full 
time officials. However, Darlington’s analysis was based on senior shop stewards, 
in a plant, rather than at a national level, such as these. There is not so much 
evidence that this is the case at workplace level as, although some of the convenors 
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on the larger sites reported lower interactions with representatives and members, it 
was not to the extent discussed by Darlington. 
The interactions between these levels within the union are therefore essential in 
order for representation to be effective. Without the interactions between the shop 
stewards and the convenors, it would not be possible, at least at larger workplaces, 
for the convenors to be able to canvas and understand the issues concerning the 
members in their workplaces, without the use of quantitative data collection 
methods. The interactions between the convenors, other convenors and national 
representatives allow for the setting of national policy in the sector, based on the 
information passed up to the convenors by the shop stewards and the links between 
the national representatives and the National Officer, mean that the views, and 
aspirations if the rank and file and local stewards committees’ can be passed all the 
way through the representational chain. Therefore, to be effective, the interactions 
between the representational levels highlighted here are essential. Later in this 
chapter, the effect that the Employee Relations Review has had in reducing facility 
time on representation will be analysed in light of these considerations. 
The next section, however, will now turn to internal change, in terms the merger that 
bought the TGWU and Amicus together to form Unite, focusing on how the merger 
has effected representation: industrially, regionally, nationally and in the workplace. 
How has it affected democracy in the union? And how has the size of Unite affected 
the ability of the members to identify with it? 
The impact of the Unite merger on national, regional, industry and workplace 
representation within the case study research sites. 
Having looked in the first section at how and where union representation takes 
place, this section seeks to explain how representation has been affected by the 
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merger of the TGWU and Amicus to form Unite. In order to achieve this, the views 
of the participants will be examined with reference to whether the merger has been 
perceived to be positive or negative for union representation. Has the union become 
more or less democratic?; is it member or officer led?; and does the size of the union 
cause problems in terms of its structures and the way that members are able to 
identify with Unite?  
The merger, as outlined in chapter 3, bought together two historically and culturally 
different organisations. Convenor 3, highlighting differences in the way the union is 
perceived, noted: “I think the biggest change has been obviously the T&G because 
the culture does seem different somehow. And I don’t quite know why, but it seems 
a different union somehow when you go to head office, maybe because you’re going 
to T&G offices”. A number of the ex-Amicus representatives raised issues in relation 
to what they perceived to be a TGWU ‘takeover’, whilst interestingly the respondents 
that had formally been members of the TGWU reported that they did not feel the 
merger had really changed the union’s structures. For example, the National Branch 
Secretary for Defence, Fire and Rescue noted that as his branch had only ever 
contained TGWU members and, therefore, he had not noticed any effect. “I know 
there are moans that the union is too Amicus or T&G orientated, but I have not seen 
this myself”, whilst one of the convenors (Con 4), who had formally been a TGWU 
member, stated “as an individual I don’t feel that the merger had that much impact 
on me as a member or me as a rep”. 
This was at odds with some of the ex-Amicus representatives, who felt that things 
had changed. The National Lay Representative responded frankly:  
It’s [been] a T&G takeover. I have embraced Unite and have had support 
from T&G colleagues. But more and more higher positions are taken by ex-
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T&G [officials]. The tradesmen are being dominated by the non-craft. Early 
days we would be at a meeting to look after the craftsman but not now. Not 
now we have bankers and air stewardesses in the union.  
This highlights some of the cultural challenges caused by the merger. This was 
further explained by Convenor 3 from one of the larger sites, who discussed a 
meeting he had attended prior to the merger taking place:  
I remember a terrible meeting I attended when we were talking about merging 
with the T&G and it was organised by the Gazette group, which was the broad 
left grouping in Amicus…for the old guard in the AEU election of officers had 
been this sort of badge of honour, you know we want election of officers, 
officers will be accountable to the members not the general secretary. So 
they said if we are going to merge we want election of officers, and this T&G 
guy said it’s never been an issue in our union and honestly he said ‘cause in 
your union you have a lot of skilled workers, and they’re quite intelligent and 
a lot of them come through the ranks, steward, then convenor then they get 
elected to be officers, our members are mostly thick so we bring the officers 
in.  
The Convenor went on to clarify his understanding of the TGWU position:  
“[I] don’t want to portray their members as thick but there is that different 
tradition within the T&G as I understand it, with officers being bought in, whilst 
in our union they emerged, they did an apprenticeship and became officers, 
and so there is that different style. Whether it’s partly that tradition that he’s 
the leader and we all follow, where with the old AEU it was more, well he’s 
the leader but I could do it just as well. 
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One of the Bovington Shop stewards (B2) summed up well the position of many of 
the ex-Amicus representatives: 
I think the T&G won this one as most of the Amicus people have been 
chucked out. I think Amicus came out very badly from the merger and it is 
disappointing to see good people go because their face doesn’t fit. I don’t 
believe it is a good move and don’t think McCluskey is the right bloke. He 
was only going to stay for one term and then changed his mind.  
Explaining what he believed to be some of the main problems in relation to the 
union’s democratic structures, he added:  
[I] think it is very difficult. I don’t think the right people are on the right 
committees. You have to fit particular criteria. He gets a position, she does, 
but DSG are only allowed one. It’s all about a tick in the box. Are the right 
people there or are they just ticking a box? They only want you if they like 
you. There are good people that can’t get on. You have to be in their club. So 
it’s a bit of a syndicate. A lot of people don’t know what they do at those 
levels. Once a year we used to have a regional meeting but that’s now been 
cut down. A lot of people on the regional and national meetings don’t want 
those to happen as, god forbid, someone might come up with a good idea. 
It’s not all about certain individuals it should be about listening to everyone. I 
know there is not a mad rush to do it but, even so are the right people there? 
It seems to be committee after committee but what are they actually 
achieving?   
The union’s democratic and representational structures where seen by a number of 
respondents to have been detrimentally effected by the merger. Shop steward (D1) 
at DSG Donnington said: “not much experience of it before, but don’t feel it is very 
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democratic” whilst a shop steward from LS Donnington replied “Less (democratic) 
really. You can’t get support now from the members because of how things have 
gone” (LS”). One of the convenors (Con2), when asked if he felt the union had 
become less democratic, stated:  
Yes I do. You can see it happening. I can see someone now who is carving 
their way to bigger things, but he is being used as a pawn by the people 
above him and, if he gets anywhere but then doesn’t do what the people want 
who got him there; he won’t be there for long. When there is an election you 
have people ringing you up telling you who to vote for and if they don’t win 
then they get shafted and moved to an area of no influence.  
The concerns that many of the respondents had in reference to democracy led to a 
feeling that they had little, or no, power to actually influence decision making in the 
union. Whilst some felt that they could influence things at the workplace level, very 
few felt that they could influence policy within the union. This was highlighted by 
convenor (Con 8), who, when asked what power he had to influence decision 
making within the union, stated:  
Virtually none. I can influence things in my workplace but within the broader 
scheme of things…. I can sit in on the RISC and have an input but overall it 
is very limited. In theory I can do things but in practice it is unlikely… Unless 
you get a group, which then means you lose your identity, you cannot do 
much. Maybe at the southwest RISC but then if I put a motion forward it may 
be accepted, but it will be watered down and changed and would not be mine.  
The problem of issues being lost as they are passed up the union were also raised 
by one of the DSG Donnington shop stewards, defined as being a member of a 
quasi-elite. “I think we can (have influence) in terms that we can have a policy idea 
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here, discuss it at the SC and take it to the RISC and then move it up, but for me we 
can raise it to the RISC but then there is not much visibility and if someone wants to 
make it go away they can” (D2). 
An issue often raised by respondents, when discussing the democratic and 
representational structures of the union, was a problem with the union’s size. For 
example, shop steward LS2 at LS Donnington, in response to being asked about 
their influence, answered, “No not at all. I am a very little fish”. A large proportion of 
the interviewees saw the size of the union as a problem in reference to the industrial 
sector and, for those whom described themselves as skilled, in regards to their 
skilled position in the union. It was felt that this was particularly of concern, in 
reference to the way that individuals identified with the union. 
The vast majority of those interviewed felt that the union had become too big. The 
DSG National Focal summed up the feelings of many of the respondents when he 
said: “Yes. It is too big and has lost its way. It is far less democratic and members 
are being forgotten”. These feelings were echoed by an LS Donnington shop 
steward who said “it is so diverse now that I feel it has lost the plot a bit. It’s lost its 
purpose” (LS”) and a shop steward at DSG Donnington (D1), agreed stating “To me 
the union is getting more remote. I think that the union has either got too big to 
control or there isn’t the will at the top to bring it to the shop floor”. Convenor (Con2) 
at one of the smaller sites, referring to high number of mergers that he has 
experienced said “it’s become faceless with all the amalgamations”, whilst a shop 
steward, from DSG Stafford (S1), who was more open than most to the idea of 
amalgamation, argued there were “two ways of looking at it. Bigger it is the more 
powerful but it can lose its grass roots influence and can lose its identity a bit”.  
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The issues of identity, raised by the Stafford steward, were an area of concern from 
many of the respondents, particularly in reference to the way that skilled members 
felt Unite was representing their interests. For example, shop steward (B2) at DSG 
Bovington said:  
When it was a skilled union, this was what it was about, protecting your skills. 
But that has all gone. There has been a lot of dilution and we have let a lot of 
that go. That’s not forward looking but maybe the past was the best… I have 
issues about managers and workers being in the same union, but to the union 
their money is as good as ours. But that line should stay there. When they 
were in separate unions they were easier to deal with.  
Another Bovington Shop steward (B3), discussing the diversity of the union said “it 
used to be to protect your skills but that has all gone now. That’s a problem with big 
unions isn’t it? When you represent everyone, where do you draw the line?”  
One of the more senior DSG Donnington stewards (D2) also highlighted the 
problems that had arisen from the union becoming more general, linking this to 
issues that the members had with identifying with other sections:  
When we were a more specific type of union we had a connection to other 
engineers and we had commonality due to the job specification. We are now 
so general that I feel some of that has been diluted. We had more identity as 
a group of engineers or electricians, and identified with people at other 
factories. Now, people see what is going on outside of the workplace within 
the union but whilst interested they are focused on what is happening to them 
here at Donnington. There is less enthusiasm to look at what is happening 
outside.  
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The issues members have identifying with the union were also discussed with by 
other respondents. A theme that emerged was that many of the members saw the 
union primarily as their workplace and not as a wider organisation, and also saw it 
primarily as an insurance policy. One of the DSG Donnington shop stewards stated:  
maybe the union is seen as not looking after us anymore. I know we are the 
union, which is something that is thrown at us all the time, but as you can see 
from the size of the shop stewards’ committee, people don’t want to be the 
union. They just want someone to hold their hand (D5).  
Similarly, a LS Donnington shop steward (LS2) said “I think that they see it as an LS 
Donnington thing. It is only when you see strikes on telly, that don’t affect us that 
you see the union outside. You don’t really realise that there are other sectors. You 
just see it as the little bubble we have here”. 
One important issue that has arisen from Unite being a large general union, as 
opposed to the craft based predecessor unions, are members not being able to 
identify with other members in sectors that can be vastly dissimilar. Two of the shop 
stewards interviewed at DSG Donnington raised this issue. The first (D6) said that 
“they [the members] definitely identify more with other engineers than they do air 
hostesses. You mention it to them, but they are not interested. They say they don’t 
support us so why should we support them.” The second (D3) expanded on this 
observing that “people don’t feel bothered as it doesn’t affect them. That’s how 
things have changed…You don’t associate yourself with trolley dolly’s or oil riggers”. 
When asked if this was a possible problem he replied: “Yes as you won’t get the 
backing if people cannot identify with them. If people see engineers on strike then 
they can understand the dispute. But outside of engineering it’s harder. This is down 
to the fact that the members only see the union as here or the shop steward”.   
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Linked to these questions of democracy, structure and identity is the issue of 
whether Unite is a member led organisation, as it claims to be, or officer led. As 
discussed in chapter three, Unite makes big claims around its credentials as a 
member led organisation, but the evidence collected from this case study research 
points to this being rather overstated, with the merger delivering an organisation that 
was more based on the officer dominated TGWU model. However, whilst many of 
the respondents agreed that the union was not member led, they were not all in 
agreement at who did lead it.  
Some, such as convenor 7 at one of the small sites felt that it was run by the 
representatives, rather than the union’s officers. He stated “it’s not officer led. Much 
of the organisation of the union comes down to reps, without whom the union 
wouldn’t be able to function. Without the input of reps at Stirling there would be no 
union”. This was a minority view, however, with most of the respondents believing 
that the union, at some level was officer run. 
Other respondents believed that the power in the union was found in the regions. 
For example, convenor 8, at another of the smaller sites, argued “I would say they 
are almost middle led. Middle up, middle down. Rather than top down or bottom up. 
I think the officers lead rather than the members. Not Len McCluskey, but the 
regional officer types. I think they tend to lead. They point you in the direction they 
want you to go in more to the point”. The view seems out of line, however, with the 
information presented earlier in the chapter that demonstrated a severe lack of 
involvement by the Regional Officer in the MoD sector. 
Another view, in respect of where the union is led from, was that it is politically 
driven. Examples of this were given by the National Lay representative, who 
explained his experience of being on the union (national) executive committee “Its 
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United-left run. There are 60 on the EC and 40 are members of United Left with 20 
independent or members of [the moderate grouping] Unite Now”. When asked how 
much influence the General Secretary had over the United Left faction he replied 
“The Chair is Martin Mayer and whilst he and (former chair) Tony Woodhouse try to 
bring everyone together, Len doesn’t. He knows who put him there and, whilst jovial, 
he always knows. I get frustrated with some people as they don’t see the politics 
and don’t understand it”.  
The former National Lay Representative explained where he felt the union was run 
from, highlighting the importance of factions:  
“It is led by the people on the top table. I have seen some sorry things in my 
time, but no it’s not [member run]. It’s led by political factions and union 
barons as they are called. I don’t think it portrays well in the public 
environment. I don’t think the image is helped at a time when I think the 
opportunities for the members have been lost.  Amicus, with the bringing in 
of MSF, was a big thing as you bought in people who dealt with managers 
and represented them which was a good thing. Representation should give 
you the opportunity to develop and MSF, for me, bought in some 
professionalism.  Ian Waddle was professional in the way he approached 
things and dealt with people without having to use foul language and bang 
the table. Same with Laurence Faircloth. But it has changed, there were 
elements of the 70s which were great and whilst it led to Thatcher changing 
the laws it also saved a lot. I think we have lost sight of trade union values 
and have not got the competent efficient people needed to lead the union. 
These descriptions in relation to the importance of politics in the union demonstrate 
the power of the left wing faction has over Unite. As discussed in chapter two, the 
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merger bought together a union in Amicus which was highly factionalised, due to its 
history and one in the TGWU, which had become dominated by the broad left and 
London left groupings. It is evident from the above descriptions, in-line with Mcllroy 
and Daniels (2009) that the right does appear to have been beaten in Unite. 
However, the lack of a serious alternative to the leadership of the union will 
consolidate the union’s popular bossdom form of governance. 
As discussed above, the majority of respondents felt that Unite was officer led. One 
of the DSG Donnington shop stewards (D1) stated: “It’s officer led. Definitely. It 
takes so long to change anything and if you have an issue then it is hard to get the 
backing”. One of the convenors (Con2) added “I think in my experience it is an officer 
led union. The people on the top table and then next couple of layers have their own 
agenda and put out what they want to get things to go their way”. Another of the 
DSG Donnington Stewards (D2) responded, giving some examples of issues where 
he had felt the officers had impeded what he was trying to do:  
Using the recent pay ballot as an example, in my opinion when I have tried 
to push something and the people above do not agree, they just ignore me…if 
[the] EC and the such don’t want to do something then they don’t. They can 
easily burst that balloon. We saw that in the pension’s issue. Lots of angry 
people being wound up and then silence, so it was clear the people at the top 
didn’t want us to do anything. So I felt that is wasn’t member led in that way. 
They got us all wound up and buzzing and rabble roused us but once the 
action had taken place it was like we had had our day, now don’t do it again.  
The Regional Officer who was interviewed also agreed that statements from the 
union arguing that it was member led were a little wide of the mark, but put some of 
the emphasis back onto the representatives and members:  
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The structures allow the activists to participate but how many reps will try for 
instance to get members on a coach. And the committees that exist are not 
performing. Some of the reps on them are there because they have done 
deals but they don’t go back and ask their members what they want or think 
about things. It is a member led union in parts but that’s down to how open 
the reps and officers are. But how do you get 1.5 mil members to participate? 
The members don’t want to be involved. And where there is a debate the 
factions have done their work first and you won’t get anywhere if you are not 
on the slate.  
Adding to this, he gave a very frank critique of the situation in Unite:  
I think it has been a disaster. In some plants the ex T&G and Amicus reps 
had very good relationships. In other places there has been a huge fall out 
over senior roles and in some cases people have moved to other unions. The 
administration is a lot poorer. The way the branch restructuring has been 
handled is bad. Staff are really demotivated. The leadership is seen as a little 
clique, who make decisions in isolation rather that engaging. At least [Derek] 
Simpson came round once a year and spoke to everyone. Too many people 
they get their news from the media and blog sites. It might be too big for its 
own good. It is too remote at times. I did vote for the merger. Some of the 
businesses I went into were either all Amicus or, where they were mixed, they 
all got on. The way T&G organised themselves doesn’t fit with how Amicus 
used to run itself. I don’t think it has been great. Legal systems have changed, 
procedures have changed. Even officer expenses have changed. I’ve seen 
some former Amicus reps being excluded from things. If Amicus people 
wanted to get on they would have to bend the knee to the United Left and 
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swear elegance. When I go into former T&G places I have to explain 
everything to them, in Amicus sites I don’t as they understand it already. 
Some of their reps (TGWU) are migratory and they have no allegiance to 
their job. They work in Tesco’s but see Morrison’s offering more money so 
they move there. Plus they don’t have the mental capacity to deal with things. 
They call you in all the time. You end up being the senior shop steward.  
This respondent also criticised the Executive Committee, in relation to the power of 
the general secretary: 
There was an officer in the Mids who backed Kevin Coyne in the (general 
secretary) election and he applied for a role in the East Midlands. He was 
vocal against Simpson and was appointed to the role by the EC, but Simpson 
said no. But, after much wrangling the EC won the day. So it’s as good as 
how strong the exec wants to be, whether they are happy to take on the GS. 
[Now) It is a self-serving oligarchy. Many of the EC election manifestos will 
have Len’s name on them saying he supports them or they support him. So 
this Exec, I think that they are often slating officers but they all want to be an 
officer. Some of them understand that if they get on with the GS then they 
may become officers. If they wanted to they could call the GS to account but 
they don’t and they are too close. Some of the EC members are elected 
unopposed”.  
Differences between the two merged unions were also raised in terms of the way 
that the union conference worked, with Convenor (Con3), from one of the larger 
sites, explaining:  
One of the shocking things was going to the last conference that I went too. 
In the AEU there was a left and a right and you know, there was a distinction, 
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there was an argument going on to win the soul of the union. And yes it was 
an electoral machine; we put our idiot up against their idiot. But at the last 
conference I went to it was very much Lenny’s show, and there wasn’t that 
feeling. It was quite strange the amount of “well we all love Lenny”. There 
were very few issues. It was a boring conference really, I think the nuclear 
power-nuclear weapons debates were the only chance where there was any 
dissent, and a few hard core old lefties got up and broke ranks with Lenny, 
and then the Trots of course, but not the ones Lenny used to be in with 
[Laughs]. 
In addressing the second research sub question, the evidence collected here, and 
from the previous question, demonstrates that the merger has had an effect on 
representation within the case study research sites. However, this has mainly been 
in relation to the union at national and industry level, rather than regional and 
workplace. 
The merger fits within the Undy et al (1981) framework of a consolidatory merger. 
As discussed by Foley (1992) and Callow (2011), it has long been the ambition of 
union leaders in the engineering industry to consolidate membership in one union. 
The Unite merger bought the union movement in the UK closer than it has ever been 
to this goal. It should also be noted that there was also a political dimension to the 
merger, as set down by Waddington and Whitson (1997), with the General 
Secretaries of the two merging unions, Simpson and Woodley, both seen to be 
members of the left wing “awkward squad” of leaders (McIlroy and 
Daniels,2009:150). 
Undy (2010) states that in a balanced partner amalgamation, which it can be argued 
the Unite merger was, as neither Amicus nor the TGWU seen as dominant, going 
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into the merger it is possible that a new union can be produced with different 
structures and governance to the merging unions. However, at an industry and 
national level, the evidence suggests that the TGWU leadership is perceived to have 
‘taken over’ the new union. It would appear that participants believe that the TGWU 
leaders have managed to secure many of the key positions of power, demonstrating 
the complex hierarchy that Kelly and Heery (1994) explained can emerge from the 
bolting together of two organisations 
The size of the union has meant that the union nationally is perceived to have 
become very remote from the members. This is especially the case with the skilled 
engineering members, who find it difficult to identify with a union that is so diverse. 
It is argued that members do not see the union as a national organisation, instead 
primarily conflating the union with the workplace, with the shop steward being its 
face. Further, they do not associate with disputes outside the workplace such as the 
high profile ones that had taken place at Hovis and British Airways. 
Unite is predominantly seen as officer led, at a national level, either by the union’s 
national leadership or by the political faction that surrounds the General Secretary 
and his senior team. As discussed in chapter two, the Unite merger was the product 
or a particularly factionalised union in terms of Amicus and a left dominated one in 
the TGWU (McIlroy and Daniels, 2009). The merger appears to have consolidated 
the influence of the united left grouping. However, it is inferred in the interviews that 
some of the active members within the faction are more rooted in a tradition of 
keeping the former TGWU in power within the union, than they are rooted in left 
wing politics. This has concerning connotations for democracy in the union. 
Whilst some of the respondents said that the union should be member led, the 
majority agreed this was not the case. There was criticism of the union nationally, 
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with respondents stating that officers were often unresponsive to their needs and 
that this had become worse since the merger. It was mentioned for example, that 
the previous General Secretary, Derek Simpson, had toured the regions, once a 
year, something that had not been replicated by the present General Secretary. The 
National Conference and the Executive Council both came in for criticism for not 
holding the General Secretary and his senior team to account.  
Retuning to Turner (1962), this appears to describe a form of union governance with 
the characteristics of a popular bossdom, calling into question the claim made by 
England (1981) that the era of the popular bossdom in the TGWU was over. Whilst 
it may have been the case in 1981, when workplace democracy was expanding in 
the union, this appears to have been pushed back, with the popular bossdom as 
prevalent as ever, by the time of the merger, in 2007. However, it is also notable 
that within the MoD sector, as outlined above, there is evidence of some forms of 
aristocracy, demonstrating the limitations of Turner, when evaluating a huge 
conglomerate union, such as Unite. 
At regional level, the merger appears to have had less impact than it has had at 
national or workplace level. There is evidence of some regional officers having left 
the organisation or having had their briefs significantly changed. This, in the main, 
appears to be due to the doubling up of officer numbers post-merger, but could also 
be down to political differences (Kelly and Heery, 1994). However, whilst a small 
number of the respondents reported contact with the region, this was a rarity. 
Therefore, the impact of the merger on the research sites was relatively minor, in 
terms of regional representation. 
In the terms of workplace representation, the merger has had more effect on some 
sites than others. In terms of DSG, prior to the merger there were very few TGWU 
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members or stewards and, consequently, the integration that had to take place in 
other areas appears to have been smooth. This was mirrored in the MoD Fire and 
Rescue Branch, where there had never been any Amicus members. LS Donnington 
had needed to integrate Amicus and TGWU members and stewards into the one 
union, but the two organisations had a history of working well at the site, with no 
evidence of the issues raised by the Regional Officer in relation to, other sectors, in 
terms of representatives competing for positions. Therefore, whilst at a national level 
a new union has been formed, perceived by the activists to have adopted many of 
the traits of the TGWU (Undy, 2010), and with a more complex hierarchy to that of 
the merging unions (Kelly and Heery, 1994), these issues do not appear to have 
filtered down to the workplace in the MoD sector. 
Having described how, and where, representation takes place and how that 
representation has been effected by internal change, in terms of the merger that 
created Unite, the following two sections will now look at the effect on trade union 
representation of external issues, firstly looking at the impact of structural changes 
and privatisation in the MoD and secondly looking at the effect of the Whitley system 
of industrial relations and the recently implemented Employee Relations review. 
The impact of structural changes and proposed or actual privatisation upon 
representation 
This section will now examine how external changes to the MoD sector, in terms of 
structural changes supported by the introduction of Human Resource Management 
(HRM), as part of the New Public Sector Management initiatives and the ongoing 
privatisation process, has affected Unite’s ability to represent its members. This will 
begin by examining the effects of the sale process on the representational 
processes in DSG.  
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At the time that the fieldwork was carried out, DSG was going through the process 
of being sold by the Government. This was raised a number of times by respondents 
and gave interesting insights into the effects that this process had on the 
representational structures. For convenor 3, from one of the larger sites, it was an 
opportunity for collective bargaining. He explained that, the day before the interview, 
he had been in attendance at a meeting where the Agency’s management had 
backed down from making unilateral changes to the flexible working agreement due 
to not wanting the adverse publicity that industrial action may bring:  
because DSG’s up for sale the last thing they want is us out by the gate, so 
we have a bit of leeway… the very threat of us taking industrial action has 
been enough to bring management to the negotiating table, which is great, 
we can sit down and talk to them. A threat that we might take action is our 
strongest card.  
On the other hand, one of the shop stewards at DSG Donnington saw the sale as 
weakening collective bargaining, as they felt the members were fearful for the future, 
making them unlikely to take action “There are a lot of frightened people here 
because we are up for sale. People say they will strike over pay but will they? I am 
not sure” (D1). 
Convenor 6, from a small site, discussed a number of issues in relation to the sale 
process. This convenor was one of the few respondents who reported having 
regular interactions with their regional officer. The sale process increased these 
interactions, as it did the interactions that they had with other DSG representatives. 
“As you know, we work really well together, nothing’s changed. In fact, I think we 
might even be a bit better now as we have the common bond of this sale process 
and everything else that’s going along with it”. However, the convenor of another 
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site raised concerns that the sale had weakened the position of the industrial 
combine, due to it being opened up to the non-industrial trade unions. “The combine 
plus started as an issue around the sale… and was an industrial meeting with the 
non-industrials invited. It leaves the industrials without their meeting. Maybe it 
should be alternated” (Con5).  
The effect of the sale process on representation was, therefore, mixed. On a positive 
note, the process is seen by some as strengthening representation, by bringing the 
sites closer together, due to them having a common purpose and increasing the 
power that the unions have in terms of collective bargaining. However, counter to 
this are the arguments that the power of the industrial unions has been diluted by 
the introduction of non-industrial unions onto the combine committee and a concern 
that members may be too frightened for their jobs to engage in industrial action, in 
order to defend their terms and conditions. The next part of this section will now look 
at some of the structural changes that have taken place in terms of how MoD 
civilians are managed and will explain how these changes have effected union 
representation.  
The key changes identified by respondents, in terms of the way industrial relations 
is coordinated in the MoD, differed from one research site to the next. However, 
issues such as the introduction of HRM practices and increasingly negative 
managerial attitudes were reoccurring themes.  
Whilst in the private sector HRM may not be something that is new, its introduction 
into the Civil Service and particularly the MoD has been less than uniform. One of 
the convenors explained how some of the stewards in that organisation had not, in 
his opinion, understood the significance of the change from Personnel Management 
to HRM “The new HR director is bringing in these sweeping changes, which 
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unfortunately, I think a lot of my colleagues still don’t get and think it’s a new name 
for personnel” (Con3). Part of the changes associated with the introduction of HRM 
had been the removal of local HRM departments in large parts of the MoD, with 
employee relations advice administered via centralised call centres, operated by 
Capita. In DSG the HRM function, whilst not centralised to the extent of the MoD 
centre, has been centralised onto the larger sites. For example, DSG Catterick 
administers HRM for Catterick, DSG Stirling and DSG’s Northern Irish interests, 
whilst DSG Bovington does the same for Bovington, DSG Lulworth, DSG Colchester 
and DSG Warminster. This has had a significant effect on the way that the stewards 
operate. In terms of DSG, the National Focal stated:  
there has been restructuring of HR departments. Some sites have no HR 
departments now. Convenors can’t do informal things to resolve conflict at 
local level as there are central points of contact and none on the sites. Stress 
levels are through the roof. As you tackle one issue another comes up. 
Convenor 3 explained, in detail, how things had changed in the time that he had 
been a shop steward:  
when I first came here as I say, it was a very much more paternalistic 
approach… I went to my first Whitley meeting around a big table and there 
was a picture of the Queen and Prince Philip at the head of the table, and a 
guy comes in wearing an army uniform who is head of the site and it’s all very 
deferential and I was told by [another Shop Steward] that a year ago, when 
an officer came in we would all have stood up. So on the one part you had 
all that, but on the other you had personnel departments where it was very 
much about administering people’s sick and leave [and to] make sure the 
discipline procedure was followed to the letter. It was very much seen as to 
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do the job you’d cosy up to personnel, in fact you’d do the bargaining stuff. 
You would go in and say, well you’re going to charge our mate with whatever, 
we are going to represent him, that means you are going to have to set up a 
hearing with outside people, you will be washing your dirty linen in public, 
we’re going to say that you haven’t followed that rule and you’re going to say 
that we’ve done this, and it’s going to cost a lot of money. But if we got him 
to say that he done it and you would assure us he would only get a slap on 
the wrists or, depending on the severity, one day’s loss of pay, when the 
maximum penalty could be a week, I’m sure that we could get him just to 
admit it. And you could do a bit of the horse trading and you dealt with things 
like that, because that’s the way it was seen… Now it’s going to be hard line, 
they’ve got a strategy to deliver efficiency savings, strategy to restructure the 
organisation, strategy to streamline it etc. etc. What is HR’s role in delivering 
it? What policies are needed to be replaced what terms and conditions need 
to be ripped up. The role is to get people out and that’s going on in the wider 
MoD. I mean the new restoring efficiency procedure just makes it so much 
quicker to get rid of people for absence and inefficiency and get them out the 
system. It seems to be they are thinking “we are fed up of paying redundancy 
payments and VER’s to civil servants, we’ll just sack them”. And that’s pretty 
much it. Colleagues in other HR departments across DSG and other reps 
have been late in seeing this and still see there HR departments as neutral 
and no matter what you say they don’t get it. So if HR say that something is 
not contractual they accept it because HR have said it so and you say but 
HR would say that wouldn’t they, management don’t want you to think its 
contractual, but they are HR. So there has been a shift there, there has been 
a shift in collective bargaining. Site Whitley’s used to have more power, you 
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could go to a Whitley, make a grievance, make local agreements and you 
can’t do that now, all policies are centrally done, or at least are centrally 
approved and vetted and seen. So that’s gone. 
One of the Donnington shop stewards (D5) also raised the changes that had taken 
place, with the introduction of HRM “HR is HR now and not Personal. There are 
probably more rules…They manage for them now they don’t look after us. They 
manage for the management.  (Former DSG Donnington Personnel Manager) was 
one of us; (Current DSG Donnington HR manager) is one of them. They see their 
job as being gestapo not Salvation Army”.  
The former National Lay Representative also discussed the impact on 
representation of the changes to a centrally administered HRM function, amongst a 
number of other important issues. He also explained, from his perspective, some of 
the inadequacies in the way the union handled itself:  
The department became fragmented. The outsourcing and capability studies. 
They murdered us by study. We didn’t have the facilities to challenge what 
they were doing and when we did they did it in a different way. We didn’t have 
people with the right calibre to challenge what they were doing based on facts 
and evidence as they were not competent to do it. And we had people that 
were not in tune with the changes. You can’t fight the First World War with 
weapons from the Stone Age. Death by study, death by outsourcing and we 
couldn’t come up with other ideas to do things different and stop them going 
out. We just told them they couldn’t do things but came up with no 
alternatives. The endless reviews, outsourcing, removal of HR and lack of 
competency. Sometimes you have to embrace change and also influence 
change…One senior Representative signed up 560 members in catering and 
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there are 14 left because the reps that were set up in those areas all tried to 
get the National Officer to do the right thing and fight for them but he didn’t 
do anything. We are not structured because of lack of involvement by 
Regional Officers and reps can’t do everything.  
The issue of the stewards’ workload was raised by other respondents. Convenor 
(Con7) from a smaller site stated “In the last 18 months, mechanisms to deal with 
issues have changed considerably. [The] job of the shop steward has changed with 
far more work involved. Reps are firefighting and can’t cope with everything being 
thrown at them. Managers don’t understand jobs and processes. Managers think 
they can get away with things and are trying to dictate to union how it does its 
business. The union has not addressed this well”.  
Linked to the increase in steward workload is another issue raised by some 
respondents; the problem with recruiting new shop stewards. As one of the larger 
site convenors stated “The problem we have got is we haven’t got enough bloody 
shop stewards, and we haven’t got enough competent shop stewards” (Con3). The 
reason for this was attributed directly to workload by one of the DSG Donnington 
stewards (D6), who stated that “members are frightened to take on the 
responsibility…people see what you do and think they wouldn’t want to do 
everything we do”. However, some respondents also highlighted structural reasons 
for the difficulties in recruiting shop stewards, with one of the convenors (Con5) 
highlighting Unite’s media image as an issue. “In recent time people have been put 
off. Possibly by Unite’s media presence which is very negative. Strikes etc. They 
don’t want their name tarred. It may have put me off…People don’t want to be tarred 
with the Unite brush as trouble makers”.  
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However, the most common reasons given for not being able to recruit shop 
stewards were the attitude of managers and the reduction in the regard that 
members hold their shop stewards, mainly due to the reduction of bargaining at the 
local level and the dependence on convenors and senior representatives for 
representation at grievance and disciplinary hearings. The second of these common 
reasons was addressed by one of the convenors of the larger sites who said:  
You know if this was the 1970s and stewards were negotiating the piece work 
rates, we wouldn’t have the stewards we have got now. We have got guys 
elected because “oh well he wants to do it” and all that but part of having the 
full time, or used to be, convenor positions is that Fred knows if the shit hits 
the fan  and they are in trouble it won’t be Fred meeting the management it 
will be somebody more competent that can do it…when I first came here, as 
I say, back in ’88 there was the vestiges of the type two productivity bonus 
so we had a thing called the JPC, which was the joint productivity committee 
and each branch as we were broken into, each department had its own, 
branch 20, branch 30, branch 40 JPC and at that meeting the branch 
manager would sit down with all the shop stewards and talk about production, 
how many widgets we got out, the machine is down that polishes the widget 
and the stewards would go along. Sometimes stewards would go along as it 
was a thing off the shop floor, but there was still a link which was coming ever 
more tenuous on the type two that actually if we haven’t got the widget it 
could affect the bonus and the steward would be the person raising that issue 
at the JPC. So each cost centre, each team, as it would be now, had a 
steward (Con3). 
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In terms of the attitudes of managers putting members off being shop stewards, due 
to the negative connotations perceived to be attached to being a union 
representative, one of the DSG Bovington Shop stewards (B2) stated “as we are 
going through sale a lot of lads see it as a bit dangerous to get involved” and one of 
the smaller site convenors (Con8) observed “people don’t want to put themselves 
forward sometimes as they think management will think they are a trouble maker”.  
The attitudes of managers were raised by a number of respondents in relation to the 
way that industrial relations have changed in the MoD. One of the shop stewards 
interviewed at DSG Bovington stated: 
the management always abided by the rules, now they just say tough, get on 
with it. We are powerless. We can argue the case and take things through 
the channels but they have bent the rules so much now. A few years ago they 
would stay within the rules, their rules but now they don’t and there is nothing 
we can really do (B3).  
These issues were also discussed by one of the DSG Donnington representatives, 
who noted that “it has changed massively. Years ago you would speak to a manager 
and they would speak to you. Now they close the door on you. It is hard to 
communicate…It’s a new level of management. People are new to the game. Before 
I felt that they were in a position because they wanted to go places for the company. 
Now people will stand on top of each other. You can only now speak to your own 
manager and some people can’t even do that” (D3). Some of the respondents did 
not see their relationships with management quite so negatively. One of the 
convenors (Con5) illustrated this saying “I always think you are doing well as a rep 
if your members think you are too close to management and management think you 
are too close to your members. You need to be somewhere in the middle. Can’t be 
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completely with the members as you won’t have any management trust but can’t be 
with management as your members won’t trust you. If neither trust you fully you are 
doing something right”. 
Some of the respondents, meanwhile, discussed having amicable relationships with 
their management, in some cases at odds with the experiences of other 
representatives in their workplaces. This was the experience, for instance, of one of 
the LS Donnington shop stewards (LS2), who reported that:  
you hear what some of the other reps are saying [and] they seem to have 
more problems. Some of their managers seem to be anti-union. Ours are 
quite pro union so it is easier for me. It seems to be personality rather than 
policy driven. So I am quite lucky”, whilst one of the Catterick representatives 
replied that “I think that the management are talking to us a lot more. Maybe 
not listening to what we say but they are talking to us (C1). 
In summary, the proposed and actual privatisation policies of the government, 
conducted by MoD management, have been shown to have had a significant impact 
on representation. The participants’ perceptions of how representation has been 
affected can be divided into two groups. In the one group there are the participants 
that saw privatisation, through the lens of the DSG sale, as strengthening 
representation. The common purpose that the sale process gave to the DSG sites 
meant that relations between the sites vastly improved, as representatives from the 
different sites worked closer together. The collective bargaining environment 
improved, as these closer relations meant a greater ability to organise collectively. 
Linked to this, the desire of the DSG management not to have any major conflict 
prior to the sale gave an added boost to the union’s ability to bargain, which had 
seen success in forcing the management to back down over a number of issues. 
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However, whilst the union was in the position to bargain, due to the pressures 
described above, the union did not have the strength to exploit this with those in the 
second group explaining that the sale process, from their perspective, had 
weakened the union. These respondents explained that the fear that members felt 
for their jobs entering a very uncertain period, meant that the union’s members were 
not willing, or at least very reluctant, to do anything that ultimately could be 
detrimental to their working lives. This resonates with Goodman and Whittingham’s 
(1969) argument, that the strength of union representatives comes from their ability 
to carry the members with them. This, therefore, weakened the position of the union, 
as the union’s ability to take industrial action, as part of the collective bargaining 
process, was greatly restricted, echoing Lane’s (1974) claim that union 
representatives have no direct power over their members. 
The key structural changes that had taken place in the MoD, and which could be 
seen as having had an effect on representation, were associated with the 
introduction of HRM and changes in the attitudes of management towards the union. 
HRM, whilst not a new concept by any means, was, according to the evidence 
collected through this study, relatively new in the way that it was being rolled out in 
the MoD. The shift from the old style, paternalistic, personnel management to the 
new HRM had an effect on representation. Participants highlighted the change in 
perceptions that whilst personnel managers, rightly or wrongly, were perceived to 
be somewhat neutral, HR managers were very much seen to be on the side of 
management. The shift to a more strategic HRM bought with it a centralisation of 
industrial relations. The use of local agreements and bargaining has been largely 
stopped, with pay and terms and conditions, being negotiated at national level so 
that there are now only a small number of national agreements, rather than the 
plethora of local agreements that were formerly in place. Some sites no longer have 
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a HR department with which to bargain, removing a major part of the steward’s role, 
as outlined by Clegg et al (1961), whilst it was reported that the workload of the 
more senior and national representatives had increased markedly.  
The increase in the workload of senior representatives and the centralisation of 
industrial relations have both contributed to a problem for the union, in being able to 
recruit new shop stewards. The centralisation has had an effect on the numbers and 
quality of shop stewards. There is less importance placed on the role of shop 
steward by the members, as the importance of local bargaining has diminished. With 
no piece rates or workplace bonus system to be negotiated around and a system 
which has had a tendency to rely on senior stewards and convenors to carry out 
representational duties, it was argued that the shop steward position has often been 
given to a willing individual rather than the person that was the best fit for the job. 
Whist all sections or teams had shop stewards when the local bonus schemes were 
in place, this has again diminished with most of the research sites reporting falls in 
the number of workplace representatives. This has effected representation as the 
reduced numbers, and reduced quality, of stewards has meant that the workload of 
the senior representatives and convenors has increased.  
Linked to the introduction of HRM, and the reduced number of shop stewards 
available to police the adherence of local and national agreements, has been a 
hardening of managerial attitudes towards the union and its representatives, with 
the bargaining relationships of the past, discussed by Batstone et al (1977) breaking 
down. These are linked to the changes to the Whitley system and the removal of 
union facilities, discussed in the next section, and which the union did not have the 
capacity to fight. Respondents reported that where managers had been accessible 
in the past this was no longer always the case, as managers were becoming less 
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keen on working with the unions, preferring instead to access the members directly. 
Whilst not universal, this tendency towards unilateral regulation has meant that 
management have not always been forced by the union representative to follow all 
of the rules, with some of the respondents expressing a frustration that they did not 
have the power to do anything about it.  
The effect of Whitley and the recent Employee Relations Review on structure 
and representation? 
This section will analyse the effect that the Whitley system of industrial relations and 
the recent review of employee relations (ERR), which is often referred to by union 
representatives as the facility time review, have had on the structure of Unite in the 
MoD sector and its representational structures. 
The impact of the Whitley System of industrial relations has already been seen in 
the other three sections discussed above. The centralisation of bargaining, poor 
engagement with regional officials and weakness of workplace level stewards’ 
organisation can all be linked to the traditions of Whitley. However, since the 
Employee Relations Review was implemented in May 2013, linked to the Coalition 
government’s austerity drive, things have been changing in a significant way, 
exacerbating these weaknesses.  
The convenors and shop stewards on the larger sites had felt the largest effect as 
their steward organisations were more sophisticated, with larger numbers of shop 
stewards and more formal structures. However, almost all of the representatives 
had been affected in some way. One of the larger site convenors (Con4) explained 
that, in his organisation, he was the only representative remaining on 100% facility 
time out of an original eight, whilst another stated that his organisation had gone 
from two to one representative on 100% release. This had affected these sites 
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directly, in terms of the union’s ability to organise, but had also had an effect on the 
other sites within the wider organisation, whose convenors and stewards had looked 
traditionally to these 100% representatives for advice and guidance.  
The larger sites, therefore, which had convenors on 100% facility time prior to the 
review, felt the impact of reduced facility time directly. One LS Donnington 
respondent (LS2) explained the way that the review had affected them, particularly 
in relation to the loss of their 100% representatives. “It’s a little negative really, as 
we always had someone here but now it can take ages to get hold of [the convenor] 
and with me being a newbie I feel that I need some guidance”. Meanwhile one of 
the DSG Donnington shop stewards stated “Yes as it has had an effect on me as 
they [the convenor and senior representatives] don’t have time to get me 
information, so I have to get it myself and don’t have time” (D1), whilst a safety 
representative at DSG Donnington (D3) explained how he perceived the effect of 
the review on the other Donnington representatives. “My facility time hasn’t been 
touched, as it is health and safety [related], but the shop stewards have struggled. 
Plus, having a 100% convenor meant they could get out and about. But now it is 
more difficult to be active now”.  
The impact of the review on the sites where no 100% representatives had existed 
prior to the review was not as direct as it was at the larger sites. There was, all the 
same, some indirect impact. For example, one of the smaller site convenors said, in 
relation to getting advice from a 100% convenor at another site “[Large site 
convenor] not being in the office all the time makes the network take more of a 
strain” (Con5). However, for the majority of the stewards who participated in the 
research at the sites, the impact of losing 100% representatives at other sites was 
minimal. 
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The current National Lay Representative explained how removal of 100% facility 
time representatives had had a major effect: 
Yes it has because buffers have been removed. [Former 100% 
representative at LS Donnington] has gone and [LS Donnington Convenor] 
is on a project, so not in Donnington 2-3 days a week. Members from 
Donnington are, therefore, calling me when they have a problem. Work is 
needed to be done as members are used to having a 100% convenor and 
now don’t have. [This] could blow up in our face if we don’t get engaged, but 
finding time is hard and the members don’t understand.  
LS Donnington shop steward (LS2) explained how the changed role of their 
convenor had affected the steward organisation at the site “If [the convenor] gets a 
chance he calls one [a JSSC meeting] but they are not as regular as they used to 
be as [Con4] isn’t here. And the last one I went to there didn’t seem to be many 
stewards there”. 
The largest impact of the review, identified by stewards and convenors from all the 
sites, was on representation, both internal and external to the workplace. However, 
the extent to which the different research sites were affected varied, with 
respondents on sites that had more difficult industrial relations prior to the review, 
reporting more impact from the review than those that had good relationships with 
their managers. One example came from convenor 7, from one of the smaller sites, 
who claimed that the review:  
is a farce. There are massive issues at [the convenor’s site] due to 
mismanagement. The manager is jealous of the contact I have with senior 
management. The 40% [time off] that I had has been cut to 25% including 
Health and Safety. Whilst H&S shouldn’t be included, the management 
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disagree and 25% is not enough time. Combines alone take up two days 
each. The role could easily be 100%, given the amount of work that there is. 
I can’t talk to HR as the relationship is so bad.   
Conversely other representatives claimed a limited impact of the review. Convenor 
5 observed that “we never took the piss so haven’t seen the hit as big as we could 
[have]. Things change, we feel the cuts and austerity”, while convenor 8 admitted 
“At this moment in time no (impact of the review). [But] in time I will have to fill in a 
lot more paper work to detail what I am doing”. Stewards also reported feeling that 
they were under more scrutiny since the review. Shop steward D2 at DSG 
Donnington stated “I feel under more scrutiny now. I have always kept a diary in 
order to nurture a good relationship with my boss, but it is a massive attack on our 
ability to be active as trade unions and that is what we are facing”. 
A number of respondents also highlighted the impact of the review on external 
representation. The former National Lay Representative raised a number of 
concerns in relation to how members would be represented following the 
implementation of the review:  
The members won’t get the service because officers don’t have a good 
understanding of the department, one because we had such a good set up 
that we looked after ourselves and officers never got involved but also they 
never had sight of the procedures as we couldn’t send them out and also 
many were not willing as it was too difficult for them. 
The Regional Officer that was interviewed explained the difficulties faced by officers 
due to the review, highlighting some of the issues raised by the current 
representational structures. Asked if the ERR would increase his workload he said:  
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Yes. It will increase in short term as there will be confusion as to who[m] the 
members go to. The thing is there are still reps on the sites, but they are over 
reliant on the senior reps doing everything for them. In LS the senior reps 
even did all of the members’ briefings. I expect that as soon as things get to 
the second stage [of a procedure] I will be called in. The branches at the 
moment are providing extra funds if they put someone forward to do first 
stage. So some of my post code work could be moved to this.  
Asked if the increased workload, on top of what they already did, would allow the 
time for this organisation to take place, the Regional Officer explained the issues 
that existed around organising in Unite:  
They [Unite strategists] say that 20% of our time should be spent organising 
but we have to be selective. The T&G model is different to the way the Amicus 
model was. For instance, if you are in a company with 60% density and you 
know as a rep that you will not be able to recruit the others. If there is an 
issue you get a call from the rep and deal with it. That’s the end of it. The 
T&G model. They phone you up and you say I won’t sort the issue, I will 
campaign around it. You make it visible and don’t solve it. Raising the profile 
so that hopefully non-members see you doing something. So a day a week 
we should be doing that. But as Amicus, we feel uncomfortable with it. As 
you may have a good relationship with the management which could be upset 
and you want to get it resolved quickly so as to move onto next issue.  So in 
answer to you I think it would be very difficult.  
This answer highlights a number of issues. It demonstrates the issues that exist in 
Unite in terms of tension between organising and servicing, tensions between 
elements from the former Amicus and TGWU officers and also the tensions that 
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exist between stewards, who know the scope for recruitment that exists in their 
workplaces, and officers who are driven by a need to recruit members in order to 
reach targets, linked increasingly to the 100% organising campaign. 
The overwhelming view of respondents was that the union did not do enough in its 
attempts to stop the cuts to union facility time, although a number of them also 
acknowledged that the government-led nature of the attacks made them difficult to 
fight. One of the smaller site convenors (Con8) stated:  
they (Unite) seemed to go to sleep on it. We all seen it but, apart from a 
couple of us, we all ignored it and hoped it would go away. There were other 
things going on too, such as changes to flexi. I think we missed a trick but as 
it was ministerial led I don’t think we could do much. The members would not 
have come out over it. We maybe could have changed the wording or the 
timescale but the outcome would have been the same.  
This was echoed by the National Lay Representative who stated that “A fight was 
put up in the MoD, but the battle was always lost as it was being driven by the 
Cabinet Office. The Unions should have collectively fought it at a national level, but 
we were always screwed as soon as it got to departmental level. All the points were 
raised at the meetings, but the MoD were not listening and consultation was 
meaningless”. Similarly, LS Donnington shop steward LS1 said “I think we tried to 
be proactive but I gather that there was not much we could do anyway as it was a 
government driven thing”.    
Whether or not the Government led nature of the review meant that a fight back was 
doomed to fail, a prevailing view from respondents was that the union had not fought 
hard enough against it. One of the convenors (D3) gave a very detailed account of 
a meeting that he had attended, which illustrates some of these perceived failings:  
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We had a meeting on this site, when they were looking at removing the facility 
time for reps. I had assumed, or hoped maybe, that the meeting would look 
at: 1- is this something we can resist; plan A - how to resist it; plan B - what 
structures so we need to put in place, how can we build on it. What 
opportunities are there? We are losing 100 percenters, can we get more reps 
in, can we use this as a way of campaigning to strengthen the sector, where 
do we go with it, what policies do we need, can we get training course for 
reps so we don’t lose everything?  That’s what I thought the meeting would 
be. I get there and there is a woman I didn’t know there. I presumed she was 
a union rep, and gave her some leaflets and stuff. She got introduced as the 
HR Focal for MoD HR. So we have a strategy meeting to say what we are 
doing, our national lay guy can’t explain the policy that he has been the union 
rep allegedly in negotiation with the company on. So he has had several 
meetings to try and argue against these policies and proposals, but he 
doesn’t understand them, so brings this woman there. He gets up and says 
“well I know we don’t like these changes, we went to the minister and said 
we didn’t like it but he said he wasn’t going to change them, so from that day 
on the battle was lost”. Well first of all we didn’t even have a battle as far as 
I can see, we gave up before the battle, Secondly why do you say in front of 
the opposition, the MoD’s HR, that we’re not going to fight?  
This convenor went on to explain some of the other ways that he felt the union had 
let the representatives and members down, contrasting it with the PCS:  
When they came for the 100 percenters we [the representatives] were told 
that we only have 100 percenters in the public sector and the MoD, no one 
else has got them. But I can go to [large engineering works] up the road who’s 
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got a 100 percenter, the bus depot that’s got a 100 percenter in the private 
sector, public sector council which has about four, but they thought it was just 
us, so they gave it up. But I went to those meetings and what would frustrate 
me is we’d got within the MoD a national officer, an EC man on 100% facility 
time, [two national lay representatives] on 100% facility time, [Senior Defence 
Equipment and Support Representative] on 100% facility time, with a national 
role. And yet nobody seemed to have a real function, and I contrast that with 
a PCS meeting I went to, and I am not saying PCS are perfect, but I went to 
one of their campaign meetings and each of them lay 100% reps gave a 
report on exactly what they had been doing.  
The issue of under-employment was raised by a number of participants who felt that 
the union had not always acted in its members’ best interests, in terms of the way 
the facility time available was used and, in some cases, even sympathised with the 
review’s architects. One of the convenors (Con4), for example, explained why he 
was disappointed by the union’s response. In terms of the facility time review the 
management were effectively saying:  
why the hell are we, the department, paying for full time trade union people 
to oppose what we’re trying to implement. [They are] not saying you can’t 
have any time to do union work, what they are saying is we’re not going to 
pay for it. So, really, saying to the unions, if you want these guys, you fund 
them you know, ’cause we’re not paying for them anymore. If I’m honest, and 
this might be me not being politically driven, I can see where maybe they 
came from: “We’re trying to bring in all these changes and these guys who 
are opposing us, we’re paying them”. I can get it really, but what I couldn’t 
get was that, obviously Unite couldn’t afford to pay for them people, or had 
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no desire to pay for them people, but what I couldn’t understand was why 
they never fought to keep them people, because even if it was just them 
saying “no fuck off, were not having that, you’re not attacking our reps” and 
then they’d lost I could have probably had more respect for them doing that. 
The fact [is] that they didn’t really do anything and never, even as a collective, 
all the unions never came out and, tried to say “no government you can’t do 
this”. I was disappointed with them, because I thought we acted on their 
behalf, some for 10 years, some for 20 years, and have tried to promote the 
union and when we have come under attack they haven’t really come out 
fighting for us.  
Another of the convenors (Con5) also explained that he felt the union could have 
used the facility time better. “You are aware that there is a bit of slack in the system 
and it’s hard to defend that. Could have tightened our belts and it bit us” whilst a 
different convenor (Con4) gave an account of a meeting he had attended where the 
union had been less than sympathetic: 
 we did raise with [an assistant General Secretary] at the top of the union to 
say look at these attacks on us, what can we do about it and her words, and 
her words were “welcome to the real world”. In other sectors they don’t enjoy 
all these full time reps, it’s the regional officers and stuff that pick up a lot of 
the work you do. And when you step back from your own environment and 
look then maybe you realise that we have enjoyed, you know, massive 
resources within our own organisation. I still don’t think that should have 
stopped the union from trying to protect the as is. Even if they knew they were 
going to lose they could have been seen to put up a good fight, but they didn’t 
to be fair, and I don’t know if that has come through in any of your other 
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interviews but it was frustrating for me really, and talking for people that aren’t 
here anymore, it was frustrating for them too. 
In summary, it can be argued that the effect of Whitley and the Employee Relations 
Review on structure and representation has been substantial. In terms of this study, 
it is possible to say that the evidence collected suggests that, of all the issues 
examined in this chapter, the review of facilities time has been the most significant 
development, in terms of change to the union’s representational structures in the 
MoD sector. 
As explained, the Whitley system of industrial relations is the cause of the 
centralised, if fragmented, nature of bargaining in the MoD and Civil service 
(Winchester, 1983). This has shaped the system of industrial relations, espoused 
by the civil service unions and which has led to an over reliance on national officials, 
both lay and full time and on a layer of senior shop stewards and convenors, with 
100% of their working day taken up by union work. Bargaining on anything of a 
significant nature, such as policy, pay and most terms and conditions, is carried out 
at a national level, with a servicing type model of representation, rather than an 
organising one.  
The ERR, which as mentioned before is often discussed by representatives as the 
facility time review, is intrinsically linked to the Whitley system. The sites with the 
more sophisticated stewards’ organisations, which tend to be the larger sites, felt 
the impact of the review more deeply than the smaller sites, where stewards 
operated on a less formal basis. All but a very few of those representatives that had 
been on 100% facility time have either left the MoD or have had their facility time 
reduced below 50%. This has had a devastating effect on the union’s ability to 
represent its members in the sector, due to the reliance on these representatives. 
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On those sites that have lost 100% convenors and stewards, the major impact has 
been that members are not able to access the support that they are used too. 
Members at these sites are used to having a full time convenor available to them 
when needed for representation at disciplinary and grievance hearings and the like, 
demonstrating a servicing model, as explained by Waddington and Whitson (1997), 
but with the convenors and full time lay representatives, taking the role of the full 
time officials. However, it is not just the members that have been affected. The shop 
stewards have also felt the impact of losing their 100% convenors. Due to the failure 
of the union to impart an organising model into the sector (Undy, 2008), these 
representatives have learnt to rely on the 100% convenors and senior stewards for 
sources of information, advice and guidance, and are now having to adapt to the 
new situation, of not having these resources so readily available.. 
Whilst not directly impacted by the removal of these representatives, the sites that 
have not traditionally enjoyed having 100% convenors have, nevertheless, been 
indirectly affected by the changes. Whilst the shop stewards at these sites have not 
noticed any major change, the convenors reported that they missed having the 
ability to contact the 100% convenors at the other sites, who often had more 
experience and were, therefore, a mine of information and advice. The removal of 
the 100% representatives, therefore, had a significant effect on the union’s ability to 
represent its members.  
The extent that the review affected representation and structure was not common 
across all sites. Those sites that were perceived to be militant and had poor 
industrial relations prior to the review appear to have been impacted more by the 
review. The research sites where industrial relations had been perceived to be 
reasonably harmonious prior to the review, with stewards developing bargaining 
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relationships with management, as discussed by Batstone et al (1977), carried on 
after the review as they had before it. However, it was acknowledged by some of 
the respondents that whilst they had been left alone, it was not expected to last. On 
the sites where industrial relations had been strained, it appears that management 
have used the review to move the frontier of control. Stewards on these sites 
explained that they felt under more scrutiny. 
External to the workplace, the respondents had also noted a number of changes, 
brought about by the review, in relation to representation and structure. The 
stripping out of lay representation at workplace level and nationally has the potential 
to have a major impact on the amount of engagement that takes place between the 
sector and the union’s full time officials. Traditionally, interaction between the shop 
stewards and the union full time officials has been low in the sector, particularly in 
terms of the regional officials, although this did differ between the sites. The 
changes, bought about by the review, therefore, have the potential to put a great 
deal of pressure onto an officer corps, which is not set up to cope. Regional officials, 
who until now have been used to the sector looking after itself, with full time lay 
representatives and sophisticated shop stewards organisations, will now find that 
they are being called on more often to represent members and give advice and 
guidance. However, as highlighted in this study, there are the tensions that already 
exist, with officers stating that they do not have the time to be able to organise the 
sector, whilst covering their other responsibilities. These were not new complaints. 
In the work of Kelly and Heery (1994), union full time officials are vocal about the 
burden that they feel is placed on them by high workloads. However, what differs in 
this particular case is that while the grievance and disciplinary work that they may 
pick up is not dissimilar to other sectors, there are other peculiarities that will be 
more challenging. 
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It was widely demonstrated that the response the union had made to the review was 
felt to be inadequate by the vast majority of the respondents. Some accepted that 
there may have been a little bit too much slack in the system prior to the review, with 
the facility time available to representatives sometimes not being fully utilised, and 
others felt that defeat had been inevitable due to the review being driven by the 
government, rather than by the department. Again, this appears to show the 
weaknesses in the system that Unite in the MoD utilised, with too much emphasis 
on the servicing of members by a hierarchical layer of senior full time 
representatives. Had the stewards been in a position to carry their members with 
them, as discussed by Goodman and Whittingham (1961), they may have been able 
to defend their facility time against the attacks levelled at them. However, even the 
more pessimistic of the respondents felt that the union had not done enough to fight 
the changes, with accusations that it had not been awake to the threat that it faced. 
Together, these changes to the union’s facilities have had an enormous effect on 
the way that the union is able to represent its members at work, with fewer 
representatives available at national and workplace level to look after the interests 
of the members. In terms of structures, these have been affected both in terms of 
the workplace and the wider union. In the workplace, steward organisation has been 
changed by the review. In addition to the removal of 100% facility time from those 
representatives that had it, workplace representation was effected in other ways. A 
number of the representatives that had previously had 100% facility time left the 
MoD, taking with them the knowledge and experience that they had gained. 
Therefore, workplace and shop stewards and members will need to turn to the 
union’s officers, particularly those in the regions for assistance, something that this 
study has demonstrated the union appears unprepared for. 
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What factors influence effective trade union representation? 
Having examined the four key sub questions that were posed in chapter five by 
analysing the findings from the semi-structured interviews with representatives, this 
section will now seek to explore the empirical evidence further, in order to address 
the overarching research question, namely what factors influence effective trade 
union representation? Previously, it has been argued that for representation to be 
deemed effective a number of prerequisites are necessary: the union must be 
recognised by the employer for a wide range of collective bargaining issues, 
including pay and conditions; the membership must be able to access shop 
stewards in their workplace and, where necessary, lay representatives outside of 
the workplace or full time union officials; there should be clear structures that 
indicate to members and union officials how the union should operate; and finally, 
and crucially, the union should able to further the interests of its members through 
joint regulation and legal enactment.   
In terms of recognition, whilst the government’s approach to the MoD unions has 
been hostile, demonstrated by the cutting of union facility time, the department has 
not moved to weaken or remove recognition and, in fact, still encourages new 
employees to join the union, as part of the new starters’ induction programme. 
However, the government has been imposing a cap on pay, at 1% every year since 
2011, which brings into question the union’s ability to truly bargain over pay. This is 
also in question, in reference to wider conditions of service. Whilst the unions are 
consulted on issues, as set down in the Whitely constitution (Annex A), the evidence 
gathered indicates that the shop stewards and convenors do not believe that this is 
meaningful, with the Employee Relations Review as an example of this. Here many 
of the participants saw this as a “done deal”, regardless of the consultation process 
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that took place. Therefore, whilst this prerequisite is partially met, there is evidence 
that it is being severely hampered by government policy and management decision-
making. 
In reference to the second prerequisite, members at all of the case study research 
sites did have access to workplace representatives. However, this had gone through 
significant change. Participants at all sites reported having fewer stewards than they 
had in the past and that is was becoming increasingly difficult to recruit new ones. 
In addition to this, the removal of facility time from shop stewards, particularly those 
with 100% time off, meant that, whilst members could access a representative, the 
time that the steward had to dedicate to union duties and responsibilities had been 
reduced. This meant that members cannot get the level of support to which they 
have been accustomed and highlights the Unite’s failure, in this sector, to implement 
an organising strategy. As facility time is (further) reduced, it may be expected that 
the slack will be picked up by the union’s full time officials. However, as discussed 
above, a number of respondents highlighted a severe lack of interaction with these 
full time officials.  
In terms of the National Officer, whilst interaction took place at a national level, 
between them, the convenors and the national representatives, there was very little 
interaction between the National Officer and local steward and members, with some 
sites reporting that they had not been visited by a National Officer for many years. 
The availability of regional officials varied from site to site, but usually this was at 
the behest of the convenors, some of whom did not wish for regional officials to be 
involved very much at all, whilst others were more accommodating toward them. 
However, a number of respondents stated that the self-sufficient nature of the sector 
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meant that officers had not been called upon very often in the past and this was 
something that was welcomed by some full time officials.  
However, the impact of the Employee Relations Review means that this may 
change. The reduction of facility time and the loss of a number of experienced 
representatives has meant that it is likely that the workload of officers will rise in 
terms of involvement with the MoD, adding to a capacity to work, which is, according 
to Kelly and Heery (1994), already close to being exhausted. It is unclear whether 
officers will be given the time and resources to organise the sector, in order to return 
it to self-sufficiency, in view of the financial constraints facing Unite, reflecting earlier 
research by Kelly and Heery (ibid), or whether a servicing model, characteristic of 
other sectors in the union, will continue to be used and entrenched. As outlined by 
Daniels (2009), the cost of organising, if done well, is relatively high and the size 
and low profile nature of the MoD sector has meant that it does not enjoy the same 
levels of financial support that some other sectors receive. Furthermore, while the 
ERR and privatisation of DSG are significant challenges, they have not been seen 
as worthy, for example, of a leverage campaign. Currently, the difficulty facing 
representatives is the reduction of facility time for lay representatives, a lack of 
knowledge among union officials (especially regional officers) about the MoD sector 
and the lack of clarity over these relationships post ERR.  
This leads onto consideration of third prerequisite, the necessity for clear and 
understandable structures, which indicate to the union’s members and officers how 
the union is meant to function. The data collected in this study has demonstrated 
that these structures exist; in terms of their being a rule book that sets out how the 
union should function and structures which should permit the functioning of them. 
However, the picture which emerges from the research is somewhat different. Whilst 
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some of the respondents were aware of how the union’s representational structures 
were supposed to work, there was a certain degree of criticism about how they 
actually worked. As discussed by Undy (2010) and by Kelly and Heery (1994), the 
outcome of the merger process can be that the bolting together of unions leads to 
problems arising from their dissimilar structures. The federal structures of the two 
unions that formed Unite, were not remarkably dissimilar, this structure after all 
being designed to make merger easier, as outlined by Waddington (1995) in the 
cases of earlier mergers. But, the large number of mergers that had taken place in 
a very small number of years, particularly in of the creation of Amicus, meant that 
these structures remained undeveloped ahead of the Unite merger.  
The vast majority of respondents did not feel that they had much, if any, ability to 
influence union policy. Participants felt that they were not listened too and that any 
attempt they made to change things would be stopped, if it was deemed to be out 
of step with the wishes of the union’s leadership, due to the previously discussed 
popular bossdom form of governance (Turner, 1962). The National Executive of the 
union was seen as under the power of the general secretary and the united left 
faction and whilst it had the power to hold the general secretary to account, it did 
not have the political will to do so. The industrial structures were seen as equally 
toothless. The RISCs were seen as talking shops, whilst the NISC came in for 
particular criticism from a number of respondents who found it to be inadequate and 
not fit for purpose. 
In addition, the size of the union was seen also by some respondents as a problem, 
in terms of its structure and ability to function. The union was viewed as having 
grown too big to function efficiently. The officers, who would have formally, in the 
engineering unions at least, been from a similar industrial background to the 
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stewards and members in the sector, are no longer so. An example of this is the 
present National Officer, having come from a background in education. This, linked 
to the size of the union and the problems that some respondents claimed they and 
the members had with identifying with a union as diverse as Unite, caused some to 
question what the union was for anymore. Some did not feel that the union was any 
longer a union for skilled workers. This was more of a concern amongst those who 
had been in Amicus prior to the merger than those from the TGWU, who in the main 
did not feel that the merger had changed anything a great deal, suggesting that the 
union’s structure, post-merger, had been modelled on that of the former TGWU. 
Finally, there is the key issue of whether the union is able to protect and further the 
interests of its members, through joint regulation and legal enactment. In terms of 
legal enactment Unite, in the MoD sector, is not in a strong position. The 
government, as can be seen from the Employee Relations Review, is hostile and 
the sector is not high profile, or large enough, to attract much in the way of support 
from the union’s leaders. Therefore, gaining support from the union, for campaigns 
seeking to reverse and change government policy is difficult. Had the sector been 
the size of the motor industry, in the case of Honda, or as high profile as British 
Airways, in the case of BASSA dispute, then it is likely that more funds and a larger 
media profile may have been made available. This was demonstrated by the 
National Lay representative, who gave this account of an Executive Council 
meeting:  
It (the ERR) was raised at the EC by Gail Cartmail (Assistant General 
Secretary) in her report. I spoke on what was happening and why it was 
important and was met with silence. Nobody contributed… I represent 13,000 
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members and sit next to someone with 150,000 members from motor 
components. The MoD is seen as the arse end of the union. 
In reference to joint regulation, the industrial relations framework is in place, but is 
not necessarily used correctly. Bargaining is often centralised, at a national level, 
and evidence is that this has become the case quite recently for all issues relating 
to conditions of service, with the centralisation of HR functions meaning that less 
negotiation or consultation takes place at the workplace level. This goes against the 
finding of Kelly and Heery (1994) and Brown et al (2003), that bargaining generally 
was being decentralised, demonstrating how the MoD, as part of the Civil Service, 
has differed from other sectors. The Whitley system ensures that negotiation and 
consultation should take place on the majority of issues that involve the pay and 
conditions of employees in the MoD. Therefore, if used correctly, the unions should 
be able to protect and further the interests of their members, successfully. However, 
as has been highlighted by this research, these procedures are not always followed 
by the management or the representatives and, in the case of unilateral 
management decision-making, the union representatives do not always feel in a 
strong enough position to force them to follow the rules. One convenor (Con3) stated 
in relation to this that:  
we had in place structures, the scaffolding of very good union organisation. 
Every MoD place has a commitment to Whitley. We didn’t have to go and win 
recognition deals, we were recognised. We didn’t have to win stewards’ 
facility time; it’s in the MoD manual. We didn’t have to win time off for 
conference, it’s there. It was all there, but we didn’t then populate it and fill it. 
I don’t think that has anything to do with the size of us in Unite. I think that 
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the internal politics within Unite probably didn’t help. I don’t think us being a 
small sector was the problem. I think it was a lack of organisation.  
Therefore, in respect of effective representation, it is argued the first three 
prerequisites must be met, in order for the fourth to occur successfully. Without 
recognition there can be no joint regulation and without access to workplace 
representatives, recognition is almost pointless. Even if there is access to union full 
time officials, recognition is relatively meaningless without a workplace shop 
steward, as with nobody ‘on the ground’; it is very difficult for unions to police the 
implementation and adherence to agreements, policies and procedures, as outlined 
by Goodman and Whittingham (1969). The third prerequisite is equally important, in 
terms of its relation to joint regulation and legal enactment. Without clear structures 
to indicate how the union should function, and to allow it to function, it would not be 
possible for members and workplace representatives to understand how they can 
influence the union in terms of policy and rules. As explained by Turner (1962), the 
government of the union is heavily influenced by the relationships between the 
members and the different representational levels. Therefore, in terms of legal 
enactment members would not understand how to make the union campaign on the 
issues that were important to them, as there would be no clear lines of 
representation between the policy making bodies of the union and the workplace. 
This is similar, in relation to joint regulation. Without clear structures, how can 
members and shop stewards further their interests, through bargaining, if they are 
not aware how they can move the issues that are important to them, onto the union’s 
bargaining agenda? 
In terms of the MoD sector, despite the hard efforts of a number of very committed 
union activists, representation does not appear to be effective. Whilst recognition 
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does not appear to be under threat, the way that unions are able to operate within 
the MoD has significantly changed, demonstrating the weaknesses of the union in 
the sector and highlighting a problem with recognition granted due to the extant 
industrial relations system, rather than being forced on the employer by a union that 
is able take sanctions, if required.  
The members’ ability to access union representatives has been seriously 
undermined by the reviewer, but in most cases membership levels are holding up. 
Members on smaller sites, which did not previously have full time convenors, will 
have felt the effect of the review less than those on sites which did. However, the 
review was deemed by all respondents to have had an effect and this will, therefore, 
impact, to some extent, on the members.  
In terms of access to full time officials, the autonomous and self-sufficient nature of 
workplace representation the sector meant that this had not traditionally been an 
issue of great importance to members in the MoD. However, the impact of the ERR 
is likely to be significant as the reduction of facility time could lead members and 
shop stewards to rely increasingly on full time officials, for support with issues that 
previously wouldn’t have been required. 
The third pre-requisite, clear structures determining the way the union functions are 
not present, based by the responses given by many of the participants. While many 
did not completely understand the structures, those that did stated that they did not 
feel that the structures were adhered to by Unite’s leaders. Respondents felt that 
‘Unite’ had become distant and lost its purpose, highlighting the belief that the union 
did not listen to its members and was no longer a union for skilled engineering 
workers. This degree of reification, identifying the union as an external and 
inaccessible body is a very worrying trend, which needs to addressed, if 
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representation in the sector is to be effective. 
As these first three pre-requisites have been deemed to have not been met, it follows 
that the union is failing to meet the fourth; namely being able to protect and further 
the interests of its members through joint regulation and legal enactment. In terms 
of legal enactment, the small size and limited influence of the sector hinders its 
representatives in securing the backing of the wider union, in order to financially 
back campaigns and organise a fight back against the issues that it faces. As 
discussed above, this is in sharp contrast to the higher profile and more influential 
parts of the union, such as BASSA and those areas dealing with Cross Rail and 
Honda, where high profile leverage campaigns have been pursued (Unite, 2015).  
In respect of joint regulation, the union is also failing. How can a union be said to be 
representing its members effectively, through joint regulation, if it is unable to protect 
the facilities of the representatives that are bargaining on its behalf? The 1% pay 
cap, imposed by the government with no meaningful attempt by the union to resist, 
has made pay negotiations null and void and whilst the Whitely negotiating 
machinery is in place, this is often being by-passed by a management that some 
respondents believe they are powerless to resist. Therefore, on the basis of this 
case study research, it is possible to argue strongly that union representation in the 
MoD sector of Unite is not effective.  
Summary. 
In summary, this chapter has presented the findings from the field work that was 
carried out as part of this thesis. It began with a discussion of the research sample, 
identifying a number of the key characteristics of respondents. This included the 
time that they have been Unite members and activists and way that they perceived 
their role and duties. The chapter then moved on to address the four sub questions 
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that had been developed from the review of literature, before attempting to 
synthesise the analysis of these themes to address the overarching research 
question, namely: what factors influence effective trade union representation? 
Throughout the chapter the attempts have been made to link what has been found 
to some of the key literature discussed in the first five chapters. The following 
chapter will now conclude the thesis by providing an overview of what has been 
covered during this project, highlighting the key findings and explaining the 
importance of this research, as an exploratory study, and how it may influence future 
projects. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions. 
Based on a case study of the MoD and Government Establishments industrial sector 
of the trade union Unite, this thesis has explored the factors that influence effective 
trade union representation. This has been done through an inductive study, which 
has explored this question through four research themes: the levels at which 
representation occurs within the sector and interactions between union 
representatives; the impact of the Unite merger upon representation; the effects of 
privatisation and structural change, pursued through HRM, on representation; and 
the constraints of the Whitley industrial relations system and impact of the Employee 
Relations review upon union representation. This chapter will, therefore, draw some 
conclusions from the research conducted around these themes and assess the 
central issue of effective union representation. Following from the analysis of the 
case study findings, the chapter will then seek to explain how this research makes 
a contribution to knowledge in this area of the industrial relations field and, finally, 
will outline what future research could be pursued, following to this study’s 
exploratory approach.  
Whilst chapter seven, laid out the research findings, chapters two through to five 
reviewed the key literature and explained the context in which the research was set 
to take place. Chapter two provided a foundation for the thesis, explaining the key 
developments that had impacted trade unions in the UK since 1979. These 
developments were analysed, using the available literature, to explain how they had 
affected the unions’ structure, internal government, democracy, and representation, 
whilst highlighting issues surrounding a lack of robust contemporary research.  
This led on to chapter three, which was concerned with explaining the complexities 
of studying a union as large and complicated as Unite. This chapter gave a detailed 
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account of the histories of the main unions that had been ‘bolted together’ 
(Waddington, 2005) in 2007, to form Unite. After this, the chapter then examined 
Unite, explaining the union’s key policies and how these do not easily relate to the 
actual industrial relations conducted in many sectors of the union.  
The fourth chapter then looked at the MoD sector of Unite, which would form the 
basis for the case study research. This chapter examined how the union is 
structured within the MoD sector, explaining what the key issues are for the sector, 
such as the government’s privatisation policies and the recent Employee Relations 
Review, which, respectively, have led to large numbers of job losses and have had 
dramatic effects on union representation. Chapter five then provided an in-depth 
discussion of union representation, examining the relationships between full time 
officials and lay union representatives and the related these of the key arguments 
in terms of the literature examined in the preceding chapters, again highlighting gaps 
in the relevant academic literature. The chapter ended by developing a number of 
relevant research questions that were to be the focus of the fieldwork research. 
Chapter six outlined the methodological approach taken and justifications for using 
an inductive qualitative approach. This began with an explanation of the choice of 
an inductive rather than deductive research methodology and why a theoretical 
framework had not been developed. Following this, there was a discussion of the 
research design, justifying the reasons for using case studies and elite, semi-
structured interviews, including an explanation of the researcher’s background in 
the MoD and of the proposed research sites. The second part of the chapter dealt 
with the actual fieldwork research process, explaining the way that the research was 
carried out, including a discussion of the ethical considerations and some of the 
unexpected issues that were encountered. 
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As discussed in chapter six, with the exception of a small number of unexpected 
access issues, the research phase of this project went smoothly, producing results 
that it is argued are robust in terms of their reliability and validity. The background 
of the researcher was evaluated as a positive attribute, as his knowledge of the 
sector allowed him to probe deeply into representation issues and avoid bias, whilst 
in reference to the project’s validity, the design of the research allowed the 
researcher in-depth access the knowledge and experiences of the people 
participating in the study. Reliability of case study research, as explained in chapter 
six, can vary. It is not expected that results could necessarily be replicated, due the 
‘snap shot’ nature of this type of research. However, the findings of this research do 
reveal a number of important themes which can be used to explain contemporary 
phenomena and could be invaluable in reference to research around the Trade 
Union Reform Bill, presently being taken through parliament (Hoque and Bacon, 
2015:3).  
Unite, formed in 2007, is the largest union in the UK, with a membership of over two 
million at its creation. The MoD sector of Unite is one of the smallest industrial 
sections of the union, and it operates in this sector, covering industrial grades, as a 
minority union. However, it is also an important sector in relation to the work it 
undertakes maintaining the armed forces equipment, its work is carried out at a 
range of sites dispersed across the country, it appears to be well organised, 
particularly in representing skilled engineering workers, and its industrial relations is 
strongly shaped by the traditions of the Whitley system at a time when dramatic 
structural change and privatisation are being pursued by management. These 
factors make it a highly interesting part of the union to research. 
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This research has demonstrated that the Whitley system has a huge effect on the 
level that representation takes place and the interactions that take place between 
representatives. Representation does takes place at different levels. However, 
reflecting the traditions of Whitley, even after the fragmentation of civil service 
industrial relations, issues of pay, terms and conditions and policy are confined to 
national level bargaining, whilst workplace representation is limited to the direct 
representation of members, in situations such as grievance and disciplinary 
hearings. What is different in this context, is the extent to which successful attempts 
to extend collective bargaining at site level over piece rates had been lost as 
management shifted the ‘frontier of control’ (Goodrich, 1920) and returned 
workplace industrial relations to the Whitely traditions of limited consultation and 
individual representation, limiting the role of local stewards. This analysis has shown 
some of the gaps that exist between the traditional literature and the realities of the 
workplace. The traditional literature, whilst still relevant in many ways, is limited in 
others. Whilst the majority of union members are now found in the public sector, the 
most robust research into union representation and structure, is dated and located 
almost entirely in the private sector (Turner 1962, Batstone et al, 1977, Darlington, 
1994, Clegg, 1976). Therefore, notwithstanding the industrial manual work 
conducted by Unite members in this sector, the structure and scope of 
representation rather reflects the legacy public sector Whitley traditions and points 
to a ranges of gaps in an increasingly fragmented industrial relations literature, 
notably in relation to how representation is shaped by the organisation, and how this 
in turn impacts upon the union’s structures.  
The second theme explored in this study, was the effect that Unite merger had on 
representation at the sites being researched, and the extent to which representation 
is shaped by trade union structure and governance and how this, in turn impacts 
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upon representation within an organisation. The findings indicate that the merger 
had indeed effected representation, but mainly at a national level rather than 
regional or workplace, again mainly due to the Whitley system, but also due to the 
traditions within the MoD sites that led to memberships, going into the merger, being 
predominantly Amicus, with a small number of TGWU dominated workplaces and 
national branches. In terms of the existing literature the merger was deemed to be 
a consolidatory one on the lines of a balanced partner amalgamation. However, the 
structures that had emerged from this were perceived by respondents to be 
dominated by the former TGWU, whilst becoming more remote from its members, 
due to its structures and perceptions of a ‘popular bossdom’ form of governance.  
The existing literature on union structure, governance and mergers and 
amalgamations appear to address the merger and its impact on representation more 
robustly, notably in relation to the type of merger (Undy, 2010), forms of union 
governance (Turner, 1962), and the sense of loss of identity (Undy, 2010) 
particularly for skilled workers in a form of conglomerate union. However, the 
research does also highlight some gaps, with the sheer scale and complicated 
structure of Unite making it difficult to apply uniform concepts of union structure and 
governance and difficult to attribute uniform concepts of union strategy (organising, 
partnership and servicing) to a union of so many parts (Thelen, 1991). Furthermore, 
this research, by looking at union’s own representation structures external to the 
workplace, has also highlighted the apparent weaknesses of the very structures 
introduced at a regional and national level RISCs and NISCs to provide democratic 
methods for representatives to influence or develop policy. By doing this it identifies 
the need for a return to much more detailed research on how factions operate within 
unions and their relationship to structure and democracy.  
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The third theme explored in the thesis was the effect of structural change within, 
and government policy toward, the MoD sector on union representation. Highlighting 
the privatisation of the Defence Support Group, which was taking place at the time 
of the fieldwork, the research found that this was perceived to have both positive 
and negative effects on representation. Some respondents reported that the fear of 
losing their jobs had made members less likely to take action to protect their pay 
and conditions, whilst other interviewees saw the sale as an opportunity to improve 
terms and conditions due to the senior management not wanting adverse publicity 
during the sale process. The sale process also, reportedly, improved the 
relationships between union representatives. The drive to apply private sector 
methods in the MoD sector, supported by a shift to an increasingly unitary HRM 
approach by management, is occurring at a time of reductions to the numbers and 
quality of workplace representatives and a hardening of management attitudes 
towards the union. The introduction of HRM, over the more paternalistic personnel 
management, had further centralised industrial relations, with some of the 
workplaces researched  having their personnel/HRM departments moved to other 
sites. These processes highlighted the weaknesses of existing Whitley 
arrangements, facilitating further shifts in the frontier of control and further reducing 
the role and influence of stewards and extending this to convenors. Some 
respondents reported that it had become more difficult to recruit shop stewards, 
whilst others stated that there had been a lowering in the quality of representatives, 
due to the reduction in localised industrial relations and from a reliance by the shop 
stewards and members on the convenors. 
This research therefore, provides greater insight into the erosion of shop stewards 
within workplaces, providing a qualitative and detailed analysis to help explain the 
trends increasingly reported only through quantitative analysis, notably through the 
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WIRS and WERS surveys. In particular, it explains how representatives in the MoD 
sector, even while trying to adopt a leadership role (Batstone et al, 1977) are 
hampered from building strong workplace organisation capable of mobilising 
members through the structures of Whitley with its promotion of partnership working. 
A key finding to emerge in respect of this, was how the privatisation process was 
perceived by the representatives to offer the chance to re-establish Whitley and 
improve partnership based relationships, not to mobilise members.   
Linked to the third question, the fourth and final theme was the effect of Whitley and, 
in particular, the impact of the Employee Relations Review (ERR), which had 
significantly reduced the facilities that were available to union representatives. The 
research showed that it was the review of facilities, above all the other issues 
investigated, that had impacted the most on representation in the research sites. 
Whilst not universal to all sites, the key theme to emerge was that the review had 
led to a reduction in the availability of representation. The review removed almost 
all of the representatives on 100% facility time on which the Whitley system was 
built, meaning that members and representatives on those sites that had previously 
enjoyed full time convenors and senior stewards suddenly found that this support 
was no longer available. In addition, those sites that had not had full time workplace 
representatives found that the advice and guidance, that they previously relied on 
from the 100% representatives at other sites, was no longer available. The problems 
encountered by the union demonstrated that the union had failed to introduce an 
organising model to the sector, despite claiming to be an organising union. Instead, 
Unite in the MoD, had depended on a layer of full time lay representatives to service 
its members in the workplace and was unprepared to deal with the situation when 
these representatives had their facility time cut. 
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Bought together, these four themes, allowed the principle research question about 
the factors which influenced effective representation to be addressed. This pulled 
the research together to explain how the data collected could be used to answer this 
question, applying a number of pre-requisites that were shown to be essential for 
representation to be truly effective. These pre-requisites included recognition by 
employers; access to representatives in the workplace and full time officials outside; 
clear structures that indicate to members, activists and officers how the union should 
function and, finally, the key issue of the extent that the union can further the 
interests of its members through joint regulation and legal enactment. These four 
prerequisites were not met. Whilst recognition existed, this was based on the needs 
of the Whitley system and not due to the threat of sanction by the union, 
demonstrated by the way that facility time was so easily removed. Members had 
access to shop stewards, but this had been seriously hampered by the ERR and it 
was yet to be seen if the union’s full time officials would be able to fill the gap. Thirdly, 
clear structures, explaining how the union was meant to function, were not apparent; 
with respondents believing that the union had become distant and had lost its 
purpose. The union was also failing in respect to the fourth and final pre- requisite, 
with the sector not large or influential enough to attract any significant assistant from 
the wider union in terms of support, such as leverage campaigns and the union’s 
ability to use joint regulation, was seriously undermined by government policy and 
the outcome of the ERR. On the basis of this evidence, it was, therefore, possible 
to strongly argue that union representation in the MoD sector is not effective.  
As discussed, this inductive research was always designed to be exploratory due to 
the perceived weaknesses in the contemporary research into trade union structures, 
governance and representation. Therefore, whilst uncovering and explaining a 
number of very interesting issues, in terms of trade union representation in an under 
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researched area, the research was never intended to address the lack of theoretical 
work that is needed to bridge the gap between seminal, but increasingly dated, 
research on structure and representation, and the more contemporary research, 
focusing on union renewal strategies and merger. Instead the focus of this research 
has been to highlight and explain how the literature that exists does not link together 
in any meaningful way, with the contemporary research into merger and renewal 
being written in isolation, with no significant attempts made to link these ideas with 
the vitally important issues of trade union structure and representation.  
Therefore, this thesis has highlighted a greater awareness of the complexities of the 
super or conglomerate union, that have emerged as a response to the decline that 
trade unions have experienced since the beginning of the 1980s and the necessity 
of a re-categorisation of union structure and governance, to update the work of 
Turner (1962). In addition, it has also demonstrated that more detailed work is 
required on the operation of factions within unions and how, in particular, this relates 
to the operation of democracy for members and activists, as whilst this has been 
analysed in the past (Daniels and McIlroy, 2009, Bray and Davies, 1982), it is in 
need of more detailed appreciation. 
Also raised by this study is the extent that industrial relations traditions continue to 
exert influence over union representational structures and approaches. This is 
particularly important given the rather dichotomous debates around organising and 
partnership, but also in relation to understanding public sector industrial relations. 
The contemporary relevance of this research is the dramatic impact of the cuts in 
facility time that have been demonstrated, alongside the government’s privatisation 
policies. This provides crucial evidence of the difficulties that unions will face, now 
that the Trade Union Act 2016 has been passed into law, in terms of the attacks that 
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have taken place on facility time in the civil service.. Whilst the headline grabbing 
proposals surrounding the Trade Union Reform Bill, were primarily focused upon 
the further restrictions that will be placed on industrial action, the Act also includes 
a number of proposals that will impose limits on union facility time across the public 
sector, reflecting the view of the Conservative government, that there are too many 
union representatives in the public sector. This includes the necessity for public 
sector employers to publish details of the paid time off that workplace 
representatives are given to carry out union activities and reserve powers given to 
government ministers to limit the amount of paid time off that union representatives 
may have as a proportion of their working hours (Hoque and Bacon: 2015:5). This 
demonstrates the timely nature of this research and the findings of this research are 
important reading for anyone attempting to discuss the Act and its possible 
repercussions. 
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DEFENCE WHITLEY COUNCIL CONSTITUTION  
  
Aims  
  
1.  The general aims of the Council are to promote effective 
communication and the involvement of the representatives of the 
Departmentally recognised NonIndustrial Trade Unions, and to secure 
continuous improvement in efficiency coupled with the well-being of 
MoD civilians.  
  
Scope  
  
2.  The scope of the Council will be all matters affecting the conditions 
of service of all UK-based non-industrial civil servants employed in the 
MoD, except those concerning pay, allowances and related conditions 
of service which are more appropriately dealt with under the auspices 
of the DWC sub-committees.   
  
Meetings  
  
3.  The following arrangements for meetings will apply:  
  
• the Council shall normally meet twice a year, in April and 
October;  
  
• the meeting in October shall be the annual meeting, at 
which the membership and constitution of the committee shall 
be ratified for a further year;    
  
• meetings are to be held during working hours, by 
arrangement with the Management Representatives;  
  
• accommodation for holding these meetings will be 
provided by the Management Representatives;  
  
• an agenda shall be circulated to all members not less than 
seven days before the date fixed for a meeting of the Council;  
  
• business not on the agenda shall be taken only by 
permission of the Management and TU Chairs.;  
  
• special meetings of the Council may be held at the request 
of the Management or TU Chair to discuss specific items; and  
  
• the Council shall draw up such standing orders and rules 
for the conduct of its business as it may deem necessary.  
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Committees  
  
4.  The Council may appoint standing committees, special committees, 
and subcommittees as required, and may delegate special powers to 
any committee so constituted, and may appoint to them, persons who 
need not necessarily be members of the Council.  
  
  
Membership  
  
5.  Management Representatives.  
  
• PUS         Chair  
• Personnel Director  
• Director General Civilian Personnel  
• Director Employment Framework  
• Deputy Director EF Employee Relations            
 Secretary TLBH/Agency/other representatives co-opted 
as necessary    
  
6.  Trade Union Representatives;  
  
• MoD CCSU                                                 TU Chair  
• MoD CCSU                                                              
 TU  Secretary  
• FDA  
• Prospect   
• Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS)  
  
7. Electorate.   Where a TU has members both outside and inside 
the MoD, the electorate shall be the MoD members, who will choose as 
their representative any member or official of the TU who is employed 
in the MOD or is a HQ officer of the TU. Elections will be the 
responsibility of the TUs concerned.     
  
8. Varying representatives.  Each Party can vary their 
representatives and fill casual vacancies in the same manner as the 
original appointments. If a member is unable to attend a meeting, he or 
she may be represented by an accredited deputy.  
  
9. Facility Time.  Attendance at Council meetings will form part of 
a TU representative’s facility time claim.  
  
10. Period of Appointment.  At each annual meeting, a Council 
shall be appointed to serve until the close of the annual meeting in the 
following year.  
  
11. Quorum.  The quorum shall be one half of the members of each 
side of the Council.  
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Formal Disagreements  
  
12. In the event of disagreement on a question that falls within the terms 
of reference of ACAS, it shall, if the authority concerned so decides, be 
remitted to them. Fixed machinery is not created to deal with those 
questions on which agreement may not be arrived at and which are 
outside ACAS’s terms of reference, as its existence would necessarily 
impair the influence and authority of the Council. Such questions shall 
be dealt with individually as they arise. The Council may seek the advice 
of the National Whitley Council in cases of difficulty.  
  
Minutes  
  
13. The Council shall keep minutes of its proceedings, which shall be 
agreed and published.  
  
Amendment of the Constitution  
  
14. The constitution of the Council may be amended only at an annual 
meeting. Notice of amendment of the constitution must be given and 
circulated to the members of the Council at least 14 days before the 
meeting.  
  
TLB/TF/Agency Non-Industrial Whitley Committees  
  
15. The Council shall have power to establish TLB/Agency non-
industrial committees, to ratify the constitution for each committee so 
established, and if necessary to disband such committees. The 
departmental administration of such committees shall be in accordance 
with such arrangements as may be determined by the Council.   
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DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL WHITLEY COUNCIL CONSTITUTION  
  
Aims  
  
1.  The general aims of the Council are to promote effective 
communication and the involvement of the representatives of the 
Departmentally recognised Industrial Trades Unions, and to secure 
continuous improvement in efficiency coupled with the well-being of 
MoD civilians.  
  
Scope  
  
2.  The scope of the Council will be all matters affecting the conditions 
of service of all UK-based industrial civil servants employed in the MoD, 
except those concerning pay, allowances and related conditions of 
service which are more appropriately dealt with under the auspices of 
the MoD Industrial Pay Committee and its sub-committees.  
  
Meetings  
  
3.  The following arrangements for meetings will apply:  
  
• the Council shall normally meet three times a year, in 
February, June, and October;  
  
• the meeting in October shall be the annual meeting, at 
which the membership and constitution of the committee shall be 
ratified for a further year;  
  
• meetings are to be held during working hours, by 
arrangement with the Management Representatives;  
  
• accommodation for holding these meetings will be 
provided by the Management Representatives;  
  
• an agenda shall be circulated to all members not less than 
seven days before the date fixed for a meeting of the Council;  
  
• business not on the agenda shall be taken only by 
permission of the Management and TU Chairs;  
  
• special meetings of the Council may be held at the request 
of the Management or TU Chair to discuss specific items; and  
  
• the Council may draw up such standing orders and roles 
for conduct of its business as it may deem necessary.   
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Committees  
  
4.  The Council may appoint standing committees, special committees, 
and subcommittees as required, and may delegate special powers to 
any committee so constituted, and may appoint to them, persons who 
need not necessarily be members of the Council. The reports of all 
committees shall be submitted to the Council for confirmation.  
  
Membership  
  
5.  Management Representatives.  
  
• US of S                                                                               Chair  
• Director General Civilian Personnel   
• Director HR Ops  
• Deputy Director HR Ops Diversity  Employee Relations    
Secretary  
• TLBH/Agency/other representatives co-opted as 
necessary  
  
  6.Trade Union Representatives.  
  
• TU Chair  
• TU Secretary  
• Amicus  
• GMB  
• Transport and General Workers Union (T&G)  
• Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UCATT)  
  
7. Electorate. Where a TU has members both outside and inside 
the MoD, the electorate shall be the MoD, who will choose as their 
representative any member or official of the TU who is employed in the 
MoD or a full time officer of the TU. Elections will be the responsibility 
of the TU concerned. It will be open, with the permission of the Council, 
for a national or local representative of any constituent body, other than 
a member of the Council, to attend a meeting in a consultative capacity.   
  
8. Varying Representatives.  Each Party can vary their 
representatives and fill casual vacancies in the same manner as the 
original appointments. If a member is unable to attend a meeting, he or 
she may be represented by an accredited deputy.   
  
9. Facility Time.  Attendance at Council meetings will form part of 
a representative’s facility time claim.  
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10. Period of Appointment.  At each annual meeting a Council shall 
be appointed to serve until the close of the annual meeting in the 
following year.  
  
11. Quorum.  The quorum shall be one half of the members of each 
side of the Council.  
  
Formal Disagreements  
  
12. In the event of disagreement on a question that falls within the terms 
of reference of ACAS, it shall, if the authority concerned so decides, be 
remitted to them. Fixed machinery is not created to deal with those 
questions on which agreement may not be arrived at and which are 
outside ACAS’s terms of reference, as its existence would necessarily 
impair the influence and authority of the Council. Such questions shall 
be dealt with individually as they arise. The Council may seek the advice 
of the National Whitley Council in cases of difficulty.  
  
Minutes  
  
13. The Council shall keep minutes of its proceedings, which shall be 
agreed and published.  
  
  
Amendment of the Constitution  
  
14. The constitution of the Council may be amended only at an annual 
meeting. Notice of amendment of the constitution must be given and 
circulated to the members of the Council at least 14 days before the 
meeting.  
  
TLB/Agency Industrial Whitley Committees  
  
15. The Council shall have power to establish TLB/Agency industrial 
committees and to ratify the constitution for each committee so 
established, and if necessary to disband such committees. The 
departmental administration of such committees shall be in accordance 
with such arrangements as may be determined by the Council.    
  
Model Constitution for all Whitley Committees  
  
      [ Enter the name of the Committee as shown in paragraph 1 below] 
Constitution  
  
Name  
  
1.  The name of the Committee is the [  enter the name of the area covered by 
the Whitley, the level of the committee, and whether it is Non-Industrial, Industrial or 
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Combined Non-Industrial. The various levels of Whitleys below Departmental level 
are:  TLBH, Defence Agency, HLBH and Local] Whitley Committee.  
  
Aims  
  
2.  The aims of the committee are to promote effective communication 
and the involvement of the representatives of the Departmentally 
recognised Trade Unions (TUs), and to secure continuous improvement 
in efficiency coupled with the wellbeing of MoD civilians employed within 
the  [  enter the name of the area covered by the  
Whitley  ].       
  
Scope  
  
[For a TLB, Defence Agency or HLB Whitley use the following paragraph:]  
  
3.  The scope of the Committee will be all matters peculiarly affecting 
the [Enter the type of staff covered by the Whitley, e.g. Non-Industrial, Industrial or 
Non-Industrial and Industrial] staff employed in the [Enter the name of the area 
covered by the Whitley] which are not essentially appropriate to the [ Enter 
either the “Defence Whitley Council” or the “Defence Industrial Whitley Council” as 
appropriate] or its Standing Committees, but which are wider in scope 
than can adequately be dealt with at [ For a TLB or Defence Agency insert 
“HLB” or “Local”; for an HLB Whitley insert “Local”] level. It is, however, 
expressly debarred from discussing questions that involve:  
  
• the formulation of departmental policy, negotiations, in 
respect of pay and pay related matters, or superannuation – 
these are discussed through the relevant negotiating 
machinery. The Committee may, however, discuss local pay 
related issues such as RRA, HSP and local productivity bonus 
payments. It should be noted however, that approval for 
payment of RRAs can only be given by the TLB, following the 
relevant consultation procedures;  
  
• the suitability of individuals for promotion or advancement; 
and  
  
• disciplinary action taken against individuals – unless the 
TU Representatives wish to represent that Departmental policy 
has been violated.  
  
• grievance of a personal nature  
  
  
  
  
[For a Local Whitley use the following paragraph]  
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4.  The scope of the Committee shall comprise all matters peculiarly 
affecting the local conditions of service of the [Enter the type of staff covered 
by the Whitley, e.g. NonIndustrial, Industrial or Non-Industrial and Industrial] 
staff employed in the [Enter the name of the area covered by the Whitley]. It is, 
however, expressly debarred from discussing questions that involve:  
  
• the formulation of departmental policy, negotiations, in 
respect of pay and pay related matters, or superannuation – 
these are discussed through the relevant negotiating 
machinery. The Committee may, however, discuss local pay 
related issues such as RRA, HSP and local productivity bonus 
payments. It should be noted however, that approval for 
payment of RRAs can only be given by the TLB, following the 
relevant consultation procedure;  
  
• the suitability of individuals for promotion or advancement;  
  
• disciplinary action taken against individuals – unless the 
TU Representatives wish to represent that Departmental policy 
has been violated; and  
  
• issues of more than purely local interest and which affect 
MOD staff outside the management unit (such as matters are 
discussed at HLB, Agency, TLB or Departmental levels).  
  
Meetings  
  
5.  The following arrangements for meetings will apply:  
  
• the Committee shall meet at the request of either Party, 
but normally not less frequently than [Enter “twice yearly” for TLB, 
HLB and Agency Whitleys, and  
“quarterly” for Local Whitleys];  
  
• meetings are to be held during working hours, by 
arrangement with the Management Representatives;  
  
• accommodation for holding these meetings will be 
provided by the Management Representatives;  
  
• an agenda shall be circulated to all members not less than 
seven days before the date fixed for each meeting;  
  
• business not on the agenda shall only be taken by 
permission of the Chair and TU Chair;  
  
• special or extraordinary meetings of the Committee may 
be held at the request of the Chair or TU Chair to discuss 
specific items; and  
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• the Committee shall draw up such standing orders and 
rules for the conduct of its business as it may deem necessary.    
Sub-Committees  
  
7.  The Committee may appoint sub-committees as required, and may 
delegate special powers to any sub-committee so appointed.  
  
Membership  
  
8.  The Committee shall consist of [Enter a figure] Management 
Representatives (including the Management Secretary) appointed by 
the Chair and up to [Enter a figure] TU Representatives as follows;  
  
Management Representatives  
  
• Chair                                           [Enter post title]  
• Members                                    [Enter post title]  
• Joint Secretary                           [Enter post title]  
  
TU Representatives  
  
The TU representatives will include a TU Chair appointed by the [Enter  
the “Council of Civil Service Unions” or “Defence Industrial Whitley Council” as 
appropriate] and a TU Secretary appointed in accordance with the 
procedures laid down for appointment of such posts and 
representatives from each TU appointed by the respective TUs as 
follows:  
  
[For Non-Industrial and combined Non-Industrial/Industrial Whitleys the following 
apply:]  
  
• FDA   
• Prospect  
• Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS)  
  
[For Industrial and combined Non-Industrial/Industrial Whitleys the following 
apply:]   
  
• Amicus  
• GMB  
• Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU)  
• Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UCATT)  
  
[Insert numbers of representatives against each TU. Insert “(where available)” 
against those TUs who currently have no representatives available.]  
  
The TU-Chair and Joint TU Secretary will be elected by the Parties of 
the Constituent Unions.   
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9. Chair and TU-Chair. The Chair of the Committee shall be the 
[Enter the title of the Head of the management unit]. The TU-Chair shall be a TU 
Representative of the Committee. Where either of these officers is 
unable to attend, it is for them to nominate a deputy to attend in their 
place.  
  
10. Secretaries. The Management Secretary and TU Secretary shall 
act as Joint Secretaries to the Committee.   
  
11. TU Representation. TU representatives of the Committee 
should be MoD employees, who serve as accredited representatives of 
their TU, not as individuals. The composition of the TU representation 
is a matter for the respective TUs to decide upon and may include 
members of their Executive Committee and National HQ officers. 
However, it is accepted that, wherever possible, the TU 
Representatives will be selected from within the service of the  
TLB/HLB/Agency/local unit concerned.   
  
12. Selection of TU Representatives. The method of selecting 
members for appointment as TU representatives will be a matter for 
decision by each TU. Members of the TUs concerned shall not be 
allowed to take part in the election of representatives for other than their 
own TU.    
  
13. Varying Representatives. It shall be open to each party of the 
Committee to vary their representatives and to fill casual vacancies in 
the same manner as the original appointments. In the event of a 
member being unable to attend a meeting of the Committee, they may 
be represented by an accredited deputy.  
  
14. Additional Representatives. Either Party of the Committee 
shall, as occasion may require, arrange for the addition to the 
Committee of a representative or representatives appointed by either 
party of the [ Enter either the “Defence Whitley Council” or the “Defence Industrial 
Whitley Council” or both as appropriate].  
  
15. Facility Time.  Attendance at Whitley Committee meetings 
should form part of a TU representative’s facility time claim.  
  
16. Period of Appointment. Representatives shall be appointed for 
a period of 12 months, after which they are eligible for re-election.   
  
17. Co-option. If, in any item included in the Agenda of a meeting, it 
would be desirable that a person having particular knowledge of the 
subject attends in a consultative capacity, the Chair or the TU-Chair, 
after consultation with the other, may invite the person to be present, 
provided that such person is present only for the period during which 
the a particular question is being discussed in the Committee.  
 335 
 
  
18. Quorum. The quorum shall be one half of the members of each 
party of the Committee.  
  
Formal Disagreements  
  
19. In the event of disagreement between the two parties, the 
responsibility for a decision rests with the Chair who, where appropriate, 
shall seek the advice (or, where necessary covering approval) of higher 
authority. The TU Representative, or any constituent member of the TU 
Representation, may raise any matter at the appropriate level through 
their own channels. A formal disagreement shall be duly recorded and 
reported, in accordance with the procedures laid down in the  
Policy Statement: Employee Relations and Understand and Operate the 
MOD Whitley System.  
  
Minutes  
  
20. Minutes shall be kept of the proceedings of the Committee. The 
Management Secretary is responsible for producing the minutes, which 
should be agreed with the TU Secretary, and then ratified and signed 
by the Chair and TU-Chair.   
  
21. One copy of the minutes of the TLB Non-Industrial Whitley 
Committee should be sent to the MoD CCSU Secretary and the 
Corporate ER team. One copy of the minutes of the TLB Industrial 
Whitley Committee should be sent to the DIWC TU Secretary and the 
Corporate ER team. Copies of HLB and Local Whitley  
Committees should be sent to the respective Joint Secretaries of the 
TLB NonIndustrial/Industrial Whitley Committees. Minutes of these 
Whitley Committees should only be copied to the Secretary CCSU/TU 
Secretary (as appropriate) and the Corporate ER team where a formal 
disagreement has been recorded.   
  
22. All minutes should clearly reflect, in the heading, the full title of 
the Committee to which the minutes relate.  
  
Amendment of the Constitution  
  
23. The constitution of the Committee may only be amended by 
agreement. Notice of proposed amendment of the constitution must be 
given and circulated to the members of the Committee at least 21 days 
before the meeting. Copies of the draft agreed amended constitution 
shall then be referred to the Joint Secretaries of the  
[Enter either the “Defence Whitley Council” or the “Defence Industrial Whitley Council” 
or both as appropriate for the TLB and Trading Fund Whitleys or the TLB Non-
Industrial Whitley Council or TLB Industrial Whitley Council or both as appropriate for 
all other Whitley Councils in their area..] for agreement of the Council, whose 
authority on constitutional matters shall be final.  
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Disbandment  
  
24. If either Party feels for any reason that the Committee should cease 
to function, such a proposal should be referred to the Joint Secretaries 
of the [Enter either the  
“Defence Whitley Council” or the “Defence Industrial Whitley Council” or both as 
appropriate for TLB and Trading Fund Whitleys or the TLB Non-Industrial Whitley 
Council or TLB Industrial Whitley Council or both as appropriate for all other Whitley 
Councils in their area] for the consideration and agreement of the Council, 
whose authority shall be final.  
  
Signed…………………………………………………………………..  
(Chair)                                                              (Vice-
Chair)   
Date ………………………………………..  
  
Date approved by Management and TU Secretariats   
  
Reference:                                                                 
 SITE SUPPORT SERVICES COMMITTEE CONSTITUTION  
  
  
[Enter the name of the Committee as shown in paragraph 1 below] Constitution  
  
Name  
  
1.  The name of the Committee is the [Enter the name of the area 
covered] Support Services Committee.  
  
Aims  
  
2.  The general aim of the Committee is to provide a forum for discussion 
of Support Services issues which cover more than one Top Level 
Budget area or Agency within [Enter the name of the area covered by 
the Committee]  
  
Scope  
  
3. The scope of the Committee will cover general Support Services 
affecting the whole site (e.g. accommodation, catering, cleaning, car 
parking, state of roads, energy efficiency etc).  
  
4. The Committee is not to discus those issues relating to 
employees or groups of employees that are more appropriate to 
properly constituted Whitley Committees.   
  
Meetings  
  
5.  The following arrangements for meetings will apply:  
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• the Committee shall meet at the request of either Party, 
but normally not less frequently than [Enter “quarterly” or the 
period agreed with the TUs];  
  
• the meeting in [Enter the month] shall be the Annual 
General Meeting.   
  
• meetings are to be held during working hours, by 
arrangement with the Management Representatives;  
  
• accommodation for holding these meetings will be 
provided by the Management Representatives;  
  
• an agenda shall be circulated to all members not less than 
seven days before the date fixed for each meeting;  
  
• business not on the agenda shall only be taken by 
permission of the Chair and TU-Chair;  
  
• special or extraordinary meetings of the Committee may 
be held at the request of the Chair and TU-Chair to discuss 
specific items; and  
  
• the Committee shall draw up such standing orders and 
rules for conduct of its business as it may deem necessary.  
  
  
  
Sub-Committees  
  
6.  The Committee may appoint sub-committees as required, and may 
delegate special powers to any sub-committee as appointed.  
  
Membership  
  
7.  The Management and TU Chairs will agree on the formation of the 
committee within the following guidelines:  
  
Management Representatives  
  
• Chair                                   [Enter post title]  
• Members                             [Enter post title]   
• Secretary                      [Enter post title]  
  
TU Representatives  
  
• TU Chair  
• TU Secretary  
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Representatives from each TU as follows:  
  
• FDA (if available)  
• Prospect  
• Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) • Amicus  
• GMB.  
• Transport and General Workers Union (T&G)  
• Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UCATT)   
  
The TU Chair and TU Secretary will be elected by the parties of the 
Constituent Unions.  
  
Additional representatives can be called as required.   
  
8. Chair and TU-Chair.  The Chair of the Committee shall be the 
[Enter the title of the senior official with the responsibility for the 
provision of support services]. The TU-Chair shall be a member of the 
TU Representatives of the Committee. Where either of these officers is 
unable to attend, it is for them to nominate a deputy to attend in their 
place.   
  
9. Secretaries. Each part of the Committee shall appoint a 
Secretary from among its number. These officers shall act as joint 
secretaries to the Committee.  
  
10. TU Representatives. TU representatives of the Committee shall 
be MoD employees of one of the TLBs occupying the site and shall be 
elected representatives of their TU.  
  
11. Selection of TU Representatives. The TU composition is a 
matter for the TU Representatives to decide. Members of the TUs 
concerned shall not be allowed to take part in the election of 
representatives for other than their own TU.  
  
12. Varying Representatives. Each party can vary their 
representatives and fill casual vacancies in the same manner as the 
original appointments. If a member is unable to attend a meeting, he or 
she may be represented by an accredited deputy appointed by the 
authority concerned.  
  
13. Facility Time. Attendance at Support Services Committee 
meetings will form part of a representative’s TU facility time claim.  
  
14. Period of Appointment. Representatives shall be appointed for 
a period of 12 months, after which they are eligible for re-election. The 
first Committee shall be appointed to serve until the close of the annual 
meeting [Enter the month used in paragraph 5]. Thereafter, at each 
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annual meeting a Committee shall be appointed or elected to serve until 
the close of the annual meeting in the following year.  
  
15. Co-option. If, in any item included in the Agenda of a meeting, it 
would be desirable that a person having particular knowledge of the 
subject attends in a consultative capacity, the Management Chair or TU 
Chair, after consultation with the other, may invite the person to be 
present, provided that such person is present only for the period during 
which the particular question is being discussed in the Committee.  
  
16. Contractors. Where Support Services are provided by a 
contractor, a representative of the company should attend in an ex-
officio capacity.  
  
17. Quorum. The quorum shall be one half of the members of each 
part of the committee.  
  
Formal Disagreements  
  
18. In the event of disagreement between the two Parties, the 
responsibility for decision shall rest with the Chair who, where 
appropriate, shall seek the advice (or, where necessary, covering 
approval) of higher authority. The TU Representation, or any constituent 
member of the TU Representation, may raise any matter at the 
appropriate level through their own channels. A formal disagreement 
shall be duly recorded and reported, in accordance with the procedures 
laid down the Employee Relations Policy, Rules and Guidance, 
Operating the MoD Whitley System.  
  
Minutes  
  
19. Minutes shall be kept of the committees proceedings. The 
Management Secretary is responsible for producing the minutes, which 
should be agreed with the TU Secretary, and then ratified and signed 
by the Management and TU Chairs. Copies of the minutes should be 
sent to the Management and TU Secretaries of the TLB Non-
Industrial/Industrial Whitley Committees. Minutes of these Whitley 
Committees should only be copied to the Secretary CCSU/TU 
Secretary (as appropriate) and the Corporate ER Team where a formal 
disagreement has been recorded.  
  
20. All minutes should clearly reflect, in the heading, the full title of 
the Committee to which the minutes relate.  
  
Amendment of the Constitution  
  
21. The constitution of the Committee may only be amended at an 
annual general meeting. Notice of proposed amendment of the 
constitution must be given and circulated to the members of the 
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Committee at least 21 days before the meeting. Copies of the agreed 
draft amended constitution shall then be referred to the Secretaries of 
the [Enter either the “TLB Non-Industrial Whitley Council” or the “TLB 
Industrial Council” or enter both if it is a combined Non-
Industrial/Industrial Committee] for agreement of the Council.  
  
  
Disbandment  
  
23. If either Party feels for any reason that the Committee should cease 
to function, such a proposal should be referred to the Secretaries of the 
[Enter either the “TLB  Non-Industrial Whitley Council” or the “TLB 
Industrial Whitley Council” or enter both if it is a combined Non-
Industrial/Industrial Committee] for the consideration and agreement of 
the Council.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Signed…………………………………………..                  
……………………….  
           (Chair)                                                                   (TU-Chair)  
  
  
Date  ……………………………………………  
  
Date approved by Management and TU Secretariats   
  
Reference.  
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Employee Relations Policy 
This Policy should be read in conjunction with the related Process and both must be followed. 
Overview 
1. This policy concerns the MOD's approach to Employee Relations. It covers the Whitley System, TU 
Engagement (incl. Consultation Arrangements), MOD recognised Trade Unions (TUs) and Staff 
Associations, Facilities for TU representatives (including Facility Time), and Industrial Action. 
2. A clearly defined framework for engagement (incl. consultation and information sharing) and negotiation 
between managers and employees must be in place for a good ER system to work well. MOD's policy is to 
seek to maintain good employee relations through active/early engagement and the Whitley System. 
Consultation and negotiation, with a view to reaching agreement between the MOD and TUs is the 
cornerstone of this policy and is based on full co-operation, at all levels, between management and 
employees. 
3. This covers all types of contact between management and the TUs, and highlights the benefits and 
importance of active and early engagement (incl. meaningful consultation). Central to this policy is the 
principle that management and the TUs meet with a genuine desire to reach agreement. 
Applies to 
4. This policy applies to all civilian employees - including casual and fixed term appointees, except the 
following categories: 
 Staff on personal contracts;  
 Former MOD employees, pensioners and dependants;  
 Prospective employees;  
 Fee Earners and contractors;  
 Locally Employed Civilians;  
 Employees in those Trading Funds or Agencies where the TUs have agreed seperate ER procedures;  
 RFA (refer to Employee Relations - RFA). 
Management Responsibility 
5. As a manager you are responsible for promoting good employee relations within your area of 
responsibility, and for active and early engagement with employees and their representatives, including 
recognised TUs (refer to Understand and Operate the Trade Union Engagement Process). 
6. ENGAGEMENT - Involves an ongoing mutually beneficial relationship between the Department and its 
recognised TUs. The main ways you can communicate with the TUs about changes in the workplace which 
affect civilian staff are: 
 INFORMING - essentially the sharing of information to facilitate meaningful engagement and 
understanding. The provision of such information may be the precursor to consultation;  
 CONSULTING - giving the TUs an opportunity to represent the views of their members and submit 
alternative proposals before final decisions are taken, with a view to reaching agreement;  
 NEGOTIATING - holding a discussion with the TUs aimed at reaching an agreement, such as the 
proposals for changing pay or conditions of service. 
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Employee Relations Framework 
7. The Human Resources Directorate (HRD) Employee Relations (ER) Team is responsible for developing - 
in consultation with stakeholders - setting and communicating MOD's ER policy and for supporting its 
implementation throughout the organisation. 
8. Three non-industrial trade unions (NITUs); FDA; Prospect; and PCS, and three industrial TUs (ITUs); 
Unite, GMB and UCATT; collectively form the MOD Civil Service Unions (MCSU). The role of the MCSU 
is to promote, maintain and encourage an effective ER link to the Department's recognised TUs. The position 
of MCSU Chair is elected by the recognised TUs. The remaining established MCSU posts are open to non-
industrial employees through the Departmental selection process. 
9. The Retired Officer's Association (ROA) is the Trade Union which represents Retired Officers. It is not a 
member of the MCSU and has limited recognition in the MOD. 
10. The Defence Police Federation and the Chief Police Officer's Association are Staff Associations and 
represent MOD police. They are not members of the MCSU. 
11. Additionally, TLBs fund established posts to act as the TLBs TU focal point for ER/TU matters. These 
are the TLB level MCSU Secretaries. 
Refer to Employee Relations - Key Contacts and Addresses for the NITUs, ITUs, Departmental and TLB 
MCSU Secretaries details. 
Trade Union Recognition 
12. Recognition, in line with Civil Service rules, may be granted nationally or Departmentally (e.g. in the 
MOD certain TUs and Staff Associations are recognised as representing specific grades). Departmental 
recognition is usually for a grade limited to one Department and allows for representation and negotiation 
within that Department solely on issues within their control. You can find a table listing the grades and their 
associated MOD recognised TU or Staff Association in Employee Relations - Recognised Trade Unions 
and Staff Associations. MOD negotiates with these TUs on pay, conditions of service, etc., for the 
employees they represent. 
13. Any TU is free to make representations on behalf of its members. However, an unrecognised TU (that is, 
a TU not listed in Employee Relations - Recognised Trade Unions and Staff Associations has no right of 
a reply, beyond an acknowledgement, to any general representation it makes. You must not enter into 
agreements with, or offer explanation or justifications to an unrecognised TU. 
14. Only the HRD Employee Relations Team can recognise or derecognise a TU on behalf of the MOD. You 
must refer any claims for recognition to them, for consideration. 
Trade Union Membership 
15. As a civilian employee you are encouraged to join an appropriate TU and to play an active part within it, 
making sure that your views are represented. It is your personal decision whether or not you join a TU. The 
existence of fully representative TUs is important both for managing good employee relations and for 
negotiating pay and conditions of service. 
16. While you can join any TU and be represented on a personal basis, only TUs recognised by the 
Department may formally represent staff in the grades for which they have recognition in negotiations with 
the MOD. However, you can choose an official from any TU to accompany you at a disciplinary or 
grievance hearing, regardless of whether or not the TU is recognised. 
17. If you are employed in the HR function or one of the MCSU Secretariat established posts, you may be a 
fully involved member of a TU, but should not be active on Branch Committees without specific exemption 
in writing from your Head of the Management Unit. This is to avoid a conflict between your loyalties to the 
Department and to your TU. Wherever you work, you must not disclose information to the TUs which you 
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receive in your official capacity and which is "in confidence" or classified. If you are in a HR post and want 
to take a more active part in TU affairs then you may request a transfer to other duties. 
18. If you are a member of the MOD Police you cannot become a member of any TU or similar association 
or society other than an association formed within the MDP with rules approved by, or on behalf of the 
Defence Council (see Employee Relations - Recognised Trade Unions and Staff Associations). However, 
if you are already a member of a TU or similar association or society on recruitment, you may, with the 
consent of the Chief Constable, continue to be a member of that organisation in order to receive any benefits 
to which you would be entitled. 
Impact Assessment Statement 
This policy has undergone an Equality and Diversity impact assessment in accordance with the Departmental 
Policy. This resulted in a: 
Part 1 screening only completed (no direct discrimination or adverse impact identified/policy is a reflection 
of statutory requirements and has been cleared by a Legal Advisor). This policy is due for review in 2014. 
Version 
Version: 2.0 
Effective Date: 1 July 2013 
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Trade union facility time  
  
Introduction  
  
On 3 October 2011, the Minister for the Cabinet Office announced that the Government would be 
starting formal consultation on reforming facility time arrangements across the Civil Service. This 
consultation document marks the start of that process.  
  
  
  
What is facility time and what facilities are currently allowed?  
  
Facility time is paid time off during working hours for trade union representatives to carry out 
trade union duties and time off for representatives and members to undertake trade union 
activities. The Government recognises that unions can play a constructive role in a modern 
workplace contributing to the effective and efficient operation of public services.  
  
Many union representatives give their own time in addition to any facility time, to support their 
colleagues both individually and collectively through the industrial relations machinery. Where 
this operates well it serves the interest both of the union members and the employer well.  
  
We are seeking to find a balance between supporting constructive engagement with employee 
representatives for the good of public services and providing better value for the taxpayer.   
  
  
1. Duties  
  
Facility time may include pre-approved paid time off to complete a range of trade union duties 
and relevant training as set out in legislation (see Annex A).  Trade union duties are employee 
relations duties that are carried out by trade union representatives on behalf of their members. 
These duties are generally employee facing. Examples of duties in Civil Service departments and 
agencies include:    
  
General representative duties such as preparation for and engaging in annual pay 
negotiations; discussing issues that affect members such as redundancies and policy changes; and 
representing a staff member at a disciplinary or grievance hearing.   
  
Learning representative duties such as identifying and promoting learning opportunities, 
supporting members on learning programmes and working with other learning providers and 
sources of advice and support, for example, local further education colleges, charities.   
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Health and safety representative duties such as examining with employers the causes of 
accidents to reduce future risks and dangers, investigating complaints and making representation 
to the employer on behalf of staff.  
  
  
  
  
  
2. Activities    
  
Facility time may also include time off for representatives and members of a trade union to take 
part in union activities and activities where the employee is acting as a representative of the 
union.  Activities are generally union facing.  Employers are required by law (see Annex A) to 
allow reasonable unpaid time-off for activities. However, some employers across the Civil 
Service are currently providing paid time off.   
  
Examples in the Civil Service would include paid time off for attending internal union meetings, 
elections to trade union branches and committees and attending TUC conferences.  
  
3. Facilities   
  
There is no statutory right for Civil Servants to be granted the use of facilities, except where those 
trade union representatives are engaged in matters relating to the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) (TUPE).  However ACAS guidance says that employers should where 
possible make available facilities necessary for representatives to perform their duties efficiently 
and effectively.    
  
Examples of use of facilities in the Civil Service would include the use of telephones, photocopying 
and the use of office accommodation.  
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The consultation  
  
What are we consulting on?   
  
We are seeking to review and rebalance the amount of paid time off provided to undertake trade 
union duties, and to review the level, frequency and cost of providing paid time off for trade 
union activities.  This consultation covers all types of trade union representatives but does not 
seek to change the statutory basis for these duties and activities. We also wish to review the use 
of facilities by trade union representatives e.g. telephones, photocopying and use of office 
accommodation, to ensure it is appropriate and represents value for money for the taxpayer.  
  
  
We are not seeking to change the nature of the duties or activities that can be undertaken by 
trade union representatives.  Likewise we recognise trade union safety representatives have 
separate legal rights to paid time off based on the necessity to undertake the functions associated 
with that role and the right to reasonable paid time off during working hours for trade union 
learning representatives to undertake a number of related duties where the union complies with 
certain legal requirements.   However we believe that in future Departments will need to consider 
carefully their current arrangements for these representatives alongside other representatives 
ensuring that time off is reasonable, necessary, and appropriate for a modern workplace.   
  
  
We are seeking views on four key areas:  
  
1) Reporting and benchmarking - developing a common system for reporting and 
monitoring Facility time across the Civil Service;   
2) Ending or limiting the practice of 100% of Civil Service employees’ time being spent on 
trade union duties and activities;   
3) Reviewing arrangements for time off for trade union activities so that the default is that 
this time is unpaid; and  
4) Reduction in overall facility time across the Civil Service, in particular through more 
rigorous individual management of facility time. Ensuring that the provision of the use of 
facilities is appropriate, and represents good value to the taxpayer.  
  
  
Why are we consulting?   
  
There are at least 6,800 trade union representatives across the Civil Service. At a time when 
departmental budgets are under great pressure  we need to ensure the current provisions for 
trade unions facility time represent the best value for money. With annual estimated expenditure 
of £36 million we need to ensure that these arrangements align with the significant Civil Service 
wide workforce and business restructuring.   
  
Providing value for money is critical in all areas of business and this includes spending on facility 
time.  We have to ensure that the time we pay for Civil Service trade union representatives to 
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spend on their trade union duties and activities is appropriate, accountable and that the value is 
identifiable within a reformed and modernised Civil Service.    
  
However it is not just the responsibility of the Civil Service to justify how taxpayers’ money is best 
and most efficiently spent.  It is important that trade unions are able to do the same and are able 
to illustrate the same level of responsibility and care in how public money is used and spent and 
the value that they provide as a result.   
  
There are differences in the provision of facility time across the Civil Service that may not be 
justified.  We want to ensure a more consistent, open and transparent approach in future.      
  
The formal consultation is between the Civil Service and its trade unions, and will run for 8 weeks 
from Friday 13 July to Friday 7 September.  Civil servants have also been invited to comment if 
they wish to do so.   
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What we are setting out to achieve?  
  
Proposal 1 – Reporting and Benchmarking  
  
Effective reporting and monitoring of facility time already takes place in several departments.  
Where this is happening there are common themes:  
  
 Line managers having responsibility for agreeing and approving the use of facility time 
and ensuring records are kept and the time monitored.  
 Representatives having a mandatory requirement to complete a record of the facility 
time they take and to provide this to their line manager with non-compliance being a 
disciplinary offence.    
 Regular and effective monitoring and sharing of the information between the 
representative, line manager, Department and Union branches.     
  
Departmental Good Practice Examples of facility time reporting methods:  
  
Department A: The line manager is responsible for agreeing and approving the use of facility  
time within the allocation made to the trade union representative. The line manager must ensure that time records 
are kept, as well as monitoring the amount of facility time taken and the activities  
it is taken for. The trade union representative will provide the line manager with the necessary  
information to monitor their facility time appropriately. This will then be passed onto the union  
branch. Monthly returns of facility time used, both of allocated and additional time, are made to  
Employee Relations by union branches. The return also includes H&S, Union Learning Representatives and training 
time taken.   
  
Department B: Ongoing completion of a facility time form is a mandatory requirement i.e. as soon  
as time off has been taken. It should be readily available if required by a line manager or ER managers. Non 
compliance with this mandatory requirement may lead to disciplinary action being  
taken. Managers with direct responsibility for trade union representatives are responsible for  
checking the ‘TU Rep Accreditation Notice and Record of Paid Time Off Taken’ form on an ongoing basis to ensure 
compliance. Monitoring of time is also carried out on a monthly basis in a central point locally and reported to 
national management quarterly.  
  
Using these themes as a starting point we envisage the use of a common system of reporting and 
benchmarking which will include the percentage of pay bill costs across the Civil Service.  This will 
enable departments and trade unions to measure and rationalise the time and money they 
spend.    
  
 We intend to introduce:  
 a common reporting mechanism for departments, and the requirement for 
departments to publish details of facility time.   a Civil Service benchmark 
on the proportion of pay bill spent on facility time   benchmarking of the 
amount of time spent on specific duties, to make sure that the money spent 
on trade union duties is appropriate to the needs of the duty and to the 
organisation so as to ensure that this is best value for money. The various 
duties should be separated out for reporting purposes – e.g. individual 
representation, industrial relations and negotiations.  
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Q1.  How should we establish this approach? Are there any other approaches that 
you can suggest?   
  
2 
 
Limiting 100% facility time Representatives  
  
There are approximately 250 trade union representatives across the Civil Service who spend 100% 
of their time on trade union duties and activities.   These individuals are employed by and paid for 
wholly by the Civil Service.  There is generally no departmental limit on how long a trade union 
representative can spend in a 100% facility time post.   
  
We believe for a trade union representative to function effectively and be able adequately to 
represent the views of employees, it is necessary for them to be actively involved in the work of 
their department or agency. Representatives currently in receipt of 100% facility time do not 
benefit from business skills that would be acquired from carrying out a Civil Service role. Equally, 
they are not delivering their primary function, that of an employee delivering a Civil Service job.   
  
Departments have demonstrated that they can successfully operate with low numbers of 100% 
representatives. Best practice therefore shows that a sizeable number of 100% representatives 
are not necessary and that in some instances consideration is already being given to operating 
without, or at least with considerably fewer, 100% representatives.    
  
We would prefer that no employee spends less than 50% of their time delivering 
their Civil Service job.   
   
In seeking to limit the practice of 100% of Civil Service employees’ time being spent on trade 
union duties and activities, employers need to be aware of and consider the possibility of 
employees with more than one trade union representative role.  An employee may not be 
spending any of their time undertaking Civil Service work through a combination of general trade 
union duties and specific health and safety and/or learning representative roles.  This employee 
effectively becomes a 100% representative. For those representatives with more than one role, 
they will need to prioritise accordingly rather than seek additional time.   
  
Q2. How can we best establish this practice? Are there any other approaches to 
address this issue that you can suggest?  
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Reviewing Paid Time off for Activities  
  
The legal requirement for trade union activities is that an employer should allow reasonable 
unpaid time off.  Most Civil Service employers are going beyond this requirement and the 
recommendations within the ACAS Code of Practice by allowing paid time off for internal trade 
union activities.    
  
We recognise and support the legal requirement to allow reasonable time off to undertake trade 
union activities.  The proposal is that the default position for Civil Service employers should be 
that paid time off is not granted for trade union activities.  However we accept that there may 
circumstances where paid time off for activities may be appropriate and wish to consult on a 
reasonable mechanism for deciding this.   
  
Alongside this we propose to develop a rigorous checking regime to support Departments and 
managers to differentiate between time off for duties and for activities.    
  
We intend that the default position should be that departments do not pay for time 
off for trade union activities.   
  
We intend that we will develop and introduce a rigorous checking regime to 
support departments to differentiate between time off for duties and activities?   
  
Q3. How can we best introduce this approach? Are there any other approaches that 
you can suggest?   
  
  
  
  
  
  
4 
 
Reduction in overall facility time and ensuring appropriate use of 
facilities  
across the Civil Service  
  
There are at least 6800 trade union representatives across the Civil Service. The spend per year is 
approximately £36 million on facility time in gross staff costs. This is on average 0.26% of the pay 
bill cost across the Civil Service.     
  
Whilst the provision of paid time off needs to be reasonable in accordance with the legal 
requirements it also needs to be adequate but not excessive, properly monitored and accounted 
for.      
  
Alongside proposals 1 – 3 we intend to consider how we can reduce overall facility time through 
rigorous line management so that the balance can be struck between reasonable paid time off 
and business needs and ensuring best value for money.    
  
Employers should deal with requests rigorously and representatives should demonstrate requests 
are reasonable and proportionate.     
  
We wish to ensure that the use of facilities e.g. telephones, photocopying and use of office 
accommodation, is appropriate and represents value for money for the taxpayer.  
  
We propose that employers should operate rigorous management of facility time at line 
management level so that the balance can be struck between reasonable paid time off and 
business needs and ensuring best value for money. Likewise representatives should manage their 
time and prioritise to ensure that requests for paid time off are realistic and proportionate.    
  
In order to provide a common basis for this rigorous process we propose to develop support and 
information for both line managers and representatives on the management of facility time.   
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We intend to introduce a more rigorous management of facility time and facilities at 
a line manager level.    
  
Q.4.  How can we support line managers and trade union representatives to make 
sure that the provision of, and use of, facility time and facilities gives the best 
value for money and meets business needs?   
  
Q.5.  What mechanisms can we implement to ensure the most effective use of 
facility time and facilities?  
  
  
 
Conclusion  
  
We propose to set out a framework for Civil Service employers to use to manage the preapproved 
amount of facility time that departments offer to trade union representatives. The framework will 
meet the statutory requirements and take account of the ACAS Code of Practice.  
  
The parameters will be set with a view to better balancing the provision of paid facility time with 
the operational and financial needs of the business.  
  
  
  
Next Steps  
  
Cabinet Office invites your views on the specific proposals and questions outlined in this 
document. Following the outcome of this consultation we will then ask departments and agencies 
to review their own facility time arrangements accordingly.   
     
  
 
  
ANNEX A  
  
  
What is facility time?  
  
Facility time is the provision of time off from an individual’s usual job to undertake trade union 
duties and activities.  Civil Service departments and agencies generally have facility time 
agreements in place between themselves and their recognised trade unions which specify the 
arrangements for the taking of facility time.   
  
The duties that facility time can be granted for will include matters such as representing 
individuals e.g. at grievance hearings; collective bargaining and representing the views of staff to 
management e.g. terms and conditions, redundancies; training e.g. examining, promoting and 
arranging training; and the undertaking of functions related to Health and Safety.     
  
  
Legal background and provision of paid and unpaid time  
  
Since the Employment Protection Act 1975, union representatives of an independent trade union 
which is recognised by the employer have had a statutory right to paid time off from employment 
to carry out trade union duties.   Union representatives and members of an independent trade 
union which is recognised by the employer have also had a statutory right to reasonable unpaid 
time off when taking part in trade union activities.   
  
The relevant rights are now contained in the trade union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992 (TULRA), Employment Relations Act 1999; and The Safety Representatives and Safety 
Committees Regulations 1977; and are supported by the ACAS Code of Practice on ‘Time off for 
trade union duties and activities’; and the HSE Code of Practice on ‘Consulting employees on 
health and safety.’  
  
  
Trade union duties   
  
Section 10 Employment Relations Act 1999 and sections 168 and 169 TULRA provide the right to 
reasonable paid time off during working hours for the purpose of carrying out trade union duties.  
These include:  
 negotiating terms and conditions of employment;  accompanying or representing a trade 
union member at a disciplinary or grievance hearing;  accompanying trade union  
  
 
members to meetings to discuss flexible working requests;  negotiating issues about trade 
union membership; or  
 discussing issues that affect trade union members such as redundancies and policy changes.  
     
Trade union activities  
  
Section 170 TULRA entitles members and representatives of the union to take reasonable time off 
during working hours to take part in any trade union activity and any activity in relation to which 
the employee is acting as a representative of the union.   
  
There is no statutory entitlement to be paid for time off for trade union activities. The ACAS Code 
of Practice states that employers may nevertheless want to consider payment in certain 
circumstances, for example to ensure that workplace meetings are fully representative or to 
ensure that employees have access to services provided by Union Learning Representatives.  
  
  
Safety Representatives  
  
We recognise Safety Representatives have a different statutory right to paid time off based on 
necessity to undertake the functions associated with that role.    
     
  
Union Learning Representatives  
  
Sections 168A and 169 TULRA provide that where the union complies with the requirements in 
section 168A, there is a right to reasonable paid time off during working hours for Union Learning 
Representatives to undertake a number of related duties.  
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Annex D 
 
Respondent Identification Table. 
 
 
  
  
 
Annex D 
The Sample. 
Post Code Location 
Convenor Con1 Bovington 
Convenor Con2 Catterick 
Convenor Con3 Donnington 
Convenor Con4 LS Donnington 
Convenor Con5 Sealand 
Convenor Con6 Stafford 
Convenor Con7 Stirling 
Convenor Con8 Warminster 
Shop Steward B1 Bovington 
Shop Steward B2 Bovington 
Shop Steward B3 Bovington 
Shop Steward B4 Bovington 
Shop Steward C1 Catterick 
Shop Steward C2 Catterick 
Shop Steward D1 Donnington 
Shop Steward D2 Donnington 
Shop Steward D3 Donnington 
Shop Steward D4 Donnington 
Shop Steward D5 Donnington 
Shop Steward D6 Donnington 
Shop Steward LS1 LS Donnington 
Shop Steward LS2 LS Donnington 
Shop Steward S1 Stafford 
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Research Ethics. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Hanks 
PhD researcher 
Institute for Social Sciences  
c/o Keele Management School  
Keele University 
Keele, ST5 5BG 
05/11/13 
 
 
Invitation to participate in a research project on UNITE 
 
Dear Mr Richards, 
 
My name is Andrew Hanks and I am currently working towards a PhD in Industrial Relations 
at Keele University. My project is entitled ‘Unite- Union Structures and Representation: A case 
study of the Ministry of Defence’ and my aim is to understand the perceptions of trade union 
officials and activists who are members of, or are connected too, the union’s MoD and 
Government Departments sector. 
 
I am writing to you as you are a Union activist within UNITE to ask if you would be willing to 
help me with my research by sharing your views and experiences via an interview. Your 
agreement to do so would be invaluable in helping to inform my work. 
 
I have attached an information sheet which will hopefully address any questions which you 
may have about the research.  You are under no obligation to take part. However, your help 
in the project would be greatly appreciated.  Any personal information which you provide 
will be treated as confidential and anything you do say will be anonymised to protect you in 
all but the most exceptional of circumstances. 
 
If you have any further queries then please contact me either by post at the address above, 
or via email (a.j.hanks@keele.ac.uk).  I hope that you are interested in the project and look 
forward to hearing from you soon. 
 
Yours fraternally, 
 
 
 
Andrew Hanks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Information Sheet  
Study Title: Unite - Union Structures and Representation: A case study of the Ministry 
of Defence. 
 
Aims of the Research 
The aim of this project is to assess the effects of trade union merger and public sector 
restructuring on the structures, governance and representational arrangements of Unite. 
 
Invitation 
You are being invited to consider taking part in the research study “Unite- union Structures 
and Representation: A case study of the Ministry of Defence”. This project is being 
undertaken by Andrew Hanks as part of his doctoral studies at Keele University, supervised 
by Dr Steve French. 
 
Before you decide whether or not you wish to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read this 
information carefully and discuss it with colleagues if you wish. Please do not hesitate to 
contact me if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more information (e-mail 
a.j.hanks@keele.ac.uk; tel. 07968 337518). 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen to take part in this research project because of your involvement, 
either as an officer or activist, in Unite’s MoD and Government Departments sector. Your 
experiences will provide a great deal of insight into the workings of Unite and the way that 
merger and organisational change have altered the union’s structures and representational 
capacities. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to take part or not.  If you do decide to take part 
you will be asked to sign two consent forms, one is for you to keep and the other is for my 
records. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving reasons.  
 
What will happen if I take part? 
If you agree to take part you will agreeing to an interview which should take up to 90 minutes 
to complete. Any comments will be treated in the strictest of confidence and you will have 
the opportunity to preserve your anonymity. 
 
If I take part, what do I have to do? 
If you take part you will be asked to sign a consent form before the interview commences. 
The interview will allow you to express your views and opinions on how merger and 
organisational restructuring have changed the structures of Unite. 
 
You will be free to stop the interview at any time should you be called to more pressing 
matters or simply wish the interview to cease. The venue of interview will be flexible and 
will be arranged to provide you with the maximum convenience based on your working 
arrangements. 
  
 
 
What are the risks of taking part? 
You will be given the option of maintaining your anonymity when you participate in the 
research. This means that when the research is presented it will be impossible to link your 
views to your identity. If you agree to waive your right to anonymity, any publication of the 
research could link your views to your name and position within the Civil Service or UNITE.    
.    
 
How will information about me be used? 
During the interview the researcher will take notes (and if consent is given record the 
interview) and your answers may inform the PhD’s findings and any subsequent publication 
based upon the PhD. 
 
Who will have access to information about me? 
 The data collected for this study will only be accessed by the 
researcher, Andrew Hanks, and his supervisor, Dr Steve 
French. 
 Information on you will be kept confidential and anonymous. 
This means that the researcher will protect your identity as a 
participant by ensuring that you remain unidentifiable in the 
research.  As stated above, the only people who will have 
access to the personal information you discuss in this study, is 
Andrew Hanks and his supervisor Dr Stephen French. As such, 
all personal information obtained will remain confidential.  When 
discussed in the research you will be given a pseudonym (a 
false name) so that you remain unidentifiable.  
 In accordance with Keele University guidelines, the data from 
this study will be retained and securely stored by the principal 
investigator – Andrew Hanks until completion of the PhD.  After 
this period of storage, the data will be securely destroyed.  
 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
This research is independent and has no third party funding other than Keele University. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may wish to speak to the 
researcher who will do their best to answer your questions.  You should contact Andrew 
Hanks on a.j.hanks@keele.ac.uk. 
 
Alternatively, you may wish to contact the researcher’s supervisor Dr Steve French whose 
contact details are as follows: 
 
Dr Steve French 
Senior Lecturer in Industrial Relations  
Keele Management School 
Keele University 
ST5 5BG 
United Kingdom 
Tel 01782  733609 
E-mail:  s.r.french@keele.ac.uk.  
 
  
 
If you remain unhappy about the research and/or wish to raise a complaint about any aspect 
of the way that you have been approached or treated during the course of the study please 
write to Nicola Leighton who is the University’s contact for complaints regarding research 
at the following address:- 
 
Nicola Leighton 
Research Governance Officer 
Research & Enterprise Services 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University  
ST5 5BG 
E-mail: n.leighton@uso.keele.ac.uk 
Tel: 01782 733306 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Pre-Interview Consent Form 
 
Title of Project:  Unite- Union Structures and Representation: A case study of the Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator:  
Andrew Hanks,  
Keele Management School, Darwin Building,  
Keele University,  
Staffordshire, ST5 5BG 
Tel: 07968 337518 
E-mail: a.j.hanks@keele.ac.uk  
 
Please tick box if you agree with the statement 
 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
□ 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time. 
 
□ 
3 I agree to take part in this study. 
 
 
□ 
4 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be annonymised 
before it is submitted for publication □ 
 I understand that data collected about me during this study will not be annonymised 
before it is submitted for publication 
  
□ 
5 I agree to the interview being recorded. 
□ 
  
 
 
 
Name of participant 
                 
 
Date 
               
 
Signature 
 
 
Name of researcher                                                                      
                 
 
Date                               
               
 
Signature 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Post-Interview Consent Form  
 
 
 
Title of Project:  Unite- Union Structures and Representation: A case study of the Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator:  
Andrew Hanks,  
Keele Management School,  
Darwin Building,  
Keele University,  
Staffordshire, ST5 5BG 
 
Tel: 07968 337518 
E-mail:a.j.hanks@keele.ac.uk    
 
Please tick these boxes if you  agree with the following statements: 
 
1 I understand that data collected about me during this study will be annonymised 
before it is submitted for publication □ 
 I understand that data collected about me during this study will not be annonymised 
before it is submitted for publication 
  
□ 
2 I agree for any comments I make to be quoted in any subsequent publication of the 
study’s findings. □ 
 
_______________________ 
Name of participant 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
 
________________________  
Researcher 
 
 
___________________ 
Date 
 
 
_____________________ 
Signature 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Indicative questions. 
 
 
1. How long have you been a member of Unite and its predecessor unions? 
 
 
2. What position do you hold within unite? 
 
 
3. How long have you been a union rep/officer? 
 
 
4. How did you become a union rep/officer? 
 
 
5. Were you a lay rep before becoming an officer? (for officers only) 
 
 
6. How do you see your role within the union? 
 
 
7. What are your main duties and responsibilities? 
 
 
8. What interactions do you have with rank and file members? 
 
 
9. What interactions do you have with full time officials? (Lay reps only) 
 
 
10. What interactions do you have with Lay representatives? (Officers only) 
 
 
11. What interactions do you have with other lay representatives? (lay reps only) 
 
 
12. What power do you feel you have to influence decision making within the 
union? 
 
 
13. How active are the rank and file members that you represent? 
 
 
14. In the time that you have worked in or have been connected with the MoD 
and Government Departments sector of Unite what changes have taken 
place in the way that industrial relations are carried out in the workplace? 
 
 
  
 
15. How have these changes impacted on the way that the union is structured 
and represents its members? 
 
 
16. How many union mergers have you experienced? 
 
 
17. What effect have these mergers had on the way that the union is structured 
and represents its members? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
